On 02/16/2018 P STANDARD GENERAL LTD filed an Other - Sister State Judgment lawsuit against DOV CHARNEY. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judges overseeing this case are EDWARD B. MORETON and SERENA R. MURILLO. The case status is Disposed - Judgment Entered.
Disposed - Judgment Entered
Los Angeles County Superior Courts
Stanley Mosk Courthouse
Los Angeles, California
EDWARD B. MORETON
SERENA R. MURILLO
STANDARD GENERAL MASTER FUND L.P.
P STANDARD GENERAL LTD.
APEX REAL ESTATE MANAGEMENT LLC
ART COMMERCE & MANUFACTURING SOLUTIONS LLC
WELLS FARGO BANK N.A.
TARAN JESSICA ESQ.
6/20/2018: ORDER GRANTING JUDGMENT CREDITORS' EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER CHARGING JUDGMENT DERTOR'S MEMBERSHIP INTEREST IN ART, COMMERCE AND MANUFACTURING SOLUTIONS, LLC AND APEX REAL ESTATE MANAGEMENT, L
7/17/2019: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON APPLICATION FOR ORDER FOR APPEARANCE AND EXAMINATI...)
8/29/2019: Ex Parte Application - EX PARTE APPLICATION JUDGMENT CREDITORS' EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER ADVANCING THE HEARING ON JUDGMENT DEBTOR'S MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA SERVED ON THIRD PARTY WELLS FARGO
12/23/2019: Certificate of Mailing for - CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR (RULING ON SUBMITTED MATTER) OF 12/23/2019
2/18/2020: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON APPLICATION FOR ORDER FOR APPEARANCE AND EXAMINATION)
2/27/2020: Certificate of Mailing for - CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR [CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR (RULING ON SUBMITTED MATTER) OF 02/27/2020, MINUTE ORDER (RULING ON SUBMITTED MATTER)]
2/27/2020: Certificate of Mailing for - CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR (RULING ON SUBMITTED MATTER) OF 02/27/2020
5/24/2018: Proof of Service by 1st Class Mail -
5/24/2018: PROOF OF SERVICE
8/2/2018: DECLARATION OF JESSICA TARAN IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR ORDER OF ASSIGNMENT AND ORDER RESTRAINING JUDGMENT DEBTOR (C.C.P. 708.510, 708.520)
8/2/2018: JUDGMENT CREDITORS' NOTICE OF AND MOTION FOR AN ASSIGNMENT ORDER, RESTRAINING ORDER, AND RELATED RELIEF (C.C.P. 708.510, 708.520]; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
8/16/2018: NOTICE OF MINUTES ENTERED ON AUGUST 9, 2018, REASSIGNING MATTER TO DEPARTMENT 94 FOR POST-JUDGMENT PROCEEDINGS
9/28/2018: Minute Order -
12/26/2018: Declaration - Declaration Decl of Jessica Taran in sup of JC app and ord for exam of and subp duces tecum to Yaghoub Nourany o/b/o Neman Brothers & Assoc., Inc.
12/26/2018: Declaration - Declaration decl of Jessica Taran in sup of jc app for an ord for app and exam of and civ subp duces tecum to third party David Nisenbaum on behalf of Los Angeles Apparel, inc.
2/22/2019: Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)
2/22/2019: Memorandum of Points & Authorities
4/10/2019: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (BENCH WARRANT RECALL)
Hearing05/11/2020 at 13:30 PM in Department 26 at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Hearing on Application for Order for Appearance and ExaminationRead MoreRead Less
Hearing04/28/2020 at 13:30 PM in Department 26 at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Hearing on Application for Order for Appearance and ExaminationRead MoreRead Less
Hearing04/27/2020 at 13:30 PM in Department 26 at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Hearing on Application for Order for Appearance and ExaminationRead MoreRead Less
Hearing04/06/2020 at 10:30 AM in Department 26 at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Non-Appearance Case ReviewRead MoreRead Less
Hearing04/02/2020 at 13:30 PM in Department 26 at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Hearing on Application for Order for Appearance and ExaminationRead MoreRead Less
Hearing03/24/2020 at 13:30 PM in Department 26 at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Hearing on Application for Order for Appearance and ExaminationRead MoreRead Less
Docketat 10:30 AM in Department 26, Serena R. Murillo, Presiding; Hearing on Motion to Seal (Petitioner's Notice of Motion and Motion to Seal Consumer Financial Records Conditionally Lodged Under Seal) - Not Held - Vacated by CourtRead MoreRead Less
Docketat 2:30 PM in Department 26, Serena R. Murillo, Presiding; Nunc Pro Tunc OrderRead MoreRead Less
DocketCertificate of Mailing for ((Nunc Pro Tunc Order) of 02/28/2020); Filed by ClerkRead MoreRead Less
DocketMinute Order ( (Nunc Pro Tunc Order)); Filed by ClerkRead MoreRead Less
DocketProof of Service by 1st Class MailRead MoreRead Less
DocketPROOF OF SERVICERead MoreRead Less
DocketNOTICE OF RELATED CASERead MoreRead Less
DocketNotice; Filed by Plaintiff/PetitionerRead MoreRead Less
DocketAPPLICATION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT ON SISTER-STATE JUDGMENTRead MoreRead Less
DocketJUDGMENT BASED ON SISTER-STATE JUDGMENT (CODE CIV. PROC.,. 1710.25)Read MoreRead Less
DocketJudgment; Filed by Plaintiff/PetitionerRead MoreRead Less
DocketSister State Judgment; Filed by Plaintiff/PetitionerRead MoreRead Less
DocketApplication for Entry of Judgment on Sister-State Judgment; Filed by nullRead MoreRead Less
DocketAPPLICATION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT ON SISTER-STATE JUDGMENTRead MoreRead Less
Case Number: BS172538 Hearing Date: July 06, 2020 Dept: 71
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles
P STANDARD GENERAL LTD, et al.;
DOV CHARNEY, et al.;
July 6, 2020
[TENTATIVE] RULING RE:
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE: WHY A RECEIVER SHOULD NOT BE APPOINTED AND A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION SHOULD NOT ISSUE
Judgment Creditors P Standard General Ltd. and Standard General Master Fund, L.P.’s request for appointment of a receiver is DENIED.
Judgment Creditors’ request for a preliminary injunction is DENIED.
Judgment Creditors’ request for an assignment order is DENIED.
Judgment Creditors P Standard General Ltd. and Standard General Master Fund, L.P. (“Judgment Creditors”) seek (1) the appointment of a receiver, (2) a preliminary injunction, and (3) an assignment order.
On February 16, 2018, Judgment Creditors filed this action against Judgment Debtor Dov Charney as an Application for Entry of Sister State Judgment on February 16, 2018 against Judgment Debtor Dov Charney (“Charney”). Judgment Creditors have three judgments against Charney in the principal amount of nearly $30 million. On July 16, 2019, the Court granted Judgment Creditors’ motion to amend the third judgment to add Apex Real Estate Management LLC (“Apex RE”) and Art, Commerce and Manufacturing Solutions, LLC (“Art Commerce”) as judgment debtors.
On December 17, 2019, Judgment Creditors filed an ex parte application (“the Application”) for an Order to Show Cause Why Appointment of Receiver Should Not Be Made and Temporary Restraining Order.
On December 23, 2019, after taking the matter under submission, the Court set an Order to Show Cause Why Appointment of Receiver Should Not Be Made, a Preliminary Injunction Should Not Issue Directing Judgment Debtors Not to Interfere With or Impede the Receiver in Any Way, and an Order Should Not Issue Directing Judgment Debtors to Assign the Judgment Creditors All Rights to Payment Under the Consulting Contract between LA Apparel and Art Commerce, and Any Agreement Between LA Apparel and Apex RE for January 8, 2020.
On February 28, 2020, after taking the matter under submission on January 8, 2020, the Court ordered the following:
Pending the hearing described below, the Court issues a temporary restraining order, directing Judgment Debtors and their respective agents, partners, property managers, employees, assignees, successors, representatives and all persons acting under or in concert with or for them, to refrain from assigning or otherwise disposing of any right to payment under (A) the Consulting Contract between LA Apparel and Art Commerce, dated April 14, 2016; and (B) any agreement between LA Apparel and Apex RE relating to use and occupancy of the Apex Avenue Property.
The Court also invited the parties’ comments on its tentative decisions on the following issues:
Whether the Receiver must submit an undertaking and, if so, the amount of the undertaking to be submitted; and
Whether the Judgment Creditors must also submit a separate undertaking pursuant to CCP section 566(b) (since the application was brought on an ex parte basis) and, if so, the amount of said undertaking
Any additional recommendations for the appointment of a specific receiver beyond Mr. Alsbrook. Any suggestions by the Judgment Debtors are without prejudice to any argument they may have about the appropriateness of the appointment of any receiver at all.
On March 9, 2020, both Judgment Creditors and Judgment Debtor Charney submitted supplemental briefings.
On June 15, 2020, this matter was reassigned from Department 26 to this Department.
On June 17, 2020, the Court scheduled this hearing on the Order to Show Cause as to Why a Receiver Should Not be Appointed and a Preliminary Injunction Should Not Issue. The Court indicated it would consider the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Ex Parte Application and supporting papers filed on December 17, 2019 and the supplemental brief filed on March 9, 2020 as the moving papers and that any opposition was to be filed by June 24, 2020 and any reply filed by June 30, 2020.
On June 24, 2020, Charney filed an opposition. Judgment Creditors filed a reply on June 30, 2020.
Request for Judicial Notice
Judgment Creditors’ requests for judicial notice are GRANTED. However, the Court will not take judicial notice of the truth of the matters asserted within these documents.
Appointment of Receiver
Judgment Creditors seek an order appointing Blake Alsbrook, Esq. of Pasternak, Pasternak & Alsbrook, ALC to (1) take, demand, collect and receive from Los Angeles Apparel, Inc. (“LA Apparel”) any property, not exempt from execution, of Judgment Debtors, including payments from LA Apparel for services rendered to LA Apparel by any Judgment Debtor and the use or occupancy of real properties located at 1809 Apex Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90026 (“Apex Avenue Property”) and 1349 Douglas Street, Los Angeles, California 90026 (“Douglas Street Property”); (2) take, demand, collect, and receive the real properties; (3) take, demand, receive, and review all financial and other records of LA Apparel to determine what payments are due and owing to Judgment Debtors from LA Apparel; and (4) take, demand, receive, and review all relevant records of or relating to the real properties.
“‘A receiver is an agent and officer of the court, and is under the control and supervision of the court. [Citations.]’” (Southern California Sunbelt Developers, Inc. v. Banyan Limited Partnership (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 910, 922 (quoting City of Chula Vista v. Gutierrez (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 681, 685).) “‘The receiver is an agent of the court and not of any party, and as such: (1) Is neutral; [¶] (2) Acts for the benefit of all who may have an interest in the receivership property; and [¶] (3) Holds assets for the court and not for [any party].’” (Id. (quoting Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1179(a)) (alteration in original).) “The receiver is obligated to preserve and manage the property during the course of the receivership.” (Id.)
CCP section 564 provides that “[a] receiver may be appointed, in the manner provided in this chapter, by the court in which an action or proceeding is pending in any case in which the court is empowered by law to appoint a receiver.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 564(a).) Subdivision (b) of CCP section 564 lists the circumstances under which a receiver may be appointed, including after a judgment pursuant to the Enforcement of Judgments Law. (Id., § 564(b)(4); see also Gold v. Gold (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 791, 804 (“[A] receiver may be appointed to enforce a judgment.”).) Under the Enforcement of Judgments Law, “[t]he court may appoint a receiver to enforce the judgment where the judgment creditor shows that, considering the interests of both the judgment creditor and the judgment debtor, the appointment of a receiver is a reasonable method to obtain the fair and orderly satisfaction of the judgment.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 708.620.) Receivers may be appointed where a writ of execution does not reach certain property and other remedies are inadequate. (Comment to CCP § 708.620; Tucker v. Fontes (1945) 70 Cal.App.2d 768, 773; see also Ahart, Cal. Practice Guide: Enforcing Judgments and Debts (The Rutter Group, June 2019 Update), § 6:1458; Cal. Judges Benchbook: Civil Proceedings After Trial (CJER, Oct. 2019 Update) Supplemental Enforcement Proceedings § 7.65.)
Appointment of a receiver is a drastic remedy. (Barclays Bank of California v. Superior Court (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 593, 597.) California rigidly adheres to the principle that the power to appoint a receiver is a delicate one that is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. It is said by the state’s courts that the appointment of a receiver is “an extraordinary and harsh,” and “delicate,” and “drastic,” remedy to be used “cautiously and only where less onerous remedies would be inadequate or unavailable . . . .” (See Cohen v. Herbert (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 488, 495; Alhambra etc. Mines v. Alhambra G. Mine (1953) 116 Cal.App.2d 869, 873; Dabney Oil Co. v. Providence Oil Co. (1913) 22 Cal.App. 233, 238; 42 Cal.Jur.2d, Receivers, § 9.) Further, a party to an action should not be “subjected to the onerous expense of a receiver, unless . . . his appointment is obviously necessary to the protection of the opposite party . . . .” (De Leonis v. Walsh (1905) 148 Cal. 254, 255.) A receiver thus should not be appointed when an injunction or some other remedy is adequate to protect the rights of the parties. (City & County of S.F. v. Daley (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 734, 745.)
The Court finds the appointment of a receiver would not be appropriate at this time. Judgment Creditors assert a receiver is necessary because Charney has “repeatedly stymied” their efforts to enforce the judgment by (1) placing ownership of LA Apparel in his family’s trust, (2) writing and redeeming at least $94,594.58 in checks written to cash from LA Apparel’s accounts, (3) routing nearly $2 million of funds from LA Apparel to alter ego shell entities set up months after entry of the first judgment to “shield assets and income from an ongoing lawsuit with Standard General”, (4) ceasing to take distributions from those alter ego shell entities after Judgment Creditors secured charging orders against his interest in them, (5) granting his father, mother, sister, uncle, and attorney liens against his real properties, and (6) attempting to transfer those same real properties to an alter ego shell entity. (Judgment Creditors’ Reply Brief in Further Support of Application for Appointment of Receiver and Assignment Order filed June 30, 2020, pp. 4-5.) Judgment Creditors could use assignment orders, judgment liens and levies, and remedies in a fraudulent transfer action to reach this personal and real property. Judgment Creditors have not shown that these procedures for enforcement of a judgment are inadequate and that the “extraordinary” and “drastic” remedy of a receiver is necessary.
Additionally, Judgment Creditors are requesting a receiver to review LA Apparel’s records. While Charney appears to have founded LA Apparel and serves as its Chief Executive Officer, LA Apparel is a third party and not a judgment debtor in this matter. The Court will not permit an intrusion into a third party’s affairs without a clear showing that such intrusion is absolutely necessary. Here, Judgment Creditors are seeking a receiver to review LA Apparel’s records on grounds that LA Apparel has been making payments to Judgment Debtors for consulting services and rent. While Judgment Creditors have submitted evidence of these payments, Judgment Creditors appear to have acknowledged that such payments from LA Apparel have since ceased. (Judgment Creditors’ Reply Brief in Further Support of Application for Appointment of Receiver and Assignment Order filed on June 30, 2020, p. 2: 6-11.) Charney has confirmed that, as of January 2020, LA Apparel is no longer renting the Apex Property, thus further supporting such payments have ceased. (Decl. of Dov Charney in Support of Opposition to Injunction, Receiver, and Assignment filed on January 7, 2020, ¶¶ 25, 34.) Given the lack of evidence that LA Apparel is still making payments to Judgment Debtors and Judgment Creditors’ failure to show the inadequacy of other procedures, the Court cannot find an absolute need to appoint a receiver to intrude into LA Apparel’s business affairs.
Accordingly, Judgment Creditors’ request for appointment of a receiver is DENIED.
Judgment Creditors request a preliminary injunction directing Judgment Debtors not to interfere with or impede the receiver. As the Court is not appointing a receiver, this request is DENIED.
Judgment Creditors request an order directing Judgment Debtors to assign to them all rights to payment under (a) the Consulting Contract between LA Apparel and Art Commerce, dated April 14, 2016 and (b) any agreement between LA Apparel and Apex RE relating to use or occupancy of the Apex Avenue Property or the Douglas Street Property.
The Court finds Judgment Creditors’ request for an assignment order to be procedurally improper. CCP section 708.510(a) authorizes the court to order the judgment debtor to assign to the judgment creditor or receiver all or part of a right to payment due or to become due “upon application of the judgment creditor on noticed motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 708.510(a) (emphasis added).) As pointed out by Charney in the opposition, Judgment Creditors’ request for an assignment order was brought upon an ex parte application, not a noticed motion. That supplemental briefings were filed does not change the fact that the request was made upon an ex parte application.
Accordingly, the request for an assignment order is DENIED. Judgment Creditors must bring a noticed motion if they intend to pursue this request.
Based on the foregoing, Judgment Creditors’ requests for appointment of a receiver, a preliminary injunction, and an assignment order are DENIED.
 Charney, Apex RE, and Art Commerce are collectively referred to as Judgment Debtors.
 As discussed, the Court invited the parties to comment on discrete issues as set forth in the February 28, 2020 Minute Order. In light of the denial, there is no need for the Court to address these issues.
Case Number: BS172538 Hearing Date: December 16, 2019 Dept: 94
P Standard General Ltd., et al. v. Charney, et al.
MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA; REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS
(CCP § 1987.1)
Judgment Debtor Dov Charney’s Motion to Quash Subpoena and for Award of Sanctions is DENIED.
Judgment Creditors P Standard General Ltd. and Standard General Master Fund, LP (“Judgment Creditors”) filed the instant Application for entry of Sister State Judgment on February 16, 2018 against Judgment Debtor Dov Charney (“Judgment Debtor”). (RJN, Exh. V.) Judgment Creditors have three judgments against Judgment Debtor in the principal amount of nearly $30 million. (Motion, RJN, Exhs. 1-2.) On July 16, 2019, the Court granted Judgment Creditors’ motion to amend the third judgment to add Apex Real Estate Management LLC (“Apex RE”) and Art, Commerce and Manufacturing Solutions, LLC (“ACMS”) as judgment debtors.
“[U]pon motion reasonably made by the party, judges may rule upon motions for quashing, modifying or compelling compliance with, subpoenas.” (Lee v. Swansboro Country Property Owners Ass’n (2007) 151 Cal. App. 4th 575, 582-83.) Either the nonparty witness who has been subpoenaed or any party to the action may challenge the deposition subpoena. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, subd. (b).) A deposition subpoena may be quashed for: (1) defects in form or content of the subpoena (e.g., inadequate description of requested records); (2) defects in service of the subpoena (e.g., failure to satisfy the requirements of providing notice to consumer; (3) requesting production of records not within the permissible scope of discovery; and (4) being unjustly burdensome or oppressive. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, subd. (a).)
Request for Judicial Notice
The request for judicial notice is granted as to Exhibits 1-10 pursuant to Cal. Evidence Code section 452, subdivisions (c) and (d). However, to the extent the request for judicial notice includes court records, the court does not take judicial notice of hearsay statements therein. (See Cal. Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d); Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 882.)
1. Documents reflecting or referring to any account maintained by Charney or to which he is a signatory or held in the name of LA Apparel or the other entities named in the Subpoena (requests 1 and 2);
2. Correspondence between Wells Fargo and Charney relating to the accounts referenced in requests 1 and 2 (requests 7 and 8);
Documents reflecting any asset that Charney, LA Apparel or the other entities named in the 1. Subpoena have held with Wells Fargo from October 23, 2017 to the present (requests 3 and 4);
2. Documents reflecting any loans borrowed or guaranteed by Charney, LA Apparel or the other entities named in the Subpoena from any financial institution or person for the period October 23, 2017 to the present (requests 5 and 6);
3. Correspondence between Wells Fargo and Charney reflecting any loan applications or debt refinancing by Charney for the period October 23, 2017 to the present (request 9);
4. Documents reflecting or referring to LA Apparel or the other entities named in the Subpoena (request 10);
Judgment Debtor initially brought this Motion to Quash as to records for Apex RE, ACMS and LAA. Following the Court’s order adding Apex RE and ACMS as judgment debtors, Judgment Debtor has withdrawn his objection as to those entities’ records. The objections remain only as to LAA. Judgment Debtor first objects to the subpoena on grounds of financial privacy. He cites to the constitutional right of privacy, but as the opposition points out, a corporation’s right of privacy is not constitutional derived.
We conclude corporations do not have a right of privacy protected by the California Constitution. Article I, section 1 of the California Constitution protects the privacy rights of “people” only. “ ‘[T]he constitutional provision simply does not apply to corporations.’ ” (Ameri-Medical Corp. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1287[50 Cal.Rptr.2d 366], quoting Roberts v. Gulf Oil Corp. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 770, 791[195 Cal.Rptr. 393]; see Zurich American Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1485, 1504[66 Cal.Rptr.3d 833] [corporation acknowledged that it had no right of privacy under the California Constitution].) While corporations do have a right to privacy, it is not a constitutional right. The corporate right to privacy is a lesser right than that held by human beings and is not considered a fundamental right. (Ameri-Medical Corp. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, at pp. 1287-1288, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 366.)
(SCC Acquisitions, Inc. v. Superior Court (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 741, 755-756.) Resolution of the parties’ competing interests—Judgment Creditors’ interest in collecting on the judgments and LAA’s privacy interests—is to be determined by a balancing test. “The discovery’s relevance to the subject matter of the pending dispute and whether the discovery ‘appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence’ is balanced against the corporate right of privacy.” (Id. at 756.) A judgment creditor’s interest in obtaining information to collect on a judgment is also “a valid significant interest.” (Id. at 755.)
Judgment Debtor argues that the documents sought regarding LAA are not relevant to collection of the judgments. Doubts about the relevance of information sought are to be resolved in favor of discovery. (Id. at 756.) Judgment Debtor contends that LAA has no connection to this matter other than as his employer and is irrelevant to this action because it is not a party nor determined to be his alter ego. While LAA has not been added as a judgment debtor, it does not have a traditional employer-employee relationship with Judgment Debtor. Judgment Creditors’ evidence demonstrates the extensive relationship between LAA, Judgment Debtor, Apex RE and ACMS, as follows.
Based on the foregoing, Judgment Debtor’s Motion to Quash Third Party Subpoena and Request for Sanctions is DENIED.
Judgment Creditors to give notice.
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