STEPHEN LASHBROOK VS CITY OF LOS ANGELES ET AL

Motion for a Determination of a Good Faith Settlement

Having considered the moving papers, the Court rules as follows. opposing papers were filed.

BACKGROUND

On September 12, 2018, Plaintiff Stephen Lashbrook (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendants City of Los Angeles, James P. Argyropoulos, and Peter J. Argyropoulos 2013 Irrevocable Trust.  Plaintiff alleges a dangerous condition of public property and negligence in the complaint in relation to a trip-and-fall that occurred on May 23, 2017.

On November 8, 2018, Defendant/Cross-Complainant City of Los Angeles filed a cross-complaint against Roes 1 through 10 seeking indemnity, apportionment, and declaratory relief.

On February 7, 2020, the Court granted Defendants James P. Argyropoulos’ and Peter J. Argyropoulos 2013 Irrevocable Trust’s motion for summary judgment against Plaintiff.

On March 6, 2020, the Court dismissed Defendant/Cross-Complainant City of Los Angeles’ cross-complaint with prejudice.

On April 7, 2020, Defendants James P. Argyropoulos and Peter J. Argyropoulos 2013 Irrevocable Trust filed an application for a determination of a good faith settlement pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6.

Trial is set for August 21, 2020.

PARTIES’ REQUEST

Defendants James P. Argyropoulos and Peter J. Argyropoulos 2013 Irrevocable Trust (“Moving Parties”) ask the Court to find that a settlement Moving Parties and Plaintiff agreed to was entered in good faith.

LEGAL STANDARD

California Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6, subdivision (a)(1), provides, in relevant part, that, on noticed motion, “[a]ny party to an action wherein it is alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors or co-obligors on a contract debt shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith of a settlement entered into by the plaintiff . . . and one or more alleged tortfeasors or co-obligors . . . .” “A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.” (Code Civ. Proc., ; 877.6, subd. (c).) Although a determination that a settlement was in good faith does not discharge any other party from liability, “it shall reduce the claims against the others in the amount stipulated” by the settlement. (Code Civ. Proc., ; 877, subd. (a).)

“The party asserting the lack of good faith shall have the burden of proof on that issue.” (Code Civ. Proc., ; 877.6, subd. (d).)

In City of Grand View Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1261, the court provided the following guidance regarding a motion for a good faith settlement determination:

This court notes that of the hundreds of motions for good faith determination presented for trial court approval each year, the overwhelming majority are unopposed and granted summarily by the trial court.  At the time of filing in many cases, the moving party does not know if a contest will develop.  If each motion required a full recital by declaration or affidavit setting forth a complete factual response to all of the Tech-Bilt factors, literally thousands of attorney hours would be consumed and inch-thick motions would have to be read and considered by trial courts in an exercise which would waste valuable judicial and legal time and clients’ resources . . . . That is to say, when no one objects, the barebones motion which sets forth the ground of good faith, accompanied by a declaration which sets forth a brief background of the case is sufficient.

If the good faith settlement is contested, section 877.6, subdivision (d), sets forth a workable ground rule for the hearing by placing the burden of proving the lack of good faith on the contesting party. Once there is a showing made by the settlor of the settlement, the burden of proof on the issue of good faith shifts to the nonsettlor who asserts that the settlement was not made in good faith. If contested, declarations by the nonsettlor should be filed which in many cases could require the moving party to file responsive counterdeclarations to negate the lack of good faith asserted by the nonsettling contesting party.

(192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1260-1261 [citation omitted].)

In Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499, the California Supreme Court identified the following nonexclusive factors courts are to consider in determining if a settlement is in good faith under section 877.6: 

[A] rough approximation of plaintiffs’ total recovery and the settlor's proportionate liability, the amount paid in settlement, the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs, and a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial. Other relevant considerations include the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants, as well as the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling defendants.

The evaluation of whether a settlement was made in good faith is required to “be made on the basis of information available at the time of settlement.” (Tech-Bilt, Inc., supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 499.) “[A] defendant’s settlement figure must not be grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the settlement, would estimate the settling defendant’s liability to be.” (Ibid. [citation omitted].)

“The party asserting the lack of good faith, who has the burden of proof on that issue (; 877.6, subd. (d)), should be permitted to demonstrate, if he can, that the settlement is so far ‘out of the ballpark’ in relation to these factors as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of the statute. Such a demonstration would establish that the proposed settlement was not a ‘settlement made in good faith’ within the terms of section 877.6.” (Id. at pp. 499-500.)

“[A] court not only looks at the alleged tortfeasor's potential liability to the plaintiff, but it must also consider the culpability of the tortfeasor vis-à-vis other parties alleged to be responsible for the same injury.  Potential liability for indemnity to a nonsettling defendant is an important consideration for the trial court in determining whether to approve a settlement by an alleged tortfeasor.”  (TSI Seismic Tenant Space, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 159, 166 [citation omitted].)

DISCUSSION

The Court initially notes that opposing papers had be filed and personally served on July 6, 2020, at the latest, to conform with the mandates of California Code of Civil Procedure section 1005.  No opposing papers were timely filed and served.  The Court exercises its discretion in refusing to consider any late opposing papers pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1300, subdivision (d).

Moving Parties and Plaintiff have agreed to a settlement of Plaintiff’s claims against Moving Parties in exchange for $10,000.  (Gonzalez Decl., ¶ 8, Exh. C.) Defendant City of Los Angeles, has stipulated to the good faith of the settlement.  (Gonzalez Decl., ¶ 8, Exh. A.)  The Court granted Moving Parties’ motion for summary judgment against Plaintiff.  (Gonzalez Decl., ¶ 9.)

The Court finds the motion is properly granted.  The Court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of Moving Parties and against Plaintiff show Moving Parties are not liable to Plaintiff.  Further, a motion for good faith settlement is intended to protect other defendants from fraudulent attempts for the settling parties to obtain higher settlements or judgments from nonsettling parties.  Defendant City of Los Angeles’ stipulation to the settlement between Moving Parties and Plaintiff show that Defendant City of Los Angeles considered its legal protection from fraud, and decided such fraud is not present here. certainly made in good faith.

CONCLUSION

The motion is GRANTED.

Moving Parties are ordered to give notice of this ruling.

The parties are directed to the header of this tentative ruling for further instructions.

Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, Summary Adjudication (x2)

Having considered the moving and non-opposing papers, the Court rules as follows.

BACKGROUND

On September 12, 2018, Plaintiff Stephen Lashbrook (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendants City of Los Angeles, James P. Argyropoulos, and Argyropoulos 2013 Irrevocable Trust.  The complaint alleges a dangerous condition of public property and negligence for a trip-and-fall that occurred on January 26, 2017.

November 8, 2018, Defendant/Cross-Defendant City of Los Angeles filed a cross-complaint against Roes 1 through 10 seeking indemnity, apportionment and declaratory relief.

On November 22, 2019, Defendants Javier Deleon and Lucina Deleon filed James P. Argyropoulos and Peter J. Argyropoulos 2013 Irrevocable Trust a motion for summary judgement, or in the alternative, summary adjudication pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 437c.

Trial is set for July 14, 2020.

PARTIES’ REQUESTS

Defendants Javier Deleon and Lucina Deleon filed James P. Argyropoulos and Peter J. Argyropoulos 2013 Irrevocable Trust (“Moving Defendants”) ask the Court to grant summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication in Moving Defendants’ favor and against Plaintiff and Defendant/Cross-Defendant City of Los Angeles.  Moving Defendants argue they do not owe a duty to Plaintiff and did not exercise control over the dangerous condition that Plaintiff tripped over.

LEGAL STANDARD

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.”  (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)  “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.”  (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.)  A defendant moving for summary judgment “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established.”  (Code Civ. Proc., ; 437c(p)(2).)  “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.”  (Ibid.)  “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Med. Ctr. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.”  (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., ; 437c, subd. (c).)

DISCUSSION

Motion Regarding City of Los Angeles

One of Moving Defendants’ motions seeks summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication against Defendant/Cross-Defendant City of Los Angeles with regard to its cross-complaint.  The cross-complaint does not name either Moving Defendants as cross-defendants.  As such, Moving Defendants’ motion seeking summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication against Defendant/Cross-Defendant City of Los Angeles is unripe for review here.  Thus, this motion must be denied.

Motion Regarding Plaintiff

The elements for premises liability are: duty, breach, causation, and damages. (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.) Those who own, possess, or control property generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in managing the property to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm. (Annocki v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 37.) The existence and scope of duty are legal questions for the court. (Id. at p. 36.)  If a dangerous condition exists, the property owner is “under a duty to exercise ordinary care either to make the condition reasonably safe for their [customers’] use or to give a warning adequate to enable them to avoid the harm.” (Bridgman v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (1960) 53 Cal.2d 443, 446.)

“A plaintiff alleging injuries based on a dangerous condition must prove the defendant either: (1) created the dangerous condition, or (2) knew or should have known of the dangerous condition.  (See Peralta v. Vons Companies, Inc. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1030, 1036; see also Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1206.)  “[A] defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the plaintiff fails to show that the dangerous condition existed for at least a sufficient time to be discovered by ordinary care and inspection.”  (Ortega, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1207.)

“The owners of lots or portions of lots fronting on any portion of a public ;street ;or place when that ;street ;or place is improved or if and when the area between the property line of the adjacent property and the ;street ;line is maintained as a park or parking strip, shall maintain any sidewalk in such condition that the sidewalk will not endanger persons or property and maintain it in a condition which will not interfere with the public convenience in the use of those works or areas save and except as to those conditions created or maintained in, upon, along, or in connection with such sidewalk by any person other than the owner, under and by virtue of any permit or right granted to him by law or by the city authorities in charge thereof, and such persons shall be under a like duty in relation thereto.” (Sts. & Hy. Code, ; 5610.) . . . .”  (Sts. & Hy. Code, ; 5600.)

“Under the common law, a landowner does not have any duty to repair abutting sidewalks along a public street, and does not owe any duty to pedestrians injured as a result of a defect in the sidewalks.” (Jordan v. City of Sacramento (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1490 (citing Schaefer v. Lenahan (1944) 63 Cal.App.2d 324, 326).) However, under Streets and Highways Code section 5610, abutting property owners bear the duty to repair defects in the sidewalk, regardless of whether he created the defects. (Id.; see also Jones v. Deeter (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 798, 803.) While abutting property owners have a duty to maintain and repair defects in the sidewalk, pursuant to the Sidewalk Accident Decisions Doctrine, abutting property owners are only liable to the public where the property owner created the defect or exercised dominion or control over the abutting sidewalk. (Jordan, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1490-1491 (“[Section 5610] imposes a duty of repair on the abutting property owners for defects in sidewalks, regardless of who created the defects, but does not of itself create tort liability to injured pedestrians or a duty to indemnify municipalities, except where a property owner created the defect or exercised dominion or control over the abutting sidewalk.” (Emphasis in original)); see also Jones, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d at pp. 802-803.)

Moving Defendants’ undisputed material facts establish the following.  Defendant Peter J. Argyropoulos 2013 Irrevocable Trust owned property located at 664 Sunset Avenue and 607 7th Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90291 (“Sunset Property”) from April 25, 2016 to the present day.  (UMF Nos. 2.)  Defendant James P. Argyropoulos is the trustee of Defendant Peter J. Argyropoulos 2013 Irrevocable Trust.  (UMF No. 1.)  The Sunset Property abuts the sidewalk where Plaintiff tripped and fell.  (UMF No. 7.) The sidewalk Plaintiff tripped over was raised from tree roots that grew from trees on the parkway abutting the Sunset Property.  (UMF No. 8.)  Defendant/Cross-Complainant City of Los Angeles owns the sidewalk and parkway abutting the Sunset Property.  (UMF No. 4.)

Moving Defendants’ undisputed material facts also establish the following.  Moving Defendants have not maintained or authorized the maintaining of this parkway.  (UMF No. 10.)  Moving Defendants did not plant or authorize the planting of the trees that raised the sidewalk.  (UMF No. 11.)  Moving Defendants have not performed or authorized the performance of maintenance of the trees that raised the sidewalk.  (UMF No. 12.)  Moving Defendants have not performed or authorized the performing of maintenance of the sidewalk where Plaintiff tripped.  (UMF No. 15.)  Moving Defendants have not exercised control over the parkway, the trees in the parkway, or the sidewalk where Plaintiff tripped.  (UMF Nos. 13-14, 16.)

The Court finds Moving Defendants have met their burden.  Moving Defendants’ evidence shows they did not create the crack in the sidewalk where Plaintiff tripped because they did not plant the trees that caused the crack in the sidewalk.  Moving Defendants’ evidence also shows that they did not exercise control over the trees, parkway where the trees are planted, or sidewalk where Plaintiff tripped.  There is no evidence showing that Moving Defendants would be liable for Plaintiff’s injuries.  The burden shifts to Plaintiff.  Plaintiff does not submit evidence showing there is a triable issue regarding whether Moving Defendants either created the crack or maintained either the crack or the trees that caused the crack.  Accordingly, summary judgment is properly granted.

CONCLUSION

The motion for summary judgment filed against Defendant/Cross-Defendant City of Los Angeles is DENIED.

The motion for summary adjudication filed against Defendant/Cross-Defendant City of Los Angeles is DENIED.

The motion for summary judgment filed against Plaintiff is GRANTED.

Moving Parties are ordered to give notice of this ruling.