This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 05/29/2019 at 03:17:18 (UTC).

PASTORA GUTIERREZ ET AL VS JOSE A ALONZO ET AL

Case Summary

On 08/15/2017 PASTORA GUTIERREZ filed a Contract - Other Contract lawsuit against JOSE A ALONZO. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judge overseeing this case is ELIZABETH ALLEN WHITE. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****2279

  • Filing Date:

    08/15/2017

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Contract - Other Contract

  • Court:

    Los Angeles County Superior Courts

  • Courthouse:

    Stanley Mosk Courthouse

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judge

ELIZABETH ALLEN WHITE

 

Party Details

Plaintiffs, Petitioners and Guardian Ad Litems

GUTIERREZ PASTORA

GUTIERREZ NADIA

GUTIERREZ PASTORA JR.

GUTIERREZ JOSE

CERVANTES ADETA

REYNOSO HUGO

SOLIS MARIA B.

ROJAS JENNIFER

PEREZ ARTURO

CURIEL LETICIA

SOLIS RAUL

REYNOSO STEFANA

GONZALEZ JUAN

SANCHEZ AUREA

REYES OLIVER

ZARAGOZA MARICELA

Defendants and Respondents

ALONZO JOSE A.

ALONZO LEONOR M.

TC-CHADRON LLC

DOES 1 THROUGH 50

Plaintiffs and Minors

GUTIERREZ NADIA

REYNOSO STEFANA

64 More Parties Available

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff, Petitioner and Minor Attorneys

LAW OFFICES OF GERALD S. OHN APC

OHN GERALD S.

Defendant Attorneys

WEBB LANE E.

ADISHIAN CHRISTOPHER M. ESQ.

 

Court Documents

APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM?CIVIL EX PARTE

2/22/2018: APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM?CIVIL EX PARTE

Unknown

4/2/2018: Unknown

PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

4/2/2018: PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

AMENDMENT TO COMPLAINT

5/1/2018: AMENDMENT TO COMPLAINT

Minute Order

6/8/2018: Minute Order

Unknown

6/14/2018: Unknown

PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF CONTINUED CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

6/14/2018: PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF CONTINUED CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

Unknown

6/14/2018: Unknown

DEFENDANTS JOSE A. ALONZO AND LEONOR M. ALONZO'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR TRIAL PREFERENCE

10/2/2018: DEFENDANTS JOSE A. ALONZO AND LEONOR M. ALONZO'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR TRIAL PREFERENCE

Notice of Change of Address or Other Contact Information

12/5/2018: Notice of Change of Address or Other Contact Information

Unknown

1/5/2018: Unknown

Unknown

1/5/2018: Unknown

REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL

12/12/2017: REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL

APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM?CIVIL EX PARTE

8/15/2017: APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM?CIVIL EX PARTE

APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM?CIVIL EX PARTE

8/15/2017: APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM?CIVIL EX PARTE

APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM?CIVIL EX PARTE

8/15/2017: APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM?CIVIL EX PARTE

APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM?CIVIL EX PARTE

8/15/2017: APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM?CIVIL EX PARTE

APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM?CIVIL EX PARTE

8/15/2017: APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM?CIVIL EX PARTE

77 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 03/25/2019
  • at 08:30 AM in Department 48, Elizabeth Allen White, Presiding; Hearing on Ex Parte Application ( to Continue Trial, or in the Alternative, to Shorten Time for the Hearing on the Motion to Continue Trial) - Held - Motion Granted

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  • 03/25/2019
  • Minute Order ( (Hearing on Defendants TC-Chadron, LLC and Turnstone Capital I...)); Filed by Clerk

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  • 03/25/2019
  • Opposition (TO EX PARTE APPLICATION TO CONTINUE TRIAL OF DEFENDANTS TC-CHADRON LLC AND TURNSTONE CAPITAL INC.; DECLARATION OF GERALD S. OHN); Filed by Noe Amaya (Plaintiff); Bryan Ani (Plaintiff); Susana Ani (Plaintiff) et al.

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  • 03/25/2019
  • Order (Granting Ex Parte Application to Continue Trial, or in the Alternative, to Shorten Time for the Hearing on the Motion to Continue Trial); Filed by TC-Chadron LLC (Defendant)

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  • 03/25/2019
  • Ex Parte Application (to Continue Trial, or in the Alternative, to Shorten Time for the Hearing on the Motion to Continue Trial); Filed by TC-Chadron LLC (Defendant); Turnstone Capital Inc. (Defendant)

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  • 03/19/2019
  • Substitution of Attorney; Filed by Turnstone Capital Inc. (Defendant)

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  • 03/04/2019
  • Substitution of Attorney; Filed by Jose A. Alonzo (Defendant)

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 03/04/2019
  • Substitution of Attorney; Filed by Leonor M. Alonzo (Defendant)

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  • 02/11/2019
  • Association of Attorney; Filed by Jose A. Alonzo (Defendant); Leonor M. Alonzo (Defendant)

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 01/11/2019
  • Stipulation and Order (Re Partial Dismissal); Filed by Noe Amaya (Plaintiff); Bryan Ani (Plaintiff); Susana Ani (Plaintiff) et al.

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176 More Docket Entries
  • 08/15/2017
  • Application ; Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 08/15/2017
  • Application ; Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 08/15/2017
  • Application ; Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 08/15/2017
  • Application ; Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 08/15/2017
  • Application ; Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 08/15/2017
  • Application ; Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 08/15/2017
  • Application ; Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 08/15/2017
  • Application ; Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 08/15/2017
  • APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM CIVIL EX PARTE

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 08/15/2017
  • APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM CIVIL EX PARTE

    Read MoreRead Less

Tentative Rulings

Case Number: BC672279    Hearing Date: January 03, 2020    Dept: 48

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MOVING PARTY: Defendant TC-Chadron LLC

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiffs Pastora Gutierrez, et al.

PROOF OF SERVICE:

Defendants TC-Chadron LLC and Turnstone Capital, Inc. filed a Stipulation and Proposed Order to take the Motion for Summary Judgment off calendar as to plaintiffs Alberto Solis, Alexander Gonzalez and Lesly Gonzalez. The Alonzo Defendants likewise took their motion off calendar. Accordingly the only motion to be addressed today is:

Defendant TC-Chadron LLC and Turnstone Capital’s Motion for Summary Judgment

 

ANALYSIS

Defendant TC-Chadron LLC and Turnstone Capital’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Documents Lodged Conditionally Under Seal

On October 18, 2019, Defendants TC-Chadron LLC and Turnstone Capital, Inc. filed a Notice of Lodging Conditionally under Seal certain documents in support of their motion for summary judgment/summary adjudication. The notice indicated that all such records would be placed in the public court record unless a timely motion or application to seal the records was filed. No such timely motion or application to seal has been filed. Accordingly, all documents lodged conditionally under seal by Defendants shall be placed in the public file. CRC Rule 2.551(b)(3)(B).

Request for Judicial Notice

Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of the following: (1) Judgment filed on October 27, 2016 in TC-Chadron LLC v. Juan Gonzalez and Maricela Zaragoza (LASC Case No. 16F04405); (2) Answer filed in 16F04405; (3) Judgment filed on November 3, 2016 in TC-Chadron LLC v. Jovan Reyes and Jackelyn Cornoado (LASC Case No. 16F04742); (4) Answer filed in 16F04742); (5) Judgment filed on January 31, 2017 in TC-Chadron LLC v,. Marcos Vargas Espindola and Esther Guerrara (LASC Case No. 16F05755); (6) Answer filed in 16F05755; (7) Unlawful Detainer Stipulation and Judgment filed on January 23, 2017 in TC-Chadron LLC v. Aristeo and Cecilia Rojas (LASC Case No. 16F05754) and Mutual General release between TC-Chadron LLC and Aristeo and Cecilia Rojas via incorporation by reference.

Requests Nos 1 – 7 are GRANTED per Evid. Code § 452(d)(court records).

Plaintiffs’ Evidentiary Objections

Pursuant to CCP § 437c(q), the Court only rules upon Plaintiffs’ evidentiary objections where are asserted against evidence which the Court deems to be material to the disposition of this motion.

Declaration of Cynthia Sun

No. 1: OVERRULED. Sufficient personal knowledge and foundation.

Declaration of John Ward

No. 1: OVERRULED. Sufficient personal knowledge and foundation.

No. 2: OVERRULED. Sufficient foundation of business records. Ward Decl., ¶ 5.

No. 3: OVERRULED. This is reflected on the document; goes to weight.

No. 4: OVERRULED. Relevant.

Defendants’ Evidentiary Objections

Pursuant to CCP § 437c(q), the Court declines to rule upon Defendants’ evidentiary objections, which are asserted against evidence which the Court does not deem to be material to the disposition of this motion.

Discussion

Defendants TC-Chadron LLC and Turnstone Capital, Inc. move for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication as to the following Plaintiffs:

1. Victor Reynoso; 2. Cecilia Rojas; 3. Marcos Vargas Espindola; 4. Esther Guevara; 5. Marco Antonio Vargas; 6. Maricela Zaragoza; 7. Juan Gonzalez;

8. Jacquelin Coronado-Reyes; 9. Jovan Reyes;

Plaintiff Victor Reynoso

Defendants argue that Plaintiff Victor Reynoso signed a mutual release agreement with a general release provision releasing all claims against Defendants TC-Chadron and Turnstone, which bar his first through fourth causes of action.

TC-Chadron was the owner of the property and Turnstone Capital, Inc. was the property management company at all times relevant to this Plaintiff. UF Nos. 1, 2. Plaintiff Reynoso signed a mutual release provision releasing claims against TC-Chadron and Turnstone on January 4, 2017. UF No. 30; Def’s Exh. 4. That Mutual General Release provides in pertinent part:

FOR VALUABLE CONSIDERATION as further defined herein, TURNSTONE CAPITAL, INC.; TURNSTONE CAPITAL MANAGEMENT GROUP; TC-CHADRON, LLC, hereinafter cumulatively TURNSTONE, and its agents, employees and employees of the principal. Release, discard and waive all claims, causes of action, costs, attorney's fees, other damages claimed or that could have been claimed so far, against SAUL REYNOSO, CELEDONIA REMIGIO, HUGO REYNOSO and VICTOR REYNOSO, hereinafter REYNOSO its agents, servants and employees. This publication is intended to extend to all claims, including, but not limited to, those arising out of REYNOSO's lease at facilities located at 14719 Chadron Avenue # 1 Gardena, California 90249 (hereinafter SUBJECT PREMISES), including income due and due for the period between November 1, 2016 and until the date REYNOSO leaves and renounces the possession of the PREMISES.

REYNOSO, its agents, servers and employees hereby release, discharge and waive all claims, causes of action, costs, attorneys' fees, other damages that have been claimed or could have been claimed so far, against TURNSTONE, its directors, agents, servers and employees. This publication is intended to extend to all claims, including but not limited to those arising out of REYNOSO's lease at facilities located at 14719 Chadron Avenue # 1 Gardena, California 90249.

(Bold emphasis and underlining added.)

Defendants have met their initial burden of demonstrating that they are entitled to judgment as to all claims asserted by Plaintiff Victor Reynoso because he signed a waiver of such claims. The burden shifts to Plaintiff to raise a triable issue of material fact.

Plaintiff Victor Reynoso submitted a declaration indicating that he does not remember signing any mutual general release agreement with any of the Defendants, does not remember anyone from Defendants discussing any mutual general release agreement with him at any time, and did not have any intent to sign away his rights to sue any of the Defendant in this lawsuit for injuries he sustained from living at the premises. See Declaration of Victor Reynoso, ¶¶ 4 – 6. Notably, Plaintiff does not dispute that the signature on the Mutual Release Agreement is his signature.

The failure to recall signing an agreement does not overcome an otherwise reasonable inference arising from the plaintiff’s signature that plaintiff agreed to the contract. Joseph E. Di Loreto, Inc. v. O'Neill (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 149, 160-61.

"It is well established, in the absence of fraud, overreaching or excusable neglect, that one who signs an instrument may not avoid the impact of its terms on the ground that he failed to read the instrument before signing it." (Hulsey v. Elsinore Parachute Center, supra, 168 Cal.App.3d 333, 339; see also Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1976) 17 Cal.3d 699, 710 [131 Cal.Rptr. 882, 552 P.2d 1178]; Izzi v. Mesquite Country Club (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1309, 1318-1319 [231 Cal.Rptr. 315].)

. . .

"Ordinarily, one who accepts or signs an instrument, which on its face is a contract, is deemed to assent to all its terms, and cannot escape liability on the ground that he has not read it. If he cannot read, he should have it read or explained to him." (1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1987) § 120, p. 145.) This is not only the California but the general rule. (3 Corbin, Contracts (1960) § 607, pp. 668-669, fn. omitted ["One who signs an instrument when for some reason, such as illiteracy or blindness, he can not read it, will be bound by its terms in case the other party acts in good faith without trick or misrepresentation. The signer should have had the instrument read to him."].)

Randas v. YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 158, 163.

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of presenting evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of material fact as to whether he signed a release of his claims against Defendants.

The motion for summary judgment against Plaintiff Victor Reynoso is GRANTED.

Plaintiff Cecilia Rojas

Defendants argue that Plaintiff Cecilia Rojas signed a mutual release agreement with a general release provision releasing all claims against Defendants TC-Chadron and Turnstone, which bar her first through fourth causes of action.

Defendants’ evidence is that Rojas’ husband, Aristeo Rojas, singed the mutual release agreement. UF No. 8; Def’s Exh. 5. Defendants have not presented sufficient evidence that Aristeo Rojas was authorized to sign a release agreement on behalf of his wife, either under actual or ostensible authority.

Evergreen's second argument to the trial court (and its primary argument on appeal) is premised on the claim that Luis's status as Josephina's spouse was sufficient to confer agency status on him. Evergreen asserts Luis's spousal status distinguishes this case from Pagarigan, which involved two daughters purporting to act on behalf of their mother. To support its assertion that the spousal relationship creates agency status, Evergreen relies on the fiduciary and support duties owed between spouses, including the duty to provide medical care. (See Fam. Code, § 4300 [general duty to support spouse]; Hawkins v. Superior Court, supra, 89 Cal. App. 3d at pp. 418–419 [duty to support spouse includes provision of health care].) Although we agree that spouses are fiduciaries and owe a duty of support in the family law context, these duties do not create a power to contractually bind each other in the agency context. “[I]t is well established that an agency cannot be implied from the marriage relation alone.” (Lovetro v. Steers, supra, 234 Cal. App. 2d at p. 475; see Russell v. Dopp (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 765, 783 [42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 768]; Avedissian v. Manukian (1983) 141 Cal. App. 3d 379, 385 [190 Cal. Rptr. 291].) We recognize that “it is also true that much less evidence is required to establish a principal and agent relationship between husband and wife than between nonspouses.” (Lovetro, supra, at p. 475.) Here, however, Evergreen presented no evidence of agency apart from the marital relationship. Although the establishment of an agency relationship between spouses does not require a high level of proof, the Floreses' marital relationship cannot alone create an agency.

Flores v. Evergreen at San Diego, LLC (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 581, 589 (bol emphasis added).

As the Flores court explained: “Agency ‘can be established either by agreement between the agent and the principal, that is, a true agency [citation], or it can be founded on ostensible authority, that is, some intentional conduct or neglect on the part of the alleged principal creating a belief in the minds of third persons that an agency exists, and a reasonable reliance thereon by such third persons.’ [Citations.] ‘ “ ‘The principal must in some manner indicate that the agent is to act for him, and the agent must act or agree to act on his behalf and subject to his control.’…” [Citations.] Thus, the “formation of an agency relationship is a bilateral matter. Words or conduct by both principal and agent are necessary to create the relationship … .” ’ [Citation.]” (Flores, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 588.)

Warfield v. Summerville Senior Living, Inc. (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 443, 448 (bold emphasis added).

Because Defendants have not met their initial burden of demonstrating that Plaintiff Cecilia Rojas signed the mutual release agreement, or that she authorized her husband to sign the mutual release agreement as her agent, the burden does not shift to Plaintiff to raise a triable issue of material fact.

The motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff Cecilia Rojas is DENIED. Defendants’ alternative motion for summary adjudication is DENIED in its entirety.

Plaintiff Marcos Vargas Espindola

Defendants argue that Plaintiff Marcos Vargas Espindola’s claims are barred by the res judicata/collateral estoppel effect of the unlawful detainer judgment entered against him on January 31, 2017 in LASC Case No. 16F05755. UF No. 10; Def’s RJN Exh. 5. Defendant’s point out that Esther Guerara in pro per filed an answer in 16F05755, which included an affirmative defense of breach of warranty to provide habitable premises. Def’s RJN Exh. 6. The Court notes that Esther Guerara filing an answer in pro per does not mean she filed an answer on behalf of her co-defendant husband.

That judgment for TC-Chadron, LLC and against Marcos Vargas Espindola and Esther Guerara is for restitution and possession of the premises located at 14719 Chadron Ave. #6, Gardena, CA 9209. Def’s RJN Exh. 6. The judgment of possession applies to any and all unnamed occupants of the premises and the lease or agreement under which the property is held was declared forfeited. Id.

The res judicata effect of an unlawful detainer proceeding is narrow, but is not nonexistent. Generally speaking, an unlawful detainer judgment has limited res judicata force because it typically follows a summary proceeding focused only on deciding a party's right to immediate possession of property. (Pelletier v. Alameda Yacht Harbor (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 1551, 1557 [230 Cal. Rptr. 253].) But when litigants to an unlawful detainer proceeding fully try other issues besides the right of possession, the unlawful detainer judgment is conclusive as to those other litigated issues. (Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251, 256–257 [142 Cal. Rptr. 414, 572 P.2d 28]; Pelletier v. Alameda Yacht Harbor, supra, at p. 1557.)

Gombiner v. Swartz (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1365, 1371 (bold emphasis and underlining added).

A similar analysis applies in the context of collateral estoppel. Ayala v. Dawson (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1319, 1327-32. See discussion below re: Plaintiff Esther Guevara.

Here, Defendants have not presented evidence that Plaintiff Marcos Vargas Espindola fully tried the issues presented by his causes of action seeking damages for breach of implied warranty of habitability, nuisance, violation of Civil Code § 1942.4 and negligence. Accordingly, Defendants have not met their initial burden of demonstrating that they are entitled to judgment as to any or all causes of action as against Plaintiff Marcos Vargas Espindola on the ground of res judicata/collateral estoppel. The burden does not shift to Plaintiff to raise a triable issue of material fact.

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED as to Plaintiff Marcos Vargas Espindola. Defendants’ alternative motion for summary adjudication is DENIED in its entirety.

Plaintiff Esther Guerara[1]

Defendants argue that Plaintiff Esther Guerara’s claims are barred by the res judicata/collateral estoppel effect of the unlawful detainer judgment entered against her on January 31, 2017 in LASC Case No. 16F05755. UF No. 14; Def’s RJN Exh. 5. Defendant’s point out that Esther Guerara in pro per filed an answer in 16F05755, which included an affirmative defense of breach of warranty to provide habitable premises. Def’s RJN Exh. 6.

That judgment for TC-Chadron, LLC and against Marcos Vargas Espindola and Esther Guerara is for restitution and possession of the premises located at 14719 Chadron Ave. #6, Gardena, CA 9209. Def’s RJN Exh. 6. The judgment of possession applies to any and all unnamed occupants of the premises and the lease or agreement under which the property is held was declared forfeited. Id.

The res judicata effect of an unlawful detainer proceeding is narrow, but is not nonexistent. Generally speaking, an unlawful detainer judgment has limited res judicata force because it typically follows a summary proceeding focused only on deciding a party's right to immediate possession of property. (Pelletier v. Alameda Yacht Harbor (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 1551, 1557 [230 Cal. Rptr. 253].) But when litigants to an unlawful detainer proceeding fully try other issues besides the right of possession, the unlawful detainer judgment is conclusive as to those other litigated issues. (Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251, 256–257 [142 Cal. Rptr. 414, 572 P.2d 28]; Pelletier v. Alameda Yacht Harbor, supra, at p. 1557.)

Gombiner v. Swartz (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1365, 1371 (bold emphasis and underlining added).

A similar analysis applies in the context of collateral estoppel:

B. The Collateral Estoppel Effect of Unlawful Detainer Judgments

Because “[a]n unlawful detainer action is a summary proceeding ordinarily limited to resolution of the question of possession[,] [citation] … any judgment arising therefrom generally is given limited res judicata effect.” (Malkoskie v. Option One Mortgage Corp. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 968, 973 [115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 821].) The approach courts take to applying collateral estoppel in this setting is broadly consistent with that taken to the collateral estoppel effect given other forms of summary, informal or specialized adjudication. As a general matter in such cases, collateral estoppel will only apply if the party to be bound agreed expressly or impliedly to submit an issue to prior adjudication (see Vandenberg, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 835) and had a full and fair opportunity to litigate (see Rohrbasser, supra, 179 Cal.App.3d at p. 300) under circumstances affording due process protections (see Basurto, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 878).

Ayala v. Dawson (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1319, 1327-30 (bold emphasis and underlining added).

Here, Defendants have not presented evidence that Plaintiff Esther Guerara fully tried the issues presented by her causes of action seeking damages for breach of implied warranty of habitability, nuisance, violation of Civil Code § 1942.4 and negligence. As Ayala notes, merely pleading the breach of implied warranty of habitability as an affirmative defense, by itself, in insufficient to show a full and extensive litigation of that issue for purposes of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Accordingly, Defendants have not met their initial burden of demonstrating that they are entitled to judgment as to any or all causes of action as against Plaintiff Esther Guerara on the ground of res judicata/collateral estoppel. The burden does not shift to Plaintiff to raise a triable issue of material fact.

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED as to Plaintiff Esther Guerara. Defendants’ alternative motion for summary adjudication is DENIED in its entirety.

Plaintiff Marco Antonio Vargas

Plaintiff Marco Antonio Vargas was a minor who lived with his parents Marcos Vargas Espindola and Esther Guevara. UF No. 20; MSJ at Page 9:6-9. Defendants argue that the judgment entered against Espindola and Guevara have res judicata/collateral estoppel effect as against Vargas. For the reasons discussed above as to Plaintiffs Marcos Vargas Espindola and Esther Guevara, this argument is not persuasive.

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED as to Plaintiff Marco Antonio Vargas. Defendants’ alternative motion for summary adjudication is DENIED in its entirety.

Plaintiff Maricela Zaragoza

Defendants argue that Plaintiff Maricela Zaragoza’s claims are barred by the res judicata/collateral estoppel effect of the unlawful detainer judgment entered against her on October 27, 2016 in LASC Case No. 16F044055. UF No. 23; Def’s RJN Exh. 1.

Defendant’s point out that Juan Gonzalez in pro per filed an answer in 16F044055 which included an affirmative defense of breach of warranty to provide habitable premises. Def’s RJN Exh. 2. The Court notes that Juan Gonzalez filing an answer in pro per does not mean he filed an answer on behalf of his co-defendant wife.

That judgment for TC-Chadron, LLC and against Juan Gonzalez and Maricela Zaragoza is for restitution and possession of the premises located at 14719 Chadron Ave. #15, Gardena, CA 9209. Def’s RJN Exh. 1. The judgment of possession applies to any and all unnamed occupants of the premises and the lease or agreement under which the property is held was declared forfeited. Id.

. For the reasons discussed above as to Plaintiffs Marcos Vargas Espindola and Esther Guevara, Defendants’ res judicata/collateral estoppel argument is not persuasive.

Here, Defendants have not presented evidence that Plaintiff Maricela Zaragoza fully tried the issues presented by her causes of action seeking damages for breach of implied warranty of habitability, nuisance, violation of Civil Code § 1942.4 and negligence. Accordingly, Defendants have not met their initial burden of demonstrating that they are entitled to judgment as to any or all causes of action as against Plaintiff Maricela Zaragoza on the ground of res judicata/collateral estoppel. The burden does not shift to Plaintiff to raise a triable issue of material fact.

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED as to Plaintiff Maricela Zaragoza. Defendants’ alternative motion for summary adjudication is DENIED in its entirety.

Plaintiff Jacquelin Coronado-Reyes

Defendants argue that Plaintiff Jacquelin Coronado Reyes’s claims are barred by the res judicata/collateral estoppel effect of the unlawful detainer judgment entered against her on November 3, 2016, 2016 in LASC Case No. 16F04742. UF No. 41; Def’s RJN Exh. 3.

Defendant’s point out that Jackelyn Coronado in pro per filed an answer in 16F04742 which included an affirmative defense of breach of warranty to provide habitable premises. Def’s RJN Exh. 4.

That judgment for TC-Chadron, LLC and against Jovan Reyes and Jackelin Coronado aka Jackelyn Coronado is for restitution and possession of the premises located at 14719 Chadron Ave. #11, Gardena, CA 9209. Def’s RJN Exh. 3. The judgment of possession applies to any and all unnamed occupants of the premises and the lease or agreement under which the property is held was declared forfeited. Id.

. For the reasons discussed above as to Plaintiffs Marcos Vargas Espindola and Esther Guevara, Defendants’ res judicata/collateral estoppel argument is not persuasive.

Here, Defendants have not presented evidence that Plaintiff Jacquelin Coronado Reyes fully tried the issues presented by her causes of action seeking damages for breach of implied warranty of habitability, nuisance, violation of Civil Code § 1942.4 and negligence. Accordingly, Defendants have not met their initial burden of demonstrating that they are entitled to judgment as to any or all causes of action as against Jacquelin Coronado Reyes on the ground of res judicata/collateral estoppel. The burden does not shift to Plaintiff to raise a triable issue of material fact.

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED as to Plaintiff Jacquelin Coronado Reyes. Defendants’ alternative motion for summary adjudication is DENIED in its entirety.

Plaintiff Jovan Reyes

Defendants argue that Plaintiff Jovan Reyes’s claims are barred by the res judicata/collateral estoppel effect of the unlawful detainer judgment entered against him on November 3, 2016, 2016 in LASC Case No. 16F04742. UF No. 45; Def’s RJN Exh. 3.

Defendant’s point out that Jackelyn Coronado in pro per filed an answer in 16F04742 which included an affirmative defense of breach of warranty to provide habitable premises. Def’s RJN Exh. 4. The Court notes that Jackelyn Coronado filing an answer in pro per does not mean she filed an answer on behalf of her co-defendant husband.

That judgment for TC-Chadron, LLC and against Jovan Reyes and Jackelin Coronado aka Jackelyn Coronado is for restitution and possession of the premises located at 14719 Chadron Ave. #11, Gardena, CA 9209. Def’s RJN Exh. 3. The judgment of possession applies to any and all unnamed occupants of the premises and the lease or agreement under which the property is held was declared forfeited. Id.

. For the reasons discussed above as to Plaintiffs Marcos Vargas Espindola and Esther Guevara, Defendants’ res judicata/collateral estoppel argument is not persuasive.

Here, Defendants have not presented evidence that Plaintiff Jovan Reyes fully tried the issues presented by his causes of action seeking damages for breach of implied warranty of habitability, nuisance, violation of Civil Code § 1942.4 and negligence. Accordingly, Defendants have not met their initial burden of demonstrating that they are entitled to judgment as to any or all causes of action as against Jovan Reyes on the ground of res judicata/collateral estoppel. The burden does not shift to Plaintiff to raise a triable issue of material fact.

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED as to Plaintiff Jovan Reyes. Defendants’ alternative motion for summary adjudication is DENIED in its entirety.


[1] Although the motion refers to Esther Guevara, it appears that Plaintiff’s last name is Guerara.