This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 10/21/2020 at 02:53:46 (UTC).

PACIFIC LUXURY MOTORS, INC. VS FRANKIE MEZA

Case Summary

On 02/15/2018 PACIFIC LUXURY MOTORS, INC filed a Contract - Other Contract lawsuit against FRANKIE MEZA. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judge overseeing this case is MITCHELL L. BECKLOFF. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****8841

  • Filing Date:

    02/15/2018

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Contract - Other Contract

  • Court:

    Los Angeles County Superior Courts

  • Courthouse:

    Stanley Mosk Courthouse

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judge

MITCHELL L. BECKLOFF

 

Party Details

Plaintiff

PACIFIC LUXURY MOTORS INC.

Defendants

MEZA FRANKIE

DURA GLO COLLISION CENTER

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff Attorneys

SANAI CYRUS M.

SANAI CYRUS MARK

Defendant Attorney

NIGOGHOSIAN SEVAG

 

Court Documents

Notice Re: Continuance of Hearing and Order

8/12/2020: Notice Re: Continuance of Hearing and Order

Reply - REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER

10/1/2020: Reply - REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER

Reply - REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE

10/1/2020: Reply - REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON DEMURRER - WITH MOTION TO STRIKE (CCP 430.10); CAS...)

10/9/2020: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON DEMURRER - WITH MOTION TO STRIKE (CCP 430.10); CAS...)

Notice Re: Continuance of Hearing and Order

2/7/2020: Notice Re: Continuance of Hearing and Order

Unknown - NOTICE OF CONTINUANCE DUE TO COVID-19 STATE OF EMERGENCY DECLARATIONS

4/24/2020: Unknown - NOTICE OF CONTINUANCE DUE TO COVID-19 STATE OF EMERGENCY DECLARATIONS

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR CONTINUANCE OF MOTIONS SE...)

8/7/2020: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR CONTINUANCE OF MOTIONS SE...)

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE)

6/21/2019: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE)

Demurrer - with Motion to Strike (CCP 430.10)

7/19/2019: Demurrer - with Motion to Strike (CCP 430.10)

Notice Re: Continuance of Hearing and Order

5/23/2019: Notice Re: Continuance of Hearing and Order

Civil Case Cover Sheet

2/15/2018: Civil Case Cover Sheet

Minute Order - Minute order entered: 2018-08-14 00:00:00

8/14/2018: Minute Order - Minute order entered: 2018-08-14 00:00:00

Minute Order - Minute Order (Case Management Conference)

10/29/2018: Minute Order - Minute Order (Case Management Conference)

Minute Order - Minute Order (Hearing - Other application to vacate dismissal;)

11/8/2018: Minute Order - Minute Order (Hearing - Other application to vacate dismissal;)

Proof of Personal Service -

9/12/2018: Proof of Personal Service -

Proof of Personal Service -

9/11/2018: Proof of Personal Service -

Proof of Personal Service -

9/11/2018: Proof of Personal Service -

Complaint -

9/12/2018: Complaint -

27 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 01/13/2021
  • Hearing01/13/2021 at 08:30 AM in Department M at 1725 Main Street, Santa Monica, CA 90401; Case Management Conference

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  • 10/09/2020
  • Docketat 09:30 AM in Department M; Case Management Conference - Held - Continued

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  • 10/09/2020
  • Docketat 09:30 AM in Department M; Hearing on Demurrer - with Motion to Strike (CCP 430.10) - Held

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  • 10/09/2020
  • DocketMinute Order ( (Hearing on Demurrer - with Motion to Strike (CCP 430.10); Cas...)); Filed by Clerk

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  • 10/01/2020
  • DocketRequest for Judicial Notice; Filed by FRANKIE MEZA (Defendant); DURA GLO COLLISION CENTER (Defendant)

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  • 10/01/2020
  • DocketReply (to Plaintiff's Opposition to Demurrer); Filed by FRANKIE MEZA (Defendant); DURA GLO COLLISION CENTER (Defendant)

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  • 10/01/2020
  • DocketReply (to Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion to Strike); Filed by FRANKIE MEZA (Defendant); DURA GLO COLLISION CENTER (Defendant)

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  • 09/28/2020
  • DocketOpposition (to Demurrer); Filed by PACIFIC LUXURY MOTORS, INC. (Plaintiff)

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  • 09/28/2020
  • DocketOpposition (to Motion to Strike); Filed by PACIFIC LUXURY MOTORS, INC. (Plaintiff)

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  • 09/28/2020
  • DocketProof of Service (not Summons and Complaint); Filed by PACIFIC LUXURY MOTORS, INC. (Plaintiff)

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54 More Docket Entries
  • 09/11/2018
  • DocketProof of Personal Service

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  • 09/11/2018
  • DocketProof of Personal Service

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  • 08/14/2018
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department M; Case Management Conference (Conference-Case Management; Court Makes Order) -

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  • 08/14/2018
  • Docketat 08:30 am in Department WEM, Mitchell L. Beckloff, Presiding; Conference-Case Management - Court Makes Order

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  • 08/14/2018
  • DocketMinute order entered: 2018-08-14 00:00:00; Filed by Clerk

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  • 02/15/2018
  • DocketComplaint Filed

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  • 02/15/2018
  • DocketCivil Case Cover Sheet

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  • 02/15/2018
  • DocketSummons Filed; Filed by Attorney for Plaintiff

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  • 02/15/2018
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by PACIFIC LUXURY MOTORS, INC. (Plaintiff)

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 02/15/2018
  • DocketSummons; Filed by Plaintiff

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Tentative Rulings

Case Number: SC128841    Hearing Date: October 09, 2020    Dept: M

CASE NAME: Pacific Luxury Motors v. Frankie Mezza, et al.

CASE NO.: SC128841

MOTION: Demurrer with Motion to Strike the First Amended Complaint

HEARING DATE: 10/9/2020

On February 15, 2018, Plaintiff Pacific Luxury Motors, Inc. filed a complaint against Defendants Frankie Meza, Dura Glo Collision Center, and Does 1-10 for breach of contract, fraud (promise without intention to perform) and intentional misrepresentation, and intentional tort. On September 12, 2018, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (FAC) and added a UCL cause of action. This action arises out of the alleged services and repair of a 1975 Cadillac El Dorado Convertible.

On March 14, 2019, at a case management conference, the parties stipulated and the Court gave Plaintiff until April 15, 2019 to file a second amended complaint (SAC). The SAC was never filed. On June 21, 2019, at another case management conference, the Court ordered that the answer/responsive pleading to the FAC be filed within 30 days. On July 19, 2019, Defendants Frankie Meza and Dura GLO Collision Center filed a demurrer with motion to strike.

Legal Standard

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10; Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 209, 220. The court “may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those arising by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.  (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 209, 220 (citing Moore v. Conliffe Montclair Parkowners Assn. v. City of Montclair The court treats all facts alleged in the complaint to be true. (Picton v. Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 732.)

When considering demurrers, courts “are required to construe the complaint liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated, given the assumed truth of the facts pleaded.” (Picton v. Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733 (citing Rogoff v. Grabowski (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 624, 628.)) “The burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate the manner in which the complaint can be amended.” (Ross v. Creel Printing & Publishing Co. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 736, 748.)

Motions to strike are used to reach defects or objections to pleadings that are not challengeable by demurrer (i.e., words, phrases, prayer for damages, etc.). (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 435, 436 & 437.) “The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.) “The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. [or] (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) A motion to strike must be filed within the time allowed to respond (e.g., 30 days after service of the complaint or cross-complaint) unless extended by court order.

Where there are grounds for a demurrer and a motion to strike, they must be filed together and noticed for hearing at the same time. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435(b)(3) and CRC Rule 329.)

request for judicial notice

Defendants request for judicial notice is DENIED. The DMV record has a disclaimer that the information contained therein may be inaccurate or incomplete. As such, the DMV refused to make any warranties or representations as to the correctness of the information contained therein.

Analysis

Defendants demur to the first, second, and third cause of actions on uncertainty grounds and on sufficiency grounds.

Meet and confer

The court finds that the Defendants met and conferred in February 2019. (See Nigoghosian Decl. ¶ 3.)

COA 1: Breach of contract

Defendants demur to the first cause of action for breach of contract arguing that the complaint fails to state sufficient facts because it is barred under the statute of limitations, because plaintiff lacks standing, and because plaintiff has failed to properly allege the essential terms of the contract. The Court addresses these issues in reverse order.

To plead a breach of contract cause of action, Plaintiff must allege: (1) the existence of contract; (2) plaintiffs’ performance or excuse for nonperformance; (3) defendants’ breach (or anticipatory breach); and (4) resulting damage to plaintiff. (See Reichert v. General Ins. Co. (1968) 68 Cal.2d 822.).

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts as to the terms of the contract. The Court agrees with Plaintiff. While Plaintiff alleges that the car would be returned upon completion of the body work and restoration, Plaintiff does not allege facts as to how long such work would take, what the contract price was and/or where such repairs would take place. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that there were no agreed upon price and there was no deadline for performance. Plaintiff concedes that more allegations can be added if required.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants breached the oral agreement on March 17, 2017. (See FAC at BC-2 at p. 4). However, Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant made a promise without the intention of performing. (See id at. FR-4 at p. 6 [fraud cause of action].) Defendants argue that these facts show that the statute of limitations have passed. The statute of limitations starts when the breach has occurred, not when the alleged contract was entered into between the parties. Since Plaintiff alleges the breach occurred on March 17, 2017, the statute of limitations has not run, and that defense fails.

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring this cause of action because this oral contract was made on behalf of another. Defendants cite Civil Code section 1559. Under that section, “A contract, made expressly for the benefit of a third person, may be enforced by him at any time before the parties thereto rescind it.” (Civ. Code, § 1559.) There is nothing in the FAC that shows that the contract was made on behalf of another person or that the contract was expressly intended to benefit some third party. Furthermore, the statute is permissive, with use of the word “may.” However, since Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts as to the terms of the contract, the demurrer is sustained with leave to amend.

COA 2: Fraud

Defendants demur to the fraud cause of action arguing that Plaintiff has failed to meet the specificity requirements. The Court notes that there is only a cause of action for promissory fraud and not intentional misrepresentation. While Plaintiff checked off some of the boxes for intentional misrepresentation, the form is incomplete. (See FAC at 5.) The Court finds that the promissory fraud cause of action on page 6 of the FAC fails to meet the heightened pleading standard. Plaintiff is a corporation and Plaintiff does not allege who on behalf of Plaintiff was told the alleged false promise. Furthermore, Plaintiff does not allege when, where, or on what date the misrepresentation was made. The Court does not infer dates from other causes of action since Plaintiff used a form complaint and does not actually incorporate all previous allegations. Therefore, the demurrer is sustained with leave to amend.

Class action allegations

Defendants demur to the FAC arguing that Plaintiff has failed to meet the requirements of a class action lawsuit. Defendants also argues that class actions must be filed in the Central District at the Stanley Mosk Courthouse. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that transferring the case to the Central District should not be made on demurrer. Here, the complaint fails to meet the pleading standards for a class action. (See CRC Rule 3.761; see also CRC Rule 3.764.). Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to support a class action. The demurrer is sustained. All class actions must be filed at the Stanley Mosk Courthouse.

Uncertainty

COA 3: Intentional tort

This cause of action is labeled as intentional tort. Defendants demur to this cause of action on uncertainty grounds and sufficiency grounds. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the third cause of action is for wrongful sale of an automobile “in violation of California statutory law governing automobile repair shops and holders of liens on automobile.” Defendants argue that they should not have to guess what sort of intentional tort Plaintiff is referring to.

The third cause of action is uncertain. While Plaintiffs make many factual allegations, it is unclear to the Court what intentional tort Plaintiff is attempting to plead. To the extent that Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated some statute, Plaintiff needs to plead facts demonstrating a right to recover under the particular statute. (Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 771, 790 [citing Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Trans. Dist. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780, 795.]) Therefore, the demurrer is sustained on uncertainty grounds with leave to amend.

Motion to Strike

Defendants also filed a motion to strike. Defendants seek to strike five paragraphs, one page, and two of the prayers of relief in the FAC. The items relate to allegations for punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and class action allegations.

As noted in the demurrer, Plaintiff has made no allegations to support a class action, therefore, the motion to strike is GRANTED as to the class action allegations (items no. 3-5) only and not as to the allegations related to alter ego.

Civil Code section 3294 provides, “In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code, § 3294(a).) Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts for punitive damages, therefore, the motion to strike is granted as to items numbers 1, 6, and 4 [sic] as to the prayer of relief with leave to amend.

Plaintiff seeks attorney’s fees on the first cause of action for breach of oral contract. Plaintiff argues that attorney’s fees are proper under Civil Code section 3068(d). That section provides, “In any action brought by or on behalf of the legal owner or lessor to recover a vehicle alleged to be wrongfully withheld by the person claiming a lien pursuant to this section, the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and costs, not to exceed one thousand seven hundred fifty dollars ($1,750).” (Civ. Code, § 3068(d) [emphasis added].) Plaintiff does not bring an action to recover a vehicle wrongfully withheld; here, Plaintiff seeks damages for breach of contract. Section 3068(d) is inapplicable. Therefore, the motion to strike items 2 and 5 [sic] are GRANTED.