This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 07/04/2019 at 01:42:30 (UTC).

RAMONA SANDERS VS CHASE GLENDALE SERVICES LLC

Case Summary

On 02/27/2018 a Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury case was filed by RAMONA SANDERS against CHASE GLENDALE SERVICES LLC in the jurisdiction of Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****5527

  • Filing Date:

    02/27/2018

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury

  • Court:

    Los Angeles County Superior Courts

  • Courthouse:

    Stanley Mosk Courthouse

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

 

Party Details

Plaintiffs, Petitioners and Cross Defendants

SANDERS RAMONA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

Defendants, Respondents and Cross Plaintiffs

CHASE GLENDALE SERVICES LLC

DOES 1 TO 100

 

Court Documents

Notice

10/15/2018: Notice

Cross-Complaint

10/26/2018: Cross-Complaint

Summons

10/26/2018: Summons

Proof of Personal Service

11/5/2018: Proof of Personal Service

Other -

12/3/2018: Other -

Answer

12/3/2018: Answer

Notice of Deposit - Jury

3/4/2019: Notice of Deposit - Jury

Notice of Change of Address or Other Contact Information

4/26/2019: Notice of Change of Address or Other Contact Information

[Proposed Order] and Stipulation to Continue Trial, FSC (and Related Motion/Discovery Dates) Person

6/7/2019: [Proposed Order] and Stipulation to Continue Trial, FSC (and Related Motion/Discovery Dates) Person

Notice of Change of Address or Other Contact Information

6/27/2019: Notice of Change of Address or Other Contact Information

PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

7/6/2018: PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

7/17/2018: ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

CIVIL DEPOSIT

7/17/2018: CIVIL DEPOSIT

SUMMONS

2/27/2018: SUMMONS

COMPLAINT-PERS. INJURY, PROP DAMAGE, WRONGFUL DEATH (2 PAGES)

2/27/2018: COMPLAINT-PERS. INJURY, PROP DAMAGE, WRONGFUL DEATH (2 PAGES)

3 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 06/27/2019
  • Notice of Change of Address or Other Contact Information; Filed by Chase Glendale Services LLC (Cross-Complainant)

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  • 06/07/2019
  • [Proposed Order] and Stipulation to Continue Trial, FSC (and Related Motion/Discovery Dates) Personal Injury Courts Only (Central District); Filed by Chase Glendale Services LLC (Defendant)

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  • 04/26/2019
  • Notice of Change of Address or Other Contact Information; Filed by Chase Glendale Services LLC (Defendant)

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  • 03/04/2019
  • Notice of Deposit - Jury; Filed by County of Los Angeles (Cross-Defendant)

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  • 12/03/2018
  • Answer To Cross-Complaint; Demand For Jury Trial; Filed by County of Los Angeles (Cross-Defendant)

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  • 12/03/2018
  • Demand For Copies Of Pleadings; Filed by Chase Glendale Services LLC (Cross-Complainant)

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  • 11/05/2018
  • Proof of Personal Service; Filed by Chase Glendale Services LLC (Defendant)

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  • 10/26/2018
  • Summons (on Cross Complaint); Filed by Clerk

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  • 10/26/2018
  • Cross-Complaint; Filed by Chase Glendale Services LLC (Cross-Complainant)

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  • 10/15/2018
  • Notice (Of Change of Mailing Address and Telephone Number); Filed by Chase Glendale Services LLC (Defendant)

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  • 07/17/2018
  • Receipt; Filed by Chase Glendale Services LLC (Defendant)

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  • 07/17/2018
  • Answer; Filed by Chase Glendale Services LLC (Defendant)

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  • 07/17/2018
  • ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

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  • 07/17/2018
  • CIVIL DEPOSIT

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  • 07/06/2018
  • Proof-Service/Summons; Filed by Ramona Sanders (Plaintiff)

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  • 07/06/2018
  • PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

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  • 02/27/2018
  • COMPLAINT-PERS. INJURY, PROP DAMAGE, WRONGFUL DEATH (2 PAGES)

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  • 02/27/2018
  • SUMMONS

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  • 02/27/2018
  • Complaint; Filed by Ramona Sanders (Plaintiff)

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Tentative Rulings

Case Number: BC695527    Hearing Date: October 24, 2019    Dept: 4B

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: CROSS-DEEFENDANT COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant Chase Glendale Services, LLC (“Chase”) owns the property located at 4680 W. San Fernando Road, Glendale, California 91204 (the “Property”) and leases it to cross-defendant County of Los Angeles (“County”), which operates the Department of Public Social Services (“DPSS”) on the property. (UMF 11-12.) On December 2, 2016, plaintiff Ramon Sanders (“Plaintiff”) tripped and fell over a protruding object located on the first floor parking lot of the Property. Plaintiff sustained injuries, filed a worker’s compensation action, received about $30,000 for her injuries. On February 27, 2018, Plaintiff filed this action against Chase for premises liability. On September 24, 2018, Chase filed a claim with the County stating that the County was responsible because “Plaintiff [], Los Angeles Superior Court case no. BC695527 alleges she tripped and fell in the parking garage at Los Angeles County, Dept. of Public Social Service facility located at 4680 W. San Fernando Road. Ms. Sanders fell on an object placed by the County of Los Angeles.” (UMF 4-5.) On September 26, 2018, the County served Chase with its Denial of Late Claim. (UMF 6.) Chase did not file another claim with the County. (UMF 7.) On October 26, 2018, Chase filed a cross-complaint against County for indemnification, apportionment of fault, and declaratory relief.

County moves for summary judgment on Chase’s Cross-Complaint on grounds: (1) Chase failed to comply with the Government Claims Act; (2) the Cross-Complaint’s indemnification claim fails because Chase was expressly required to keep the subject property in good repair and because Chase cannot establish that County created the condition causing the trip and fall; and (3) the indemnification claim also fails because County did not cause or have notice of the alleged condition.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if that party contends that the cause of action has no merit or that there is no affirmative defense thereto, or that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, or both, or that there is no merit to a claim for damages . . . or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) A motion for summary adjudication shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(2).)

“[T]he initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) A moving defendant need not conclusively negate an element of plaintiff’s cause of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854.)

To meet this burden of showing a cause of action cannot be established, a defendant must show not only “that the plaintiff does not possess needed evidence” but also that “the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854.) It is insufficient for the defendant to merely point out the absence of evidence. (Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891.) The defendant “must also produce evidence that the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain evidence to support his or her claim.” (Ibid.)  The supporting evidence can be in the form of affidavits, declarations, admissions, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855.)

“Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The plaintiff may not merely rely on allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists, but instead, “shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action.” (Ibid.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

III. OBJECTIONS

Sanders Deposition: Objection Nos. 1, 2 are OVERRULED.

Harris Deposition: Objection Nos. 3-8 are OVERRULED.

Baker Deposition: Objection Nos. 9-10 are SUSTAINED.

IV. DISCUSSION

County argues Chase has not complied with the Government Claims Act because it did not present an adequate claim to County before filing its cross-complaint. “[S]ubmission of a claim to a public entity pursuant to section 900 et seq. ‘is a condition precedent to a tort action and the failure to present the claim bars the action.’ [Citation.]” (Phillips v. Desert Hospital Dist. (1989) 49 Cal.3d 699, 708.) A plaintiff must comply with the Government Claims Act, which states, in part: “no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented . . . until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the board . . .” (Gov. Code, § 945.4.)

A claim for death or injury to person or personal property shall be presented not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action. (Gov. Code, § 911.2, subd. (a).) The claim shall contain all of the following: (a) the name and post office address of the claimant; (b) the post office address to which the person presenting the claim desires notices to be sent; (c) the date, place and other circumstances of the occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the claim asserted; (d) a general description of the indebtedness, obligation, injury, damage or loss incurred so far as it may be known at the time of presentation of the claim; (e) the name or names of the public employee or employees causing the injury, damage, or loss, if known; (f) the amount claimed if totals less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) as of the date of presentation of the claim, including the estimated amount of any prospective injury, damage, or loss, insofar as it may be known at the time of the presentation of the claim, together with the basis of computation of the amount claimed. (Gov. Code, § 910.)

County argues Chase’s claim does not state a theory that County is liable for indemnification and does not present sufficient information to enable the County to make an adequate investigation of the merits of the claim. Chase’s claim states: “Plaintiff Ramona Sanders, Los Angeles Superior Court case no. BC695527, alleges she tripped and fell in the parking garage at Los Angeles County, Dept. of Public Social Service facility located at 4860 W. San Fernando Road. Ms. Sanders fell on an object placed by the County of Los Angeles.” County argues the claim should have expressly stated that Chase and County had a lease that required County to indemnify Chase for Plaintiff’s claims.

County has not established a prima facie case of non-compliance by Chase. By citing the specific case number of Plaintiff’s lawsuit, Chase indicated that Plaintiff (not Chase) had already filed a lawsuit for damages involving a trip and fall at a County facility. That information was sufficient to allow County to understand that Chase was not the plaintiff in that lawsuit, Chase had not tripped and fell, and Chase was not seeking to recover on a negligence theory. That information also was sufficient for County to discover that Chase was the defendant in the lawsuit and therefore was seeking recovery from County as a defendant, i.e., indemnification or a share in the fault. By giving the address of the facility, Chase provided information to allow the City to investigate the claim and discover the existence of the lease. Thus, the Court cannot determine as a matter of law that Chase’s claim did not state a theory of indemnification and was not in substantial compliance.

County also argues the lease imposes liability on County only for damages “resulting from the County’s activities on the Subject Property,” and Chase cannot show Plaintiff’s lawsuit arose out of County’s activities at the Property. County argues Plaintiff’s discovery responses state that no one knows who created the condition causing Plaintiff’s fall. However, Helen Harris, the property manager since at least 2016 (UMF 19), testified that she believed County was responsible for reconfiguring the parking lot and installing new delineators. In 2016, she had seen a permanent traffic delineator – a white delineator similar to the delineators on a freeway – at the location of the incident. At some point before the incident the delineator was removed, leaving the base on which Plaintiff allegedly tripped. (Harris Depo, pp. 86-89.) This testimony is sufficient to create a disputed fact about whether County created the condition of the base of the delineators on which Plaintiff allegedly tripped. It also creates a disputed fact whether County had notice of the condition – if it created the condition, it had notice of it.

County contends it cannot be liable because the lease gave Chase the sole responsibility to inspect, maintain, and repair the Property. Paragraph 9(a) required Chase to keep in good repair, replace and maintain parking spaces. However, paragraph 9(b) gave County the option to perform or cause to be performed repair or maintenance work, if Chase failed to perform such work after receiving notice that repairs need to be made. Thus, County had the ability to repair dangerous conditions under the lease.

V. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the motion for summary judgment is DENIED

Moving party to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT4B@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court’s website at www.lacourt.org.