This case was last updated from Santa Clara County Superior Courts on 08/07/2019 at 22:46:51 (UTC).

Patterson v. Johnson & Johnson, et al. [Coordinated into JCCP4872 Los Angeles]

Case Summary

On 05/07/2018 Patterson filed a Personal Injury - Other Product Liability lawsuit against Johnson Johnson, Coordinated into JCCP4872 Los Angeles. This case was filed in Santa Clara County Superior Courts, Downtown Superior Court located in Santa Clara, California. The Judge overseeing this case is Walsh, Brian C. The case status is Other - Stayed.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ******7827

  • Filing Date:

    05/07/2018

  • Case Status:

    Other - Stayed

  • Case Type:

    Personal Injury - Other Product Liability

  • Court:

    Santa Clara County Superior Courts

  • Courthouse:

    Downtown Superior Court

  • County, State:

    Santa Clara, California

Judge Details

Judge

Walsh, Brian C

 

Party Details

Plaintiff

Patterson, Lori

Defendants

Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc.

Imerys Talc America Inc.

Johnson & Johnson

Not Classified By Court

Superior Court of California

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff Attorney

Robinson, Mark Parker, Jr.

Not Classified By Court Attorney

Superior Court of CA, County of Santa Clara

 

Court Documents

Order: Deeming Case Complex

Order Deeming Case Complex and Staying Action Pending Coordination Proceedings: Comment: Order Deeming Case Complex and Staying Action Pending Coordination Proceedings signed/BCW

Notice

Patterson Notice of Court Order.pdf: Comment: Notice of Court Order Re Coordination of Add-On Cases

Proof of Service: Summons DLR (Civil)

POS-Imerys.pdf: Comment: HRG 8/24/18 Proof of Service of Summons

Proof of Service: Summons DLR (Civil)

POS-J&J.pdf: Comment: HRG 8/24/18 Proof of Service of Summons

Proof of Service: Summons DLR (Civil)

POS-J&J Consumer.pdf: Comment: HRG 8/24/18 Proof of Service of Summons

Notice

Patterson Notice of Submission.pdf: Comment: Notice of Submission of Potential Add-On Cases For Coordination of This Case Into JCCP 4872

Civil Case Cover Sheet

Patterson Cover Sheet.pdf:

Summons: Issued/Filed

Summons Issued Filed:

Complaint (Unlimited) (Fee Applies)

Complaint (Unlimited) (Fee Applies):

 

Docket Entries

  • 08/24/2018
  • Conference: Case Management - Judicial Officer: Walsh, Brian C; Hearing Time: 10:00 AM; Cancel Reason: Vacated; Comment: (1st CMC) Discovery and responsive pleading deadline stayed, as of 7/26/18, when the case was deemed complex. Matter stayed, as of 7/26/18, pending coordination proceedings.

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  • 07/26/2018
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  • Order: Deeming Case Complex - Order Deeming Case Complex and Staying Action Pending Coordination Proceedings: Comment: Order Deeming Case Complex and Staying Action Pending Coordination Proceedings signed/BCW

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  • 07/09/2018
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  • Notice - Patterson Notice of Court Order.pdf: Comment: Notice of Court Order Re Coordination of Add-On Cases

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  • 06/28/2018
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  • Proof of Service: Summons DLR (Civil) - POS-Imerys.pdf: Comment: HRG 8/24/18 Proof of Service of Summons

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  • 06/28/2018
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  • Proof of Service: Summons DLR (Civil) - POS-J&J.pdf: Comment: HRG 8/24/18 Proof of Service of Summons

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  • 06/28/2018
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  • Proof of Service: Summons DLR (Civil) - POS-J&J Consumer.pdf: Comment: HRG 8/24/18 Proof of Service of Summons

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  • 06/06/2018
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  • Notice - Patterson Notice of Submission.pdf: Comment: Notice of Submission of Potential Add-On Cases For Coordination of This Case Into JCCP 4872

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  • 05/07/2018
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  • Civil Case Cover Sheet - Patterson Cover Sheet.pdf:

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  • 05/07/2018
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  • Summons: Issued/Filed - Summons Issued Filed:

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  • 05/07/2018
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  • Complaint (Unlimited) (Fee Applies) - Complaint (Unlimited) (Fee Applies):

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Complaint Information

E-FILED

5/7/2018 11:43 AM

Mark P. Robinson, Jr., Esq., State Bar No. 54426 Clerk of Court ROBINSON CALCAGNIE, INC. Superior Court of CA, 19 Corporate Plaza Drive County of Santa Clara Newport Beach, CA 92660 18CV 327827

Tel.: (949)720-1288 Reviewed By: V. Taylor

Fax 949-720-1292 mrobinson@ robinsonfirm.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA

CASE No, 18CV327827

LORI PATTERSON, an individual,

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

Plaintiff, AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

V.

JOHNSON & JOHNSON, a New Jersey corporation doing business in California;

JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER INC. E

F/K/A JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER

COMPANIES, INC., a New Jersey corporation E doing business in California; ;

IMERYS TALC AMERICA, INC., a Delaware Corporation with its principal place of business in the State of California;

and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,

Defendants. Plaintiff herein, by and through counsel, for causes of action against the Defendants, alleges as follows: PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. Plaintiff is a competent individual, over the age of 18, and a citizen of the United States.

2. Venue of this case is appropriate in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Santa Clara because injury to Plaintiff occurred in this County.

3. This suit arises out of and relates to Defendants’ contacts with the State of California, and occurrences within the State of California. For the vast majority of relevant times, Plaintiff was a resident of the State of California. For the vast majority of relevant times, Plaintiff purchased JOHNSON & JOHNSON's and JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER, INC.’s talc-based products known as Johnson & Johnson Baby Powder and Shower to Shower (hereinafter “the PRODUCTS”), from a source within the State of California. Forthe vast majority of relevant times, Plaintiff purchased JOHNSON & JOHNSON's and JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER, INC.”s PRODUCTS as a result of being exposed in California to Defendants’ advertising and promotion of said PRODUCTS. For the vast majority of relevant times, Plaintiff used JOHNSON & JOHNSON’s and JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER, INC.’s PRODUCTS within the State of California. For the vast majority of relevant times, Plaintiff was exposed to JOHNSON & JOHNSON’s and JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER, INC.’s PRODUCTS within the State of California. For the vast majority of relevant times, Plaintiff was injured and suffered harm as a result of purchasing and using JOHNSON & JOHNSON’s and JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER, INC.”s PRODUCTS within the State of California. For the vast majority of relevant times, Plaintiff was injured and suffered harm as a result of relevant actions of Defendants JOHNSON & JOHNSON and JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER, INC. engaged together with IMERY S TALC AMERICA, INC. in the State of California. For the vast majority of relevant times, Plaintiff was injured and suffered harm as aresult of conduct by IMERY STALC AMERICA, INC. in the State of California, forwhich JOHNSON & JOHNSON and JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER, INC. are derivatively liable. For the vast majority of relevant times, Plaintiff was treated in the State of California for injuries caused by Defendants’ PRODUCTS.

4, Upon information and belief, beginning in approximately 1977, Plaintiff purchased Defendants’ PRODUCTS and used said PRODUCTS on a daily basis in and around her perineal regions through in or about 2007. While a citizen and resident of the State of California, and a citizen and resident of the Counties of Santa Clara, Monterey, San Luis Obispo and Marin, Plaintiff purchased the PRODUCTS and used the PRODUCTS by applying the PRODUCTS to her body in accordance with the instructions for use that accompanied the PRODUCTS and in a reasonably foreseeable manner. Plaintiff also purchased and used the PRODUCTS by applying the PRODUCTS to her body in accordance with the instructions for use that accompanied the PRODUCTS and in a reasonably foreseeable manner in the state Nevada.

d. Upon information and belief, in or about 2016, Plaintiff was diagnosed with ovarian cancer and received medical treatment for said ovarian cancer. Plaintiff suffered effects and sequelae therefrom, while a citizen and resident of the State of California, as a direct and proximate result of the unreasonably dangerous and defective nature of talcum powder, the main ingredient of the PRODUCTS, and D efendants’ wrongful and negligent conduct in the research, development, design, labeling, testing, manufacture, production, promotion, distribution, marketing, and sale of the PRODUCTS.

0. Plaintiff brings this action in accordance with California Code of Civil Procedure section 378 as Plaintiff’s claims arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and questions of law and fact are common to all of the other plaintiffs that were or may be joined in this case will arise in the action. All claims in this action are a direct and proximate result of the negligent, willful, and wrongful acts and/or omissions of Defendants and/or their corporate predecessors in connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the PRODUCTS by JOHNSON & JOHNSON and JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER COMPANIES, INC. known as Johnson & Johnson Baby Powder and Shower to Shower, and the talcum powder product which was mined, extracted, sorted, milled, treated, formulated, processed, packaged, sold, and shipped by IMERY STALC AMERICA, INC. to JOHNSON & JOHNSON and JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER COMPANIES, INC. for use in the PRODUCTS and for sale to the public. Plaintiff in this action seeks recovery for damages as a result of ovarian and/or fallopian tube cancer, which was directly and proximately caused by such wrongful conduct by Defendants, the unreasonably dangerous and defective nature of talcum powder, and the attendant effects of developing ovarian and/or fallopian tube cancer. All of the claims in this action involve common legal, common

factual, and common medical issues. 7. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges, that at all relevant times Defendant JOHNSON & JOHNSON is a corporation doing business in and authorized to do business in the state of California, and was incorporated in New Jersey in 1887.

8. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges, that at all relevant times Defendant JOHNSON & JOHNSON maintains an office located at One Johnson & Johnson Plaza, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 08933 as well as several locations within the state of California, and has approximately 127,100 employees worldwide.

9. As stated in JOHNSON & JOHNSON’S Form10-K Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for the fiscal year ended January 3, 2016, JOHNSON & JOHNSON’S primary focus is on products related to human health and well-being.

10. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges that at all relevant times Defendant JOHNSON & JOHNSON'S family of companies includes more than 250 operating companies conducting business in 60 countries of the world and organized into three business segments: Consumer, Pharmaceutical and Medical Devices.

11. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges that at all relevant times the JOHNSON & JOHNSON family of companies includes 121 manufacturing facilities and, within the United States, eight facilities are used by the Consumer segment. In addition to the manufacturing facilities, JOHNSON & JOHNSON maintains numerous offices and warehouses in the United States.

12. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges that at all relevant times the Consumer segment of the JOHNSON & JOHNSON family of companies includes a broad range of over- the-counter products including, but not limited to, Shower to Shower body powder and Johnson & Johnson’s Baby Powder. These products are marketed to the general public and sold both to retail outlets and distributors throughout the world.

13. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges that at all relevant times, Defendant JOHNSON & JOHNSON has engaged in substantial, continuous economic activity in California, including marketing, distribution, and sale of billions of dollars in products to Californians including, but not limited to, Shower to Shower body powder and Johnson & Johnson's Baby Powder, that said activity by Defendant is substantially connected to the Plaintiff’s claims as alleged herein. 14. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges at all relevant times, Defendant JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER INC. F/K/A JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER COMPANIES, INC., was a New Jersey Corporation doing business in the state of California, a wholly owned subsidiary of JOHNSON & JOHNSON, and engaged in substantial, continuous economic activity in California, including marketing, distribution, and sale of billions dollars in products to Californians including, but not limited to, Shower to Shower body powder and Johnson & Johnson’'s Baby Powder, that said activity by Defendant is substantially connected to the Plaintiff’s claims as alleged herein.

15, JOHNSON & JOHNSON and JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER INC. F/K/A JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER COMPANIES, INC. are hereinafter referred to collectively as the “JOHNSON & JOHNSON"” Defendants.

16. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges that, at all relevant times, Defendant, IMERYS TALC AMERICA, INC,, is a Delaware corporation, with its principal place of business in the state of California. Specifically, IMERY S TALC AMERICA, INC. maintains its Head Office and Laboratory at 1732 North First Street, Suite 450, San Jose, California 95112.

17. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges that, at all relevant times, IMERYS TALC AMERICA, INC., is the successor or continuation of Luzenac America, Inc., and IMERYS TALC AMERICA, INC. (hereinafter “IMERY S”) is legally responsible for all liabilities incurred when it was known as Luzenac America, Inc.

18. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges that, at all relevant times, Defendant IMERY S has been in the business of mining, extracting, processing, treating, formulating, promoting, selling, and distributing talcum powder for use in talcum powder based products, including the PRODUCTS.

19. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges that, at all relevant times, the true names or capacities, whether individual, corporate, or otherwise, of Defendants Does 1 through 100, inclusive, were unknown to Plaintiff at the time of original filing of the underlying complaint in this action and, therefore sue said Defendants by such fictitious names.

20. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges that, at all relevant times, the

true names or capacities, whether individual, corporate, or otherwise, of Defendants DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, remain unknown to Plaintiff and, therefore Plaintiff sues said Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiff is informed and believes and based thereon alleges that each of the Defendants designated herein by fictitious names is in some manner legally responsible for the events and happenings herein referred to and caused damages proximately and foreseeably to Plaintiff as alleged herein.

21. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges that, at all relevant times, all of said Defendants herein, including the named Defendants, Defendants DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, and the Other Defendants named by Plaintiff in the Notice of Adoption of Master Complaint are collectively referred to herein as “Defendants” and all acts and omissions of Defendants as alleged herein were undertaken by each of the Defendants or said Defendants agents, servants, employees and/or owners, acting in the course and scope of its respective agencies, services, employments and/or ownerships.

22. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges that, at all relevant times, all allegations concermning Defendants includes Defendants’ parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, divisions, franchises, partners, joint venturers, organizational units of any kind, predecessors, successors and assigns, and their officers, directors, employees, agents, representatives, and any and all other persons acting on behalf of Defendants.

23. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges that, at all relevant times alleged herein, Defendants, and each of them were the agents of each of the other Defendants, and acting within the course and scope of such agency.

24. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges that, at all relevant times, Defendants were engaged in the business of placing the PRODUCTS into the stream of commerce by designing, manufacturing, marketing, packaging, labeling, distributing and/or selling said PRODUCTS to Californians, including Plaintiff herein, and that JOHNSON & JOHNSON and JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER INC. F/K/A JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER COMPANIES, INC. designed, developed, manufactured, tested, packaged, promoted, marketed, advertised, distributed, labeled, and sold the PRODUCTS to consumers, and IMERY S TALC AMERICA, INC. mined, extracted, sorted, milled, processed, treated, processed, formulated, packaged, sold, and shipped the talcum powder that comprises the PRODUCTS to JOHNSON & JOHNSON and JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER INC. F/K/A JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER COMPANIES, INC. for sale, without substantial change, to the general public worldwide and in the state of California.

25. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges that, at all relevant times, Defendants, designed, developed, tested, patented, manufactured, marketed, advertised, promoted and/or sold the PRODUCTS worldwide and in the state of California.

26. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff purchased the PRODUCTS and used said PRODUCTS on a daily basis in and around her perineal regions. The Plaintiff further used the PRODUCTS to dust other parts of her bodies including, but not limited to, her face, under arms and chest in proximity to their breathing zone. The Plaintiff further used the PRODUCTS when diapering her children and on their bed sheets and for other household purposes. The Plaintiff’s parents and others further used the PRODUCTS when diapering Plaintiff. Plaintiff purchased the PRODUCTS and used the PRODUCTS by applying the PRODUCTS to her body in accordance with the instructions for use that accompanied the PRODUCTS and in a reasonably foreseeable manner.

27. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon allege that, at all relevant times, Defendants were engaged in the business of placing the PRODUCTS into the stream of commerce by designing, manufacturing, marketing, packaging, labeling, and/or selling said PRODUCTS, and that JOHNSON & JOHNSON and JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER INC. F/K/A JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER COMPANIES, INC. designed, developed, manufactured, tested, packaged, promoted, marketed, advertised, distributed, labeled, and sold the PRODUCTS to consumers and IMERY S TALC AMERICA, INC. mined, extracted, sorted, milled, processed, treated, analyzed, tested, processed, formulated, packaged, sold, and shipped the talcum powder that comprises the PRODUCTS to JOHNSON & JOHNSON and JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER INC. F/K/A JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER COMPANIES, INC. for sale, without substantial change, to the general public worldwide and in the state of California.

28. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff purchased the PRODUCTS and used the PRODUCTS by applying the PRODUCTS to her body in accordance with the instructions for use that accompanied the PRODUCTS and in a reasonably foreseeable manner.

29. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff developed ovarian cancer, and suffered effects and

sequelae therefrom, as a direct and proximate result of the unreasonably dangerous and defective nature of talcum powder, the main ingredient of the PRODUCTS, and Defendants” wrongful and negligent conduct in the research, development, testing, manufacture, production, formulation, processing, packaging, promotion, distribution, marketing, and sale of the PRODUCTS and/ or the talcum powder that comprises the PRODUCTS.

30. Upon information and belief, as a direct and proximate result of the injuries alleged herein, Plaintiff has incurred and will in the future incur both general and special damages as hereinafter alleged.

31. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges that, all claims in this action are a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ and/or their corporate predecessors negligent, willful, and wrongful conduct as follows: Defendants’ design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, distribution, labeling, sale, mining, extraction, processing, treatment, formulation, packaging, and distribution of the PRODUCTS.

32. Plaintiff in this action seeks recovery for damages as a result of ovarian cancer, which was directly and proximately caused by such wrongful conduct by Defendants, the unreasonably dangerous and defective nature of the talcum powder, the main ingredient of the PRODUCTS.

33. Plaintiff developed ovarian cancer, and suffered effects attendant thereto, as a direct and proximate result of the unreasonably dangerous and defective nature of the PRODUCTS and the talcum powder therein, and Defendants’ wrongful and negligent conduct as follows: Defendants’ design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, distribution, labeling, sale, mining, extraction, processing, treatment, formulation, packaging, and distribution of the PRODUCTS, and as a direct and proximate result of these injuries, Plaintiff has incurred and will incur medical expenses in the future, has endured and will endure pain and suffering, has endured and will endure loss of enjoyment of life, has endured and will endure other general and special damages, and has otherwise been damaged in a personal and pecuniary nature.

34. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges that, at all relevant times alleged herein, all Defendants were engaged in the research, development, manufacture, design, testing, sale and marketing of PRODUCTS as follows: Defendants’ design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, distribution, labeling, sale, mining, extraction, processing, treatment,

formulation, packaging, and distribution of the PRODUCTS, and Defendants introduced said PRODUCTS into interstate commerce with knowledge and intent that such PRODUCTS be sold to consumers in the State of California.

35. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges that, at all relevant times alleged herein, Defendant IMERY S TALC AMERICA, INC. (“IMERY S”) was not merely a raw materials supplier. Rather, IMERY S actively designs, develops, and formulates talc for specific uses.

COMMON FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

a. Introduction to the PRODUCTS

36. Historically, the PRODUCTS, which include “Johnson’s Baby Powder” and “Shower to Shower,” have represented freshness, cleanliness, and purity.

37. Uponinformation and belief, at all relevant times alleged herein, the Defendants JOHNSON & JOHNSON and JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER INC. F/K/A JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER COMPANIES, INC. advertised and marketed “Johnson’s Baby Powder” as the beacon of “freshness” and “comfort,” eliminating friction on the skin, absorbing “excess wetness” helping keep skin feeling dry and comfortable, and “clinically proven gentle and mild”. The Defendants JOHNSON & JOHNSON and JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER INC. F/K/A JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER COMPANIES, INC. compelled women through advertisements to dust themselves with this product to mask odors. The bottle of “Johnson’s Baby Powder” specifically targets women by stating, “For you, use every day to help feel soft, fresh, and comfortable.”

38. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times alleged herein, Defendants JOHNSON & JOHNSON and JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER INC. F/K/A JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER COMPANIES, INC. advertised and marketed the product “Shower to Shower” as safe for use by women, as evidenced in its slogan, “A sprinkle a day keeps odor away,” and through advertisements such as, “Y our body perspires in more places than just under your arms. Use SHOWER to SHOWER to feel dry, fresh, and comfortable throughout the day,” and “SHOWER to SHOWER can be used all over your body.”

39. Plaintiff herein used the PRODUCTS to dust her perineum for feminine hygiene purposes. This was an intended and foreseeable use of the PRODUCTS based on the advertising, marketing, and labeling of the PRODUCTS. 40. Upon information and belief, the PRODUCTS are composed almost entirely of magnesium trisilicate, also known as talc. Talc is an inorganic mineral that is mined from the earth.

41. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, IMERY S supplied its customers, including JOHNSON & JOHNSON, with material safety data sheets for talc. These material safety data sheets are supposed to convey adequate health and warning information to customers.

42. Upon information and belief, since as early as the 1970s, IMERY S and JOHNSON & JOHNSON have been on notice of an association between talc exposure and ovarian cancer, as discussed more fully below.

43, Upon information and belief, since the 1970s, Defendants JOHNSON & JOHNSON and JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER INC. F/K/A JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER COMPANIES, INC. have nonetheless continually advertised and marketed the PRODUCTS as safe for human use, and IMERY S TALC AMERICA, INC. has marketed and promoted talcum powder, the main ingredient of the PRODUCTS, as safe for human use. Upon information and belief, JOHNSON & JOHNSON and JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER INC. F/K/A JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER COMPANIES, INC. decided to downgrade the quality of the talc product supplied by IMERYS and informed IMERY S to supply a downgraded version of the talc product to use in its PRODUCT in order to reduce costs and increase profits for JOHNSON & JOHNSON and JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER INC. F/K/A JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER COMPANIES, INC.

44, At all relevant times alleged herein, a feasible alternative to the PRODUCTS has existed. Comnstarch is an organic carbohydrate that is quickly broken down by the body with no known health effects. Cornstarch powders have been sold and marketed for the same uses as the PRODUCTS with nearly the same effectiveness.

b. Timeline of the Scientific Literature Analyzing the Relationship Between Talc and

Ovarian Cancer

45. Research published as early as 1961 has established that particles, like talc, can translocate from the exterior genital area to the ovaries in women. See G.E. Egli, and Michael Newton, The Transport of Carbon Particles in the Human Female Reproductive Tract, 12 FERTILITY

STERILITY 2,151-155(1961). 46. Due to talc’s potential for transmission, researchers remained concerned about its carcinogenic nature and the effects of use. In 1968, a study concluded that “[a]ll of the 22 talcum products analyzed have a . . . fiber content ... averaging 19%. The fibrous material was predominantly talc but probably contained minor amounts of tremolite, anthophyllite, and chrysotile [asbestos-like fibers] as these are often present in fibrous talc mineral deposits . . . Unknown significant amounts of such materials in products that may be used without precautions may create an unsuspected problem.” L. J. Cralley et al., Fibrous and Mineral Content of Cosmetic Talcum PRODUCT, 29 AM. INDUSTRIAL HYGIENE Assoc. J. 350-354 (1968). A 1976 follow-up study concluded that “[t]he presence in these products of asbestiform anthophyllite and tremolite, chrysotile, and quartz indicates the need for a regulatory standard for cosmetic talc . . . We also recommend that evaluation be made to determine the possible health hazards associated with the use of these products.” Arthur Rohl, et al., Consumer talcums and powders: mineral and chemical characterization, 2 ] ToXICOL ENVIRON HEALTH 255-284 (19706).

47. In 1971, the first study was published that suggested an association between talc and ovarian cancer. This study was published by W. J. Henderson in Cardiff, W ales at the Tenovus Institute. The study found talc particles “deeply embedded” in ten of thirteen ovarian tumors, twelve of twenty-one cervical tumors, one primary carcinoma of the endometrium and five of twelve “normal” ovaries from women with breast cancer. W. J. Henderson et al., Talc and carcinoma of the ovary and cervix, 78 ]J. OBSTET. GYNAECOL. BR. COMMW. 3, 2066-272 (1971).

48. In 1982, the first epidemiologic study was published on talc powder use in the female genital area. This study was published by Dr. Daniel Cramer and others. This study found a 92% increased risk in ovarian cancer with women who reported genital talc use. Additionally, it found that talc application directly to the genital area around the time of ovulation might lead to talc particles becoming deeply imbedded in the tissues of the ovary, and perhaps causing foreign body reaction capable of causing growth of epithelial ovarian tissue. This study showed an epidemiologic association between the use of cosmetic talc in genital hygiene and ovarian cancer. Daniel Cramer et al., Ovarian cancer and talc: a case control study, 50 CANCER 372-376 (1982).

[1]

e [n 1983, Patricia Hartage and Robert Hoover of the National Cancer Institute and Linda Lester and Larry McGowan of the George Washington University Medical Center, published a case- control interview study regarding ovarian cancer. Although no association was proven due to the small sample size, the study found an “excess relative risk” of 2.5 (95% CI=0.7 to 10.0) of ovarian cancer for women who use talc in the genital area. Patricia Hartage et al., Talc and ovarian cancer, 250 JAMA 1844 (1983) available at http://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/article-abstract/1725023.

e [n 1988, a case control study of 188 women diagnosed with epithelial ovarian cancer and 539 controls found that 52% of the cancer patients habitually used talc on the perineum before their cancer diagnosis. The study showed that women using talc daily on their perineum had 1.45 times the risk of ovarian cancer then women that did not use talc daily, showing a positive dose- response relationship. Alice Whittemore et al., Personal and environmental characteristics related to epithelial ovarian cancer. II. Exposures talcum powder, tobacco, alcohol, and coffee, 128 AM. J. EPIDEMIOL. 6, 1228-1240 (1988).

e A case control study conducted in 1989 found similar results. The study looked at 235 women diagnosed with epithelial ovarian cancerand 451 controls and found an increased risk in ovarian cancer with women who reported genital talc powder use more than once per week. Margaret Booth et al., Risk factors for ovarian cancer: a case-control study, 60 BR. J. CANCER 4, 592- 598 (1989).

e Another case control study conducted in 1989 by Bernard Harlow of Harvard Medical School at Brigham and Women's Hospital, found an increased risk of ovarian cancer generally from genital talc use after bathing, and a statistically significant increased risk of ovarian cancer from women that used talc-containing powders in combination with deodorizing powders on their perineum. This study also found a positive dose-response relationship. Bernard Harlow and

Neinke Weiss, A case-control study of borderline ovarian tumors: the influence of perineal exposure to talc, 130 AM. J. EPIDEMIOL. 2, 390-394 (1989).

A 1992 study, also by Dr. Harlow, found that frequent and long-term talc use directly on the genital area during ovulation increased a woman’s risk of ovarian cancer threefold. The study also found “[t]he most frequent method of talc exposure was use as a dusting powder directly to the perineum (genitals). Brand or generic ‘baby powder’ was used most frequently and was the category associated with a statistically significant risk for ovarian cancer.” This study looked at 235 ovarian cancer cases compared to 239 controls, concluding that “given the poor prognosis for ovarian cancer, any potentially harmful exposures should be avoided, particularly those with limited benefits. For this reason, we discourage the use of talc in genital hygiene, particularly as a daily habit.” Bernard Harlow et al., Perineal exposure to talc and ovarian cancer risk, 80 OBSTET. GYNECOL. 1, 19-26 (1992).

Also in 1992, a case-control study was conducted by Karin Rosenblatt at the Department of Epidemiology of John's Hopkins School of Hygiene and Public Health. This study showed that the development of ovarian cancer may be associated with genital fiber exposure (especially talc on sanitary napkins), and a relative risk of 4.8 for ovarian cancer development from talc use on sanitary napkins. Karen Rosenblatt et al., Mineral fiber exposure and the development of ovarian cancer, 45 GYNECOL. ONcOL. 20-25 ( 1992).

Another 1992 case-control study conducted by Yong Chen with 112 diagnosed epithelial ovarian cancer cases and 224 age-matched community controls, found an elevated risk for ovarian cancer in women who applied talc-containing dusting powder to the lower abdomen and perineum for longer than 3 months. Y ong Chen et al., Risk Factors for Epithelial Ovarian Cancer in Beijing, China, 21 INT. J. EPIDEMIOL. 23-29 (1992).

In 1993, the United States National Toxicology Program published a study on the toxicity of non-asbestiform talc and found clear evidence of carcinogenic activity. The study found “some evidence of carcinogenic activity in male rats” and “clear evidence of carcinogenic activity in female rats.” Talc was found to be a carcinogen, with or without the presence of asbestos-like fibers. National Toxicology Program, Toxicology and carcinogenesis studies of

talc (CAS No 14807-96-6) in F344/N rats and B6C3F 1 mice (Inhalation studies), Technical Report Series No. 421 (September 1993).

In 1995, a case control study conducted in Australia by David Purdie, involving over 1600 women found a statistically significant 27% increased risk in ovarian cancer for women who regularly use talc in the region of the abdomen or perineum. David Purdie et al., Reproductive and other factors and risk of epithelial ovarian cancer: an Australian case-control study, 62 INT. J. CANCER 6, 678-684 (1995).

In 1996, a case-control study similarly found a statistically significant increased risk of ovarian cancer in women who used talc-based powders in their genital area. See A sher Shushan et al., Human menopausal gonadotropin and the risk of epithelial ovarian cancer, 65 FERTIL. STERIL. 1,13-18 (1995).

In 1996, the condom industry stopped coating condoms with talc due to the health concemns of ovarian cancer, “[c]oncern about talc as an ovarian carcinogen goes back 50 years in the medical literature. By the 1970s, evidence was mounting that talc particles might migrate into a woman’s fallopian tubes where they could cause scarring and irritation in the ovaries. Scientists believed in some cases that the scarring led to infertility or cancer.” Marie McCullough, Women’s health concerns prompt condom makers to stop using talc, Jersey Journal (City Ed.) (Jan. 10, 1996). In 1997, a case-control study of 313 women with ovarian cancer and 422 controls found that the women with cancer were more likely to have applied talc powder to their external genitalia area. Women using these products had a statistically significant 50% to 90% higher risk of developing ovarian cancer. Linda Cook et al., Perineal powder exposure and the risk of ovarian cancer, 145 AM. J. EPIDEMIOL. 459-465 (1997).

In 1997, a case-control study conducted by Stella Chang and Harvey Risch from the D epartment of Epidemiology and Public Health, Y ale University School of Medicine, which included over 1,000 women found a statistically significant increased risk for ovarian cancer for women who applied talc via sanitary napkins to their perineum. The study indicated that “[cJommercial talc substitutes often replace talc with comstarch. Furthermore, women may choose to powder or dust with cornstarch instead of talc. When cornstarch was assessed in relation to risk of ovarian

carcinoma, no associations were found,” concluding “[t]he results of this study appear to support the contention that talc exposure increases risk of ovarian carcinoma. Dusting with talcum powder is not an unusual practice for women, and, given the heterogeneity of the etiology and course of ovarian carcinoma, any possible harmful practices, particularly those with little benefit, should be deliberated.” Stella Chang and Harvey Risch, Perineal talc exposure and risk of ovarian carcinoma, 79 CANCER 12, 2396-2401 (1997).

A 1998 case-control study conducted in Canada by Beatrice Godard found increased risk of ovarian cancer in women who used talc-based powders on their perineum. Beatrice Godard et al., Risk factors for familial and sporadic ovarian cancer among French Canadians: a case- control study, 179 AM. J. OBSTET. GYNECOL. 2, 403-410 (1998).

In 1999, Dr. Cramer conducted a case-control study of 563 women newly diagnosed with epithelial ovarian cancer and 523 controls. The study found a statistically significant 60% increased risk of ovarian cancerin women that used talc-based body powders on their perineum: “[w]e conclude that there is a significant association between the use of talc in genital hygiene and risk of epithelial ovarian cancer that, when viewed in perspective of published data on this association, warrants more formal public health warnings.” The study was funded by a grant from the National Cancer Institute (“NCI”). Daniel Crameretal., Genital talc exposure and risk of ovarian cancer, 81 INT. J. CANCER 3, 351-356 (1999).

In 2000, Roberta Ness, from University of Pennsylvania, led a case control study of over 2,000 women. This study found a statistically significant 50% increased risk of ovarian cancer from genital talc use in women. The study also found that talc causes inflammation, and that inflammation contributes to cancer cell development. Roberta Ness et al., Factors Related to Inflammation of the Ovarian Epithelium and Risk of Ovarian Cancer, 11 EPIDEMIOLOGY 2, 111- 117 (2000).

Also in 2000, a prospective cohort study found a 40% increase in invasive serous cancers in women who applied talc to their perineum. Dorota Getrig et al., Prospective Study of Talc Use and Ovarian Cancer, 92 J. NATL. CANCER INST. 3, 249-252 (2000).

In 2003, a meta-analysis was conducted which re-analyzed data from 16 studies published

prior to 2003, finding a 33% increase in ovarian cancer risk among talc users. Michael Huncharek et al., Perineal application of cosmetic talc and risk of invasive epithelial ovarian cancer: A meta-analysis of 11,933 subjects from sixteen observational studies, 23 ANTICANCER RES. 2C, 1955-60 (2003).

In 2004, a case-control study of nearly 1400 women from twenty-two counties was performed in Central California. This study found a statistically significant 37% increased risk of epithelial ovarian cancer from women'’s genital talc use. The study also found a 77% increased risk of serous invasive ovarian cancer from women'’s genital talc use, compared with women using cornstarch powders as “[c]omstarch is also not thought to exert the same toxicologic reaction in human tissue as does talc.” This study concluded that “users should exercise prudence in reducing or eliminating use,” and “the precautionary principle should be invoked, especially given that this is a serious form of cancer, usually associated with a poor prognosis, with no current effective screening tool, steady incidence rates during the last quarter century and no prospect for successful therapy. Unlike other forms of environmental exposures, talcum powder use is easily avoidable.” Paul Mills et al., Perineal talc exposure and epithelial ovarian cancer risk in the Central Valley of California, 112 INT. J. CANCER 458-64 (2004).

In 2008, Margaret Gates performed a combined study of over 3,000 women from a New England-based case-control study and a prospective Nurses’ Health Study (the “Gates Study”). This study was funded by NCI, and found a general 36% statistically significant increased risk of epithelial ovarian cancer from genital talc use. A 60% increased risk of the serous invasive subtype was also found. Dr. Gates noted a pronounced and positive dose-response relationship, increasing risk with increasing talc usage by women. These results “provide additional support for a main effect of genital talc exposure on epithelial ovarian cancer . . . the finding of highly significant trends between increasing frequency of use and risk ‘strengthen[ing] the evidence of an association, because most previous studies have not observed a dose response.”” Notably, the study promoted an alternative to talc, comstarch, which “has not been shown to increase ovarian cancerrisk . ..” The study concluded that “women should be advised not to use talcum powder in the genital area, based on our results and previous evidence supporting an association

between genital talc use and ovarian cancer risk. Physicians should ask the patient about talc use history and should advise the patient to discontinue using talc in the genital area if the patient has not already stopped.” Margaret Gates et al., Talc Use, Variants of the GSTMI, GSTTI1, and NATZ2 Genes, and Risk of Epithelial Ovarian Cancer, 17 CANCER EPIDEMIOL, B10. & PREV. 9, 2436-2444 (2008).

In October of 2008, Michael Thun, Vice-President of Epidemiology and Surveillance Research at the American Cancer Society commented on the Gates Study. He stated the dose-response relationship between talc and ovarian cancer had finally been confirmed by this study: “[T ]here are very few modifiable risk factors for ovarian cancer. The mainoral contraceptives, which has been clearly established to lower the risk for ovarian cancer. Others include tubal ligation, hysterectomy, and parity. Then there are factors that ‘probably’ increase the risk for ovarian cancer, and this is where talc fits in, alongside asbestos, postmenopausal hormone therapy, and radiation.” Zosia Chustecka and Desiree Lie, Talc Use in Genital Area Linked to Increased Risk for Ovarian Cancer, Medscape Medical News (Oct. 8, 2008) available at http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/581781.

In 2008, Melissa Merritt, from the Australian Cancer Study and A ustralian Ovarian Cancer Study Group, conducted a case-control study of over 3,000 women finding a statistically significant increased risk of ovarian cancer for women who used talc on their perineum was confirmed. This study also confirmed a statistically significant increased risk of ovarian cancer of a serous subtype in women who used talc on their perineum. Melissa Merritt et al., Talcum powder, chronic pelvic inflammation and NSAIDs in relation to risk of epithelial ovarian cancer, 122 INT. J. CANCER 1, 170-176 (2008).

In 2009, a case-control study of over 1,200 women found the risk of ovarian cancer increased significantly with frequency and duration of talc use. The study found an overall statistically significant 53% increased risk of ovarian cancer from genital talc use. The study also found a 108% statistically significant increased risk of ovarian cancer in women with the longest duration and most frequent talc use. In conclusion the study stated, “that risk of ovarian cancer is significantly associated with talc use and with a history of endometriosis, as has been found

in recent studies.” Anna Wu et al., Markers of inflammation and risk of ovarian cancer in Los C.

50.

Angeles County, 124 INT. J. CANCER 6, 1409-1415 (2009). In 2015, Anna Wu looked at the risk factors for invasive epithelial ovarian cancer among Hispanics and African Americans. The study used multivariate logistic regression to examine parity, oral contraceptive use, tubal ligation, endometriosis, family history of ovarian cancer, and talc use and risk of ovarian cancer among Hispanics, African A mericans and non-Hispanic Whites using four case control-studies conducted in Los Angeles County. The study found a statistically significant increased risk for ovarian cancer for Non-Hispanics whites of 41% and an additional 14% for every five years of talc use, an increased risk for Hispanics of 77% and an additional 18% for every five years of talc use, and an increased risk for A frican A mericans of 56% and a 15% additional increase for every five years of talc use. Anna Wu etal., African Americans and Hispanics remain at lower risk of ovarian cancer than non-Hispanic Whites after considering non-genetic risk actors and oophorectomy rates, CANCER EPIDEMIOL BIOMARKERS PREV July; 24(7): 1094-1100 (2015). Various meta-analyses conducted have found positive associations between the use of talc in the genital area and ovarian cancer. See generally Bernard Harlow et al., Perineal exposure to talc and ovarian cancer risk, 80 OBSTET. GYNECOL. 1, 19-26 (1992); Andrew Gross, A meta- analytical approach examining the potential relationship between talc exposure and ovarian cancer, b J. EXP0. ANAL. ENVIRON. EPIDEMIOL. 2, 181-195 (1995); Michael Huncharek et al., Perineal application of cosmetic talc and risk of invasive epithelial ovarian cancer: a meta- analysis of 11,933 subjects from sixteen observational studies, 23 ANTICANCER RES. 1955-60 (2003).

Knowledge of the Connection Between Talc Usage and Ovarian Cancer within the

G overnment, within the Medical Community, and within the Defendant Companies

Upon information and belief, in 1975, JOHNSON & JOHNSON was aware of Henderson,

et al.’s Tenovus data suggesting an association between talc and ovarian cancer, and was thereby on notice

of the association as early as the mid-1970s. JOHNSON & JOHNSON sent a donation to the Cardiff

Scientific Society in order to obtain information concerning research being conducted Tenovus Institute

and JOHNSON & JOHNSON admitted that it was on notice of the talc and ovarian cancer problem. 51. Upon information and belief, shortly after Dr. Cramer’s 1982 study was published, Dr. Semple visited with Dr. Cramer about his study. Dr. Cramer advised Dr. Semple that JOHNSON & JOHNSON should place a warning on its talcum powder PRODUCTS concerning ovarian cancer risks so that women could make an informed decision about their health.

52. Upon information and belief, on August 12, 1982, JOHNSON & JOHNSON publicly recognized the studies linking the use of the PRODUCTS to ovarian cancer. In a New York Times article entitled “Talcum Company Calls Study on Cancer Link Inconclusive,” the company admitted to being aware of the 1982 Cramer article that concluded women who apply talc daily to their genital areas were three times more likely to contract ovarian cancer.

53. Upon information and belief, JOHNSON & JOHNSON recognized that the safety of cosmetic powders was a concern in a May 1986 Technological Forecast. JOHNSON & JOHNSON recognized that the safety of cosmetic powders was a concern, especially among health professionals, that studies have implicated talc use in the vaginal area with incidents of ovarian cancer and that Johnson’s Baby Powder sales were declining along with the overall cosmetic powders market in a classic mature model curve.” Upon information and belief, JOHNSON & JOHNSON in approximately 1992 was looking for “opportunities to grow” the Baby Powder franchise despite the fact that the same internal document cited cancer linkage as a “major obstacle” and recommended implementing a plan to market to Hispanic and African American’s by launching an adult Hispanic media program and potentially launching an adult black print effort.

54. In 1993, the United States National Toxicology Program published a study on the toxicity of non-asbestiform talc and found clear evidence of carcinogenic activity. Talc was found to be a carcinogen, with or without the presence of asbestos-like fibers.

55. Upon information and belief, on November 10, 1994, the Cancer Prevention Coalition mailed a letter to then JOHNSON & JOHNSON C.B.O, Ralph Larson, informing the company that studies as far back as 1960’s “show conclusively that the frequent use of talcum powder in the genital area pose a serious health risk of ovarian cancer.” Upon information and belief, the letter cited a recent study from Dr. Harlow of Harvard Medical School confirming this fact and quoted a portion of the study where Dr. Harlow

and his colleagues discouraged the use of talc in the female genital area. Upon information and belief, the letter further stated that 14,000 women per year die from ovarian cancer and that this type of canceris very difficult to detect and has a low survival rate. Upon information and belief, the letter concluded by requesting that JOHNSON & JOHNSON withdraw talc products from the market, or at a minimum, place warning information on its talc-based products disclosing the risk of ovarian cancer.

56. Upon information and belief, on September 17, 1997, JOHNSON & JOHNSON was notified that on three separate occasions the CTFA (as an agent of Defendants) had released false information to the public about the safety of talc, that studies had shown a statistically significant association between hygienic talc use and ovarian cancer, and that anybody who denies this risks that the talc industry will be perceived by the public like it perceives the cigarette industry: denying the obvious in the face of all evidence to the contrary.

57. Upon information and belief, in 1998 IMERY S wanted to stop discussions about ovarian cancer in order to free the development in cosmetic applications, avoid the initiation of a process for classification of talc as a carcinogen, and implement a plan to discredit research and scientists.

58. Upon information and belief, on January 30, 2000, IMERY S was on notice of the National Toxicology Program (“NTP”) listing nomination of non-asbestiform talc as carcinogenic and votes in favor of such listing, and acknowledged that the reviewers found that the epidemiology studies associating talc and ovarian cancer providing convincing evidence of talc carcinogenicity in humans.

59. Upon information and belief, as of September 12, 2000, Luzenac was specifically aware, knew, and acknowledged that the general public was not aware of any health issues regarding talc.

60. Upon information and belief, as of October 13, 2000, Luzenac was specifically aware, knew, and explicitly acknowledged that that the company would ultimately be held responsible for placing a harmful product into the stream of commerce.

61. Upon information and belief, in this letter the CTFA admitted that talc was “toxic,” that “some talc particles... can reach the human ovaries,” and acknowledged prior epidemiologic studies have concluded that talc increases the risk of ovarian cancer in women.

62. Uponinformation and belief, internal reports in 2002, indicated that Luzenac may be asked when the company first learned of the possible association of talc with ovarian cancer, when it began to

warn of this risk, and whether company felt a moral and ethical obligation to inform women that the hygienic use of talc may increase their risk for ovarian cancer, or were the company’s profits from mining and selling this potentially dangerous, life-threatening product more important than protecting the health and welfare of the women and children in our society.

63. Upon information and belief, Luzenac considered implementing warnings, including a warning label would warn the consumers the product is not to be used for genital dusting and would report of the possible association between genital dusting and ovarian cancer.

064. In February of 2006, IARC published a paper whereby they classified perineal use of talc based body powder as a “Group 2B” human carcinogen. JARC, which is universally accepted as the international authority on cancer issues, concluded that studies from around the world consistently found an increased risk of ovarian cancer in women from perineal use of talc. IARC found that between 16-52% of women in the world were using talc to dust their perineum and found an increased risk of ovarian cancer in women talc users ranging from 30-60%. IARC concluded: “There is limited evidence in humans for the carcinogenicity of perineal use of talc-based body powder.” By definition “Limited evidence of carcinogenicity” means “a positive association has been observed between exposure to the agent and cancer for which a causal interpretation is considered by the Working Group to be credible, but chance, bias or confounding could not be ruled out with reasonable confidence.”

65. In 20006, the Canadian government under The Hazardous Products Act and associated

n u

Controlled Products Regulations classified talc asa “D2A,” “very toxic,” “cancer causing” substance under its Workplace Hazardous Materials Information System (WHMIS). A sbestos is also classified as “D2A".

66. Upon information and belief, in 2006, IMERY S began placing a warning on the Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) it provided to JOHNSON & JOHNSON in conjunction with the talc product it sold to them to be used in the PRODUCTS. These MSDSs provided the warning information about the TARC classification, warning information regarding “States Rights to Know,” and warning information about the Canadian Government's “D2A" talc classification.

67. Upon information and belief, in 2006 Luzenac was on notice of the potential for product liability litigation against the talc producers for failing to warmn of the health risks associated with Talc use.

68. Upon information and belief, in spite of the mounting evidence pointing to the

carcinogenicity of the PRODUCTS, particularly when used in the perineal region, from 2008 through 2009 JOHNSON & JOHNSON admitted that its marketing was targeting use of JOHNSON & JOHNSON'S baby powder for obese women.

d. Defendants F ailed to Warn Consumers of the Dangers of Talc Use

69. Atall times herein mentioned, Defendants had a duty to know and warn about the hazards associated with the use of the PRODUCTS.

70. Upon information and belief, at all times herein mentioned, despite the mounting scientific and medical evidence regarding talc use and ovarian cancer development over the past several decades, none of the warnings on product labels or in other marketing informed users, or similarly situated individuals, that use of the PRODUCT'S in the genital area could lead to an increased risk of ovarian cancer. For example, the only warnings on the Baby Powder label are to “[k]eep powder away from child’s face to avoid inhalation, which can cause breathing problems,” and to “[a]void contact with eyes.” The label also states: “SAFETY TIP: Keep out of reach of children. Do not use if quality seal is broken.” JOHNSON & JOHNSON provides similar warnings on their website: “[f]or external use only. Keep out of reach of children. Close tightly after use. Do not use on broken skin. Avoid contact with eyes. Keep powder away from child’s face to avoid inhalation, which can cause breathing problems.”

71. Upon information and belief, at all times herein mentioned, JOHNSON & JOHNSON continues to represent on the labeling and in their marketing that Johnson’s Baby Powder has “clinically proven mildness,” is “clinically proven to be safe, gentle and mild,” and “that the safety of cosmetic talc is supported by decades of scientific evidence and independent peer reviewed studies.”

72. Upon information and belief, at all times herein mentioned, Defendants failed to inform customers and end users of the PRODUCTS of a known catastrophic health hazard associated with their use.

73. Upon information and belief, at all times herein mentioned, Defendants procured and disseminated false, misleading, and biased information regarding the safety of the PRODUCTS to the public and used influence over governmental and regulatory bodies regarding talc.

74. Upon information and belief, as a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ calculated and reprehensible conduct, Plaintiff suffered catastrophic injuries and damages, namely ovarian cancer, which

required surgeries and treatments. e. Defendant IMERYS Failed to Warn Consumers of the Dangers of Talc Use

75. On information and belief, at all relevant times alleged herein, Defendant IMERY S TALC AMERICA, INC., mined, manufactured and sold talc to JOHNSON & JOHNSON and JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER INC. F/K/A JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER COMPANIES, INC. for sale to the public.

76. At all times herein mentioned, the talcum powder mined, extracted, sorted, milled, processed, treated, formulated, packaged, shipped, supplied, sold, marketed and distributed by IMERY S to JOHNSON & JOHNSON for sale to the public was inherently and extremely dangerous in that, as set forth in detail above, it causes cancer in humans.

77. On information and belief, at all relevant times alleged herein, JOHNSON & JOHNSON and JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER INC. F/K/A JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER COMPANIES, INC. then packaged and sold said talc in the PRODUCTS they sold to consumers, and IMERY S knew that consumers of the PRODUCT'S were using it to powder their perineal regions.

78. On information and belief, the PRODUCTS had potential risk and side effects that were known or knowable in light of the scientific and medical knowledge that was generally accepted in the scientific community at the time of the manufacture, distribution and sale.

79. Oninformation and belief, the potential risks and side effects presented a substantial danger when the PRODUCTS were used or misused in an intended or reasonably foreseeable way.

80. On information and belief, ordinary consumers would not have recognized the potential risks and side effects described herein.

81. Upon information and belief, IMERY S actively participated in the design, development, and formulation of the PRODUCTS. IMERYSS is the world’s largest talc producer and engages in the development, formulation, treatment, and promotion of talc for specific use in the PRODUCTS. IMERY S has represented publicly that:

e IMERY S spearheads talc milling technology, a complex process where the methods used depend both on the ore type and the final application. To obtain exactly the right particle sizegiven application, we use a variety of techniques including

compressed air, steam and impact milling - many of which have been developed in-house. Median particle sizes can range from less than 1 micron to 15 microns, and top cuts from 6 microns to over 100 microns.

IMERY S implements specific treatments to the talc used in the PRODUCTS by milling, sorting, heating, grinding, and works directly with JOHNSON & JOHNSON on formulations (“... applications specialists work directly with customers on their formulations.”)

http://www.imerystalc.com/content/corporate/A boutImerysTalc/Expertise and quality/ Expertise/index.php

IMERY S uses sorting and milling technologies to process talc, laser and image analysis technology, friction sorting, flotation techniques, drying, crushing grounding and MIiCronizing;

IMERY S specifically promotes its talc for use in body powders and engineers it processing so that the Talc retain perfume (“... surfaces of the talc platelets retain the perfume with the minimum loss of potency.”)

IMERY S employs end-market specialists to pilot each market sector to match right talc to the right application and leads its products to new innovations... .

IMERY S employs experts from the specialist markets it serves and provides technical expertise, collaborating on research projects, and supports JOHNSON & JOHNSON in its product development and marketing efforts;

Working at our technical centers in San José and Toulouse, our R&A teams focus on finding new applications for talc and new formulations to improve existing applications; formulation studies for customers; and fundamental research.

IMERY S works with JOHNSON & JOHNSON to develop new process technologies for its products;

IMERY S collaborates JOHNSON & JOHNSON on research to find new applications for its products;

IMERY S employs teams to find new applications for talc, conducts formulation studies for customers, and conducts fundamental research concerning Talc. 82. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges that at all times herein mentioned, IMERY S failed to adequately warn that its talcum powder PRODUCTS presented substantial dangers and risks, which would not have been recognized by ordinary consumers when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable way, as evidenced through the following conduct:

e Through its mining, extraction, sorting, milling, processing, treating, formulating, packaging

and manufacture of the talcum powder that comprises the PRODUCTS, IMERYS had a significant role in creating the finished PRODUCTS, and did not actually or reasonably rely on JOHNSON & JOHNSON and JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER INC. F/K/A JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER COMPANIES, INC. to convey warnings to end users, and any such reliance would have been unjustified.

e IMERY S did not take the additional steps it should have, including inquiring about JOHNSON & JOHNSON'S and JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER INC. F/K/A JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER COMPANIES, INC.’s warmning practices, to ensure that warnings were communicated to consumers.

e IMERY S ignored known facts that would provide notice of a substantial risk that JOHNSON & JOHNSON and JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER INC. F/K/A JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER COMPANIES, INC. might fail to warn consumers of the risks of talcum powder exposure, and those warnings might fail to reach consumers.

e IMERYS knew there was a substantial likelihood that JOHNSON & JOHNSON and JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER INC. F/K/A JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER COMPANIES, INC. would not convey the necessary or adequate warnings or information to ultimate consumers of talc PRODUCTS.

e IMERYS knew JOHNSON & JOHNSON and JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER INC. F/K/A JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER COMPANIES, INC. were not conveying such warnings or information to consumers, and that said Defendants’ economic motivations were such that they had an incentive to withhold necessary information about talcum powder because warnings would make the products containing talc less attractive to consumers.

[ 83. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges that at all times herein mentioned, IMERY S could and should have shared its superior knowledge and information about the dangers involvedtalcum powder with JOHNSON & JOHNSON and JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER INC. F/K/A JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER COMPANIES, INC., and could and should have warned said Defendants and the public of the risks of harm.

84. According to IMERY S’S website (http://www.imerystalc.com/) talc is used in agriculture, ceramics, cosmetics, food, paints and coatings, paper, pharmaceuticals, plastics, and rubber products, and for each broad category of applications IMERY S manufactures and markets talc products with unique features, formulations and physical properties which are designed for specific uses within those categories. IMERY S’S subjective plan of milling, treating and formulating its Talc products for use in JOHNSON & JOHNSON PRODUCTS constitutes a design. The Talc product produced by IMERY S is of common experience, encountered generally in everyday life, and a product on which a jury can rely on its own expectations of safety, and it failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended and reasonably foreseeable manner.

85. The talc product sold by IMERY S is inherently dangerous for perineal application, is not substantially changed during the manufacturing of the finished products sold by JOHNSON & JOHNSON to consumers, and IMERY S had more than a limited role in creating the finished product and the PRODUCTS. IMERY S did not have to guess or speculate about the type of use to which its Talc product would be put, but rather IMERY S was aware of and intended that the Talc product supplied would be used in the manner in which it was actually used. The Talc products supplied by IMERY S were specifically designed to meet the needs of JOHNSON & JOHNSON.

86. The talc product designed and sold by IMERY S is itself harmful and, without change in its composition, remains so when incorporated into the PRODUCT'S and, renders the PRODUCT'S into which it is incorporated harmful, contrary to ordinary consumer expectations. JOHNSON & JOHNSON did not significantly alter the IMERY S Talc product. It is not just a design defect in the manufactured end product that caused the injury, but the defective nature of the IMERY S Talc product contained in the PRODUCTS.

87. Upon information and belief, at all times herein mentioned, the talcum powder mined,

extracted, sorted, milled, processed, treated, formulated, packaged, shipped, supplied, sold, marketed and distributed by IMERY S to JOHNSON & JOHNSON for sale to the public was not substantially changed during the manufacturing of the finished PRODUCTS, and Imerys had a significant role in creating the finished PRODUCTS.

88. Upon information and belief, IMERY S actively participated in the design, development, and formulation of the PRODUCTS. Specifically, as stated on IMERY S’S website www.imerystalc.com, IMERY S is the world’s largest talc producer and represents on its website the following:

From mine to market Sorting Sorting the different talc ores according to their talc content and brightness is a key phase of the production process. Techniques include state-of-the-art laser and image analysis technology, friction sorting or flotation techniques. The ores are then dried,

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- Certain grades of talc are g i freated, e.q. amine-coated

B talcs for fertilizers; silane- e coated talcs for the rubber industry; and cationic talcs for pitch control in papermaking. For the cosmetics and pharmaceuticals industries, talcs are heat-treated to decontaminate them.

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Formulating for our customers

Qur applications specialists work directly with customers on their formulations. Existing formulations are improved and rendered more cost-effective, or replaced by more advanced solutions. Every year, we camy out more than a hundred formulation studies at our research and development facilities in Denver and Toulouse and help customers achieve their perfiormance objectives while saving them valuable time.

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CEWTFEE Hur > Apphd bd > Body poveds & criman Body powders & creams Hew TALC HELPS Imerys talcs make excellent body powders and fragrance carmers for scented powders. They are ideal for face O TN el N (e, R Dy SIS, Bty s by potos HE"!&' pfignu.[::'rs W theair 2ol silky fodd Inndiyss talcs miaka eoecidhent body poadins

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Good understanding of each market segment is vital to matching the right talc to the right application. At Imerys Talc, we have end-market specialists on board who pilot each market sector, leading the way with new innovations... . Working at state of the art R&D facilities and pilot plants in the United States, Europe, and Assia Pacific, our experts - many of whom have been recruited from the specialist markets we serve - are dedicated to:

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Talc/Expertise and quality/Expertise/index.php

89. Upon information and belief, at all times herein mentioned, IMERY S did not actually or reasonably rely on JOHNSON & JOHNSON to convey warnings to end users, and any such reliance would have been unjustified.

90. Because of the gravity of the risks posed by the talc involved and the severity of the harm to consumers, and because of its unique and sophisticated knowledge of the dangers inherent in its talcum powder, IMERY S could and should have taken additional steps, such as inquiring about JOHNSON & JOHNSON’S warning practices, to ensure that warnings were communicated to consumers. 91. Upon information and belief, at all times herein mentioned, IMERY S had the legal right to issue notices regarding the safe use of JOHNSON & JOHNSON'S talc products, including end uses of the products. Upon information and belief, at all times herein mentioned, IMERY S also had the legal right to refuse to sell talc to JOHNSON & JOHNSON, if JOHNSON & JOHNSON’S use was improper, unsafe or unlawful.

92. Uponinformation and belief, however, for twenty-five years, IMERY S disregarded the facts and evidence it had compiled internally regarding the carcinogenicity of talc, as detailed herein, and never exercised its right to refuse to sell talcum powder to the JOHNSON & JOHNSON Defendants.

93. Uponinformation and belief, in 2006, when IMERY S added a warning to its talcum powder label, the company still never required JOHNSON & JOHNSON to convey the same or a substantially similar warning to end users of the product, even though IMERY S knew there was a substantial likelihood that JOHNSON & JOHNSON would not convey the necessary or adequate warnings or information to ultimate consumers of talc, and even though it knew in 2006, as discussed herein, of the potential for talc producers to be liable in product liability litigation in the United States.

94. Upon information and belief, at all times herein mentioned, IMERY S knew for a fact that JOHNSON & JOHNSON was not conveying such warnings or information to consumers, and that said Defendants’ economic motivations were such that they had an incentive to withhold necessary information about talcum powder because warnings would make products containing talc less attractive to consumers.

95. Uponinformation and belief, at all times herein mentioned, IMERY S could and should have shared its superior knowledge and information about the dangers involvedtalcum powder with JOHNSON & JOHNSON and could and should have warned said Defendants and the public of the risks of harm.

96. At all times herein mentioned, IMERY S failed to adequately warn that its talcum powder products presented substantial dangers and risks, which would not have been recognized by ordinary consumers, when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable way.

97. Asadirectand proximate result of IMERY S’ calculated and reprehensible conduct, Plaintiff suffered catastrophic injuries and damages, namely ovarian cancer, which required surgeries and

treatments. f. JOHNSON & JOHNSON and IMERYS Conspired to Conceal the Dangers of Talc

98. Upon information and belief, the JOHNSON & JOHNSON Defendants and IMERY S and/or their predecessors-in-interest knowingly agreed, contrived, combined, confederated and conspired among themselves, in the State of California, to cause injuries, diseases, and/or illnesses by exposing consumers and Plaintiff to the harmful and dangerous PRODUCTS. JOHNSON & JOHNSON and IMERYS knowingly agreed, contrived, confederated and conspired to deprive Plaintiff of the opportunity of informed free choice as to whether to use the PRODUCTS or to expose themselves to the dangers associated with them. JOHNSON & JOHNSON and IMERYS committed the above described wrongs by willfully misrepresenting and suppressing the truth as to the risks and dangers associated with the use of the talcum powder contained within the PRODUCTS.

99. Upon information and belief, in furtherance of said conspiracies, for decades JOHNSON & JOHNSON and IMERY S individually, jointly, and in conspiracy with each other, have been in possession of medical and scientific data, literature and test reports which clearly indicated that ordinary and foreseeable use of their PRODUCTS by women is unreasonably dangerous, hazardous, deleterious to human health, carcinogenic, and potentially deadly.

100. Upon information and belief, in furtherance of said conspiracies, JOHNSON & JOHNSON and IMERY S, despite the medical and scientific data, literature, and test reports possessed by and available to said Defendants, individually, jointly, and in conspiracy with each other, wrongtully, fraudulently, willfully and maliciously agreed among themselves to withhold, conceal and suppress medical information regarding the increased risk of ovarian cancer, as set out hereinabove. Upon information and belief, in furtherance of said conspiracies, JOHNSON & JOHNSON and IMERY S, despite the medical and scientific data, literature, and test reports possessed by and available to said Defendants, individually, jointly, and in conspiracy with each other, caused to be released, published and disseminated medical and scientific data, literature, and test reports containing information and statements regarding the risks of ovarian cancer which JOHNSON & JOHNSON and IMERY S knew were incorrect, incomplete, outdated, and misleading. Upon information and belief, specifically, through the CTFA, JOHNSON & JOHNSON and IMERY S collectively agreed to release false information to the public regarding the safety of talc on July 1, 1992; July 8, 1992; and November 17, 1994. Upon information and belief, in a letter dated September 17, 1997, JOHNSON & JOHNSON and IMERY S were criticized by their own toxicologist consultant for releasing this false information to the public, as stated hereinabove, yet nothing was done by JOHNSON & JOHNSON and IMERY S to correct or redact this public release of knowingly false information.

101. Upon information and belief, in furtherance of said conspiracies, JOHNSON & JOHNSON and IMERY S, despite the medical and scientific data, literature, and test reports possessed by and available to said Defendants, individually, jointly, and in conspiracy with each other, by these false and fraudulent representations, omissions, and concealments, intended to induce Plaintiff and others to rely upon false and fraudulent representations, omissions and concealments, and to continue to expose themselves to the dangers inherent in the use and exposure to the PRODUCTS.

102. Upon information and belief, individually and in concert with each other, JOHNSON & JOHNSON and IMERY S participated in a common plan to commit the torts alleged herein, and each acted tortiously in pursuance of the common plan to protect and promote the health and safety of talc use, to the known detriment of the public, including Plaintiff.

103. Plaintiff reasonably and in good faith relied upon false representations, omissions, and concealments made by JOHNSON & JOHNSON and IMERY S regarding the nature of the PRODUCTS, and as a result suffered the injuries and damages alleged herein.

104. Defendants conspired and entered into the aforementioned agreements in the State of California, and engaged in the aforementioned acts in furtherance of their conspiracy and agreements together with each other in California, and as a result of the foregoing conduct in furtherance of their conspiracy and agreements, each of the Defendants is derivatively liable for the conduct of the others in California.

105. As alleged in this Complaint, the term “talcum powder products” or “PRODUCTS” refers to Johnson & Johnson’s Baby Powder and Shower to Shower products and all constituent elements of those products, including talc, asbestos, fibrous talc, Cadmium, Cobalt, Chromium, Copper, Iron, Manganese, Nickel, and other constituent and related elements and fibers contained within.”

g. Defendants concealed and failed to warn about the dangers posed by asbestos in the

talcum powder products 106. Plaintiff alleges that the talcum powder products mined, milled, imported, designed, manufactured, marketed, labeled, supplied, distributed, sold and otherwise placed in the stream of commerce by Defendants contained asbestos, including ashestos and asbestiform fibers, e.g., tremolite, chrysotile, and other carcinogens, which Plaintiff used and was exposed to, and that Defendants failed to warn the public, including Plaintiff, about the fact that the talcum powder products contained such carcinogenic substances.

107. Defendants engaged in wrongful conduct and were negligent and created a dangerous and unreasonable risk of harm to others, including Plaintiff, by mining, milling, processing, supplying, distributing, designing, manufacturing, and selling the talcum powder products which contained asbestos which Defendants knew or should have known was dangerous and posed a substantial risk of harm to others, including Plaintiff.

108. Title21, Section 740.1(a) of the Code of Federal Regulations states: “The label of a cosmetic product shall bear a warning statement whenever necessary or appropriate to prevent a health hazard that may be associated with the product.” 21 C.F.R. § 740.1(a). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated this law and that the violation was a substantial factor in bringing about harm to Plaintiff. The label for the talcum powder product did not provide any warning regarding the health hazard that were or may be associated with the product, including the health hazards associated with talc exposure and/or exposure to asbestos.

109. Geologists, Defendants, the and CTFA — and their suppliers, experts, agents and advisors— have long known that the deposits in the earth that are associated with talc are also associated with the formation of asbestos. The United States Geological Survey on Commercial Talc production in 1965, as well as those dating back to the 1800s, note the presence of tremolite, anthophyllite and chrysotile commonly among those minerals found within talc deposits.

110. Defendants have long employed and/or consulted with doctors, scientists, geologists, mineralogists and toxicologists, and that they have long maintained extensive medical and scientific libraries and archives containing materials relating to the health hazards of talc and the presence of asbestos and asbestiform talc fibers in talc and talc deposits.

[ 111. Beginning in the 1930s, medical and scientific literature emerged indicating talc was commonly, if not invariably, contaminated with substances known or suspected of being carcinogenic, such as asbestos, silica, quartz, nickel and arsenic. Within the next several decades, a growing body of medical and scientific literature demonstrated that direct and secondary exposure to talc, including asbestos-containing talc, was hazardous to exposed persons’ health in that it could cause lung disease, cancer and death.

112. Defendants and their employees, agents and/or suppliers were members of the National Safety Council. In March of 1933, Waldemar C. Dreesen of the United States Public Health Service reported to the National Safety Council the results of a study conducted among tremolite, talc and slate workers. The study indicated that the talc was a hydrous calcium magnesium silicate, being 45% talc and 45% tremolite.

113. In 1968, a study presented at the American Industrial Hygiene Conference & Exposition and published in the American Industrial Hygiene Association Journal concluded that “[a]ll of the 22 talcum products analyzed have a... fiber content... averaging 19%. The fibrous material was predominantly talc but contained minor amounts of tremolite, anthophyllite, and chrysotile as these are often present in fibrous talc mineral deposits... Unknown significant amounts of such materials in products that may be used without precautions may create an unsuspected problem.” L. J. Cralley, et al., Fibrous and Mineral Content of Cosmetic Talcum Products, 29 AM. IND. HY G. ASSOC.]J. 350-354 (1968).

114. A 1976 follow-up study conducted by researchers at Mount Sinai Hospital in New Y ork concluded that “[t]he presence in these products of asbestiform anthophyllite and tremolite, chrysotile, and quartz indicates the need for a regulatory standard for cosmetic talc... We also recommend that evaluation be made to determine the possible health hazards associated with the use of these products.” Rohl A.N., et al., Consumer Talcums and Powders: Mineral and Chemical Characterization, 2 J. TOXICOL. ENVIRON. HEALTH 255-284 (1976). The Mount Sinai study results were published by various newspapers, including the New Y ork Times and the Washington Post.

115. In 1968, a scientific study of store-bought, commercially available talcum powders conducted by the Occupational Health Program, National Center for Urban Industrial Health, was

published and presented by the A merican Industrial Hygiene A ssociation revealing that, contrary to popular belief, talcum powders were not entirely pure, but rather contained various fibrous minerals, including tremolite, anthophyllite, and chrysotile. This was not unexpected, as the study explains, because these types of fibers are often present in fibrous talc mineral deposits. Available documents indicate that during the same year and in the years following, at least one company began testing store-bought talcum powders for asbestos content. Despite tests showing some commercial talcum powders contained asbestos, there is no evidence that positive results or the brand names of contaminated products were communicated to any governmental agency, the media or the public.

116. Inthe early 1970s, the FDA began an inquiry into whether to regulate and require warnings on consumer talcum powder products. Defendants and the CTFA, an exclusive lobbying and advocacy group representing companies engaged in the cosmetic products industry, conspired and worked in concert to block efforts to label and warn consumers regarding the dangers associated with cosmetic talcum powder products, such as Defendants’ products.

117. In 1971, the New Y ork City of Environmental Protection A dministration Air Resources Board conducted a study of two “leading” brands of talcum powder using transmission electron microscopy (“TEM”) and X-ray diffraction analysis (“XRD”), and found them to contain 5-25% tremolite and anthophyllite asbestos fibers under 5 microns.

118. Contemporaneously, evidence began to emerge from testing conducted by various regulatory agencies revealing that asbestos was being found in food, beer and drugs, including intravenously injected medicines. In 1972, and laterin 1973, the FDA filed notices of proposed rulemaking requiring talc used in food, food packing and drugs to be asbestos-free. These were some of the same grades of talc used and supplied by Defendants.

119. In 1973, the CTFA created a talc subcommittee and the Scientific Advisory Committee to develop a testing methodology for detecting asbestos in talc. Initially, the CTFA designated a group of its members to tests talc grades used in talcum powder utilizing the methodology proposednotice of rulemaking. Six samples of talc used in commercially available talcum powders, plus one talc sample purposely spiked with tremolite and chrysotile, were circulated among the members, including representatives of Defendants. Of the eight participating members, four found asbestos in every sample,

three did not find asbestos in any sample (including the spiked sample), and one found asbestos only in the spiked sample. In conclusion, all members agreed that the best and most reliable method of detecting asbestos in talc is not optical microscopy, but rather TEM and electron diffraction. The same members, however, dispensed with this analytical method, claiming TEM and electron diffraction equipment was too expensive, despite Defendants then owning or having unfettered access to same.

120. From there, the difference between what Defendants and the CTFA knew diverged from what they were representing to the FDA. Defendants, the CTFA and others in the industry knew that there was no such thing as asbestos-free talc— only talc in which asbestos could not be detected using the prevailing, most economic analytical methodology, XRD, which at the time could not accurately identify chrysotile asbestos in talc, nor detect tremolite asbestos contamination levels below 2-5%.

121. Defendants and third parties collectively met with and corresponded with the CTFA, as well as collectively met with the FDA, to individually and collectively advocate for the use of “voluntary” XRD

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testing of miniscule portions of the tons of talc to be used in consumer products. Defendants’ “voluntary” method— that was developed collectively by Defendants and the CTFA and advocated to the FDA in lieu of regulations requiring asbestos labeling or warnings on talcum powder products— was inadequate because levels of ashestos contamination in talc commonly fell below the detection limit of XRD. Defendants and the CTFA also knew that asbestos contamination was not uniformly distributed, such that the miniscule amounts tested would not reveal the true level of contamination in talc products, such as those to which Plaintiff was exposed.In support of their voluntary XRD methodology, which was finally published in 1977, the CTFA produced letters to the FDA written by its members, including Defendants, identifying tests conducted showing talcum powder products did not contain asbestos. The CTFA, Defendants and other talc product producers, however, never informed the FDA of the hundreds of positive tests showing talc and talcum powders contained asbestos and other carcinogens.D efendants and the CTFA made and published representations claiming that their testing method was adequate, that they were ensuring that talcum powder products were safe, and that the talc reaching consumers was “safe,” despite having substantial knowledge and evidence to the contrary. Defendants intentionally and knowingly did so to avoid FDA regulations that may have required them to place warnings regarding the asbestos content of their products, and thereby inform the public, including Plaintiff, that talc-containing products contained

asbestos. 122. The CTFA and Defendants have represented to various news media outlets and the public at large that their products are “asbestos-free,” when, in fact, their products did test positive for asbestos and those that did not were merely the result of inadequate and imprecise testing methods. “No asbestos detected” means something much different than “no asbestos,” but due to Defendants’ repeated conflation of the terms, the public has been lead to erroneously believe talc products are safe.

123. Between 1970 and the 1990s, tests conducted by and on behalf of Defendants and the talc industry continued to show that talc and talcum powder products contained asbestos as well as other contaminates such as Cadmium, Cobalt, Chromium, Copper, Iron, Manganese, and Nickel. None of these positive tests have ever been produced or made known to any regulatory agency, and knowledge of their existence is only because of civil litigation.

124. Since at least 1979, Defendants have conducted a campaign to convince the public that their products are regulated by the FDA, that their tests are conducted pursuant to FDA regulations, and that talcum powder products are therefore safe. Nothing could be further from the truth: the FDA has never been assigned a budget by Congress to regulate cosmetics, including talcum powders. Defendants’ concerns for the safety of their products have always been voluntary and under the auspices of the CTFA, a private industry group, that in its 40 years has only banned the use of 11 ingredients in all cosmetics ever sold in the United States.

125. Defendants and the CTFA, collectively by their agreement and conspiracy, controlled industry standards regarding the testing, manufacture, sale, distribution and use of talcum powder products, and controlled the level of knowledge and information available to the public, including Plaintiff, regarding the hazards of exposure to carcinogens, including talc, asbestos, and fibrous talc., They also knowingly and intentionally released, published and disseminated invalid, inaccurate, outdated and misleading scientific data, literature and test reports containing misinformation and false statements regarding the health risks associated with the use of talc and talcum powder products, including those to which Plaintiff was exposed.

126. Defendants and the CTFA, while cognizant of the aforementioned data, deliberately chose to ignore the health and safety issues raised in said data and embarked upon a plan of deception intended to deprive the public at large, including Plaintiff, of alarming medical and scientific findings, many of

which remained in their exclusive possession and under their exclusive control. 127. Defendants and the CTFA conspired and/or acted in concert with each other and/or with other entities through agreement and consciously parallel behavior: (a) to withhold from users of their products— and from persons who Defendants knew and should have known would be exposed thereto— information regarding the health risks of asbestos, talc, and other carcinogens contained in the PRODUCTS; (b) to eliminate or prevent investigation into the health hazards of exposure to asbestos, talc and other carcinogens in the PRODUCTS; (c) to ensure that ashestos-containing talc and talcum powder products became widely used in commerce, irrespective of the potential and actual risk of harm to the users and consumers from the asbestos, talc and other carcinogens therein; and (d) to falsely represent that talc and talcum powder products, including those of Defendants, were safe for use by consumers.

128. Plaintiff reasonably and in good faith relied upon the false and fraudulent representations, omissions and concealments made by Defendants and their agent, the CTFA, regarding the hazards of talc and talcum powder products, including the failure to warn and disclose the fact that such products contained asbestos and other carcinogens, including talc itself, and was, therefore, deprived of an opportunity to make informed decisions concerning use of, exposure to and contact with said products.

129. McCrone Associates, the laboratory selected by several talc producers— including Defendants— to analyze their products, was already using TEM for asbestos analysis. An article by McCrone and Stewart from 1974 describes the advantages of TEM for asbestos analysis and states that the TEM “only recently installed in our laboratory will undoubtedly be the ideal instrument for the detection and identification of very fine asbestos fibers.”

130. The CTFA “Method J4-1,” published on October 7, 1976, states that TEM-SAED “offers greater sensitivity, but is not presented since it is unsuitable for normal quality control applications.” The published method, rather, relies on XRD with “the level of detection of amphibole by this method [being] 0.5% and above.” The CTFA met with and corresponded with Defendants and third parties, to individually and collectively advocateinadequate XRD testing on miniscule portions of the tons of talc obtained from the mining sources to be used in the consumer products, followed by fewer “periodic” tests by TEM. This voluntary method was developed by CTFA, Defendants, and was advocatedCTFA, and Defendants in lieu of regulations requiring labeling and warnings on talcum powder products, even though the CTFA and Defendants knew that the J4-1 method would not reveal the true level of asbestos in the talc that reached consumers. In fact, the first “round robin” tests, which analyzed a “CTFA Tremolite-Spiked Talc,” resulted in 6 of 7 participating laboratories failing to detect the tremolite.

131. In other words, 84% of the industry’s laboratories failed to detect asbestos in a sample known to contain tremolite asbestos while using the CTFA’s own J4-1 method. There is no evidence that the CTFA or Defendants ever shared this remarkable failure with the FDA or the public.

132. The FDA, and ultimately Plaintiff, directly and/or indirectly relied upon the CTFA’s false representations regarding the safety of cosmetic talc. In fact, a FDA letter dated January 11, 1979, states “In cooperation with scientists from industry, our scientists have been making progress in the development of such regulatory methods.” The continuing lack of FDA awareness regarding the CTFA’s and Defendants’ misrepresentations and concealment was obvious seven years later. In a response to a citizen petition to require an asbestos warning label on cosmetic talc, a July 11, 1986, the FDA states that an “analytical methodology was sufficiently developed” to ensure that “such talc [is] free of fibrous amphibole...” The CTFA’s J4-1 method has continued for the past four decades to be the cosmetic talc industry’s method for “ensuring” “asbestos-free” talc. The use of TEM, recognized by the CTFA as offering “greater sensitivity” for asbestos, continued to increase over the following decades as its advantages were applied to more matrices.

133. In 1990, Kremer and Millette published a TEM method for analysis of asbestos in talc with a theoretical detection limit of about 0.00005%. Despite such improvements in analytical techniques, the cosmetic talc industry continues, four decades later, to use and promote its antiquated and wholly inadequate J4-1 method.

134. The CTFA and Defendants, knowingly and intentionally released, published and disseminated invalid, inaccurate, outdated and misleading scientific data, literature and test reports containing misinformation and false statements regarding the health risks associated with the use of talc and talcum powder, including talc and talcum powder used in the production of products to which Plaintiff used and was exposed.

135. The CTFA, which was Defendants’ agent, along with Defendants, suppressed, altered, changed, destroyed and/or revised reports, data, tests, studies and other documents regarding the potential presence of asbestos and other carcinogens in talc and talc-containing products, including Defendants’ talc powder products to which Plaintiff was exposed. The conduct of Defendants, both acting individually and in concert with others, including the CTFA , was a substantial factor in causing harm to Plaintiff.

136. The conduct of Defendants, independently and collectively and through their agents, constitute a pattern or practice of intentionally wrongful conduct and/or malice resulting in injuries to Plaintiff as alleged in this complaint.

h. Defendants’ wrongful acts are indigenous to the State of California

137. Defendants’ wrongful acts are connected to California in that the PRODUCTS and/or talc (mixed with asbestos fibers such as chyrysotile, anthrophyllite, and tremolite, as well as asbestiform fibers such as fibrous talc) intended for use in the PRODUCTS were analyzed, tested, marketed, advertised, distributed and sold in California and certified by Defendant IMERY S as free of asbestos and asbestiform fibers in California for sale throughout the United States.

138. At all pertinent times, JOHNSON & JOHNSON was and continues to be connected to California through their predecessor ownership in California talc mines, mills and processing plants. JOHNSON & JOHNSON originally sourced all raw talcum powder for Johnson’s Baby Powder PRODUCTS from domestic mines located in California. California served as the exclusive source of talc for JOHNSON & JOHNSON from the inception of its Johnson’s Baby Powder PRODUCTS line until 1926. In 1926, JOHNSON & JOHNSON changed its sourcing of raw talcum powder from domestic mines located in California to talc sourced in Italy.

139. In 1941, due to the outbreak of World War II and the attendant difficulties in procuring talcum powder from its Italian source, JOHNSON & JOHNSON returned to California for sourcing of its talc from approximately 1941 through 1946. After 1946, JOHNSON & JOHNSON returned to sourcing the raw talcum powder used in its PRODUCT'S from Italy, specifically, Italy’s Val Chisone region and its associated mines.

140. In 1971, California talc is again investigated by JOHNSON & JOHNSON as a source for its Baby Powder PRODUCTS line when Defendants began the process of evaluating and qualifying the Grantham Mine, located in the Death Valley region of California. The Grantham ore was considered as a

potential source of raw talcum powder for use in its PRODUCTS despite the fact that it was shown to contain both tremolite and chrysotile.

141. Tremolite, chrysotile, anthophyllite, other forms of asbestos and ashestiform minerals, as well as known carcinogens such as heavy metals (including nickel,hexa-valent chromium, cadmium, cobalt, copper, iron, and manganese), as well as arsenic, quartz, silica, and lead, were known by JOHNSON & JOHNSON to be constituent minerals that were incapable of being wholly removed from the talcum powder which it used in the manufacture of its Baby Powder and Shower to Shower product lines.

142. Formore than half a century JOHNSON & JOHNSON in concert with Defendant IMERY S performed experimental analyses and studies detailing the presence, contamination levels, and inability to mitigate, the amounts of these carcinogens in the raw talcum powder used in the PRODUCTS.

143. At all pertinent times, Defendant IMERY S (formerly known as Luzenac A merica and its predecessors), and/or its predecessors in interest, were engaged in the business of mining, milling, manufacturing, research and developing, processing and testing talc in California.

144. 1In 1919, the Inyo Talc Company began producing talc from a mine in Talc City, California, and a processing the talc at a mill at Keeler, California. Inyo changed its name to Sierra Talc and in 1942 Sierra Talc expanded is talc production in California with the purchase of the Pacific Coast Talc, Bay Street Mill, in California. Sierra Talc then purchased Muroc Clay Company, and the Randolph Street Mill, located in Los Angeles, California.

145. In 1953, Defendant opened the Panamint Mine in California which was in operation for over 30 years until its close in 1986.

146. In 1964, Cyprus Mines purchased Sierra Talc, and in 1973 the United Sierra Division became the Cyprus Industrial Minerals Company, and was renamed Cyprus Industrial Minerals Corporation. Shortly thereafter, in 1974, Cyprus Industrial Minerals relocated its headquarters to Los Angeles, California. Cyprus subsequently became a major player in the market for talcum powder, logging production of 122,000 tons and revenues of $11 million in 1976.

147. In 1992, Rio Tinto purchased the talc assets of Cyprus Industrial Minerals, incorporating these assets as Luzenac America Incorporated. Included in these assets were the mines and processing facilities of Windsor Minerals, Inc. a former subsidiary of JOHNSON & JOHNSON which maintained

significant talc producing and milling assets located in Vermont and in California. 148. At all pertinent times, JOHNSON & JOHNSON was and continues to be connected with California by and through their dealings, communications and contracts with Defendant IMERY S. JOHNSON & JOHNSON Defendants’ relationship with IMERY S was specifically related to Defendants’ talc and the PRODUCTS, and thus is and was specific to the issues herein.

149. JOHNSON & JOHNSON worked closely with Defendant IMERY S for the supply and testing of its PRODUCTS. Defendant IMERY S’ nucleus of operations and control center for PRODUCT analysis and testing was through its the Corporate Research and Development Laboratory, which was at all relevant times, based in San Jose, California. Defendant IMERY S tested JOHNSON & JOHNSON'S talc for ashestos and asbestiform talc fibers at their California facility knowingly using faulty test methods that had “detection limits” and as such could only vouch that asbestos was “not detected.” And yet, IMERY S approved the respective talc samples despite IMERY S’ knowledge of the presence of deadly asbestos fibers as well as asbestiform fibers and other harmful constituents in the talc.

150. Defendant IMERY S was complicit in exposing the general public, including Plaintiff, to the PRODUCTS through the testing of talcum powder supplied to JOHNSON & JOHNSON using a knowingly flawed, inaccurate and imprecise, methodology at its California Corporate Laboratory where research and development, analysis, testing and the approval of talc supplies for Defendants’ PRODUCTS were conducted. Defendant IMERY S’ California Corporate Laboratory was the quality control nerve center for JOHNSON & JOHNSON’S PRODUCTS.

151. The testing methodology employed by Defendant IMERY S in qualifying its raw talcum powder as “free of asbestos” is incapable of ensuring the absence of harmful asbestos and asbestiform talc fibers, and was developed by members of the industry, through the auspices of its trade group, the CTFA, as a means of avoiding more accurate, and precise testing protocols. To this day, Defendant IMERY S continues to use this flawed testing methodology in qualifying its ore as “free of ashestos”.

152. Defendant IMERY S further tested the raw talcum powder supplied to JOHNSON & JOHNSON through a second proprietary testing method developed by JOHNSON & JOHNSON. Such testing is a pre-requisite to maintaining its status as a supplier of talc to JOHNSON & JOHNSON.

153. Despite knowledge by JOHNSON & JOHNSON that the testing methodology used in detecting and quantifying the level of asbestos and asbestiform fibers in the PRODUCTS was incapable of ensuring the complete absence of the same, JOHNSON & JOHNSON has, and continues to, market its PRODUCTS as “free from asbestos and asbestiform fibers”.

154. In addition to asbestos, JOHNSON & JOHNSON knew or should have known that the talcum powder used in the PRODUCTS contained other harmful constituents, including arsenic, quartz, silica, and heavy metals such as nickel, cadmium, cobalt, copper, iron, manganese and chromium. JOHNSON & JOHNSON'’S contracts, communications and business relationships with several testing laboratories in California were specifically related to Defendants’ talc and the PRODUCTS, and thus is and was specific to the issues herein. JOHNSON & JOHNSON contracted with EXOVA Inc. in Sante Fe Springs, California and the R] LEE GROUP in Berkeley, California to test for harmful carcinogens and other harmful constituents in the PRODUCTS. In addition, Forensic Analytical located in Hayward, California also tested the PRODUCTS for JOHNSON & JOHNSON.

155. Atall pertinent times, JOHNSON & JOHNSON communicated with Defendant IMERY S’ California Corporate Laboratory on asbestos testing methods and standards. A s part of their agreements to test JOHNSON & JOHNSON’S PRODUCTS, Defendant IMERY S relied on testing by Intertek, a testing laboratory with several California locations including its North A merican Consumer Goods location in El Segundo, California.

156. At all pertinent times, Defendant IMERY S’ California Corporate Laboratory managers made presentations throughout California (among other places) promoting IMERY S’ flawed testing techniques and methodologies at several industrial mineral conferences, including but not limited to the California Society of Cosmetic Chemists, the ASTM conferences and the Michael E. Beard A sbestos Conferences.

157. JOHNSON & JOHNSON and IMERYS worked in concert to obtain a favorable determination by the Cosmetic Ingredient Review that their talc was safe, despite evidence to the contrary.

158. Further, Defendants JOHNSON & JOHNSON and IMERY S have undertaken a concerted and extensive effort to influence both regulators and the prevailing body of scientific evidence that talcum powder PRODUCTS are not carcinogenic, and that they contain no other carcinogenic constituents such as asbestos and asbestiform fibers. This effort has consisted of contracting with, and soliciting the input

of, numerous California thought leader scientists to offer opinions, author peer-reviewed articles and supplemental analyses of the PRODUCT'S in order to fend of negative publicity and government regulation aimed at mandating labeling requirements on cosmetic talcum powder PRODUCTS. JOHNSON & JOHNSON’S contracts, communications and business relationships with thought leaders and academic institutions in California were specifically related to Defendants’ talc and the PRODUCTS, and thus is and was specific to the issues herein.

159. JOHNSON & JOHNSON contracted with the noted California thought leader scientist Dr. Hoda Anton- Culverof UC Irvine and Dr. Dwight Culverin formulating a response to discredit a significant talc inhalation study undertaken by the NTP in 1992. Dr. Dwight Culver, an occupational physician and consulting medical director to U.S. Borax (a subsidiary of Rio Tinto in Boron, California), provided consulting services to JOHNSON & JOHNSON, along with his wife, Dr. Hoda A nton-Culver, the Director of Epidemiology at the University of California-Irvine.

160. JOHNSON & JOHNSON also contracted with California thought leader Professor Gordon E. Brown, Professor of Mineralogy and Geochemist at Stanford University, to refute and discredit the analysis of JOHNSON & JOHNSON’S PRODUCT samples of tested by Dr. Lewin (see discussion below) who found Defendants’ PRODUCTS contained asbestos. JOHNSON & JOHNSON continues to contract with Professor Brown as a thought leader consultant on a range of analyses and testing issues related to the safety of its PRODUCTS.

161. JOHNSON & JOHNSON also employed California thought leader Dr. Donald Dungworth of the University of California-Davis as a consultant in order to prevent the NTP from classifying talc as a carcinogen. Defendant JOHNSON & JOHNSON used Dr. Dungworth and his research in order convince the NTP to disregard studies where rats and mice exposed to talc suffered from cancer and/or lung disease.

162. JOHNSON & JOHNSON also sought the services of thought leader experts in occupational medicine, Dr. Clark Cooper and Dr. Irving Tabershaw, of the University of California Berkeley School of Public Health. Drs. Cooper and Tabershaw operated a consulting business known as Tabershaw-Cooper A ssociates.

163. JOHNSON & JOHNSON sought to influence the work of the Stanford Research Institute (“SRI”), based at Stanford University in California, in order to achieve favorable regulatory decisions in

the late 1970s. The U.S. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (“NIOSH”) contracted SRI for assistance with an official “criteria document” on talc. Defendants were aware that any decision by NIOSH would be based largely on findings by SRI and so hoped to influence both. To that end, Defendants hosted a delegation from NIOSHtheir facilities to convince them that their “cosmetic- grade” talc was free of asbestos and posed no health risks.

164. At all pertinent times, JOHNSON & JOHNSON has maintained and continues to maintain a substantial presence and a vested financial interest in California with the presence of ten locations across the State in Fremont, CA, Irvine, CA; Irwindale, CA; La Jolla, CA; Menlo Park, CA; Milpitas, CA; Sacramento, CA; San Diego, CA; South San Francisco, CA; and Vacaville, CA.

165. JOHNSON & JOHNSON'S California Innovation Center in Silicon Valley was recently created to develop relationships between JOHNSON & JOHNSON, California scientists, and their respective companies in the Western United States.

166. JOHNSON & JOHNSON'S Research and D evelopment laboratory in San Diego, known as JLABS, houses scientific development by “resident companies” in the health care, pharmaceutical, and consumer goods markets, in which JOHNSON & JOHNSON invest, as a means to further establish relations with California and West Coast Scientists and Companies.

167. To expand their product lines even further in California market, JOHNSON & JOHNSON recently established JJDC, INC, an investment venture fund, to incubate and develop start-ups in California.

168. At all pertinent times, JOHNSON & JOHNSON has maintained and continues to maintain an office in Sacramento, California dedicated to lobbying efforts encompassing issues, among otherissues, Proposition 65 and the classifications of carcinogens, including talc used in Defendants’ PRODUCT. JOHNSON & JOHNSON'S lobbying efforts in California were related to Defendants’ talc and the PRODUCTS, and thus is and was specific to the issues herein. In the last fifteen years, JOHNSON & JOHNSON spent over ten million dollars ($10,000,000) to influence the laws and regulations of the State of California.

169. At all pertinent times, California’s Proposition 65 was of particular interest to JOHNSON & JOHNSON, as labeling requirements on consumer goods flowing from the recognition of talcum powder

as a carcinogen would have triggered labeling requirements on JOHNSON & JOHNSON's Baby Powder and Shower to Shower PRODUCT'S which it had sought to avoid since the early 1970’s when the FDA first began considering labeling and regulation of talcum powder and talcum powder containing PRODUCTS.

170. With full knowledge of the ultra-hazardous nature of the PRODUCTS, JOHNSON & JOHNSON marketed, sold, promoted, and distributed these PRODUCTS across the country through a nationwide distribution network with locations in; New Brunswick, New Jersey; Savannah, Georgia; Chicago; Illinois; Los Angeles, California; and Dallas, Texas.

171. Atall pertinent times, JOHNSON & JOHNSON targeted California in their advertising and marketing strategies, and reaped significant profits from purchasers of their PRODUCTS. JOHNSON & JOHNSON'S contracts, communications and business relationships with several advertising, marketing, media and public relations firms in California was specifically related to Defendants’ talc and the PRODUCTS, and thus is and was specific to the issues herein. JOHNSON & JOHNSON implemented an aggressive strategy to expand their PRODUCT sales specifically to Hispanic women. With the nation’s largest Hispanic population, California and specifically California Hispanic women were and continue to be an important strategic market for Defendants’ PRODUCTS.

172. At all pertinent times, JOHNSON & JOHNSON hired, supervised and directed third party media and public relations companies with offices in both Northern and Southern California to create sophisticated Spanish-language newspaper, magazine, billboard, radio, and television marketing and advertising campaigns to promote the PRODUCTS specifically to California Hispanic women. JOHNSON & JOHNSON’S campaign was so successful that Defendants created and produced a Spanish-language Johnson’s Baby Powder bottle for placement on, among other locations, California grocery, pharmacy and big-box store (Target, Walmart, Kmart) shelves through-out the State.

173. At all pertinent times, JOHNSON & JOHNSON paid substantial funds to purchase California media from California advertising and marketing agencies to target the women of California, and specifically target the Hispanic women of California, into purchasing their Baby Powder PRODUCTS while knowingly concealing the fact that the PRODUCTS contained the carcinogenic substances talc, asbestos and asbestiform fibers which posed a high risk of ovarian cancer and/or death.

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175. Defendants’ liabilities arise from and relate to these contacts with the forum of the State of California.

176. Defendants purposefully affiliated themselves with the forum of the State of California giving rise to the underlying controversy. Such purposeful availment and activities within and related to the State of California included, but are not limited to, the Defendants’ contractual relationships with the entities and discussed above giving rise to the source, supply, manufacturing, production, research and testing, analyzing, processing, distribution, advertising and marketing of the PRODUCTS in the State of California and being controlled and directed from the State of California; agreements between D efendants and entities, institutions and thought leader academics within State of California regarding the PRODUCTS where Defendants contractually consented to have state courts within the State of California adjudicate disputes; marketing and advertising of the PRODUCTS by Defendants targeted specifically to women within the State of California as opposed to the Nation as a whole; agreements and other arrangements between D efendants and hospitals and other healthcare providers specific to the State of California where, for example, expectant and post-partum mothers were provided gift baskets containing the PRODUCTS; conferences, tradeshows and other promotional activities by Defendants with regard to the PRODUCTS targeted specifically to the State of California; lobbying, consulting, and advisory efforts on behalf of Defendants with regard to the PRODUCTS stemming from law firms and other agents in the State of California; and other actions by Defendants targeted to the State of California to be obtained through discovery and other means. As the location from which Defendants’ suit-related conduct arose out of, California has a substantial vested interest in the acts of Defendants which led to the underlying controversy.

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CAUSES OF ACTION FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

Negligence (Against All Defendants)

177. Plaintiff hereby incorporates each of the paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

178. Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care to prevent harm to another person.

179. Plaintiff claims that she was harmed by Defendants’ negligence. Plaintiff bought and used the talcum powder products. Plaintiff’s perineal use of the talcum powder products was a substantial factor in causing her harm.

180. Defendants designed, manufactured, supplied, inspected, tested, distributed and sold the talcum powder product.

181. Defendants were negligent. Defendants were negligent in designing, manufacturing, supplying, inspected, testing, distributing, and selling the talcum powder products.

182. Defendants failed to use reasonable care to prevent harm to others, including Plaintiff.

183. Plaintiff was harmed.

184. Defendants’ negligence was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s harm.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

Presumption of Negligence Per Se (Against All Defendants)

185. Plaintiff hereby incorporates each of the paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

186. Title 21, Section 740.1(a) of the Code of Federal Regulations states: “The label of a cosmetic product shall bear a warning statement whenever necessary or appropriate to prevent a health hazard that may be associated with the product.” 21 C.F.R. § 740.1(a).

187. Defendants violated this law.

188. The violation was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm suffered by Plaintiff,

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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

Negligent Failure to Warn (Against All Defendants)

189. Plaintiff hereby incorporates each of the paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

190. Plaintiff claims that Defendants were negligent by not using reasonable care to warn or instruct about the talcum powder product’s dangerous condition or about facts that made the product likely to be dangerous.

191. Defendants manufactured, distributed or sold the product.

192. Defendants knew or reasonably should have known that the product was dangerous or was likely to be dangerous when used or misused in a reasonably foreseeable manner;

193. Defendants knew or reasonably should have known that users would not realize the danger.

194. Defendants failed to adequately warn of the danger or instruct on the safe use of the product.

195. A reasonable manufacturer, distributor, or seller under the same or similar circumstances would have warned of the danger or instructed on the safe use of the product.

196. Plaintiff was harmed.

197. Defendants’ failure to warn or instruct was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s harm.

198. Plaintiff also alleges that D efendants failed to provide any warning about the dangers of the talcum powder products to consumers, including Plaintiff, after it was sold.

199. Defendants manufactured, distributed and sold the product.

200. Defendants knew or reasonably should have known that the product was dangerous or was likely to be dangerous when used in a reasonably foreseeable manner.

201. Defendants were aware of this danger and defect both before and after the product was sold.

202. Defendants failed to recall the product or warn of the danger of the product.

203. A reasonable manufacture, distributor or seller under the same or similar circumstances would have recalled the product or provided a post-sale warning.

204. Plaintiff was harmed.

[ 205. Defendants’ failure to recall the product or provide a warning was a substantial factor in

causing Plaintiff’s harm.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Strict Liability - Design Defect (Against All Defendants)

206. Plaintiff hereby incorporates each of the paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

207. Plaintiff claims that she was harmed by a product tested, distributed, manufactured, and/or sold by Defendants that was defectively designed.

208. Plaintiff claims the product’s design was defective because the talcum powder product did not perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would have expected it to perform.

209. Defendants manufactured, distributed or sold the talcum powder product.

210. The talcum powder product did not perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would have expected it to perform when used or misused in an intended or reasonably foreseeable way.

211. Plaintiff was harmed.

212. The talcum powder product’s failure to perform safely was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s harm.

213. As an altemative to the consumer expectations test, Plaintiff also claims that the talcum powder product was defectively designed under the risk-benefit test.

214. Defendants manufactured, distributed or sold the product.

215. The talcum powder product’s design was a substantial factor in causing harm to Plaintiff.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Strict Liability - Failure to Warn (Against All Defendants)

216. Plaintiff hereby incorporates each of the paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

217. Plaintiff claims that the talc powder products lacked sufficient warmnings of the potential