SONIA SOTO, ET AL. VS MATRIX SERVICE, INC., ET AL.

Tentative Rulings

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Case Number: 20STCV35557 Hearing Date: October 27, 2021 Dept: B

LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT – SOUTHWEST DISTRICT

Honorable Gary Y. Tanaka Wednesday, October 27, 2021

Department B Calendar No. 12

PROCEEDINGS

Sonia Soto, et al. v. Matrix Service, Inc., et al.

20STCV35557

1. Brandon K. Austin’s Motion to Quash Service of Summons and Complaint

2. Brandon K. Austin’s Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to C.C.P. ; 128.5(a) and (b)(1)

TENTATIVE RULING

Brandon K. Austin’s Motion to Quash Service of Summons and Complaint is granted.

Brandon K. Austin’s Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to C.C.P. ; 128.5(a) and (b)(1) is denied.

Background

Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on September 20, 2020. Plaintiffs allege the following facts: Plaintiffs’ decedent died in a work-related accident. Decedent was killed by a defective jack stand used to refurbish a tank at the Torrance Refinery. Plaintiffs allege the following causes of action: 1. Negligence; 2. Strict Products Liability; 3. Breach of Warranties.

Objections

Plaintiffs’ objections 1 to 4 to the declaration of Brandon K. Austin are overruled.

Defendant’s objections 1 to 4 are sustained.

Requests for Judicial Notice

Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice is granted pursuant to Evid. Code ; 452(h).

Defendant’s request for judicial notice is granted pursuant to Evid. Code ; 452(d).

Motion to Quash

Defendant Brandon K. Austin moves for an order quashing service of the summons and complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedures section 418.10(a) and (b)(1).

Plaintiffs have the burden to show that sufficient minimum contacts exist between Defendant and California to establish personal jurisdiction. See, Mihlon v. Superior Court (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 703, 710; See, also, Edmunds v. Superior Court (1994) 24 Cal.App.4^th 221, 230-31. Plaintiffs must meet this burden by a preponderance of the evidence. See, Ziller Elec. Lab GmbH v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1222, 1232. Here, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently met their burden.

General Jurisdiction

A non-resident defendant may be subject to the forum state’s general jurisdiction if the defendant’s contacts are substantial, continuous, and systematic. See, Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4^th 434, 445. Here, Plaintiffs have not submitted evidence to establish that the Court may exercise general jurisdiction over Defendant. Plaintiffs have failed to provide competent evidence to establish that Defendant’s connections with California are sufficiently continuous and systematic to impose general jurisdiction. See, Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945). The Court notes that in Plaintiffs’ opposition, Plaintiffs failed to present any argument to suggest that the Court may exercise general jurisdiction over moving Defendant.

Specific Jurisdiction

Plaintiffs have not met their burden to establish the exercise of specific jurisdiction over Defendant.

“When determining whether specific jurisdiction exists, courts consider the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation. A court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if: (1) the defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits; (2) the controversy is related to or arises out of the defendant's contacts with the forum; and (3) the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with fair play and substantial justice.” Snowney v. Harrah’s Ent., Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4^th 1054, 1062 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Defendant has submitted the following evidence to support his contention that he did not purposefully avail himself of the benefits of the California forum. Defendant was first contacted by Adam at JT Thorpe to duplicate a drawing of a jack stand. (Austin Decl., ¶ 7.) Adam did not inform Defendant why he needed a drawing of this particular jack stand and where the project would be located. (Id. at ¶ 8.) Defendant believed that Adam was located in New Jersey. (Id. at ¶ 9.) Defendant advised Adam repeatedly that he would stamp his drawing with his Texas stamp as Defendant is only currently actively licensed in Texas. (Id. at ¶¶ 4, 10.) Adam never advised Defendant that the job required a stamp for a different jurisdiction. (Id. at ¶ 10.) Had Adam stated he needed it to be stamped for California, Austin would have advised him that he is not a licensed engineer in California and cannot stamp it with a California stamp. (Id. at ¶ 10.) Defendant gave Adam the drawing with a Texas stamp. (Id. at ¶ 11.) After Defendant gave Adam the drawing, he learned nothing further of the jack stand. He did not know if it was built, who built it, where they built it, whether they built it to the specifications of the drawing, and whether it was modified. (Id. at ¶ 12.) Defendant did not know if or where the jack stand was used and did not know that jack stand was used in California until Defendant became aware of this incident. (Id. at ¶ 12.)

Plaintiffs provide no competent evidence to establish that Defendant purposefully availed himself of the benefits of the California forum. Plaintiffs simply provide conjecture and speculation that Defendant must have known that the design would be made for a jack stand to be utilized in California based primarily on emails from Adam Tussey, an employee of JT, and Defendant. In Tussey’s signature line on the emails, a California address is set forth. Also, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant submitted his invoice to an address in California for JT.

However, there is no substantive, competent evidence to demonstrate that Defendant knew that his jack stand design would be utilized for a product to be used in California. As noted above, Defendant made it clear to Adam Tussey that an engineering stamp from a state outside of Texas would be required if the jack stand was to be used outside of Texas, and that Defendant would have provided a referral to an engineer from the proper state. The arguments presented by Plaintiffs are not sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (stating that “in contrast to general, all-purpose jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.) (Internal citations and quotations omitted). There is no competent evidence to show that Defendant specifically knew that his design was going to be utilized for a jack stand in California. The stray references in a signature line in an email or the mere fact that invoices were sent to California does not establish that Defendant knew that the jack stand itself was to be used for a California project.

Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to provide facts that demonstrate that Defendant purposefully availed himself of the forum benefits. Plaintiffs failed to submit facts to show that the controversy relates to or arises out of Defendant’s contacts with California. See, Gilmore Bank v. Asia Trust New Zealand Ltd. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1558, 1573. Finally, requiring Defendant to defend himself in California does not comport with notions of fair play and substantial justice.

Thus, Plaintiffs have not met their burden to establish the existence of specific jurisdiction as to Defendant.

Defendant’s motion to quash service of summons and complaint is granted.

Motion for Sanctions

Code Civ. Proc., ; 128.5 states:

“(a) A trial court may order a party, the party's attorney, or both, to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by another party as a result of actions or tactics, made in bad faith, that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay. This section also applies to judicial arbitration proceedings under Chapter 2.5 (commencing with Section 1141.10) of Title 3 of Part 3.

(b) For purposes of this section:

(1) “Actions or tactics” include, but are not limited to, the making or opposing of motions or the filing and service of a complaint, cross-complaint, answer, or other responsive pleading. The mere filing of a complaint without service thereof on an opposing party does not constitute “actions or tactics” for purposes of this section.

(2) “Frivolous” means totally and completely without merit or for the sole purpose of harassing an opposing party.

(c) Expenses pursuant to this section shall not be imposed except on notice contained in a party's moving or responding papers or, on the court's own motion, after notice and opportunity to be heard. An order imposing expenses shall be in writing and shall recite in detail the action or tactic or circumstances justifying the order.

(d) In addition to any award pursuant to this section for an action or tactic described in subdivision (a), the court may assess punitive damages against the plaintiff on a determination by the court that the plaintiff's action was an action maintained by a person convicted of a felony against the person's victim, or the victim's heirs, relatives, estate, or personal representative, for injuries arising from the acts for which the person was convicted of a felony, and that the plaintiff is guilty of fraud, oppression, or malice in maintaining the action.

(e) This section shall not apply to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions.

(f) Sanctions ordered pursuant to this section shall be ordered pursuant to the following conditions and procedures:

(1) If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court issues an order pursuant to subdivision (a), the court may, subject to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the party, the party's attorneys, or both, for an action or tactic described in subdivision (a). In determining what sanctions, if any, should be ordered, the court shall consider whether a party seeking sanctions has exercised due diligence.

(A) A motion for sanctions under this section shall be made separately from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific alleged action or tactic, made in bad faith, that is frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.

(B) If the alleged action or tactic is the making or opposing of a written motion or the filing and service of a complaint, cross-complaint, answer, or other responsive pleading that can be withdrawn or appropriately corrected, a notice of motion shall be served as provided in Section 1010, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court, unless 21 days after service of the motion or any other period as the court may prescribe, the challenged action or tactic is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected.

(C) If warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm shall be held jointly responsible for violations committed by its partners, associates, and employees.

(D) If the alleged action or tactic is the making or opposing of a written motion or the filing and service of a complaint, cross-complaint, answer, or other responsive pleading that can be withdrawn or appropriately corrected, the court on its own motion may enter an order describing the specific action or tactic, made in bad faith, that is frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay, and direct an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has made an action or tactic as defined in subdivision (b), unless, within 21 days of service of the order to show cause, the challenged action or tactic is withdrawn or appropriately corrected.

(2) An order for sanctions pursuant to this section shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of the action or tactic or comparable action or tactic by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorney's fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the action or tactic described in subdivision (a).

(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party for a violation of presenting a claim, defense, and other legal contentions that are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law.

(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's motion unless the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims made by or against the party that is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned.

(g) A motion for sanctions brought by a party or a party's attorney primarily for an improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation, shall itself be subject to a motion for sanctions. It is the intent of the Legislature that courts shall vigorously use its sanction authority to deter the improper actions or tactics or comparable actions or tactics of others similarly situated.

(h) The liability imposed by this section is in addition to any other liability imposed by law for acts or omissions within the purview of this section.

(i) This section applies to actions or tactics that were part of a civil case filed on or after January 1, 2015.”

First, the Court finds that the safe harbor provision was sufficiently complied with by Defendant as the motion was served on March 10, 2021, but not filed until April 1, 2021. Here, however, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ inaction to dismiss Defendant, upon being served with the motion for sanctions, was not in bad faith. Plaintiffs have sufficiently established that the decision not to dismiss Defendant and instead oppose the instant motions was based on a good faith belief that emails and correspondences between Defendant and Adam Tussey from JT Thorpe provided a sufficient basis to show that moving Defendant purposefully availed himself of the benefits of the instant forum. While the Court ultimately determined that no general or specific jurisdiction existed over moving Defendant, Plaintiffs’ decision to vigorously oppose the instant motions and not to dismiss Defendant does not constitute frivolous conduct or tactics intended to cause unnecessary delay for purposes of imposing sanctions pursuant to CCP ; 128.5.

The Court also finds that the motion itself was not brought for an improper purpose and declines to impose counter sanctions upon the moving party.

Thus, the requests for sanctions submitted by both moving Defendant and Plaintiffs are denied.

Defendant is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

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