UNITED RENTALS (NORTH AMERICA) INC. VS RED BULL GLOBAL

Tentative Rulings

Case Number: ****8496    Hearing Date: January 26, 2021    Dept: P

Tentative Ruling

United Rentals, Inc. v. Red Bull Global et al., Case No. ****8496

Hearing Date January 20, 2021

Defendant Dyne’s Motion for Summary Adjudication – cont’d. from 9/16/20

Plaintiff alleges defendant Alpha GRP, Inc. dba Red Bull Global Rallycross ALP (“Red Bull”) failed to pay money owed under a written credit application. Plaintiff alleges Red Bull’s former CEO defendant Dyne personally guaranteed the loan. Defendant Dyne moves for summary adjudication, arguing he did not sign the credit agreement or authorize anyone to sign it on his behalf. On September 16, 2020 the court continued the hearing to allow plaintiff to depose Dyne.

Evidentiary Objections: OVERRULED.

Analysis

To obtain summary judgment, “all that the defendant need do is to show that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action.” See Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853; see also Mitchell v. United National Ins. Co. (2005) 127 Cal. App. 4th 457. “Although he remains free to do so, the defendant need not himself conclusively negate any such element.” Ibid. “Once the defendant has made such a showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or as to a defense to the cause of action. If the plaintiff does not make such a showing, summary judgment in favor of the defendant is appropriate.” See Mitchell, at 467. Until defendant meets this evidentiary burden, plaintiff has no burden to present evidence showing a triable issue of fact. See Hagen v. Hickenbottom (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 168, 178; see also Hawkins v. Wilton (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 936, 940, citing Duckett v. Pistoresi Ambulance Service, Inc. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1525, 1533.

A party seeking to rely on an agreement including an electronic signature must provide evidence the signature was the act of the purported signer. Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 840. An agent has authority to bind a principal when the principal “intentionally, or by want of ordinary care, allows the agent to believe” the agent possesses authority. Cal. Civ. Code ;2316.

Dyne presents evidence he never signed the credit application and never conferred actual or ostensible authority on anyone else to sign it on his behalf. Def. sep. stmt. 1-3. In plaintiffs’ January 2020 responses to special interrogatories, plaintiff admitted it had no facts indicating Dyne signed or electronically submitted the agreement. Sep. stmt. 1-2. This meets defendant’s initial burden, which shifts to plaintiff to show a triable issue of fact.

Plaintiff argues defendant’s assistant Hope Korey signed the agreement and had ostensible authority to bind Dyne. Additionally, plaintiff argues that under equitable estoppel, when an agent negligently misrepresents the scope of her authority to a third party, the third party can rely on that representation, and the agent’s principal can be held liable for agreements formed by the agent, even if outside the scope of the agent’s actual authority. Lix v. Edwards (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 573. Plaintiff presents evidence indicating Dyne delegated some authority to Korey, and she may have been responsible for credit applications as Red Bull’s agent. Dyne depo., pp. 23:24 - 30:5. This creates a triable issue of fact. DENIED.

DUE TO THE ONGOING COVID-19 PANDEMIC, PARTIES AND COUNSEL ARE STRONGLY ENCOURAGED TO APPEAR VIA COURT CALL WHENEVER POSSIBLE.

Case Number: ****8496    Hearing Date: January 20, 2021    Dept: P

Tentative Ruling

United Rentals, Inc. v. Red Bull Global et al., Case No. ****8496

Hearing Date January 20, 2021

Defendant Dyne’s Motion for Summary Adjudication – cont’d. from 9/16/20

Plaintiff alleges defendant Alpha GRP, Inc. dba Red Bull Global Rallycross ALP (“Red Bull”) failed to pay money owed under a written credit application. Plaintiff alleges Red Bull’s former CEO defendant Dyne personally guaranteed the loan. Defendant Dyne moves for summary adjudication, arguing he did not sign the credit agreement or authorize anyone to sign it on his behalf. On September 16, 2020 the court continued the hearing to allow plaintiff to depose Dyne.

Evidentiary Objections: OVERRULED.

Analysis

To obtain summary judgment, “all that the defendant need do is to show that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action.” See Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4^th 826, 853; see also Mitchell v. United National Ins. Co. (2005) 127 Cal. App. 4th 457. “Although he remains free to do so, the defendant need not himself conclusively negate any such element.” Ibid. “Once the defendant has made such a showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or as to a defense to the cause of action. If the plaintiff does not make such a showing, summary judgment in favor of the defendant is appropriate.” See Mitchell, at 467. Until defendant meets this evidentiary burden, plaintiff has no burden to present evidence showing a triable issue of fact. See Hagen v. Hickenbottom (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 168, 178; see also Hawkins v. Wilton (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 936, 940, citing Duckett v. Pistoresi Ambulance Service, Inc. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1525, 1533.

A party seeking to rely on an agreement including an electronic signature must provide evidence the signature was the act of the purported signer. Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 840. An agent has authority to bind a principal when the principal “intentionally, or by want of ordinary care, allows the agent to believe” the agent possesses authority. Cal. Civ. Code ;2316.

Dyne presents evidence he never signed the credit application and never conferred actual or ostensible authority on anyone else to sign it on his behalf. Def. sep. stmt. 1-3. In plaintiffs’ January 2020 responses to special interrogatories, plaintiff admitted it had no facts indicating Dyne signed or electronically submitted the agreement. Sep. stmt. 1-2. This meets defendant’s initial burden, which shifts to plaintiff to show a triable issue of fact.

Plaintiff argues defendant’s assistant Hope Korey signed the agreement and had ostensible authority to bind Dyne. Additionally, plaintiff argues that under equitable estoppel, when an agent negligently misrepresents the scope of her authority to a third party, the third party can rely on that representation, and the agent’s principal can be held liable for agreements formed by the agent, even if outside the scope of the agent’s actual authority. Lix v. Edwards (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 573. Plaintiff presents evidence indicating Dyne delegated some authority to Korey, and she may have been responsible for credit applications as Red Bull’s agent. Dyne depo., pp. 23:24 - 30:5. This creates a triable issue of fact. DENIED.

DUE TO THE ONGOING COVID-19 PANDEMIC, PARTIES AND COUNSEL ARE STRONGLY ENCOURAGED TO APPEAR VIA COURT CALL.