This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 11/05/2020 at 01:33:01 (UTC).

SHARON LYLE VS LONG BEACH COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT ET AL

Case Summary

On 03/06/2018 SHARON LYLE filed a Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury lawsuit against LONG BEACH COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judges overseeing this case are MARC D. GROSS, JON R. TAKASUGI, HOLLY E. KENDIG and THOMAS D. LONG. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****6763

  • Filing Date:

    03/06/2018

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury

  • Court:

    Los Angeles County Superior Courts

  • Courthouse:

    Stanley Mosk Courthouse

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judges

MARC D. GROSS

JON R. TAKASUGI

HOLLY E. KENDIG

THOMAS D. LONG

 

Party Details

Plaintiff and Petitioner

LYLE SHARON

Defendants and Respondents

LOS ANGELES COUNTY OF

LONG BEACH COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT

DOES 1 - 50

LONG BEACH CITY OF

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

CITY OF LONG BEACH

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff and Petitioner Attorneys

AZIZI DAVID ESQ.

AZIZI DAVID

Defendant and Respondent Attorneys

ENGELIEN KEVIN COUNTY COUNSEL

RUSSELL HOWARD D.

DUMONT LOUIS R. ESQ.

DUMONT LOUIS R.ESQ.

HARBER STEPHEN M.

DUNKEL YARON FELIX

ENGELIEN KEVIN JOHN

 

Court Documents

Notice - NOTICE NOTICE OF NON OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT CITY OF LONG BEACH'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF ISSUES

10/26/2020: Notice - NOTICE NOTICE OF NON OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT CITY OF LONG BEACH'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF ISSUES

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (TRIAL SETTING CONFERENCE)

11/3/2020: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (TRIAL SETTING CONFERENCE)

Affidavit - AFFIDAVIT EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF THE ISSUES BY DEFENDANT LONG BEACH COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT

9/18/2020: Affidavit - AFFIDAVIT EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF THE ISSUES BY DEFENDANT LONG BEACH COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT

Request for Judicial Notice

9/18/2020: Request for Judicial Notice

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (COURT ORDER RE RESCHEDULING MOTION HEARING;)

9/24/2020: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (COURT ORDER RE RESCHEDULING MOTION HEARING;)

Notice - NOTICE NOTICE OF CONTINUED HEARING ON DEFENDANT CITY OF LONG BEACH'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

10/16/2020: Notice - NOTICE NOTICE OF CONTINUED HEARING ON DEFENDANT CITY OF LONG BEACH'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (COURT ORDER RE FINAL STATUS CONFERENCE AND JURY TRIAL)

4/27/2020: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (COURT ORDER RE FINAL STATUS CONFERENCE AND JURY TRIAL)

Notice - NOTICE NOTICE OF CONTINUED HEARING ON DEFENDANT CITY OF LONG BEACH'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

4/27/2020: Notice - NOTICE NOTICE OF CONTINUED HEARING ON DEFENDANT CITY OF LONG BEACH'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON MOTION TO COMPEL DEPOSITION OF PLAINTIFF)

2/21/2020: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON MOTION TO COMPEL DEPOSITION OF PLAINTIFF)

Declaration - DECLARATION DECLARATION OF MARY FRANCES TORRES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

2/11/2020: Declaration - DECLARATION DECLARATION OF MARY FRANCES TORRES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR STIPULATED ORDER CONTINUI...)

11/21/2019: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR STIPULATED ORDER CONTINUI...)

Substitution of Attorney

8/1/2019: Substitution of Attorney

Notice of Lodging - NOTICE OF LODGING CROSS COMPLAINT

7/12/2019: Notice of Lodging - NOTICE OF LODGING CROSS COMPLAINT

REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL -

5/16/2018: REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL -

REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL -

9/11/2018: REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL -

CITY OF LONG BEACHS ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

4/13/2018: CITY OF LONG BEACHS ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS -

3/21/2018: PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS -

PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS -

3/23/2018: PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS -

37 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 03/08/2021
  • Hearing03/08/2021 at 08:30 AM in Department 31 at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; : OSC RE Dismissal

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  • 01/20/2021
  • Hearing01/20/2021 at 14:30 PM in Department 31 at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment

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  • 01/20/2021
  • Hearing01/20/2021 at 14:30 PM in Department 31 at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Trial Setting Conference

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  • 11/04/2020
  • DocketCertificate of Mailing for ((Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative...) of 11/04/2020); Filed by Clerk

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  • 11/04/2020
  • DocketMinute Order ( (Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative...)); Filed by Clerk

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  • 11/03/2020
  • Docketat 10:30 AM in Department 31, Thomas D. Long, Presiding; Trial Setting Conference - Held - Continued

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  • 11/03/2020
  • DocketMinute Order ( (TRIAL SETTING CONFERENCE)); Filed by Clerk

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  • 10/26/2020
  • DocketNotice (Notice of Non Opposition to Defendant City of Long Beach's Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative for Summary Adjudication of Issues); Filed by City of Long Beach (Defendant)

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  • 10/19/2020
  • Docketat 2:30 PM in Department 31, Thomas D. Long, Presiding; Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment (or, in the Alternative for Summary Adjudication of Issues) - Not Held - Advanced and Continued - by Court

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  • 10/16/2020
  • DocketNotice (NOTICE OF CONTINUED HEARING ON DEFENDANT CITY OF LONG BEACH'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT); Filed by City of Long Beach (Defendant)

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66 More Docket Entries
  • 04/13/2018
  • DocketAnswer; Filed by County of Los Angeles (Defendant)

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  • 03/23/2018
  • DocketProof-Service/Summons; Filed by Sharon Lyle (Plaintiff)

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  • 03/23/2018
  • DocketPROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

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  • 03/21/2018
  • DocketPROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

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  • 03/21/2018
  • DocketProof-Service/Summons; Filed by Sharon Lyle (Plaintiff)

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  • 03/15/2018
  • DocketProof-Service/Summons; Filed by Sharon Lyle (Plaintiff)

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  • 03/15/2018
  • DocketPROOF OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

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  • 03/06/2018
  • DocketSUMMONS

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  • 03/06/2018
  • DocketCOMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES: LIABILITY FOR DANGEROUS CONDITION OF PUBLIC PROPERTY, PURSUANT TO GOVERNMENT CODE 835 ET SEQ.; ETC

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  • 03/06/2018
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by Sharon Lyle (Plaintiff)

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Tentative Rulings

Case Number: BC696763    Hearing Date: November 04, 2020    Dept: 31

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

SHARON LYLE,

Plaintiff(s),

vs.

LONG BEACH COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT, ET AL.,

Defendant(s).

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CASE NO: BC696763

[TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT CITY OF LONG BEACH’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Dept. 31

2:30 p.m.

November 4, 2020

 

  1. Background

    Plaintiff, Sharon Lyle (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Long Beach Community College District (the “College”), City of Long Beach (the “City”), and County of Los Angeles for damages arising out of Plaintiff’s fall on a sidewalk. The complaint alleges causes of action for (1) dangerous condition of public property pursuant to Government Code § 835, and (2) public employee liability for wrongful acts or omissions under Government Code § 840.2

    The City now moves for summary judgment as to both Plaintiff’s complaint.

  2. Motion for Summary Judgment

  1. Moving Argument

The City moves for summary judgment on the ground that the City transferred beneficial ownership of the sidewalk to the College in 1986, and the City had no possessory or beneficial interest in the sidewalk and did not control it. Furthermore, the City asserts it is not liable under Government Code § 840.2 because this provision pertains to liability of an employee, not a public entity, and Plaintiff cannot establish the City owed her duty since the City did not control the sidewalk.

On 10/26/20, the City filed a Notice of Non-Opposition indicating that no opposition had been filed and none was expected to be.

  1. Burdens on Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper “if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc. §437c(c).) Where a defendant seeks summary judgment or adjudication, he must show that either “one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action.” (Id. at §437c(o)(2).) A defendant may satisfy this burden by showing that the claim “cannot be established” because of the lack of evidence on some essential element of the claim. (Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 574, 590.) Once the defendant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or defense thereto.” (Ibid.)

The moving party bears the initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) A defendant moving for summary judgment must show either (1) that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established or (2) that there is a complete defense to that cause of action. (Id. at §437c(p).) A defendant may discharge this burden by furnishing either (1) affirmative evidence of the required facts or (2) discovery responses conceding that the plaintiff lacks evidence to establish an essential element of the plaintiff's case. If a defendant chooses the latter option he or she must present evidence “and not simply point out that plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence….” Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 865-66,

[A] defendant may simply show the plaintiff cannot establish an essential element of the cause of action “by showing that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” (Id. at p. 854.) Thus, rather than affirmatively disproving or negating an element (e.g., causation), a defendant moving for summary judgment has the option of presenting evidence reflecting the plaintiff does not possess evidence to prove that element. “The defendant may, but need not, present evidence that conclusively negates an element of the plaintiff's cause of action. The defendant may also present evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence—as through admissions by the plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing” to support an essential element of his case. (Aguilar, supra, at p. 855.) Under the latter approach, a defendant's initial evidentiary showing may “consist of the deposition testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses, the plaintiff's factually devoid discovery responses, or admissions by the plaintiff in deposition or in response to requests for admission that he or she has not discovered anything that supports an essential element of the cause of action.” (Lona v. Citibank, N.A., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 110.) In other words, a defendant may show the plaintiff does not possess evidence to support an element of the cause of action by means of presenting the plaintiff's factually devoid discovery responses from which an absence of evidence may be reasonably inferred. (Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Construction Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 83.)

Thus, a moving defendant has two means by which to shift the burden of proof under the summary judgment statute: “The defendant may rely upon factually insufficient discovery responses by the plaintiff to show that the plaintiff cannot establish an essential element of the cause of action sued upon. [Citation.] [Or a]lternatively, the defendant may utilize the tried and true technique of negating (‘disproving’) an essential element of the plaintiff's cause of action.” (Brantly v. Pisaro (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1591, 1598.)

(Leyva v. Garcia (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1095, 1103.)

Until the moving defendant has discharged its burden of proof, the opposing plaintiff has no burden to come forward with any evidence. Once the moving defendant has discharged its burden as to a particular cause of action, however, the plaintiff may defeat the motion by producing evidence showing that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action. (Id. at §437c(p)(2).) On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party's supporting documents are strictly construed and those of his opponent liberally construed, and doubts as to the propriety of summary judgment should be resolved against granting the motion. (D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 21.)

  1. Analysis

The elements of a negligence and premises liability cause of action are the same: duty, breach, causation, and damages. (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.) Those who own, possess, or control property generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in managing the property in order to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm. (Annocki v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 37.) To determine the existence and scope of duty, courts consider the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, and the extent of the burden to the defendant of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach. (Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 113.)

“A defendant cannot be held liable for the defective or dangerous condition of property which it did not own, possess, or control. Where the absence of ownership, possession, or control has been unequivocally established, summary judgment is proper. [Citation.]” (Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital (1985) 38 Cal.3d 112, 134.) There are exceptions to this general rule where a person has voluntarily assumed a duty to act, either by contract or by his or her actions (Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club of Southern California (2002) 161 Cal.App.3d 571, 575), or where a person creates the danger that causes the harm or increases a foreseeable risk of harm. (Vasilenko v. Grace Family Church (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1077, 1081).

Courts have held that in the absence of a statute a landowner is under no duty to maintain in a safe condition a public street abutting upon the landowner’s property unless the landowner created the danger. (See, e.g., Sexton v. Brooks (1952) 39 Cal.2d 153, 157.) “The reason for this rule is that a landowner generally has no right to control another’s property, including streets owned and maintained by the government.” (Vasilenko, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1084.) However, after applying the Rowland factors, courts have imposed a duty on adjacent landowners where the landowners magnified the danger of abutting property, obstructed the danger of abutting property, or had control over a condition on their property which would justify imposing a duty.

Moreover, supporting the rule that the duty of an abutter to maintain the sidewalk in a safe condition, if existing, runs with the land, and hence a property owner cannot avoid such duty on the ground that the condition was created by or at the request of his predecessor in title, the courts in a number of cases have held the owner of abutting property liable for injuries resulting from a defective or dangerous condition of the sidewalk although such condition was created by his predecessor in title, particularly where the abutting owner had adopted the nuisance created by the faulty condition or had knowledge thereof prior to the time of the accident, or where, subsequent to his acquiring title, he exercised some general control over the sidewalk. Sexton v Brooks, supra, 39 Cal.2d 153; Peters v San Francisco (1953) 41 Cal.2d 419.

  1. Moving Burden

The City’s evidence shows that in 1989 it executed a Stadium Transfer Deed to the College, which included the area with the subject sidewalk where Plaintiff fell. (UMF 17-18.) The deed conveyed beneficial title conveyed and all equitable right to use, control, manage, improve, develop, enjoy and profit from the subject lot to the College. (UMF 19-20.) The City has not used, controlled, managed, improved, developed, enjoyed or profited from the Veterans Memorial Stadium lot, including the sidewalk, at least since 2002, which is far before Plaintiff’s incident. (UMF 23, 26-29.) This evidence is sufficient to establish the City is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to Plaintiff’s claim under Government Code § 835 against it. Moreover, because the evidence establishes the City owed no duty to Plaintiff in regard to any liability under Government Code § 840.2. The burden therefore shifts to Plaintiff to raise a triable issue of material fact in this regard.

To date, no opposition has been filed. The City has filed and served a notice of non-opposition.

  1. Conclusion

Defendant the City’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

Defendant the City is ordered to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at sscdept31@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If the parties do not submit on the tentative, they should arrange to appear remotely.

 

Dated this 4th day of November, 2020

Hon. Thomas D. Long

Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: BC696763    Hearing Date: February 21, 2020    Dept: 31

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

SHARON LYLE,

Plaintiff,

vs.

LONG BEACH COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT, ET AL.,

Defendants.

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CASE NO: BC696763

[TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO COMPEL DEPOSITION; IMPOSING SANCTIONS

Dept. 31

1:30 p.m.

February 21, 2020

Defendant, Long Beach Community College District, conducted the first volume of Plaintiff’s, Sharon Lyle, deposition on November 6, 2019. The deposition was subsequently suspended, and the parties agreed to continue the second volume of Plaintiff’s deposition on a future date. (Motion, Ex. A.) On December 5, 9, 11, and 26, 2019, Defendant attempted to schedule the second volume of Plaintiff’s deposition. (Motion, Ex. B.) To date, Plaintiff’s counsel has not responded. This motion therefore follows.

The motion to compel is granted.  CCP §2025.450(a).  Defendant’s Counsel and Plaintiff’s Counsel are ordered to work together to schedule a time, date, and location for Plaintiff’s, Sharon Lyle, deposition(s).  The deposition(s) must go forward within twenty days.  If Counsel are unable to resolve this issue, Defendant’s Counsel may set the deposition on Defendant’s Counsel’s terms with ten days’ notice to Plaintiff’s Counsel (additional notice per Code if notice is by other than personal service). 

Defendant seeks sanctions against Plaintiff and her attorneys of record in the amount of $520.00.  Sanctions are mandatory.  §2025.450(g).  The Court finds this amount to be reasonable and therefore awards $520.00 in attorneys’ fees.

Sanctions are sought and imposed against Plaintiff and her attorney of record, jointly and severally; they are ordered to pay sanctions to Defendant, by and through its attorney of record, in the amount of $520.00, within twenty days.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at SSCDEPT31@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar.