On 01/11/2018 RONALD K WIGGINS filed a Property - Foreclosure lawsuit against WELLS FARGO BANK N A. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judge overseeing this case is DEIRDRE HILL. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.
Pending - Other Pending
Los Angeles County Superior Courts
Stanley Mosk Courthouse
Los Angeles, California
WIGGINS RONALD K.
DEUTSCHE MELLON NATIONAL ASSET LLC
DOES 1 THROUGH 20
CLEAR RECON CORP
WELLS FARGO BANK N.A.
SIMONE STUART R.
SIMONE STUART RUSSELL
GOLDING JONATHAN FREDERICK
REED SMITH LLP
ALDRIDGE PITE LLP
HANKINS SUZANNE M
ANDERSON GENAIL M
4/20/2018: CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT -
8/10/2018: Minute Order -
8/14/2018: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL?CIVIL
9/14/2018: Minute Order -
9/21/2018: NOTICE OF CONTINUANCE RE: MOTION TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL
11/7/2018: Minute Order - Minute Order (Hearing on Motion to be Relieved as Counsel)
11/30/2018: Minute Order - Minute Order (1) Further Case Management Conference; 2) Order to Show Cause...)
8/15/2019: Ex Parte Application - EX PARTE APPLICATION EX PARTE APPLICATION TO SET INFORMAL DISCOVERY CONFERENCE
10/23/2019: Separate Statement
10/23/2019: Motion for Summary Judgment
3/5/2020: Opposition - OPPOSITION TO MOTION
9/25/2020: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (C/F 1-8-20) (C/F 6/2...)
10/2/2020: Notice - NOTICE CORRECTED NOTICE OF RULING AND CONTINUANCE OF HEARING ON MSJ
4/3/2018: PROOF OF PERSONAL SERVICE OF CROSS-COMPLAINT ON CROSS-DEFENDANT DEUTSCHE MELLON NATIONAL ASSET LLC
3/9/2018: DEFENDANT WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.'S NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF
3/26/2018: SUMMONS -
1/18/2018: PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS -
1/17/2018: PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS -
Hearing03/24/2021 at 08:30 AM in Department 49 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Trial Setting ConferenceRead MoreRead Less
Hearing03/24/2021 at 08:30 AM in Department 49 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Hearing on Motion for Summary JudgmentRead MoreRead Less
Docketat 09:30 AM in Department 49; Non-Appearance Case Review (reconfirmation of receipt of briefs (due by3/10/21)) - HeldRead MoreRead Less
DocketStatus Report (RE SETTLEMENT MEET-AND-CONFER); Filed by Ronald K. Wiggins (Plaintiff)Read MoreRead Less
DocketMinute Order ( (Non-Appearance Case Review re: confirmation of receipt of bri...)); Filed by ClerkRead MoreRead Less
DocketBrief (PLAINTIFF?S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF RE HOW THE SHEEN v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT DECISION MAY IMPACT THE COURT'S DECISION ON DEFENDANT?S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT); Filed by Ronald K. Wiggins (Plaintiff)Read MoreRead Less
DocketReply (Supplemental Brief in support of Motion for Summary Judgment); Filed by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Defendant)Read MoreRead Less
DocketNotice (Corrected Notice of Ruling and Continuance of Hearing on MSJ); Filed by Ronald K. Wiggins (Plaintiff)Read MoreRead Less
DocketNotice of Ruling; Filed by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Defendant)Read MoreRead Less
Docketat 08:30 AM in Department 49; Trial Setting Conference ((c/f 6/22 per m.o. of 5/14/20)) - Held - ContinuedRead MoreRead Less
DocketOSC-RE Other (Miscellaneous); Filed by ClerkRead MoreRead Less
DocketNOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCERead MoreRead Less
DocketORDER TO SHOW CAUSE HEARINGRead MoreRead Less
DocketProof-Service/Summons; Filed by Ronald K. Wiggins (Plaintiff)Read MoreRead Less
DocketPROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONSRead MoreRead Less
DocketPROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONSRead MoreRead Less
DocketProof-Service/Summons; Filed by Ronald K. Wiggins (Plaintiff)Read MoreRead Less
DocketSUMMONSRead MoreRead Less
DocketCOMPLAINT FOR 1. VIOLATIONS OF THE HOMEOWNER BILL OF RIGHTS; 2. NEGLIGENCE; ETCRead MoreRead Less
DocketComplaint; Filed by Ronald K. Wiggins (Plaintiff)Read MoreRead Less
Case Number: BC689933 Hearing Date: September 25, 2020 Dept: 49
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles
Ronald K. Wiggins,
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., et al.
Hearing Date: September 25, 2020
Department 49, Judge Stuart M. Rice
(1) Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment or Adjudication
Moving Party: Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
Responding Party: Plaintiff Ronald K. Wiggins
Ruling: Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted.
Requests for Judicial Notice
Defendant’s Evidentiary Objections to Plaintiff’s Supplemental Declaration
Objection 1 is sustained for lack of foundation.
Objection 2 is overruled.
Objection 3 is sustained for lack of foundation and speculation.
Objection 4 is sustained for lack of foundation.
Objection 5 is sustained for lack of foundation.
Objection 6 is sustained for lack of foundation and speculation.
Objections 7-8 are overruled.
Objection 9 is sustained as to “[a]s far as I know, California legal support never received a reply or a denial letter” for lack of personal knowledge and overruled as to the remainder.
Objection 10 is sustained for lack of personal knowledge, speculation, and improper argument.
The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)
Trial judges are required “to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)
As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) Once the defendant has met that initial burden, the burden of production shifts, and the opposing party must make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Id.)
There are two means by which a moving defendant can shift the burden of proof under the summary judgment statute. (Levya v. Garcia (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1095, 1103.) The first is to negate or disprove an essential element of a plaintiff’s cause of action. (Id.) The second is to show that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence to establish an essential element of the cause of action. (Id.)
To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)
Motion for Summary Judgment or Adjudication
First Cause of Action for HBOR Violation
Under former section 2923.6 as in effect during the relevant period—until the end of 2017 (since amended)—if a borrower submitted a complete application for a first lien loan modification, a mortgage servicer was prohibited from recording a notice of default or sale until it makes a written determination that the borrower is not eligible for such a modification, and any appeal period has expired. (Former Civ. Code, § 2923.6, subd. (c).)
. . ..” (Former Civ. Code, § 2923.7, subd. (e).)
Defendant has met its burden of establishing that plaintiff cannot establish any HBOR violations. On February 10, 2017, a notice of default was recorded against the subject property. (UMF 7.) Defendant received a third-party authorization form dated February 21, 2017, allowing California Legal Support and two named individuals to communicate with defendant concerning the loan on plaintiff’s behalf. (UMF 8.) On March 27, 2017, defendant received plaintiff’s loan modification application. (UMF 9.) After reviewing that application, defendant determined plaintiff did not qualify for a loan modification and mailed plaintiff a denial letter dated April 25, 2017. (UMF 10-11.)
Defendant has presented evidence that it did not engage in dual tracking because it recorded the notice of trustee’s sale on August 16, 2017 (UMF 18), which was six days prior to the date plaintiff submitted another loan modification application on August 22, 2017 (UMF 19). Thus, defendant has made a prima facie showing that it did not engage in dual tracking under subdivision (c) of former 2923.6 since it had not even received plaintiff’s loan modification application until after it had recorded the notice of sale.
Further, defendant has proffered evidence showing that the application plaintiff submitted on August 22, 2017 was incomplete, and that plaintiff never provided the necessary additional documents despite being alerted as to the incompleteness of his loan modification application. (UMF 21, 24-25.) Thus, there was never a complete application that would result in dual-tracking within the meaning of former section 2923.6, subdivision (f).
Defendant has also shown that even if plaintiff had submitted a complete application for a loan modification when the notice of trustee’s sale was recorded in August 2017, that notice of sale expired by operation of law in September 19, 2018, one year from the originally-scheduled sale date of September 19, 2017. (See Civ. Code § 2924g, subd. (c).)
Finally, defendant has made a prima facie showing that it assigned a single point of contact to communicate with plaintiff and informed plaintiff through letters who those individuals were. (See Civ. Code, § 2923.7; UMF 15-16, 22-23.) Defendant has met its initial burden of establishing that there is no triable issue of material fact as to plaintiff’s first cause of action for violation of the HBOR.
Therefore, the burden shifts to plaintiff to establish that a material factual issue exists as to his cause of action for violation of the HBOR. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of raising a triable issue of material fact. The only evidence that plaintiff provides in support of his opposition to defendant’s motion is his own declaration. (See Declaration of Ronald K. Wiggins.)
Plaintiff purports to dispute that defendant provided him with a denial letter or explanation regarding a reason for defendant’s denial of his March 2017 loan application. (DMF 10.) However, plaintiff’s statement in his declaration that he did not receive the April 25, 2017 denial letter is insufficient to raise a triable issue of material fact as to whether defendant complied with its obligation to send such a letter. (See King v. United Parcel Services, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 426, 433 [uncorroborated and self-serving declarations are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact].) Plaintiff’s statement in his declaration that his authorized agent for communication with defendant about plaintiff’s loan “to [plaintiff’s] knowledge, [n]ever received any correspondence [from] Defendant dated April 25, 2017,” is also insufficient because it lacks foundation and plaintiff does not have personal knowledge of what a third-party received or did not receive on his behalf. (See Wiggins Decl. ¶ 16.)
Plaintiff also purports to dispute that defendant received his loan modification application on August 22, 2017. (See DMF 19.) Plaintiff contends that he submitted the application on August 14, 2017, two days prior to when defendant recorded the notice of trustee’s sale. (Id.) He contends that the application dated August 22, 2017, contained in defendant’s exhibit 12, is a false document on which defendant forged plaintiff’s signature. (DMF 19.) No factfinder would reasonably find in plaintiff’s favor on this issue. Whether submitted on August 22, or on August 16, as plaintiff contends, plaintiff does not dispute that he never submitted a complete application for loan modification, which is the predicate for a dual-tracking violation under the former HBOR section 2923.6, subdivision (c). Nor does plaintiff dispute that any claim based on a purported violation (assuming plaintiff had submitted a complete application) regarding the August 2017 notice of trustee’s sale is now moot because that notice expired by operation of law in September 2018. Plaintiff remains in the subject property. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue of material fact as to the HBOR cause of action based on dual-tracking.
Further, plaintiff does not dispute defendant’s position and evidence showing that it assigned plaintiff a single point of contact. (See DMF 15-16,22-23.) Therefore, plaintiff has also failed to meet his burden with respect to this allegation made in support of his first cause of action for violation of the HBOR.
In light of the foregoing, defendant’s motion is granted as to plaintiff’s first cause of action for violation of the HBOR.
Second Cause of Action for Negligence
Third Cause of Action for Violation of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL)
As contemplated by the HBOR (Civil Code section 2923.4, set seq.), defendant is nonetheless encouraged to work with plaintiff to come to a solution whereby plaintiff may remain in his house while defendant’s financial investment is also protected. Defendant is ordered to prepare and submit a proposed judgment consistent with this ruling and to give notice.
Date: September 25, 2020
Honorable Stuart M. Rice
Judge of the Superior Court
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