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This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 06/20/2019 at 02:42:57 (UTC).

PANAYIOTIS GEORGE SKORDI VS THE NOVO ET AL

Case Summary

On 03/28/2017 PANAYIOTIS GEORGE SKORDI filed a Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury lawsuit against THE NOVO. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judges overseeing this case are HOLLY J. FUJIE, LAURA A. SEIGLE and AMY D. HOGUE. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****5703

  • Filing Date:

    03/28/2017

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury

  • Court:

    Los Angeles County Superior Courts

  • Courthouse:

    Stanley Mosk Courthouse

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judges

HOLLY J. FUJIE

LAURA A. SEIGLE

AMY D. HOGUE

 

Party Details

Plaintiffs and Petitioners

NICOLA DESPINA

SKORDI PANAYIOTIS GEORGE

Defendants and Respondents

NOVO THE

POWER MUSE PRUDUCTIONS

GOLDENVOICE LLC

AEG LIVE LLC

DOES 1-50

PRUDUCTIONS POWER MUSE

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff and Petitioner Attorneys

DOWNTOWN LA LAW GROUP

DJOUGOURIAN ARTHUR

Defendant and Respondent Attorneys

GOBEL SEVAN ESQ.

LENKOV JEFFREY M. ESQ.

LENKOV JEFFREY MYLES ESQ.

 

Court Documents

Motion for Protective Order

11/15/2018: Motion for Protective Order

Motion to Compel Discovery

2/1/2019: Motion to Compel Discovery

Motion to Compel Discovery

2/1/2019: Motion to Compel Discovery

Motion to Compel Discovery

2/1/2019: Motion to Compel Discovery

Motion to Compel Discovery

2/1/2019: Motion to Compel Discovery

Motion to Compel Discovery

2/1/2019: Motion to Compel Discovery

Motion to Deem RFA"s Admitted

2/1/2019: Motion to Deem RFA"s Admitted

Minute Order

2/15/2019: Minute Order

Ex Parte Application

2/15/2019: Ex Parte Application

Opposition

2/15/2019: Opposition

Minute Order

4/15/2019: Minute Order

Notice of Ruling

4/18/2019: Notice of Ruling

ORDER RE: DEFENDANT AEG PRESENTS LA, LLC'S MOTIONS TO COMPEL DISCOVERY RESPONSES AND STATEMENT OF DAMAGES; AND REQUESTS FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS

10/4/2017: ORDER RE: DEFENDANT AEG PRESENTS LA, LLC'S MOTIONS TO COMPEL DISCOVERY RESPONSES AND STATEMENT OF DAMAGES; AND REQUESTS FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS

SUMMONS

3/28/2017: SUMMONS

PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

5/3/2017: PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

5/3/2017: PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT

5/25/2017: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION BY DEFENDANT TO COMPEL PLAINTIFFS TO PROVIDE RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE, AND; ETC.

8/30/2017: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION BY DEFENDANT TO COMPEL PLAINTIFFS TO PROVIDE RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE, AND; ETC.

31 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 04/18/2019
  • Notice of Ruling (RE: DEFENDANT'S DISCOVERY MOTIONS); Filed by Aeg Live, LLC (Defendant)

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  • 04/17/2019
  • at 1:30 PM in Department 4B, Laura A. Seigle, Presiding; Hearing on Motion to Compel Discovery (not "Further Discovery") (Responses to Supplemental Request for Production of Documents - Panayiotis Skordi) - Held - Advanced and Heard

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  • 04/17/2019
  • at 1:30 PM in Department 4B, Laura A. Seigle, Presiding; Hearing on Motion to Compel Discovery (not "Further Discovery") (Resopnses to Supplemental Interrogatory - Despina Nicola) - Held - Advanced and Heard

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 04/17/2019
  • at 1:30 PM in Department 4B, Laura A. Seigle, Presiding; Hearing on Motion to Compel Discovery (not "Further Discovery") (Responses to Supplemental Interrogatory - Panayiotis Skordi) - Held - Advanced and Heard

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 04/15/2019
  • at 1:30 PM in Department 4B, Laura A. Seigle, Presiding; Hearing on Motion to Deem Request for Admissions Admitted (Despina Nicola) - Held - Motion Denied

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 04/15/2019
  • at 1:30 PM in Department 4B, Laura A. Seigle, Presiding; Hearing on Motion to Compel Discovery (not "Further Discovery") (Responses to Form Interrogatories - Panayiotis Skordi) - Held - Motion Denied

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 04/15/2019
  • at 1:30 PM in Department 4B, Laura A. Seigle, Presiding; Hearing on Motion to Compel Discovery (not "Further Discovery") (Responses to Demand for Production of Documents, Set Two - Despina Nicola) - Held - Motion Denied

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 04/15/2019
  • at 1:30 PM in Department 4B, Laura A. Seigle, Presiding; Hearing on Motion to Compel Discovery (not "Further Discovery") (Responses to Form Interrogatories - Despina Nicola) - Held - Motion Denied

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 04/15/2019
  • at 1:30 PM in Department 4B, Laura A. Seigle, Presiding; Hearing on Motion to Compel Discovery (not "Further Discovery") (Responses to Demand for Production, Set Two - Panayiotis Skordi) - Held - Motion Denied

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 04/15/2019
  • at 1:30 PM in Department 4B, Laura A. Seigle, Presiding; Hearing on Motion to Compel Discovery (not "Further Discovery") (Responses to Supplemental Request for Production - Despina Nicola) - Held - Motion Denied

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69 More Docket Entries
  • 05/03/2017
  • PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

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  • 05/03/2017
  • PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

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  • 05/03/2017
  • Proof-Service/Summons; Filed by Panayiotis George Skordi (Plaintiff); Despina Nicola (Plaintiff)

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  • 05/03/2017
  • PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

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  • 05/03/2017
  • PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

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  • 04/03/2017
  • AMENDMENT TO COMPLAINT

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  • 04/03/2017
  • Amendment to Complaint; Filed by Panayiotis George Skordi (Plaintiff); Despina Nicola (Plaintiff)

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  • 03/28/2017
  • COMPLAINT FOR: 1. ASSAULT AND BATTERY ;ETC

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  • 03/28/2017
  • Complaint; Filed by Panayiotis George Skordi (Plaintiff); Despina Nicola (Plaintiff)

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 03/28/2017
  • SUMMONS

    Read MoreRead Less

Tentative Rulings

Case Number: BC655703    Hearing Date: March 05, 2021    Dept: 27

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

PANAYIOTIS GEORGE SKORDI, et al.,

Plaintiff(s),

vs.

THE NOVO, et al.,

Defendant(s).

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.: BC655703

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANT AEG PRESENTS LA, LLC’S MOTION FOR AN ORDER COMPELLING PLAINTIFF TO APPEAR FOR SECOND INDEPENDENT MEDICAL EXAMINATION

Dept. 27

8:30 a.m.

March 5, 2021

On March 28, 2017, Plaintiffs Panayiotis George Skordi (“Plaintiff”) and Despina Nicola filed this action against Defendant AEG Presents LA, LLC (erroneously sued as “The Anschutz Corporation, the Novo, Goldenvoice, LLC and AEG Live, LLC”) (“Defendant”).  Defendant moves for an order compelling Plaintiff to appear for an independent medical examination (“IME”) before Dr. Ronald S. Kvitne (“Dr. Kvitne”) on April 6, 2021 at 1:30 p.m. Dr. Kvitne is a board-certified orthopedic surgeon and the examination will include a patient history, x-rays and/or MRI, and physical examination, limited to the shoulders and back.  

“Nowhere does the Legislature specifically limit the number of available examinations, either mental or physical.  The authoritative discovery commentators agree that multiple defense examinations are permitted on the necessary showing of good cause.”  (Shapira v. Superior Court (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1249, 1255.)  A showing of good cause requires “that the party produce specific facts justifying discovery and that the inquiry be relevant to the subject matter of the action or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”  (Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 840.)  “The requirement of a court order following a showing of good cause is doubtless designed to protect an examinee’s privacy interest by preventing an examination from becoming an annoying fishing expedition.”  (Ibid.)

Plaintiff’s initial discovery responses from October 2017 indicated that Plaintiff sustained injuries to his leg, ankle, and back.  Plaintiff’s first IME on December 21, 2018 was conducted by Dr. Tye Ouzonian, an orthopedic surgeon who specializes in foot and ankle disorders.  The first notice of IME stated that the exam would focus on Plaintiff’s ankles, shoulders and extremities.”  (Lenkov Decl., Ex. B.) Defendant argues a second IME is necessary to examine Plaintiff’s shoulder and back because in February 2019, Plaintiff served supplemental discovery responses stating that he suffered left shoulder pain and emotional distress.  Defendant states that although Dr. Ouzonian examined Plaintiff’s shoulder, he is not a shoulder or back specialist.  

In opposition, Plaintiff states that Defendant was already aware of Plaintiff’s back injuries in October 2017 and that Defendant knew to examine Plaintiff’s shoulders because the notice of examination specifically identified them.  Plaintiff further argues that in June 2018, Plaintiff testified about his shoulder and back injuries, and therefore Defendant knew about his shoulder and back injuries six months before the first IME. 

Dr. Kvitne and Dr. Ouzonian are both orthopedic surgeons.  While Dr. Ouzonian is admittedly not a shoulder specialist, Defendant has not shown good cause why an orthopedist who specializes in both ankles and shoulders/back was not retained.  Defendant also does not explain why a second IME examining the back and shoulder is being requested two years after the injuries were disclosed.  The Court agrees that while Defendant may regret its decision to have Dr. Ouzonian conduct the IME, Defendant’s regret does not warrant a second examination of Plaintiff.  Defendant’s Motion is DENIED. 

“The court shall impose a monetary sanction . . . against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel response and compliance with a demand for a physical examination, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”  (Code of Civ. Proc., § 2032.240, subd. (c).)

As neither party requests sanctions, the Court declines to impose sanctions in connection with this motion. 

Moving party to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  

Dated this 5th day of March 2021

Hon. Edward B. Moreton, Jr.

Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: BC655703    Hearing Date: December 04, 2020    Dept: 27

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

PANAYIOTIS SKORDI, an individual; DESPINA NICOLA, an individual,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

THE NOVO; POWER MUSE

PRODUCTION; GOLDENVOICE, LLC;

AEG LIVE, LLC; and DOES 1-50, inclusive,

Defendants.

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CASE NO.: BC654247

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEEFENDANT DENA ROMIOS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Dept. 26

1:30 p.m.

December 4, 2020

I. INTRODUCTION

On March 28, 2017, Plaintiffs, Panayiotis Skordi and Despina Nicola, filed this action against Defendants, The Novo, Power Muse Productions, Goldenvoice, LLC, and AEG Live, LLC, to claim that the Defendants are liable for an attack by the Defendants’ security guards on Payayiotis Skordi. His wife, Despina Vandi, claims she suffered emotional distress when she saw the attack.

AEG Presents LA, LLC, which states that it was erroneously sued as The Novo, Goldenvoice, LLC, and AEG LIVE, LLC, filed a Cross-Complaint for indemnity against Power Muse Productions to allege that it had expressly agreed to indemnify the AEG Presents LC, LLC.

Power Muse Productions, which is a dba of Dena Romios, then filed a Cross-Complaint for indemnity against ROES 1 to 50.

The Defendant, Dena Romios, who dba Power Muse Productions, moves for summary judgment on the grounds that she did not hire, supervise, or retain the security and that she has no duty to indemnify for the conduct of the security guards. In the alternative, the Defendant seeks summary adjudication of the claim for punitive damages.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

At a concert promoted by the Defendant on October 1, 2016, Plaintiffs suffered personal injuries when they were attacked by several security guards. The Defendant states that she did not witness the incident and that she did not hire, supervise, or retain the security guards.

The relevant pleadings for this motion are the Plaintiffs’ Complaint and the Cross-Complaints filed by AEG Presents LA, LLC.

The Plaintiffs commenced this action by filing a Complaint to seek relief under the following causes of action:

1) Assault and Battery;

2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress;

3) Negligent Hiring, Supervision and Retention; and

4) Loss of Consortium.

In response, the Defendant, AEG Presents LA, LLC, filed a Cross-Complaint to seek relief under the following causes of action:

1) Express Indemnification;

2) Equitable Indemnification;

3) Equitable Contribution; and

4) Declaratory Relief.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if that party contends that the cause of action has no merit or that there is no affirmative defense thereto, or that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, or both, or that there is no merit to a claim for damages . . . or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) A motion for summary adjudication shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(2).)

“[T]he initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) A moving defendant need not conclusively negate an element of plaintiff’s cause of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854.)

To meet this burden of showing a cause of action cannot be established, a defendant must show not only “that the plaintiff does not possess needed evidence” but also that “the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854.) It is insufficient for the defendant to merely point out the absence of evidence. (Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891.) The defendant “must also produce evidence that the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain evidence to support his or her claim.” (Ibid.)  The supporting evidence can be in the form of affidavits, declarations, admissions, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855.)

“Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The plaintiff may not merely rely on allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists, but instead, “shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action.” (Ibid.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

IV. DISCUSSION

The Defendant, Dena Romios, seeks summary judgment on the Plaintiffs’ Complaint and AEG Presents LC, LLC’s Cross-Complaint. Under CCP section 437c, the Defendant has the burden of showing that an essential element cannot be established in each cause of action of both the Complaint and the Cross-Complaint.

1. Plaintiffs’ Complaint

The Defendant argues that she is not liable for the Plaintiffs’ injuries because she did not engage in any tortious conduct and because she did not employ or supervise the security guards. The Defendant seeks summary judgment on the ground that none of the four causes of action in the Complaint can be established against her. In the alternative, the Defendant seeks summary adjudication of the claim for punitive damages.

a. First Cause of Action for Assault and Battery

The Plaintiffs allege in paragraph 19 of the first cause of action that the Defendants and their employees intentionally assaulted and battered the Plaintiff. The essential elements of a cause of action for battery are:

1) defendant touched plaintiff, or caused plaintiff to be touched, with the intent to harm or offend plaintiff;

2) plaintiff did not consent to the touching;

3) plaintiff was harmed or offended by defendant’s conduct; and

4) a reasonable person in plaintiff’s position would have been offended by the touching.

(So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 669.)

In addition, the Plaintiff’s allegations show that he is claiming the Defendant is liable under a vicarious liability theory for the acts of the security guards. Under this doctrine, employers are liable for the torts of their employees that were committed within the scope of their employment. (Moreno v. Visser Ranch, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 568, 575-576.)

The Defendant provides evidence that she did not touch the Plaintiff and that she arrived after hearing the commotion (Separate Statement of Facts (“SSF”) 15 and 17; Romios decl., paragraph 8). Further, the Defendant provides evidence that she did not hire, employ, or provide the security guards, she did not supervise the security guards, and she did not authorize or ratify their conduct (SSF 24, 25, 26, and 27; Romios decl., paragraph 10, 11, and 13). This evidence shows that the Plaintiff cannot establish the essential element that the Defendant touched the Plaintiff or caused the Plaintiff to be touched. It also shows that the Defendant is not liable for the conduct of the security guards under the vicarious liability doctrine because she did not employ the security guards. As a result, the Defendant has met her burden of proof and the burden is shifted to the Plaintiff to show that a dispute of fact exists.

The Plaintiff did not file any opposition papers. As a result, the Plaintiff did not meet his burden.

Therefore, the undisputed facts show that the Plaintiff cannot establish the first cause of action.

b. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The Plaintiffs allege in paragraph 22 and 23 of the second cause of action that the Defendants engaged in extreme conduct and intended to cause the Plaintiff to suffer severe physical injury. The essential elements of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress are the following:

1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress;

2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and

3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.

(Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035,1050-1051.)

In addition, the Plaintiff’s allegations in the other portions of the Complaint show that he is claiming the Defendant is liable under a vicarious liability theory for the acts of the security guards. Under this doctrine, employers are liable for the torts of their employees that were committed within the scope of their employment. (Moreno v. Visser Ranch, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 568, 575-576.)

The Defendant provides evidence that she did not touch the Plaintiff and that she arrived after hearing the commotion (Separate Statement of Facts (“SSF”) 15 and 17; Romios decl., paragraph 8). Further, the Defendant provides evidence that she did not hire, employ, or provide the security guards, she did not supervise the security guards, and she did not authorize or ratify their conduct (SSF 24, 25, 26, and 27; Romios decl., paragraph 10, 11, and 13). This evidence shows that the Plaintiff cannot establish the essential element that the Defendant engaged in extreme or outrageous conduct with the intent of causing the Plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress. It also shows that the Defendant is not liable for the conduct of the security guards under the vicarious liability doctrine because she did not employ the security guards. As a result, the Defendant has met her burden of proof and the burden is shifted to the Plaintiff to show that a dispute of fact exists.

The Plaintiff did not file any opposition papers. As a result, the Plaintiff did not meet his burden.

Therefore, the undisputed facts show that the Plaintiff cannot establish the second cause of action.

c. Negligent Hiring, Supervision and Retention

The Plaintiff alleges in paragraph 27 that the Defendants owed a duty of care to the Plaintiff to hire employees that would conform their conduct to the law and not inflict harm on customers. California case law recognizes the theory that an employer can be liable to a third person for negligently hiring, supervising, or retaining an unfit employee.” (Doe v. Capital Cities (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1038, 1054.)

The Defendant provides evidence that she did not hire, employ, or provide the security guards, she did not supervise the security guards, and she did not authorize or ratify their conduct (SSF 24, 25, 26, and 27; Romios decl., paragraph 10, 11, and 13). This evidence shows that the Plaintiff cannot establish the essential element that the Defendant had a duty of care with regards to the security guards because she did not employ the security guards. As a result, the Defendant has met her burden of proof and the burden is shifted to the Plaintiff to show that a dispute of fact exists.

The Plaintiff did not file any opposition papers. As a result, the Plaintiff did not meet his burden.

Therefore, the undisputed facts show that the Plaintiff cannot establish the third cause of action.

d. Loss of Consortium

The Plaintiff, Despina Nicola, alleges in paragraph 30 that as a result of the torts in the first, second, and third causes of action, she suffered a loss of consortium with her husband, Panayiotis Skordi. This cause of action dependent upon the existence of a cause of action for tortious injury to a spouse. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 746.) An unsuccessful personal injury suit by the physically injured spouse acts as an estoppel that bars the spouse who

would claim damages for loss of consortium. (Meighan v. Shore (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1025, 1035-1036.)

The above analysis shows that Panayiotis Skordi cannot establish his first, second, and third causes of action against the Defendant. As a result, the Plaintiff, Despina Nicola, cannot establish her cause of action for loss of consortium against the same Defendant.

Therefore, the undisputed facts show that the Plaintiffs cannot establish their first, second, third, and fourth causes of action in their Complaint. Since the Plaintiffs cannot establish any of their causes of action, the Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the Plaintiff’s Complaint.

The Defendant’s request for summary adjudication of the claim for punitive damages is moot because this claim is encompassed by the order granting summary judgment on the Complaint.

2. AEG Presents LA, LLC’s Cross-Complaint

The Defendant also argues that she is entitled to summary judgment on AEG Presents LA, LLC’s Cross-Complaint because she did not engage in the torts and she did not hire the security guards who engaged in the conduct that caused the Plaintiffs’ injuries.

a. First Cause of Action for Express Indemnification

AEG Presents LA, LLC, alleges in paragraph 7 of the first cause of action that Dena Romios, dba Power Muse Productions, expressly agreed to indemnify it in the Public Event License Agreement.

Under California law, there are two types of indemnity claims based on a contract: express and implied. (Smoketree-Lake Murray v. Mills Concrete Constr. Co. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1724, 1736-1737.) An indemnity claim based on an express contract to indemnify is an express contractual indemnity claim. (Id.) An indemnity claim based on contractual language not specifically dealing with indemnification is an implied contractual indemnity claim and this implied indemnity is a form of equitable indemnity. (Id.)

Express indemnity reflects its contractual nature and it permits great freedom of action to the parties in the establishment of the indemnity arrangements while at the same time subjecting the resulting contractual language to established rules of construction. (Id.) Implied contractual indemnity is based on the equities of the circumstances and is designed to apportion loss among contract parties based on the concept that one who enters a contract agrees to perform the work carefully and to discharge foreseeable damages resulting from that breach. (Id.)

Indemnity agreements ordinarily fall into two categories. (Rossmoor Sanitation, Inc. v. Pylon, Inc. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 622, 628-629.). The first category includes agreements providing "indemnification against an indemnitee's own negligence. (Id.) The second category embraces agreements that do not address the issue of the indemnitee's negligence, a category called "'general' indemnity clauses." (Id.) General indemnity agreements "may be construed to provide indemnity for a loss resulting in part from an indemnitee's passive negligence, they will not be interpreted to provide indemnity if an indemnitee has been actively negligent." (Id. at p. 1537.) Whether negligence is to be characterized as active or passive is based on the circumstances of each case and presents a question for the trier of fact unless the evidence is so clear and undisputable that reasonable persons could not disagree. (Id.)

Exhibit D to the Defendant’s Notice of Lodging of Exhibits contains the Public Event License Agreement between AEG Live LA, LLC, and the Defendant. Paragraph 8 on page 5 contains the following indemnification clause:

8. Indemnification. Notwithstanding any other provision in this Agreement, Licensee shall indemnify and hold harmless Licensor and its affiliates (including, without limitation, Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. and AEG Live LLC), and their respective members, owners, officers, directors, agents, representatives, employees and landlords (the "Indemnitees") harmless from any claim(s), losses, damages, liabilities, demands, liens, suits and expenses (collectively,

"Claims") arising out of or related to (i) any performance of the Event; (ii) Licensee's use of the

Premises; (iii) any breach of any of Licensee's covenants or obligations hereunder, (iv) any act or

omission of Licensee, its members, partners, officers, directors, employees, contractors, agents

and other persons assisting Licensee (whether on a paid or voluntary basis), patrons, guests and

invitees, participants and artists appearing in the Event (including support personnel in

connection with the presentation of the Event), (v) any inaccuracy of any representation made by

Licensee hereunder; (vi) any advertisement related to the Event, and (vii) the content of any

song or verbal statement at any performance of the Event by any performer or other person

under the control of Licensee.

This is a general indemnity clause because it requires the Defendant to indemnify AEG Live LLC for any claim for losses, damages, or liabilities arising from the performance of the Event or “any act or omission” of the Licensee, persons assisting the Licensee, patrons, guests, invitees, participants, and artists appearing in the Event. The Defendant argues that this does not require her to indemnify AEG Live LLC for the claims by the Plaintiffs because their injuries do not arise out of or relate to the Event and because she did not hire or supervise the security guards who allegedly caused the Plaintiff’s injuries.

A review of Exhibit A to the contract, which is on page 9, reveals that it identifies the name of the “Event” as “Despina Vandi Live”. It does not define “Event” or limit “Event” to the performance. The Defendant argues that “Event” was to listen to and see the Greek singer, Despina Vandi. However, the contract does not define Event in such a limited manner, e.g., it does not limit the event solely to the time on which Despina Vandi is on the stage performing a song. Instead, it merely identifies the “Event” as “Despina Vandi Live”.

Further, in the deposition testimony of Despina Nicola, she testified that there were other artists performing (Defendant’s Notice of Lodging, exhibit D, 19:24 to 25). It is not clear whether “Despina Vandi Live” included the time when other artists were performing.

Also, in the Complaint, the Plaintiffs allege in paragraph 11 that they were attending a convert and that they were assaulted when they walked towards the side stage to say goodbye to a friend. It cannot be determined that this occurred after the “Event” of seeing “Despina Vandi Live” had concluded. The Defendant has not met her burden of proof because she does not provide evidence that the Plaintiffs’ injuries occurred after the “Event” had ended.

Further, the indemnification clause is not limited to the acts of security guards. Instead, a review of the language in paragraph 8 reveals that the Defendant agreed to indemnify for any act of the patrons, guests, and licensees. This would include the conduct of the Plaintiffs, who were patrons, guests, or licensees. The Defendant does not provide evidence that the Plaintiffs did not cause the incident that resulted in their injuries.

As a result, the Defendant has not met her burden of proof because she has not shown that the she has no duty under the express indemnity clause.

Further, in the opposition, AEG Live LLC, provides evidence in the declaration of a security guard, Walter Alfaro, that at the end of the show, the Plaintiff tried to walk backstage, and he stood in front of him to stop him (Compendium of Evidence in Opposition, Exhibit A, pages 18 to 19). Mr. Alfaro continues by testifying that the Plaintiff was agitated, punched the wall, and then began flailing his arms (Id.). Mr. Alfaro states that the Plaintiff’s flailing arms made contact with him and that Mr. Alfaro then attempted to restrain the Plaintiff because he believed the Plaintiff was about to harm him (Id.). This evidence shows that the Plaintiff’s injuries may have arisen from the Plaintiff’s conduct of trying to walk backstage and then touching the security guard while agitatedly gesturing his arms. This is evidence that creates a dispute of fact whether the Defendant had agreed to indemnify AEG Live LLC in the indemnification clause because it shows that the duty to indemnify arose from the acts of a patron, guest, or licensee.

Therefore, the Defendant has not shown that the first cause of action lacks merit.

b. Equitable Indemnification, Equitable Contribution, and Declaratory Relief

The Defendant’s motion for summary judgment of the Cross-Complaint is denied because the Defendant has not established that she is entitled to a judgment on the entire Cross-Complaint, i.e., she did not show that the first cause of action for express indemnity lacks merit.

Further, the Defendant did not request summary adjudication of these causes of action as alternative relief. Instead, the Defendant only sought summary adjudication of punitive damages.

The notice of motion must identify the causes of action or defenses to which the motion for summary adjudication is directed. (Sequoia Ins. Co. v. Sup.Ct. (Norden) (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1472, 1478). The court may not summarily adjudicate claims or defenses as to which no triable issue was raised unless requested in the notice of motion. (Homestead Sav. v. Sup.Ct. (Dividend Develop. Corp.) (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 494, 498).

As a result, the Defendant cannot obtain summary adjudication on the second, third, and fourth causes of action in the Cross-Complaint.

Therefore, the Defendant has not established that she is entitled to summary judgment on the Cross-Complaint because there are questions of fact whether the indemnification agreement requires her to indemnify AEG Live LLC for damages arising from the incident between the Plaintiffs and the security guards.

V. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment of the Plaintiffs’ Complaint is GRANTED. However, the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment of AEG Live LLC is DENIED.

Moving party to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT7@lacourt.org indicating the intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court’s website at www.lacourt.org.

Dated this 4th day of January 2020

Hon. Edward B. Moreton, Jr.

Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: BC655703    Hearing Date: March 17, 2020    Dept: 27

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSES TO DISCOVERY AND MONETARY SANCTIONS

On March 28, 2017, Plaintiff Panayiotis George Skordi and Nicola Despina filed this action against Defendant AEG Live LLC (“Defendant”) and others. On October 18, 2019, Defendant served Updated Interrogatories and Supplemental Demands for Production of Documents on each Plaintiff. Defendant has not received any responses. Defendant moves to compel Plaintiffs’ responses to discovery requests and monetary sanctions.

Compel Responses

Where a party fails to serve timely responses to discovery requests, the court may make an order compelling responses. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.290, 2031.300; Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 403.) A party that fails to serve timely responses waives any objections to the request, including ones based on privilege or the protection of attorney work product. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.290, subd. (a), 2031.300, subd. (a).)

Plaintiffs filed no oppositions to these motions and did not serve responses to Defendant’s discovery. Accordingly, the motions to compel are GRANTED, and Plaintiffs are ordered to serve verified responses, without objection, to Defendant’s Updated Interrogatories and Supplemental Demands for Production of Documents within twenty (20) days of the date of this order.

Monetary Sanctions

Where the court grants a motion to compel responses, sanctions shall be imposed against the party who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel, unless the party acted with substantial justification or the sanction would otherwise be unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.290, subd. (c), 2031.300, subd. (c).)

Defendant filed two motions when it should have filed four motions – one for each set of discovery and paid four filing fees. Subject to Defendant paying two additional filing fees and filing proof of payment, the request for monetary sanctions is GRANTED and imposed against Plaintiff Panayiotis George Skordi and Plaintiff’s counsel in the amount of $460.00 to be paid within twenty (20) days of the date of this order, and against Plaintiff Nicola Despina and Plaintiff’s counsel in the amount of $460.00 to be paid within twenty (20) days of the date of this order.

Moving party to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative. Parties who do not submit ARE STRONGLY ENCOURAGED to participate in the hearing via Courtcall so as to minimize the number of people entering the courthouse.

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