This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 06/03/2019 at 00:02:30 (UTC).

RAVEN STARRE VS BROOKE MARCH ET AL

Case Summary

On 12/15/2017 RAVEN STARRE filed a Personal Injury - Assault/Battery/Defamation lawsuit against BROOKE MARCH. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judge overseeing this case is TERESA A. BEAUDET. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.
Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****7258

  • Filing Date:

    12/15/2017

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Personal Injury - Assault/Battery/Defamation

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judge

TERESA A. BEAUDET

 

Party Details

Plaintiff and Petitioner

STARRE RAVEN

Respondents and Defendants

JOHNSON NANCY

STARR JASON

SHEELY AMY

MARCH BROOKE

SHOEMAKER MIKA

CERVINE SCOTT

BAYARD BETH

KIRKPATRICK PETER

ARTURA DEBRA

WEATHERS MINDY

VANG KANG

SHOEMAKER CRAIG

HERRIFORD CHRIS

CERVINE STEVEN

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff and Petitioner Attorneys

MLG AUTOMOTIVE LAW APLC

MICHAELS JONATHAN A.

Defendant Attorneys

SAFARIAN HARRY A.

KALLAS SERENA J.

WELLMAN CHRIS

STONE JASON M.

 

Court Documents

NEW NOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

1/30/2018: NEW NOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S UNVERIFIED COMPLAINT BY MIKA SHOEMAKER AND CRAIG SHOEMAKER

2/1/2018: ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S UNVERIFIED COMPLAINT BY MIKA SHOEMAKER AND CRAIG SHOEMAKER

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT, BROOKE MARCH'S, DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR LIBEL PER SE AND EXTORTION

2/5/2018: MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT, BROOKE MARCH'S, DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR LIBEL PER SE AND EXTORTION

NOTICE OF HEARING ON DEFENDANT' BROOKE MARCH'S, DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR LIBEL PER SE AND EXTORTION

2/5/2018: NOTICE OF HEARING ON DEFENDANT' BROOKE MARCH'S, DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR LIBEL PER SE AND EXTORTION

NOTICE OF HEARING ON DEFENDANT, AMY SHEELY'S, DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR LIBEL PER SE AND EXTORTION

2/5/2018: NOTICE OF HEARING ON DEFENDANT, AMY SHEELY'S, DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR LIBEL PER SE AND EXTORTION

DECLARATION OF JASON M. STONE, ESQ. IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT, AMY SHEELY'S, DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR LIBEL PER SE AND EXTORTION

2/5/2018: DECLARATION OF JASON M. STONE, ESQ. IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT, AMY SHEELY'S, DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR LIBEL PER SE AND EXTORTION

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT, AMY SHEELY'S, DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR LIBEL PER SE AND EXTORTION

2/5/2018: MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT, AMY SHEELY'S, DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR LIBEL PER SE AND EXTORTION

NOTICE OF HEARING ON DEFENDANT, STEVEN CERVINE'S, DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR LIBEL PER SE AND EXTORTION.

2/5/2018: NOTICE OF HEARING ON DEFENDANT, STEVEN CERVINE'S, DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR LIBEL PER SE AND EXTORTION.

DECLARATION OF JASON M. STONE, ESQ. IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT, DEBRA ARTURA'S, DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR LIBEL PER SE AND EXTORTION.

2/5/2018: DECLARATION OF JASON M. STONE, ESQ. IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT, DEBRA ARTURA'S, DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR LIBEL PER SE AND EXTORTION.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT, DEBRA ARTURA'S, DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR LIBEL PER SE AND EXTORTION.

2/5/2018: MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT, DEBRA ARTURA'S, DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR LIBEL PER SE AND EXTORTION.

DECLARATION OF JASON M. STONE, ESQ. IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT, NANCY JOHNSON'S, DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR LIBEL PER SE AND EXTORTION.

2/5/2018: DECLARATION OF JASON M. STONE, ESQ. IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT, NANCY JOHNSON'S, DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR LIBEL PER SE AND EXTORTION.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT, NANCY JOHNSON'S, DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR LIBEL PER SE AND EXTORTION.

2/5/2018: MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT, NANCY JOHNSON'S, DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR LIBEL PER SE AND EXTORTION.

NOTICE OF HEARING ON DEFENDANT, DEBRA ARTURA'S, DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR LIBEL PER SE AND EXTORTION.

2/5/2018: NOTICE OF HEARING ON DEFENDANT, DEBRA ARTURA'S, DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR LIBEL PER SE AND EXTORTION.

DECLARATION OF JASON M. STONE, ESQ. IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT, STEVEN CERVINE'S, DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR LIBEL PER SE AND EXTORTION.

2/5/2018: DECLARATION OF JASON M. STONE, ESQ. IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT, STEVEN CERVINE'S, DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR LIBEL PER SE AND EXTORTION.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT, STEVEN CERVINE'S, DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR LIBEL PER SE AND EXTORTION.

2/5/2018: MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT, STEVEN CERVINE'S, DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR LIBEL PER SE AND EXTORTION.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT, BETH BAYARD'S, DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR LIBEL PER SE AND EXTORTION.

2/5/2018: MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT, BETH BAYARD'S, DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR LIBEL PER SE AND EXTORTION.

NOTICE OF HEARING ON DEFENDANT, SCOTT CERVINE'S, DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR LIBEL PER SE AND EXTORTION

2/5/2018: NOTICE OF HEARING ON DEFENDANT, SCOTT CERVINE'S, DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR LIBEL PER SE AND EXTORTION

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT, SCOTT CERVINE'S, DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR LIBEL PER SE AND EXTORTION.

2/5/2018: MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT, SCOTT CERVINE'S, DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR LIBEL PER SE AND EXTORTION.

128 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 05/29/2019
  • Docketat 09:30 AM in Department 50, Teresa A. Beaudet, Presiding; Jury Trial - Held - Continued

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 05/16/2019
  • Docketat 09:30 AM in Department 50, Teresa A. Beaudet, Presiding; Final Status Conference - Held - Continued

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 05/10/2019
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department 50, Teresa A. Beaudet, Presiding; Hearing on Ex Parte Application (for order to continue trial date and all related dates) - Held - Advanced and Heard

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 05/10/2019
  • DocketNotice of Ruling; Filed by Raven Starre (Plaintiff)

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 05/09/2019
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department 50, Teresa A. Beaudet, Presiding; Hearing on Motion to Quash (subpoena and to seek a protective order for defendants Brooke March, Nancy Johnson, Amy Sheely, Beth Bayard, Debra Artura, Steven Cervine and Scott Cervine's facebook correspondence and accounts and sanctions of $4,140.00 (consolidated motion ).) - Not Held - Taken Off Calendar by Court

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 05/09/2019
  • DocketMinute Order ( (Hearing on Motion to Quash subpoena and to seek a protective ...)); Filed by Clerk

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 05/09/2019
  • DocketOrder (re Consolidated Motion to Quash)

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 05/09/2019
  • DocketOrder (re Ex Parte Application to continue trial); Filed by Raven Starre (Plaintiff)

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 05/09/2019
  • DocketEx Parte Application (Ex Parte Application); Filed by Raven Starre (Plaintiff)

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 05/08/2019
  • DocketProof of Service (not Summons and Complaint); Filed by Raven Starre (Plaintiff)

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
217 More Docket Entries
  • 02/01/2018
  • DocketANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S UNVERIFIED COMPLAINT BY MIKA SHOEMAKER AND CRAIG SHOEMAKER

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 02/01/2018
  • DocketAnswer; Filed by Mika Shoemaker (Defendant)

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 01/30/2018
  • DocketNotice of Case Management Conference; Filed by Clerk

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 01/30/2018
  • DocketNEW NOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 01/08/2018
  • DocketNotice of Case Management Conference; Filed by Clerk

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 01/08/2018
  • DocketNOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 12/15/2017
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by Raven Starre (Plaintiff)

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 12/15/2017
  • DocketSUMMONS

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 12/15/2017
  • DocketCOMPLAINT FOR: 1. LIBEL PER SE; AND 2. EXTORTION.

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 02/05/2017
  • DocketPoints and Authorities; Filed by Defendant/Respondent

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less

Tentative Rulings

Case Number: ****7258 Hearing Date: June 21, 2022 Dept: 50

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

RAVEN STARRE,

Plaintiff,

vs.

brooke march, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.:

****7258

Hearing Date:

June 21, 2022

Hearing Time:

10:00 a.m.

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE:

PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Raven Starre (“Plaintiff”) requests entry of default judgment against Defendants Peter Kirkpatrick, Mindy Weathers, and Jason Starr (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff seeks judgment in the total amount of $23,000,000.00, comprising $23,000,000.00 demanded in the complaint.

The Court notes that Plaintiff has still failed to sufficiently prove up the substantial amount of damages requested. The Court reiterates that it is required to render default judgment only “for that relief . . . as appears by the evidence to be just.” ((Code Civ. Proc., 585(b).) Without such evidence, the court may refuse to grant default judgment for any amount, notwithstanding the defendant’s default. ((Taliaferro v. Hoogs (1963) 219 Cal.App.2d 559, 560.)

Plaintiff’s declaration submitted in support of the request for default judgment references an Excel Spreadsheet and bank statements attached as Exhibit “B,” but the exhibit is entirely redacted. (See Starre Decl., 17.) On November 15, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to file under seal Exhibits M, N, O, P, and Q to the Declaration of Raven Starre in Support of Application for Default Judgment.[1] It does not appear that Plaintiff sought to file Exhibit “B” to her current declaration under seal. In any event, it is still unclear how Plaintiff arrived at the amount of $23,000,000.00 in requested damages. The Court notes that the bolded amounts listed in paragraphs 19-21 of Plaintiff’s declaration do not add up to $23,000,000.00. It is also still unclear how Plaintiff determined that her salary would have been at a minimum $300,000 more per year for the past 7 years and the next 13 years. (Starre Decl., 19.) In addition, there is insufficient evidence supporting these claims.

Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff’s request for default judgment without prejudice. The Court will discuss with Plaintiff a schedule for resubmission of the default judgment package.

DATED: June 21, 2022

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court


[1]This Order pertained to Plaintiff’s declaration in support of a previous request for default judgment.



Case Number: ****7258 Hearing Date: March 22, 2022 Dept: 50

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

RAVEN STARRE,

Plaintiff,

vs.

brooke march, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.:

****7258

Hearing Date:

March 22, 2022

Hearing Time:

10:00 a.m.

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE:

PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Raven Starre (“Plaintiff”) requests entry of default judgment against Defendants Peter Kirkpatrick, Mindy Weathers, and Jason Starr (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff seeks judgment in the total amount of $35,000,000.00, comprising $35,000,000.00 demanded in the complaint.

The Court notes a number of defects with the submitted default judgment package.

First, Plaintiff submitted a proposed judgment on Form JUD-100 yesterday. This is untimely. Additionally, Plaintiff has checked both box 1(e)(1) as well as 1(e)(2). Only box (2) should be checked.

Second, Plaintiff has still failed to sufficiently prove up the substantial amount of damages requested. Plaintiff’s declaration submitted in support of the request for default judgment references an Excel Spreadsheet attached as Exhibit “B,” but no exhibits are attached to the filed declaration. (See Starre Decl., 17.) The Court did receive a courtesy copy of the declaration with what appears to be over 100 pages that are totally redacted. On November 15, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to file under seal Exhibits M, N, O, P, and Q to the Declaration of Raven Starre in Support of Application for Default Judgment.[1] It does not appear that Plaintiff sought to file Exhibit “B” to her current declaration under seal. In any event, it is still unclear how Plaintiff calculated the amount of $35,000,000.00 in requested damages, and how Plaintiff determined that her salary would have been at a minimum $300,000 more per year for the past 7 years and the next 13 years. (Starre Decl., 19.) In addition, there is insufficient evidence supporting these claims.

Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff’s request for default judgment without prejudice. The Court will discuss with Plaintiff a schedule for resubmission of the default judgment package.

DATED: March 22, 2022

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court


[1]This Order pertained to Plaintiff’s declaration in support of her prior request for default judgment.



b'

Case Number: ****7258 Hearing Date: November 15, 2021 Dept: 50

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

RAVEN STARRE,

Plaintiff,

vs.

brooke march, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.:

****7258

Hearing Date:

November 15, 2021

Hearing Time:

10:00 a.m.

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE:

PLAINTIFF RAVEN STARRE’S MOTION TO FILE EXHIBITS UNDER SEAL

Background

Plaintiff Raven Starre (“Plaintiff”) filed this action on December 15, 2017. The operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) was filed on March 1, 2019 against various defendants. The SAC asserts causes of action for (1) libel per se, (2) cyber stalking – violation of Civil Code ; 1708.7, (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (4) conspiracy to commit libel per se, (5) aiding and abetting libel per se, (6) conspiracy to commit intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (7) aiding and abetting intentional infliction of emotional distress.

On October 26, 2021, Plaintiff filed a request for entry of default judgment against certain defendants, including defendants Peter Kirkpatrick, Mindy Weathers, and Jason Starr (collectively, “Defendants”).

Plaintiff now moves to file under seal certain documents attached to the Declaration of Raven Starre in Support of Plaintiff’s application for default judgment. The motion is unopposed.

Discussion

Generally, court records are presumed to be open unless confidentiality is required by law. ((Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550(c).) If the presumption of access applies, the court may order that a record be filed under seal “if it expressly finds facts that establish: (1) There exists an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to the record; (2) The overriding interest supports sealing the record; (3) A substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the record is not sealed; (4) The proposed sealing is narrowly tailored; and (5) No less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interest.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550(d).)

Plaintiff contends that the overriding interest at play here is Plaintiff’s right to privacy, including Plaintiff’s right to privacy concerning confidential financial information consisting of Plaintiff’s bank records and income documents. ((Cal. Const., art. I, ; 1); Moskowitz v. Superior Court (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 313, 315, disapproved on other grounds by Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531 [“Personal financial information comes within the zone of privacy protected by article I, section 1 of the California Constitution.”].) Plaintiff also asserts a right to privacy concerning Plaintiff’s medical information. ((Cal. Const., art. I, ; 1.)

Plaintiff contends that this interest supports sealing the documents at issue. Plaintiff also contends that there is a substantial probability that Plaintiff’s privacy interests will be prejudiced if the records are not sealed. Plaintiff contends Defendants created a website called RavenStarreScam.com, containing a litany of false, derogative, and libelous statements about Plaintiff. (Stupak Decl., ¶ 3). Plaintiff asserts that if the subject records are not filed under seal, Defendants will be provided with further opportunities to humiliate Plaintiff publicly. (Stupak Decl., ¶ 6).

Lastly, Plaintiff contends that the request is narrowly tailored and no less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interest. As set forth above, Defendants do not oppose the motion.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion to file under seal Exhibits M, N, O, P, and Q of the Declaration of Raven Starre in Support of Application for Default Judgment Against Defendants Peter Kirkpatrick, Mindy Weathers, and Jason Starr is GRANTED. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 2.551(e), the Court directs the clerk to file this order, maintain the records ordered sealed in a secure manner, and clearly identify the records as sealed by this order. The Court sets the hearing on the request for default judgment on December 2, 2021 at 2 p.m. in Dept. 50.

DATED: November 15, 2021 ________________________________

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court

'


Case Number: ****7258    Hearing Date: August 11, 2020    Dept: 50

 

 

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

raven starre,

Plaintiff,

vs.

brooke march, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.:

BC 687258

Hearing Date:

August 11, 2020

Hearing Time:

10:00 a.m.

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE:

DEFENDANTS AMY SHEELY, BETH BAYARD, BROOKE MARCH, DEBRA ARTURA, SCOTT CERVINE, AND STEVEN CERVINE’S (6) MOTIONS FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES UNDER C.C.P. ; 2033.420; 2033.420; 2033.420SectionOnlycite","Markup":null,"Master":"","name":"Psych_Cite_5","Original_string":"; 2033.420","Page":null,"Parallel":null,"Pattern":"SectionOnly","PinPage":null,"ReadOrderIndex":380,"Refers_To":null,"ShortText":"; 2033.420","Start":380,"Story":"wdMainTextStory"},"TOA":"","html":"

; 2033.420

"}" docpart="9707800FA626493992623F5CEEF007D1"> ; 2033.420

Background

Plaintiff Raven Starre (“Starre”) filed this action on December 15, 2017. The operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) was filed on March 1, 2019 against, inter alia, Defendants Brooke March, Scott Cervine, Nancy Johnson, Amy Sheely, Beth Bayard, Debra Artura, and Steven Cervine (collectively, “Defendants”). The Court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on February 13, 2020. On March 12, 2020, the Court entered judgment in favor of Defendants and against Starre.

Defendants now move for an award of attorney fees pursuant to PsychStateSubjectCode Full.StateStatuteCite Cal. Civ. Proc. Code ; 2033.420 ","ParentCiteID":null,"Processed":true,"Citation":{"current_string":"Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420","original_string":"Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420","error":null,"fullText":"Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420","refers_to_cite":null,"shortText":"Cal. Civ. Proc. Code ; 2033.420","isParallel":false,"parallel":null,"start":946,"end":986,"pattern":"Full.StateStatuteCite","readOrderIndex":946,"index":946,"citeType":1,"CiteShepSignal":0,"CiteShepSignalLink":null,"story":"wdMainTextStory","PinPage":null,"name":"CITRUS_BOOKMARK2","foundBy":"PsychStateSubjectCode","FullTextParen":"Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420","ParentheticalType":null,"IntermediateCite":false,"TOAHeading":null,"ts":{"$id":"5","End":134,"Offset":884,"Start":0,"nref":0,"nind":0,"story":"wdMainTextStory","namedRanges":[{"$id":"6","Name":"Psych_Cite_2","Range":{"$id":"7","ts":{"$ref":"5"},"_Start":62,"_End":102,"_Text":"Defendants now move for an award of attorney fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420. Starre opposes. Discussion "},"foundBy":null,"pattern":null,"tabName":null}],"Range":{"$id":"8","ts":{"$ref":"5"},"_Start":0,"_End":134,"_Text":"Defendants now move for an award of attorney fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420. Starre opposes. Discussion "}},"master":"___RESULTS_12","kernel_data":"Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420Full.StateStatuteCitecite__AfterStatutoryCite__AfterStatutoryCite._PatternAfterStatutoryCite.AfterStatutoryCite__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite()__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.((__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.))__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite._PatternStatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEdition__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEdition._PatternStatutoryCodeEdition.StatutoryCodeEdition__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEdition.PublisherDeering __AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEdition.Year__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEdition.Year._PatternYear.Year__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEdition.Year.YearJURISDICTIONYESPUBLISHERDeeringStateStatuteCode of Civil Procedure section 2033.420 StateStatute.__SectionOrSections section 2033.420 StateStatute.__SectionOrSections._PatternX1.X1StateStatute.__SectionOrSections.RequiredSectionSymbol section StateStatute.__SectionOrSections.RequiredSectionSymbol._PatternRequiredSectionSymbol.RequiredSectionSymbolStateStatute.__SectionOrSections.RequiredSectionSymbol.SectionSymbol;StateStatute.__SectionOrSections.X12033.420StateStatute._PatternStateStatutes.StateStatutesStateStatute.CalCal.StateStatute.CaliforniaCodeSubjectCiv. Proc. CodeStateStatute.Sectionsectionmaster_name___RESULTS_12"},"IconIndicator":{"Id":1,"Title":"Cite is formatted correctly, its long and short form are automatically being updated, and it will be included in TOA.","IconType":1,"ImagePath":"~/Content/Images/CCF/RecognizedNoSuggestions.png","Description":"Number of cites recognized by system as valid."},"Display":"Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420","CitationRichText":"Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420","IconShepardSignal":{"Id":-1,"Title":"No Analysis","IconType":0,"ImagePath":"/Content/Images/blank.jpg","Description":null},"ShepardSignalLink":null,"ShowShepardSignal":false,"ShowParentLink":false,"ParentCitation":null,"SuggestionsForCitation":[],"SuggestionsForCite":[],"SelectedSuggestion":null,"IsSuggestionEnabled":false,"UseCurrentIconIndicator":{"Id":1,"Title":"Cite is formatted correctly, its long and short form are automatically being updated, and it will be included in TOA.","IconType":1,"ImagePath":"~/Content/Images/CCF/RecognizedNoSuggestions.png","Description":"Number of cites recognized by system as valid."},"UseSuggestionIconIndicator":{"Id":1,"Title":"Cite is formatted correctly, its long and short form are automatically being updated, and it will be included in TOA.","IconType":1,"ImagePath":"~/Content/Images/CCF/RecognizedNoSuggestions.png","Description":"Number of cites recognized by system as valid."},"OriginalUseCurrentIconIndicator":{"Id":1,"Title":"Cite is formatted correctly, its long and short form are automatically being updated, and it will be included in TOA.","IconType":1,"ImagePath":"~/Content/Images/CCF/RecognizedNoSuggestions.png","Description":"Number of cites recognized by system as valid."},"CitationMarkupText":"Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420","ShortText":"Cal. Civ. Proc. Code ; 2033.420","IsParentCorrect":true,"IsParentCorrectableConfirmed":false,"IsParentUnknownConfirmed":false,"IsParentCorrectable":false,"IsParentUnknown":false,"CitationOriginalText":"Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420","ModifiedCiteText":null,"MarkUp":null,"IsCheckCurrent":false,"PreviousCitationRetain":null},"CQ":"","TOA":"","html":"

Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420

"}" docpart="9707800FA626493992623F5CEEF007D1">Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420Full.StateStatuteCitecite__AfterStatutoryCite__AfterStatutoryCite._PatternAfterStatutoryCite.AfterStatutoryCite__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite()__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.((__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.))__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite._PatternStatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEdition__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEdition._PatternStatutoryCodeEdition.StatutoryCodeEdition__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEdition.PublisherDeering __AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEdition.Year__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEdition.Year._PatternYear.Year__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEdition.Year.YearJURISDICTIONYESPUBLISHERDeeringStateStatuteCode of Civil Procedure section 2033.420 StateStatute.__SectionOrSections section 2033.420 StateStatute.__SectionOrSections._PatternX1.X1StateStatute.__SectionOrSections.RequiredSectionSymbol section StateStatute.__SectionOrSections.RequiredSectionSymbol._PatternRequiredSectionSymbol.RequiredSectionSymbolStateStatute.__SectionOrSections.RequiredSectionSymbol.SectionSymbol;StateStatute.__SectionOrSections.X12033.420StateStatute._PatternStateStatutes.StateStatutesStateStatute.CalCal.StateStatute.CaliforniaCodeSubjectCiv. Proc. CodeStateStatute.Sectionsectionmaster_name___RESULTS_12","Markup":"Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420","Master":"___RESULTS_12","name":"CITRUS_BOOKMARK2","Original_string":"Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420","Page":null,"Parallel":"","Pattern":"Full.StateStatuteCite","PinPage":"","ReadOrderIndex":946,"Refers_To":null,"ShortText":"Cal. Civ. Proc. Code section 2033.420","Start":946,"Story":"wdMainTextStory"},"TOA":"","html":"

Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420

"}" docpart="9707800FA626493992623F5CEEF007D1">Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420. Starre opposes.

Discussion

“Correct quotation (No suggestions)","CitationText":"Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (a)","ModifiedCitationText":"Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (a)","IsUseMyText":true,"IsMarkMyText":false,"IsEditMyText":false,"SuggestionForCitation":[],"IconIndicator":8,"UseCurrentIconIndicator":8,"UseCurrentMarkQuoteIconIndicator":0,"UseSuggestionIconIndicator":8,"IsEnabled":false,"IsUserConfirmed":false,"SuggestionCount":0,"IsManagedCite":true,"PinpointPageText":"Reassign pinpoint page","IsViewPinpointPage":false,"IsCorrect":true,"ShowPinPointPage":false,"SuggestionVisibility":false,"SuggestedDocUri":"If%20a%20party%20fails%20to%20admit%20the%20genuineness%20of%20any%20document%20or%20the%20truth%20of%20any%20matter%20when%20requested%20to%20do%20so%20under%20this%20chapter,%20and%20if%20the%20party%20requesting%20that%20admission%20thereafter%20proves%20the%20genuineness%20of%20that%20document%20or%20the%20truth%20of%20that%20matter,%20the%20party%20requesting%20the%20admission%20may%20move%20the%20court%20for%20an%20order%20requiring%20the%20party%20to%20whom%20the%20request%20was%20directed%20to%20pay%20the%20reasonable%20expenses%20incurred%20in%20making%20that%20proof,%20including%20reasonable%20attorney%e2%80%99s%20fees."}}}' docpart="9707800FA626493992623F5CEEF007D1">If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter when requested to do so under this chapter, and if the party requesting that admission thereafter proves the genuineness of that document or the truth of that matter, the party requesting the admission may move the court for an order requiring the party to whom the request was directed to pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney’s fees.” ( PsychStateSubjectCode Full.StateStatuteCite Cal. Civ. Proc. Code ; 2033.420 ","ParentCiteID":null,"Processed":true,"Citation":{"current_string":"Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (a)","original_string":"Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (a)","error":null,"fullText":"Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (a)","refers_to_cite":null,"shortText":"Cal. Civ. Proc. Code ; 2033.420","isParallel":false,"parallel":null,"start":1493,"end":1531,"pattern":"Full.StateStatuteCite","readOrderIndex":1493,"index":1493,"citeType":1,"CiteShepSignal":0,"CiteShepSignalLink":null,"story":"wdMainTextStory","PinPage":null,"name":"CITRUS_BOOKMARK3","foundBy":"PsychStateSubjectCode","FullTextParen":"Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (a)","ParentheticalType":null,"IntermediateCite":false,"TOAHeading":null,"ts":{"$id":"9","End":5313,"Offset":1018,"Start":0,"nref":0,"nind":0,"story":"wdMainTextStory","namedRanges":[{"$id":"10","Name":"Psych_Cite_3","Range":{"$id":"11","ts":{"$ref":"9"},"_Start":475,"_End":513,"_Text":"“If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter when requested to do so under this chapter, and if the party requesting that admission thereafter proves the genuineness of that document or the truth of that matter, the party requesting the admission may move the court for an order requiring the party to whom the request was directed to pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney’s fees.” (Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (a).) Such an order is mandatory unless an objection to the request was sustained or a response to it was waived under section 2033.290, the admission sought was of no substantial importance, the party failing to make the admission had reasonable ground to believe that that party would prevail on the matter, or there was other good reason for the failure to admit. (Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (b).) In the course of discovery, Starre denied the following Requests for Admission propounded by Defendants: Request for Admissions No. 13: Admit that YOU do not know the identity of the PERSON(S) who participated in publicizing the Website www. RavenStarreScam.com Request for Admissions No. 18: Admit that Defendant, Peter Kirkpatrick acted alone in creating the Website www.RavenStarreScam.com Request for Admissions No. 21: Admit that YOU do not know which PERSON(S) have control over the Website www.RavenStarreScam.com Request for Admissions No. 53: Admit that YOU do not know the identity of the PERSON(S) who maintain the Website www.RavenStarreScam.com Request for Admissions No. 56: Admit that YOU are assuming DEFENDANTS are the PERSON(S) who participated in publicizing the Website www.RavenStarreScam.com Request for Admissions No. 57: Admid that YOU are assuming DEFENDANTS are the PERSON(S) who maintain the Website www.RavenStarreScam.com The Requests for Admissions were served on Starre on September 26, 2018. (Stone Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. 1.) Starre served her responses on November 30, 2018. (Stone Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. 2.) Defendants argue that Starre had no reasonable ground to believe that she would prevail on this matter because on April 10, 2018, Defendants had all served responses to Starre’s special interrogatories, which stated, among other things, that Defendants had nothing to do with the creation or content of the subject website. (Stone Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. 3.) Moreover, Defendants submit a declaration by Peter Kirkpatrick, who stated under oath that he purchased the domain name of the website, that he was and is the sole creator of the website, that he did not have help in creating the website, and that he had sole discretion in deciding what information to post on the website. (Stone Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. 4.) Mr. Kirkpatrick’s declaration was signed on July 31, 2019. In response, Starre argues that at the time she served her responses to the subject Requests for Admissions, she was in possession of evidence that supported a reasonable belief that Defendants were all involved in the creation of the website at issue. First, Starre offers Defendant Mika Shoemaker’s Responses to Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, which were served on April 13, 2018. (Michaels Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. A.) The accompanying document production included certain Facebook posts by various Defendants discussing the creation of a website about Starre where “[a]nyone” could “put up a post” about her. (Michaels Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. A.) Counsel for Starre also asserts that on multiple occasions prior to November 30, 2018, he spoke with counsel for Defendant Kang Vang regarding the website. (Michaels Decl., ¶ 3.) According to Ms. Vang, Defendants were all part of a group that agreed to create a website about Starre. (Michaels Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. B, ¶¶ 4-8.) Defendants argue that the Facebook posts that were provided in Ms. Shoemaker’s document production only proves that Mr. Kirkpatrick was the sole creator of the website about Starre. However, the Court notes that the discussion in the Facebook posts produced by Ms. Shoemaker suggests that Mr. Kirkpatrick did not “act[] alone” (RFA No. 18) in creating the website or that there was only one reasonable conclusion about the identity of the person(s) who “participated in publicizing the Website” (RFA No. 13) or “control[led]” the website (RFA No. 21). The Court also finds that, based on the evidence provided, Starre had reasonable ground for denying that she did not know the identity of the person who “maintain[ed]” the website (RFA No. 53) and denying that she was “assuming” that Defendants were the culprits behind the website (RFA Nos. 56-57). The Court further notes that Mr. Kirkpatrick’s declaration taking full responsibility for the website was not executed until July 2019, long after Starre had responded to the Requests for Admissions at issue. Accordingly, the Court finds that Starre has established that she had reasonable ground to believe that she would prevail on the matters set forth in Requests for Admissions Nos. 13, 18, 21, 53, 56, and 57. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, the Court denies Defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees. Starre is ordered to give notice of this ruling DATED: August 11, 2020 ________________________________ Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court "},"foundBy":null,"pattern":null,"tabName":null},{"$id":"12","Name":"Psych_Cite_4","Range":{"$id":"13","ts":{"$ref":"9"},"_Start":878,"_End":916,"_Text":"“If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter when requested to do so under this chapter, and if the party requesting that admission thereafter proves the genuineness of that document or the truth of that matter, the party requesting the admission may move the court for an order requiring the party to whom the request was directed to pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney’s fees.” (Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (a).) Such an order is mandatory unless an objection to the request was sustained or a response to it was waived under section 2033.290, the admission sought was of no substantial importance, the party failing to make the admission had reasonable ground to believe that that party would prevail on the matter, or there was other good reason for the failure to admit. (Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (b).) In the course of discovery, Starre denied the following Requests for Admission propounded by Defendants: Request for Admissions No. 13: Admit that YOU do not know the identity of the PERSON(S) who participated in publicizing the Website www. RavenStarreScam.com Request for Admissions No. 18: Admit that Defendant, Peter Kirkpatrick acted alone in creating the Website www.RavenStarreScam.com Request for Admissions No. 21: Admit that YOU do not know which PERSON(S) have control over the Website www.RavenStarreScam.com Request for Admissions No. 53: Admit that YOU do not know the identity of the PERSON(S) who maintain the Website www.RavenStarreScam.com Request for Admissions No. 56: Admit that YOU are assuming DEFENDANTS are the PERSON(S) who participated in publicizing the Website www.RavenStarreScam.com Request for Admissions No. 57: Admid that YOU are assuming DEFENDANTS are the PERSON(S) who maintain the Website www.RavenStarreScam.com The Requests for Admissions were served on Starre on September 26, 2018. (Stone Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. 1.) Starre served her responses on November 30, 2018. (Stone Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. 2.) Defendants argue that Starre had no reasonable ground to believe that she would prevail on this matter because on April 10, 2018, Defendants had all served responses to Starre’s special interrogatories, which stated, among other things, that Defendants had nothing to do with the creation or content of the subject website. (Stone Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. 3.) Moreover, Defendants submit a declaration by Peter Kirkpatrick, who stated under oath that he purchased the domain name of the website, that he was and is the sole creator of the website, that he did not have help in creating the website, and that he had sole discretion in deciding what information to post on the website. (Stone Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. 4.) Mr. Kirkpatrick’s declaration was signed on July 31, 2019. In response, Starre argues that at the time she served her responses to the subject Requests for Admissions, she was in possession of evidence that supported a reasonable belief that Defendants were all involved in the creation of the website at issue. First, Starre offers Defendant Mika Shoemaker’s Responses to Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, which were served on April 13, 2018. (Michaels Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. A.) The accompanying document production included certain Facebook posts by various Defendants discussing the creation of a website about Starre where “[a]nyone” could “put up a post” about her. (Michaels Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. A.) Counsel for Starre also asserts that on multiple occasions prior to November 30, 2018, he spoke with counsel for Defendant Kang Vang regarding the website. (Michaels Decl., ¶ 3.) According to Ms. Vang, Defendants were all part of a group that agreed to create a website about Starre. (Michaels Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. B, ¶¶ 4-8.) Defendants argue that the Facebook posts that were provided in Ms. Shoemaker’s document production only proves that Mr. Kirkpatrick was the sole creator of the website about Starre. However, the Court notes that the discussion in the Facebook posts produced by Ms. Shoemaker suggests that Mr. Kirkpatrick did not “act[] alone” (RFA No. 18) in creating the website or that there was only one reasonable conclusion about the identity of the person(s) who “participated in publicizing the Website” (RFA No. 13) or “control[led]” the website (RFA No. 21). The Court also finds that, based on the evidence provided, Starre had reasonable ground for denying that she did not know the identity of the person who “maintain[ed]” the website (RFA No. 53) and denying that she was “assuming” that Defendants were the culprits behind the website (RFA Nos. 56-57). The Court further notes that Mr. Kirkpatrick’s declaration taking full responsibility for the website was not executed until July 2019, long after Starre had responded to the Requests for Admissions at issue. Accordingly, the Court finds that Starre has established that she had reasonable ground to believe that she would prevail on the matters set forth in Requests for Admissions Nos. 13, 18, 21, 53, 56, and 57. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, the Court denies Defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees. Starre is ordered to give notice of this ruling DATED: August 11, 2020 ________________________________ Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court "},"foundBy":null,"pattern":null,"tabName":null},{"$id":"14","Name":"Psych_Cite_5","Range":{"$id":"15","ts":{"$ref":"9"},"_Start":629,"_End":645,"_Text":"“If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter when requested to do so under this chapter, and if the party requesting that admission thereafter proves the genuineness of that document or the truth of that matter, the party requesting the admission may move the court for an order requiring the party to whom the request was directed to pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney’s fees.” (Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (a).) Such an order is mandatory unless an objection to the request was sustained or a response to it was waived under section 2033.290, the admission sought was of no substantial importance, the party failing to make the admission had reasonable ground to believe that that party would prevail on the matter, or there was other good reason for the failure to admit. (Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (b).) In the course of discovery, Starre denied the following Requests for Admission propounded by Defendants: Request for Admissions No. 13: Admit that YOU do not know the identity of the PERSON(S) who participated in publicizing the Website www. RavenStarreScam.com Request for Admissions No. 18: Admit that Defendant, Peter Kirkpatrick acted alone in creating the Website www.RavenStarreScam.com Request for Admissions No. 21: Admit that YOU do not know which PERSON(S) have control over the Website www.RavenStarreScam.com Request for Admissions No. 53: Admit that YOU do not know the identity of the PERSON(S) who maintain the Website www.RavenStarreScam.com Request for Admissions No. 56: Admit that YOU are assuming DEFENDANTS are the PERSON(S) who participated in publicizing the Website www.RavenStarreScam.com Request for Admissions No. 57: Admid that YOU are assuming DEFENDANTS are the PERSON(S) who maintain the Website www.RavenStarreScam.com The Requests for Admissions were served on Starre on September 26, 2018. (Stone Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. 1.) Starre served her responses on November 30, 2018. (Stone Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. 2.) Defendants argue that Starre had no reasonable ground to believe that she would prevail on this matter because on April 10, 2018, Defendants had all served responses to Starre’s special interrogatories, which stated, among other things, that Defendants had nothing to do with the creation or content of the subject website. (Stone Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. 3.) Moreover, Defendants submit a declaration by Peter Kirkpatrick, who stated under oath that he purchased the domain name of the website, that he was and is the sole creator of the website, that he did not have help in creating the website, and that he had sole discretion in deciding what information to post on the website. (Stone Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. 4.) Mr. Kirkpatrick’s declaration was signed on July 31, 2019. In response, Starre argues that at the time she served her responses to the subject Requests for Admissions, she was in possession of evidence that supported a reasonable belief that Defendants were all involved in the creation of the website at issue. First, Starre offers Defendant Mika Shoemaker’s Responses to Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, which were served on April 13, 2018. (Michaels Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. A.) The accompanying document production included certain Facebook posts by various Defendants discussing the creation of a website about Starre where “[a]nyone” could “put up a post” about her. (Michaels Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. A.) Counsel for Starre also asserts that on multiple occasions prior to November 30, 2018, he spoke with counsel for Defendant Kang Vang regarding the website. (Michaels Decl., ¶ 3.) According to Ms. Vang, Defendants were all part of a group that agreed to create a website about Starre. (Michaels Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. B, ¶¶ 4-8.) Defendants argue that the Facebook posts that were provided in Ms. Shoemaker’s document production only proves that Mr. Kirkpatrick was the sole creator of the website about Starre. However, the Court notes that the discussion in the Facebook posts produced by Ms. Shoemaker suggests that Mr. Kirkpatrick did not “act[] alone” (RFA No. 18) in creating the website or that there was only one reasonable conclusion about the identity of the person(s) who “participated in publicizing the Website” (RFA No. 13) or “control[led]” the website (RFA No. 21). The Court also finds that, based on the evidence provided, Starre had reasonable ground for denying that she did not know the identity of the person who “maintain[ed]” the website (RFA No. 53) and denying that she was “assuming” that Defendants were the culprits behind the website (RFA Nos. 56-57). The Court further notes that Mr. Kirkpatrick’s declaration taking full responsibility for the website was not executed until July 2019, long after Starre had responded to the Requests for Admissions at issue. Accordingly, the Court finds that Starre has established that she had reasonable ground to believe that she would prevail on the matters set forth in Requests for Admissions Nos. 13, 18, 21, 53, 56, and 57. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, the Court denies Defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees. Starre is ordered to give notice of this ruling DATED: August 11, 2020 ________________________________ Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court "},"foundBy":null,"pattern":null,"tabName":null}],"Range":{"$id":"16","ts":{"$ref":"9"},"_Start":0,"_End":5313,"_Text":"“If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter when requested to do so under this chapter, and if the party requesting that admission thereafter proves the genuineness of that document or the truth of that matter, the party requesting the admission may move the court for an order requiring the party to whom the request was directed to pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney’s fees.” (Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (a).) Such an order is mandatory unless an objection to the request was sustained or a response to it was waived under section 2033.290, the admission sought was of no substantial importance, the party failing to make the admission had reasonable ground to believe that that party would prevail on the matter, or there was other good reason for the failure to admit. (Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (b).) In the course of discovery, Starre denied the following Requests for Admission propounded by Defendants: Request for Admissions No. 13: Admit that YOU do not know the identity of the PERSON(S) who participated in publicizing the Website www. RavenStarreScam.com Request for Admissions No. 18: Admit that Defendant, Peter Kirkpatrick acted alone in creating the Website www.RavenStarreScam.com Request for Admissions No. 21: Admit that YOU do not know which PERSON(S) have control over the Website www.RavenStarreScam.com Request for Admissions No. 53: Admit that YOU do not know the identity of the PERSON(S) who maintain the Website www.RavenStarreScam.com Request for Admissions No. 56: Admit that YOU are assuming DEFENDANTS are the PERSON(S) who participated in publicizing the Website www.RavenStarreScam.com Request for Admissions No. 57: Admid that YOU are assuming DEFENDANTS are the PERSON(S) who maintain the Website www.RavenStarreScam.com The Requests for Admissions were served on Starre on September 26, 2018. (Stone Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. 1.) Starre served her responses on November 30, 2018. (Stone Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. 2.) Defendants argue that Starre had no reasonable ground to believe that she would prevail on this matter because on April 10, 2018, Defendants had all served responses to Starre’s special interrogatories, which stated, among other things, that Defendants had nothing to do with the creation or content of the subject website. (Stone Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. 3.) Moreover, Defendants submit a declaration by Peter Kirkpatrick, who stated under oath that he purchased the domain name of the website, that he was and is the sole creator of the website, that he did not have help in creating the website, and that he had sole discretion in deciding what information to post on the website. (Stone Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. 4.) Mr. Kirkpatrick’s declaration was signed on July 31, 2019. In response, Starre argues that at the time she served her responses to the subject Requests for Admissions, she was in possession of evidence that supported a reasonable belief that Defendants were all involved in the creation of the website at issue. First, Starre offers Defendant Mika Shoemaker’s Responses to Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, which were served on April 13, 2018. (Michaels Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. A.) The accompanying document production included certain Facebook posts by various Defendants discussing the creation of a website about Starre where “[a]nyone” could “put up a post” about her. (Michaels Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. A.) Counsel for Starre also asserts that on multiple occasions prior to November 30, 2018, he spoke with counsel for Defendant Kang Vang regarding the website. (Michaels Decl., ¶ 3.) According to Ms. Vang, Defendants were all part of a group that agreed to create a website about Starre. (Michaels Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. B, ¶¶ 4-8.) Defendants argue that the Facebook posts that were provided in Ms. Shoemaker’s document production only proves that Mr. Kirkpatrick was the sole creator of the website about Starre. However, the Court notes that the discussion in the Facebook posts produced by Ms. Shoemaker suggests that Mr. Kirkpatrick did not “act[] alone” (RFA No. 18) in creating the website or that there was only one reasonable conclusion about the identity of the person(s) who “participated in publicizing the Website” (RFA No. 13) or “control[led]” the website (RFA No. 21). The Court also finds that, based on the evidence provided, Starre had reasonable ground for denying that she did not know the identity of the person who “maintain[ed]” the website (RFA No. 53) and denying that she was “assuming” that Defendants were the culprits behind the website (RFA Nos. 56-57). The Court further notes that Mr. Kirkpatrick’s declaration taking full responsibility for the website was not executed until July 2019, long after Starre had responded to the Requests for Admissions at issue. Accordingly, the Court finds that Starre has established that she had reasonable ground to believe that she would prevail on the matters set forth in Requests for Admissions Nos. 13, 18, 21, 53, 56, and 57. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, the Court denies Defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees. Starre is ordered to give notice of this ruling DATED: August 11, 2020 ________________________________ Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court "}},"master":"___RESULTS_13","kernel_data":"Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (a)Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (a)Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (a)Full.StateStatuteCitecite__AfterStatutoryCite__AfterStatutoryCite._PatternAfterStatutoryCite.AfterStatutoryCite__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite()__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.((__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.))__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite._PatternStatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEdition__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEdition._PatternStatutoryCodeEdition.StatutoryCodeEdition__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEdition.PublisherDeering __AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEdition.Year__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEdition.Year._PatternYear.Year__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEdition.Year.YearJURISDICTIONYESPUBLISHERDeeringStateStatuteCode Civ. Proc., ;2033.420, subd. (a)StateStatute.,,StateStatute.__SectionOrSections ;2033.420, subd. (a)StateStatute.__SectionOrSections.,,StateStatute.__SectionOrSections._PatternX1.X1StateStatute.__SectionOrSections.RequiredSectionSymbol ;StateStatute.__SectionOrSections.RequiredSectionSymbol._PatternRequiredSectionSymbol.RequiredSectionSymbolStateStatute.__SectionOrSections.RequiredSectionSymbol.SectionSymbol;StateStatute.__SectionOrSections.Subdsubd. (a)StateStatute.__SectionOrSections.Subd._PatternSubdsList.SubdsListStateStatute.__SectionOrSections.Subd.First(a)StateStatute.__SectionOrSections.Subd.First._PatternSubdScalarOrRangeCal.SubdScalarOrRangeCalStateStatute.__SectionOrSections.Subd.First.First(a)StateStatute.__SectionOrSections.Subd.subdivisionssubdivisionStateStatute.__SectionOrSections.X12033.420StateStatute._PatternStateStatutes.StateStatutesStateStatute.CalCal.StateStatute.CaliforniaCodeSubjectCiv. Proc. CodeStateStatute.Sectionsectionmaster_name___RESULTS_13"},"IconIndicator":{"Id":1,"Title":"Cite is formatted correctly, its long and short form are automatically being updated, and it will be included in TOA.","IconType":1,"ImagePath":"~/Content/Images/CCF/RecognizedNoSuggestions.png","Description":"Number of cites recognized by system as valid."},"Display":"Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (a)","CitationRichText":"Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (a)","IconShepardSignal":{"Id":-1,"Title":"No Analysis","IconType":0,"ImagePath":"/Content/Images/blank.jpg","Description":null},"ShepardSignalLink":null,"ShowShepardSignal":false,"ShowParentLink":false,"ParentCitation":null,"SuggestionsForCitation":[],"SuggestionsForCite":[],"SelectedSuggestion":null,"IsSuggestionEnabled":false,"UseCurrentIconIndicator":{"Id":1,"Title":"Cite is formatted correctly, its long and short form are automatically being updated, and it will be included in TOA.","IconType":1,"ImagePath":"~/Content/Images/CCF/RecognizedNoSuggestions.png","Description":"Number of cites recognized by system as valid."},"UseSuggestionIconIndicator":{"Id":1,"Title":"Cite is formatted correctly, its long and short form are automatically being updated, and it will be included in TOA.","IconType":1,"ImagePath":"~/Content/Images/CCF/RecognizedNoSuggestions.png","Description":"Number of cites recognized by system as valid."},"OriginalUseCurrentIconIndicator":{"Id":1,"Title":"Cite is formatted correctly, its long and short form are automatically being updated, and it will be included in TOA.","IconType":1,"ImagePath":"~/Content/Images/CCF/RecognizedNoSuggestions.png","Description":"Number of cites recognized by system as valid."},"CitationMarkupText":"Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (a)","ShortText":"Cal. Civ. Proc. Code ; 2033.420","IsParentCorrect":true,"IsParentCorrectableConfirmed":false,"IsParentUnknownConfirmed":false,"IsParentCorrectable":false,"IsParentUnknown":false,"CitationOriginalText":"Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (a)","ModifiedCiteText":null,"MarkUp":null,"IsCheckCurrent":false,"PreviousCitationRetain":null},"CQ":"","TOA":"","html":"

Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (a)

"}" docpart="9707800FA626493992623F5CEEF007D1">Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (a)Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (a)Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (a)Full.StateStatuteCitecite__AfterStatutoryCite__AfterStatutoryCite._PatternAfterStatutoryCite.AfterStatutoryCite__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite()__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.((__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.))__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite._PatternStatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEdition__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEdition._PatternStatutoryCodeEdition.StatutoryCodeEdition__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEdition.PublisherDeering __AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEdition.Year__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEdition.Year._PatternYear.Year__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEdition.Year.YearJURISDICTIONYESPUBLISHERDeeringStateStatuteCode Civ. Proc., ;2033.420, subd. (a)StateStatute.,,StateStatute.__SectionOrSections ;2033.420, subd. (a)StateStatute.__SectionOrSections.,,StateStatute.__SectionOrSections._PatternX1.X1StateStatute.__SectionOrSections.RequiredSectionSymbol ;StateStatute.__SectionOrSections.RequiredSectionSymbol._PatternRequiredSectionSymbol.RequiredSectionSymbolStateStatute.__SectionOrSections.RequiredSectionSymbol.SectionSymbol;StateStatute.__SectionOrSections.Subdsubd. (a)StateStatute.__SectionOrSections.Subd._PatternSubdsList.SubdsListStateStatute.__SectionOrSections.Subd.First(a)StateStatute.__SectionOrSections.Subd.First._PatternSubdScalarOrRangeCal.SubdScalarOrRangeCalStateStatute.__SectionOrSections.Subd.First.First(a)StateStatute.__SectionOrSections.Subd.subdivisionssubdivisionStateStatute.__SectionOrSections.X12033.420StateStatute._PatternStateStatutes.StateStatutesStateStatute.CalCal.StateStatute.CaliforniaCodeSubjectCiv. Proc. CodeStateStatute.Sectionsectionmaster_name___RESULTS_13","Markup":"Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (a)","Master":"___RESULTS_13","name":"CITRUS_BOOKMARK3","Original_string":"Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (a)","Page":null,"Parallel":"","Pattern":"Full.StateStatuteCite","PinPage":"","ReadOrderIndex":1493,"Refers_To":null,"ShortText":"Cal. Civ. Proc. Code ;2033.420","Start":1493,"Story":"wdMainTextStory"},"TOA":"","html":"

Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (a)

"}" docpart="9707800FA626493992623F5CEEF007D1">Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (a).) Such an order is mandatory unless an objection to the request was sustained or a response to it was waived under section 2033.290section 2033.290section 2033.290SectionOnlycite","Markup":null,"Master":"","name":"Psych_Cite_6","Original_string":"section 2033.290","Page":null,"Parallel":null,"Pattern":"SectionOnly","PinPage":null,"ReadOrderIndex":1647,"Refers_To":null,"ShortText":"section 2033.290","Start":1647,"Story":"wdMainTextStory"},"TOA":"","html":"

section 2033.290

"}" docpart="9707800FA626493992623F5CEEF007D1">section 2033.290, the admission sought was of no substantial importance, the party failing to make the admission had reasonable ground to believe that that party would prevail on the matter, or there was other good reason for the failure to admit. ( PsychStateSubjectCode Full.StateStatuteCite Cal. Civ. Proc. Code ; 2033.420 ","ParentCiteID":null,"Processed":true,"Citation":{"current_string":"Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (b)","original_string":"Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (b)","error":null,"fullText":"Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (b)","refers_to_cite":null,"shortText":"Cal. Civ. Proc. Code ; 2033.420","isParallel":false,"parallel":null,"start":1896,"end":1934,"pattern":"Full.StateStatuteCite","readOrderIndex":1896,"index":1896,"citeType":1,"CiteShepSignal":0,"CiteShepSignalLink":null,"story":"wdMainTextStory","PinPage":null,"name":"CITRUS_BOOKMARK4","foundBy":"PsychStateSubjectCode","FullTextParen":"Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (b)","ParentheticalType":null,"IntermediateCite":false,"TOAHeading":null,"ts":{"$ref":"9"},"master":"___RESULTS_18","kernel_data":"Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (b)Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (b)Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (b)Full.StateStatuteCitecite__AfterStatutoryCite__AfterStatutoryCite._PatternAfterStatutoryCite.AfterStatutoryCite__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite()__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.((__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.))__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite._PatternStatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEdition__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEdition._PatternStatutoryCodeEdition.StatutoryCodeEdition__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEdition.PublisherDeering __AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEdition.Year__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEdition.Year._PatternYear.Year__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEdition.Year.YearJURISDICTIONYESPUBLISHERDeeringStateStatuteCode Civ. Proc., ;2033.420, subd. (b)StateStatute.,,StateStatute.__SectionOrSections ;2033.420, subd. (b)StateStatute.__SectionOrSections.,,StateStatute.__SectionOrSections._PatternX1.X1StateStatute.__SectionOrSections.RequiredSectionSymbol ;StateStatute.__SectionOrSections.RequiredSectionSymbol._PatternRequiredSectionSymbol.RequiredSectionSymbolStateStatute.__SectionOrSections.RequiredSectionSymbol.SectionSymbol;StateStatute.__SectionOrSections.Subdsubd. (b)StateStatute.__SectionOrSections.Subd._PatternSubdsList.SubdsListStateStatute.__SectionOrSections.Subd.First(b)StateStatute.__SectionOrSections.Subd.First._PatternSubdScalarOrRangeCal.SubdScalarOrRangeCalStateStatute.__SectionOrSections.Subd.First.First(b)StateStatute.__SectionOrSections.Subd.subdivisionssubdivisionStateStatute.__SectionOrSections.X12033.420StateStatute._PatternStateStatutes.StateStatutesStateStatute.CalCal.StateStatute.CaliforniaCodeSubjectCiv. Proc. CodeStateStatute.Sectionsectionmaster_name___RESULTS_18"},"IconIndicator":{"Id":1,"Title":"Cite is formatted correctly, its long and short form are automatically being updated, and it will be included in TOA.","IconType":1,"ImagePath":"~/Content/Images/CCF/RecognizedNoSuggestions.png","Description":"Number of cites recognized by system as valid."},"Display":"Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (b)","CitationRichText":"Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (b)","IconShepardSignal":{"Id":-1,"Title":"No Analysis","IconType":0,"ImagePath":"/Content/Images/blank.jpg","Description":null},"ShepardSignalLink":null,"ShowShepardSignal":false,"ShowParentLink":false,"ParentCitation":null,"SuggestionsForCitation":[],"SuggestionsForCite":[],"SelectedSuggestion":null,"IsSuggestionEnabled":false,"UseCurrentIconIndicator":{"Id":1,"Title":"Cite is formatted correctly, its long and short form are automatically being updated, and it will be included in TOA.","IconType":1,"ImagePath":"~/Content/Images/CCF/RecognizedNoSuggestions.png","Description":"Number of cites recognized by system as valid."},"UseSuggestionIconIndicator":{"Id":1,"Title":"Cite is formatted correctly, its long and short form are automatically being updated, and it will be included in TOA.","IconType":1,"ImagePath":"~/Content/Images/CCF/RecognizedNoSuggestions.png","Description":"Number of cites recognized by system as valid."},"OriginalUseCurrentIconIndicator":{"Id":1,"Title":"Cite is formatted correctly, its long and short form are automatically being updated, and it will be included in TOA.","IconType":1,"ImagePath":"~/Content/Images/CCF/RecognizedNoSuggestions.png","Description":"Number of cites recognized by system as valid."},"CitationMarkupText":"Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (b)","ShortText":"Cal. Civ. Proc. Code ; 2033.420","IsParentCorrect":true,"IsParentCorrectableConfirmed":false,"IsParentUnknownConfirmed":false,"IsParentCorrectable":false,"IsParentUnknown":false,"CitationOriginalText":"Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (b)","ModifiedCiteText":null,"MarkUp":null,"IsCheckCurrent":false,"PreviousCitationRetain":null},"CQ":"","TOA":"","html":"

Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (b)

"}" docpart="9707800FA626493992623F5CEEF007D1">Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (b)Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (b)Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (b)Full.StateStatuteCitecite__AfterStatutoryCite__AfterStatutoryCite._PatternAfterStatutoryCite.AfterStatutoryCite__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite()__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.((__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.))__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite._PatternStatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEdition__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEdition._PatternStatutoryCodeEdition.StatutoryCodeEdition__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEdition.PublisherDeering __AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEdition.Year__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEdition.Year._PatternYear.Year__AfterStatutoryCite.StatutoryCodeEditionCite.StatutoryCodeEdition.Year.YearJURISDICTIONYESPUBLISHERDeeringStateStatuteCode Civ. Proc., ;2033.420, subd. (b)StateStatute.,,StateStatute.__SectionOrSections ;2033.420, subd. (b)StateStatute.__SectionOrSections.,,StateStatute.__SectionOrSections._PatternX1.X1StateStatute.__SectionOrSections.RequiredSectionSymbol ;StateStatute.__SectionOrSections.RequiredSectionSymbol._PatternRequiredSectionSymbol.RequiredSectionSymbolStateStatute.__SectionOrSections.RequiredSectionSymbol.SectionSymbol;StateStatute.__SectionOrSections.Subdsubd. (b)StateStatute.__SectionOrSections.Subd._PatternSubdsList.SubdsListStateStatute.__SectionOrSections.Subd.First(b)StateStatute.__SectionOrSections.Subd.First._PatternSubdScalarOrRangeCal.SubdScalarOrRangeCalStateStatute.__SectionOrSections.Subd.First.First(b)StateStatute.__SectionOrSections.Subd.subdivisionssubdivisionStateStatute.__SectionOrSections.X12033.420StateStatute._PatternStateStatutes.StateStatutesStateStatute.CalCal.StateStatute.CaliforniaCodeSubjectCiv. Proc. CodeStateStatute.Sectionsectionmaster_name___RESULTS_18","Markup":"Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (b)","Master":"___RESULTS_18","name":"CITRUS_BOOKMARK4","Original_string":"Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (b)","Page":null,"Parallel":"","Pattern":"Full.StateStatuteCite","PinPage":"","ReadOrderIndex":1896,"Refers_To":null,"ShortText":"Cal. Civ. Proc. Code ;2033.420","Start":1896,"Story":"wdMainTextStory"},"TOA":"","html":"

Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (b)

"}" docpart="9707800FA626493992623F5CEEF007D1">Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.420, subd. (b).)

In the course of discovery, Starre denied the following Requests for Admission propounded by Defendants:

Request for Admissions No. 13: Admit that YOU do not know the identity of the PERSON(S) who participated in publicizing the Website www. RavenStarreScam.com

Request for Admissions No. 18: Admit that Defendant, Peter Kirkpatrick acted alone in creating the Website www.RavenStarreScam.com

Request for Admissions No. 21: Admit that YOU do not know which PERSON(S) have control over the Website www.RavenStarreScam.com

Request for Admissions No. 53: Admit that YOU do not know the identity of the PERSON(S) who maintain the Website www.RavenStarreScam.com

Request for Admissions No. 56: Admit that YOU are assuming DEFENDANTS are the PERSON(S) who participated in publicizing the Website www.RavenStarreScam.com

Request for Admissions No. 57: Admit that YOU are assuming DEFENDANTS are the PERSON(S) who maintain the Website www.RavenStarreScam.com

The Requests for Admissions were served on Starre on September 26, 2018. (Stone Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. 1.) Starre served her responses on November 30, 2018. (Stone Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. 2.)

Defendants argue that Starre had no reasonable ground to believe that she would prevail on this matter because on April 10, 2018, Defendants had all served responses to Starre’s special interrogatories, which stated, among other things, that Defendants had nothing to do with the creation or content of the subject website. (Stone Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. 3.) Moreover, Defendants submit a declaration by Peter Kirkpatrick, who stated under oath that he purchased the domain name of the website, that he was and is the sole creator of the website, that he did not have help in creating the website, and that he had sole discretion in deciding what information to post on the website. (Stone Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. 4.) Mr. Kirkpatrick’s declaration was signed on July 31, 2019.

In response, Starre argues that at the time she served her responses to the subject Requests for Admissions, she was in possession of evidence that supported a reasonable belief that Defendants were all involved in the creation of the website at issue. First, Starre offers Defendant Mika Shoemaker’s Responses to Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, which were served on April 13, 2018. (Michaels Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. A.) The accompanying document production included certain Facebook posts by various Defendants discussing the creation of a website about Starre where “[a]nyone” could “put up a post” about her. (Michaels Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. A.) Counsel for Starre also asserts that on multiple occasions prior to November 30, 2018, he spoke with counsel for Defendant Kang Vang regarding the website. (Michaels Decl., ¶ 3.) According to Ms. Vang, Defendants were all part of a group that agreed to create a website about Starre. (Michaels Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. B, ¶¶ 4-8.)

Defendants argue that the Facebook posts that were provided in Ms. Shoemaker’s document production only proves that Mr. Kirkpatrick was the sole creator of the website about Starre. However, the Court notes that the discussion in the Facebook posts produced by Ms. Shoemaker suggests that Mr. Kirkpatrick did not “act[] alone” (RFA No. 18) in creating the website or that there was only one reasonable conclusion about the identity of the person(s) who “participated in publicizing the Website” (RFA No. 13) or “control[led]” the website (RFA No. 21). The Court also finds that, based on the evidence provided, Starre had reasonable ground for denying that she did not know the identity of the person who “maintain[ed]” the website (RFA No. 53) and denying that she was “assuming” that Defendants were the culprits behind the website (RFA Nos. 56-57). The Court further notes that Mr. Kirkpatrick’s declaration taking full responsibility for the website was not executed until July 2019, long after Starre had responded to the Requests for Admissions at issue.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Starre has established that she had reasonable ground to believe that she would prevail on the matters set forth in Requests for Admissions Nos. 13, 18, 21, 53, 56, and 57.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Court denies Defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees.

Starre is ordered to give notice of this ruling

DATED: August 11, 2020

________________________________

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court



Case Number: ****7258    Hearing Date: February 13, 2020    Dept: 50

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

raven starre,

Plaintiff,

vs.

brooke march, et al.

Defendants.

Case No.:

BC 687258

Hearing Date:

February 13, 2020

Hearing Time:

8:30 a.m.

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE:

DEFENDANTS BROOKE MARCH, SCOTT CERVINE, MIKA SHOEMAKER, NANCY JOHNSON, AMY SHEELY, BETH BAYARD, CRAIG SHOEMAKER, DEBRA ARTURA, AND STEVEN CERVINE’S JOINT MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

Background

Plaintiff Raven Starre (“Starre”) filed this action on December 15, 2017. The operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) was filed on March 1, 2019 against various defendants. The SAC asserts causes of action for (1) libel per se, (2) cyber stalking – violation of Civil Code ; 1708.7, (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (4) conspiracy to commit libel per se, (5) aiding and abetting libel per se, (6) conspiracy to commit intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (7) aiding and abetting intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Defendants Brooke March, Scott Cervine, Mika Shoemaker, Nancy Johnson, Amy Sheely, Beth Bayard, Craig Shoemaker, Debra Artura, and Steven Cervine have moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of each of the causes of action. Starre opposes.

The Court notes that Defendants Mika Shoemaker and Craig Shoemaker were dismissed with prejudice on January 7, 2020. Therefore, the remaining moving defendants are Brooke March, Scott Cervine, Nancy Johnson, Amy Sheely, Beth Bayard, Debra Artura, and Steven Cervine (collectively, “Defendants”).

Evidentiary Objections

The Court rules on Starre’s evidentiary objections as follows:

Objection 1: sustained

Objections 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9: sustained as to “despite gathering hours of footage” and overruled as to the remainder

Objection 5: overruled

Objection 10: sustained as to the first sentence and overruled as to the remainder

Objection 11: overruled[1]

The Court rules on Defendants’ evidentiary objections as follows:

Objections 2, 14, 22, 31, and 41: overruled

Objection 5: sustained as to “unlawful” and overruled as to the remainder

Objections 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 18, 19, 20, 23, 26, 28 (only regarding the reference to “the Defendants;” overruled as to the remainder), 32, and 35: sustained

Legal Standard

“[A] motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., section 437c, subd. (c).) The moving party bears the initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) If the moving party carries this burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. (Ibid. .) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

When a defendant seeks summary judgment, he/she must show either (1) that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established; or (2) that there is a complete defense to that cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., section 437c, subd. (p)(2).)

Discussion

In the SAC, Starre alleges that beginning in 2015, Defendants conspired together to emotionally and financially ruin Starre by creating a website called RavenStarreScam.com (the “Website”). (SAC, ¶ 19.) The Website published various false and damaging statements about Starre, including that Starre was a pedophile and that Starre had sexually abused her son. (SAC, ¶ 20.) The publications on the Website continued after this lawsuit was originally filed. (SAC,

¶ 23.) These publications form the basis for all of Starre’s causes of action against Defendants. (SAC, ¶¶ 27, 44, 53, 62, 70, 79, 88.) Starre also alleges that Defendants sent her written communications demanding that she pay them money under the threat of filing false criminal complaints against her. (SAC, ¶ 19.) These allegations, along with the allegations relating to the Website, form the basis for Starre’s cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. (SAC, ¶ 53.)

Libel

“Libel is a form of defamation effected in writing.” (John Doe 2 v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1300, 1312.) “Libel is a false and unprivileged publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye, which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation.” (Civ. Code, section 45.) “The elements of a defamation claim are (1) a publication that is (2) false, (3) defamatory, (4) unprivileged, and (5) has a natural tendency to injure or causes special damage.” (Wong v. Jing (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1369.)

Defendants contend that the libel cause of action is without merit because Starre cannot show that Defendants published the statements at issue, namely, the statements made on the Website. In support, Defendants proffer evidence that Defendant Peter Kirkpatrick (“Kirkpatrick”) was and is solely responsible for the Website and its contents. (Defendants’ Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) 17-18.) Kirkpatrick attests to the fact that the information on the Website was done at his sole discretion, that he did not consult with or conspire with anyone regarding the information on the Website, and that he is solely responsible for all of the information on the Website. (Kirkpatrick Decl., ¶¶ 2-3.) Moreover, Defendants themselves disavow any involvement in the creation of the Website, the maintenance of the Website, and the content on the Website (including the defamatory content). (UMF 19-20.)

In opposition, Starre offers essentially two pieces of evidence: her own declaration and the screenshots of comments made by various Defendants in a Facebook group discussing the group’s dissatisfaction with Starre. (Response to UMF 17-21.) The Court has already found much of Starre’s testimony inadmissible, as set forth in the Court’s rulings on Defendants’ evidentiary objections. With respect to the Facebook comments, the Court does not find that the comments raise a triable issue of fact.[2] First, to dispute the fact that Kirkpatrick purchased the Website domain name and created the Website, Starre offers a comment by Defendant Nancy Johnson (“Johnson”) in the Facebook group wherein she suggests that a website be created to “warn others away” from Starre and to “use the tools of search engine optimization to assure that anyone searching for info on [Starre] finds that site.” (Jones Decl., ¶ 7, Ex. 16.)[3] The Court does not find that Starre’s evidence creates a dispute as to the fact that Kirkpatrick created the Website. Next, to dispute that Kirkpatrick had complete control over the Website and its contents, Starre points to comments made by Kirkpatrick, Johnson, and Defendant Brooke March (“March”) in the Facebook group. (Response to UMF 17.) However, those comments also do not create a dispute as to the fact that Kirkpatrick controlled the Website and was responsible for its contents. March states that Johnson’s idea for a website alerting people to Starre’s alleged scam is a “[g]reat idea.” (Jones Decl., ¶ 7, Ex. 16.) Later, Kirkpatrick confirms that he created the Website in response to March’s question about the status of the Website. (Jones Decl., ¶ 7, Ex. 16.) Johnson adds that searching for Starre’s name on Google results in “top hits [that] now scream scam artist.” (Jones Decl., ¶ 7, Ex. 16.) March then encourages others to post their stories about Starre to the Website. (Jones Decl., ¶ 7, Ex. 16.) None of these comments support a reasonable inference that anyone other than Kirkpatrick created the Website, controlled the Website, or had any say in the information published on the Website. Moreover, none of these comments support a reasonable inference that any of the Defendants intended to or encouraged others to post false stories about Starre to the Website.

Defendants present evidence that they never made any statements regarding Starre being a pedophile or sexually molesting her son. (UMF 21.) Starre disputes this fact, but the only evidence cited in support is the fact that Defendant Amy Sheely (“Sheely”) testified to lodging a complaint with Child Protective Services about Starre, which resulted in an investigation. (Response to UMF 21.) However, Sheely’s testimony also makes clear that her complaint to CPS was based on her observations that Starre was “neglectful” because Starre kept her son in rooms from early in the morning to late at night. (Jones Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. 14, p. 68:2-10.) Sheely specifically testified that she never observed sexually inappropriate behavior between Starre and her son and never learned of any sexually inappropriate contact between Starre and her son. (Jones Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. 14, p. 68:19-24.) Therefore, the Court does not find that Starre has raised a triable issue as to whether Defendants published any statements about Starre regarding either pedophilia or child sexual abuse.

Starre also cites to evidence that Defendants created flyers defaming Starre’s business (by referring to it as a “scam”), that Defendants attempted to interfere with Starre’s business relationship with a third party, and that Defendants created a YouTube video about said “scam”.[4] (Response to UMF 12.) However, “[t]he pleadings delimit the issues to be considered on a motion for summary judgment.” (Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1253.) “Accordingly, the burden of a defendant moving for summary judgment only requires that he or she negate plaintiff’s theories of liability as alleged in the complaint….” (Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493 (emphasis in original).) The theory of liability for libel alleged in the SAC is based on statements that Starre is a pedophile and that Starre sexually abused her child. There are no allegations that Defendants defamed Starre by referring to her business as a “scam.” Therefore, the Court does not find that Starre has raised a triable issue of fact with this evidence.

Next, Defendants contend that because the cause of action for libel has no merit, the conspiracy to commit libel cause of action similarly has no merit. Defendants argue that in order to recover on a conspiracy theory against certain defendants, a plaintiff must prove that the underlying tort has been committed by the same defendants. It is true that “[a] civil conspiracy, however atrocious, does not per se give rise to a cause of action unless a civil wrong has been committed resulting in damage.” (Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503, 511.) But nothing in Applied Equipment suggests that the civil wrong must have been committed by the defendants accused of conspiracy. “By its nature, tort liability arising from conspiracy presupposes that the coconspirator is legally capable of committing the tort, i.e., that he or she owes a duty to plaintiff recognized by law and is potentially subject to liability for breach of that duty.” (Ibid.) “[A]lleging a conspiracy fastens liability on those who agree to the plan to commit the wrong as well as those who actually carry it out.” (Stueve Bros. Farms, LLC v. Berger Kahn (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 303, 323.) “The elements of a civil conspiracy are the formation and operation of the conspiracy and damage resulting to plaintiff from an act done in furtherance of the common design.” (Ibid.) Here, Defendants have not established that an underlying wrong has not been committed. Nevertheless, Defendants have presented evidence to show that there was no formation or operation of a conspiracy because Kirkpatrick did not consult or conspire with the other Defendants about the posts at issue on the Website. (UMF 18-20.) And, as noted above, the Court does not find that Starre has demonstrated that a triable issue exists as to those facts.

Similarly, Defendants argue that the cause of action for aiding and abetting libel is without merit because Starre cannot show that Defendants gave any assistance or encouragement to Kirkpatrick in making the posts at issue on the Website or that Defendants had any duty to control Kirkpatrick’s actions with respect to the Website. “Liability may . . . be imposed on one who aids and abets the commission of an intentional tort if the person . . . knows the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other to so act ... .” (Schulz v. Neovi Data Corp. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 86, 93.) “Mere knowledge that a tort is being committed and the failure to prevent it does not constitute aiding and abetting.” (Fiol v. Doellstedt (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1326.) Based on the evidence presented, the Court finds that Defendants have met their burden of showing that the cause of action for aiding and abetting libel has no merit. The Court further finds that Starre has failed to meet her burden of showing that a triable issue of fact exists as to this cause of action.

Cyber Stalking

Defendants contend that the cyber stalking cause of action is without merit because Starre cannot establish that Defendants “engaged in a pattern of conduct the intent of which was to follow, alarm, place under surveillance, or harass” Starre. (Civ. Code, ; 1708.7, subd. (a)(1).) “Pattern of conduct” means “conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose.” (Civ. Code, ; 1708.7, subd. (b)(1).) Here, Starre alleges that the posts on the Website constitute the “pattern of conduct” that is intended to harass her. (SAC, ¶ 44.) But Defendants point to the evidence (discussed above) showing that they had no involvement in the creation of the Website or the posts made on the Website.

Starre argues that Defendants’ written demands for money also constitute a “pattern of conduct” to alarm or harass her. Starre submits evidence that in March 2015, March, Sheely, Johnson, and Defendant Beth Bayard (“Bayard”) each sent Starre an email demanding payment of money, under the express threat of accusing her of a crime and subjecting her to criminal prosecution. (Starre Decl., ¶ 6, Exs. 3-7.)

First, Starre’s evidence shows that each woman sent her one email demanding payment. Thus, the evidence of these emails does not raise a triable issue that each of the Defendants engaged in “conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however, short, evidencing a continuity of purpose.” Second, the Court notes that the allegations relating to the demands for money are not set forth in support of Starre’s cyber stalking cause of action. (SAC, ¶¶ 43-50.) Therefore, the Court finds that Starre has failed to show that a triable issue of fact exists as to the cause of action for cyber stalking.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”)

To prevail on an IIED claim, a plaintiff must prove: “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050.)

Defendants contend that the IIED cause of action has no merit because Starre cannot demonstrate that Defendants engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct—either by creating/maintaining the Website or by demanding money from Starre. First, as to the Website, the Court has already found that Defendants have met their burden of showing that they were not involved in the creation or maintenance of the Website, so they could not have engaged in conduct to create a website to make accusations of child molestation or to make death threats against Starre. (See SAC, ¶ 53.) As noted above, Starre has failed to meet her burden of showing that a triable issue of fact exists as to the creation of the Website and the posts contained on the Website. Second, as to the demands for money, Defendants argue that they were merely seeking to recover a debt owed to them. Therefore, Starre cannot show that Defendants intended to cause or recklessly disregarded the probability of causing Starre emotional distress. Defendants also argue that the conduct of emailing Starre to demand repayment does not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct that goes beyond all reasonable bounds of decency. “[L]iability [for IIED] does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities, but only to conduct so extreme and outrageous as to go beyond all possible bo[u]nds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” (Alcorn v. Anbro Eng’g, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 499, fn. 5 [internal quotations omitted].)

As noted by Starre in opposition, while a court makes the initial determination “whether a defendant’s conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery[,] [w]here reasonable men can differ, the jury determines whether the conduct has been extreme and outrageous to result in liability.” (Plotnik v. Meihaus (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1590, 1614.) Here, the Court finds that there is no reasonable basis for finding that sending one email demanding payment for a failed multi-level marketing scheme is so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery.

As far as the causes of action for conspiracy to commit intentional infliction of emotional distress and aiding and abetting intentional infliction of emotional distress, it is directed only to the creation and maintenance of the Website. (SAC, ¶ 62.) Starre alleges that Defendants “agreed with Kirkpatrick and intended that [Starre] be defamed by Kirkpatrick’s continual postings on the Website.” (SAC, ¶¶ 65.) Starre alleges that Defendants “cooperated with Kirkpatrick in enabling him to make the further defamatory postings” and “gave Kirkpatrick substantial assistance and encouragement in making the continual postings on the Website.” (SAC, ¶¶ 65, 73.) But as noted above, the Court finds that Defendants have met their burden of proof of showing that they did not have any involvement in the Website or the posts that were contained in the Website. Defendants have presented evidence that Kirkpatrick had sole control over what was posted on the Website and that he did not consult with Defendants about his posts. Therefore, the Court finds that Defendants have met their burden of proof of showing that the conspiracy to commit IIED and aiding and abetting IIED causes of action have no merit. The Court further finds that Starre has not raised a triable issue of fact thereto.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment in its entirety.

The Court orders Defendants to file and serve a proposed judgment of dismissal within 10 days of the date of this Order.

Defendants are ordered to give notice of this Order.

DATED: February 13, 2020

________________________________

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court


[1] See Code Civ. Proc., ; 437c, subd. (e) [“If a party is otherwise entitled to summary judgment pursuant to this section, summary judgment shall not be denied on grounds of credibility or for want of cross-examination of witnesses furnishing affidavits or declarations in support of the summary judgment . . . .”]).

[2] The Court notes that Starre inserts objections to each of the facts set forth in Defendants’ separate statement, which the Court disregards as improper. The Court also notes that Starre improperly incorporates facts by reference. (See Response to UMF 18.) CRC rule 3.1350(f)(2) requires that a disputed response to a material fact “must state, on the right side of the page directly opposite the fact in dispute, the nature of the dispute and describe the evidence that supports the position that the fact is controverted.” CRC rule 3.1350(f)(2) also requires citation to evidence that includes reference to the exhibit, title, page, and line numbers.

[3] The Court notes that Starre’s response to UMF 13, which sets forth this information, actually cites to Johnson’s deposition transcript, but the portions of the deposition transcript highlighted do not support the fact asserted by Starre in her separate statement.

[4] The gist of the underlying dispute between Starre and the Defendants is that Starre recruited Defendants to be a part of a multi-level marketing scheme and corresponding reality show that did not pan out as advertised.