PERRIE PITTS ET AL VS CUSTOM HOTEL LLC ET AL

Tentative Rulings

Case Number: BC666128    Hearing Date: January 08, 2020    Dept: 32

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Perrie Pitts, Antonio Jones and Calvin Duke (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) commenced this action against Defendants Custom Hotel LLC, Seychelles Hospitality Group, Inc., SHG Hospitality Group, Tamika Frasier, Khanna Enterprises General Partnership, Khanna Enterprises, Inc. on June 22, 2017. The operative pleading is the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) filed on July 12, 2018. The FAC alleges causes of action for (1) misclassification as an independent contractor; (2) declaratory relief; (3) failure to pay wages upon separation; (4) failure to provide itemized wage statements; (5) unfair business practices; (6) failure to pay overtime; (7) failure to provide meal and rest breaks; (8) claim brought under Labor Code § 2699; (9) failure to pay statutory minimum wage; and (10) violation of Labor Code § 212.

LEGAL STANDARD

On receipt of a response to an RPD, the demanding party may move for an order compelling further responses to the demand if the demanding party deems that (1) a statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete, (2) a representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive, or (3) an objection in the response is without merit or too general. (CCP § 2031.310(a).)

Motions to compel further responses to RPDs must set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the request. (CCP § 2031.310(b).) To establish good cause, a discovery proponent must identify a disputed fact that is of consequence in the action and explain how the discovery sought will tend in reason to prove or disprove that fact or lead to other evidence that will tend to prove or disprove the fact. (Digital Music News LLC v. Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 216, 224 disapproved on other grounds by Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531; see also Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98 (characterizing good cause as “a fact-specific showing of relevance”).) If good cause is shown by the moving party, the burden shifts to the responding party to justify any objections made to disclosure of the documents. (Kirkland, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at 98.)

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs move to compel Khanna Enterprises General Partnership (“Khanna”) to provide further responses to Plaintiffs’ RPD, Set One, Nos. 7, 14-16.

Khanna persuasively responds that this motion is untimely and must be denied. CCP section 2031.310(c) provides: “Unless notice of this motion is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the demanding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the demanding party waives any right to compel a further response to the demand.” The time within which to make a motion to compel RPDs is mandatory and jurisdictional. (Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410; see also Standon Co. v. Superior Court (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 898, 902 (“Failure to so move within the specified period constitutes a waiver of any right to compel a further response….”).)

Plaintiffs served Khanna with the discovery in question on May 20, 2019. (Savarse Decl. ¶ 9, Ex. 1.) Khanna mail-served responses to this discovery on June 21, 2019. (Savarse Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. 2.) This obligated Plaintiffs to bring this motion by August 10, 2019. (See CCP §§ 1013; 2030.310(c).)

On August 1, 2019, Plaintiffs served Khanna with a meet-and-confer letter, requesting a response by August 7, 2019. (Savarse Decl. Ex. 3.) On August 5, 2019, Khanna’s counsel responded that Khanna “need[ed] more time to respond” to the letter and proposed a “mutual extension of time which extends [Plaintiffs’] time to bring a motion to compel if necessary.” (Ibid.) Plaintiffs’ counsel agreed to this proposal. (Ibid. (“That works.”).) Khanna’s counsel replied: “Great. 45 days on both.” (Ibid.)

Based on this email correspondence, Plaintiff’s deadline to bring the instant motion was extended by 45 days, from August 10, 2019 to September 24, 2019. Because Plaintiffs served and filed this motion on November 5, 2019, several weeks after the deadline, Plaintiffs waived their right to compel a further response.

In reply, Plaintiffs maintain that this motion is timely for two reasons. First, Plaintiffs assert inequity. Plaintiffs lament the fact that Khanna requested additional time to respond to the meet-and-confer letter but never provided a response. The Court is unpersuaded. Khanna’s unresponsiveness, while instructive as to whether sanctions should be awarded, has no effect on Plaintiffs’ obligation to move to compel within the statutory time period. Rather, the effect of Khanna’s failure to provide a meet-and-confer letter was that Plaintiffs had satisfied their meet-and-confer obligations and could have brought this motion weeks before September 24, 2019.

Second, Plaintiffs argue that Khanna agreed to two successive 45-day extensions — one for Khanna to respond to the meet-and-confer letter and another for Plaintiffs to bring the instant motion. Plaintiffs reason that this second 45-day extension started on September 24, 2019, the deadline for Khanna to respond to the meet-and-confer letter. The Court is again unpersuaded. As this is Plaintiffs’ motion, they bear the burden of substantiating of this argument. While the parties could have “agreed in writing” to this arrangement (CCP § 2031.310(c)), Plaintiff has not presented writings reflecting the same. Instead, the email correspondence cited ante most reasonably reflects an agreement between the parties to grant one 45-day extension for (1) Khanna to respond to the meet-and-confer letter and (2) Plaintiffs to bring this motion. If a different arrangement was actually contemplated, Plaintiffs should have sought more clarification.

Plaintiffs’ motion to compel further responses is DENIED. Defendants’ request for monetary sanctions is DENIED because Defendants have presented no justification for failing to respond to Plaintiffs’ meet-and-confer letter.