This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 07/12/2021 at 15:59:37 (UTC).

NUTSIRI KIKKUL VS REDONDO BEACH HOSPITALITY COMPANY LLC ET A

Case Summary

On 12/22/2017 NUTSIRI KIKKUL filed a Civil Right - Other Civil Right lawsuit against REDONDO BEACH HOSPITALITY COMPANY LLC ET A. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The case status is Disposed - Dismissed.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****7987

  • Filing Date:

    12/22/2017

  • Case Status:

    Disposed - Dismissed

  • Case Type:

    Civil Right - Other Civil Right

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

 

Party Details

Petitioner and Plaintiff

KIDKUL NUTSIRI

Defendants and Respondents

SHADE REDONDO BEACH

DOES 1 TO 10

REDONDO BEACH HOSPITALITY COMPANY LLC

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Petitioner and Plaintiff Attorney

MOUZARI AZAR ESQ.

Defendant Attorney

ZIEGLER AMBER M.

 

Court Documents

PROOF OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

1/8/2018: PROOF OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

COMPLAINT

12/22/2017: COMPLAINT

SUMMONS -

12/22/2017: SUMMONS -

NOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

1/30/2018: NOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL -

10/2/2018: REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL -

Minute Order -

5/21/2018: Minute Order -

CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT -

5/7/2018: CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT -

CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT -

5/4/2018: CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT -

PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF RELATED CASE

4/30/2018: PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF RELATED CASE

Minute Order -

4/27/2018: Minute Order -

NOTICE OF RELATED CASE

4/23/2018: NOTICE OF RELATED CASE

NOTICE OF RELATED CASE

4/23/2018: NOTICE OF RELATED CASE

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

2/2/2018: ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

1 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 10/03/2018
  • Docketat 10:00 AM in Department 71; (Further Proceedings; Order of Dismissal) -

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 10/03/2018
  • DocketMinute order entered: 2018-10-03 00:00:00; Filed by Clerk

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 10/02/2018
  • DocketREQUEST FOR DISMISSAL

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 10/02/2018
  • DocketRequest for Dismissal; Filed by Nutsiri Kidkul (Plaintiff)

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 05/21/2018
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department 71; Case Management Conference (Conference-Case Management; Trial Date Set) -

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 05/21/2018
  • DocketMinute order entered: 2018-05-21 00:00:00; Filed by Clerk

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 05/21/2018
  • DocketMinute Order

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 05/07/2018
  • DocketCASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 05/07/2018
  • DocketCase Management Statement; Filed by Redondo Beach Hospitality Company, LLC (Defendant)

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 05/04/2018
  • DocketCase Management Statement; Filed by Nutsiri Kidkul (Plaintiff)

    Read MoreRead Less
9 More Docket Entries
  • 04/23/2018
  • DocketNotice of Related Case; Filed by Redondo Beach Hospitality Company, LLC (Defendant)

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 02/02/2018
  • DocketAnswer; Filed by Redondo Beach Hospitality Company, LLC (Defendant)

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 02/02/2018
  • DocketANSWER TO COMPLAINT

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 01/30/2018
  • DocketNotice of Case Management Conference; Filed by Clerk

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 01/30/2018
  • DocketNOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 01/08/2018
  • DocketPROOF OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 01/08/2018
  • DocketProof-Service/Summons; Filed by Nutsiri Kidkul (Plaintiff)

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 12/22/2017
  • DocketSUMMONS

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 12/22/2017
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by Nutsiri Kidkul (Plaintiff)

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 12/22/2017
  • DocketCOMPLAINT

    Read MoreRead Less

Tentative Rulings

Case Number: BC687987    Hearing Date: September 25, 2020    Dept: 24

Defendant First Motor Group of Encino LLC’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

On December 22, 2017, Plaintiff Rosa May (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant breach of warranty complaint against Defendant First Motor Group of Encino LLC (“Defendant” or “FMG”). The Complaint alleges two causes of action for: (1) violation of Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”); and (2) breach of implied warranty of merchantability.

The Complaint alleges that on March 27, 2012, Plaintiff purchased a pre-owned 2009 Mercedes-Benz C300 (the “vehicle”) from Defendant, an auto dealer. In April 2016, the vehicle needed to be serviced by Defendant when the SRS control unit/airbag module needed to be replaced and reprogrammed. In May 2016, Plaintiff received a letter from Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, informing her that a defect related to safety exists. In August 2016, she received a second letter indicating that a safety defect exists. Subsequently, Plaintiff took the vehicle to Defendant many times because she was scared to continue driving herself and others. She wished to either have the defect repaired, or to accept the vehicle for a trade-in/buy-back. Defendant failed to repair or accept the vehicle on a trade in because of the safety defect.

On May 22, 2020, Defendant filed the instant motion for summary judgment. On July 24, 2020, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On August 5, 2020, Defendant filed a reply.

On August 10, 2020, the court continued the hearing on the motion to September 25, 2020 to allow the court and parties to review an unredacted Purchase Agreement.

Central to the MSJ is that Plaintiff purchased the vehicle in 2012 from a separate entity. Defendant thus argues that it is not the correct entity to sue. The UMFs attempt to show that Plaintiff bought the used car in 2012 from the predecessor dealership, Encino Motor Cars. In January 2017, Encino Motor Cars sold its dealership to Trophy Automotive Dealer Group LLC (“Trophy”) via an Asset Purchase Agreement. Prior to the closing, Trophy assigned its rights and obligations under the Asset Purchase Agreement to FMG, the defendant that currently owns/operates the dealership, via an Assignment and Assumption Agreement. Under the Agreements, all "excluded liabilities" (including breach of warranty) were retained by the seller, not assumed by the buyer. (See Watar Revised Decl., Ex. A, sec. 2.4.)

Plaintiff attacked this argument by noting that the purchase agreement is heavily redacted. She states that FMG represented that it would produce this document. Defendant produced the document but did not produce an un-redacted copy. FMG says it only redacted financial information, etc., but there was a large portion of the document redacted which comes in the "Assignment and Assumption of Liabilities" section; for example, the redactions after section 2.4(n).

The court required FMG to provide the full, unredacted copy of the agreement under the protective order. (See 03/26/20 Protective Order.)

On September 14, 2020, Plaintiff filed a supplemental opposition. On September 18, 2020, Defendant filed a supplemental reply.

Summary Judgment Standard

A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action, affirmative defenses, claims for damages, or issues of duty if that party contends that there is no merit to the cause of action, defense, or claim for damages, or if the party contends that there is no duty owed. (See CCP §437c(f)(1).) “A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Ibid.) A cause of action has no merit if: (1) one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be separately established, even if that element is separately pleaded, or (2) a defendant establishes an affirmative defense to that cause of action. (See CCP §437c(n); Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573, 583.) Once the defendant has shown that a cause of action has no merit, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action. (See CCP §437c(o)(2); Union Bank, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at 583.)

In order to obtain summary judgment, “all that the defendant need do is to show that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action.” (See Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853; see also Mitchell v. United National Ins. Co. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 457.) “Although he remains free to do so, the defendant need not himself conclusively negate any such element.” (Ibid.) “Once the defendant has made such a showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or as to a defense to the cause of action. If the plaintiff does not make such a showing, summary judgment in favor of the defendant is appropriate.” (See Mitchell, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at 467.)

Until the defendant meets this evidentiary burden, the plaintiff has no burden to present evidence showing a triable issue of fact. (See Hagen v. Hickenbottom (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 168, 178; see also Hawkins v. Wilton (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 936, 940, citing Duckett v. Pistoresi Ambulance Service, Inc. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1525, 1533 [“[w]here the evidence presented by defendant does not support judgment in his favor, the motion must be denied without looking at the opposing evidence, if any, submitted by plaintiff”].)

Request for Judicial Notice

Defendant requests judicial notice of two items: (1) Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Adjudication, filed on May 31, 2019, and (2) Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion and Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint, filed on May 26, 2020. This request is GRANTED. (Evid. Code § 452(d).)

Procedural Issues

First, the court addresses the sufficiency of Defendant’s separate statement. It does not separately identify each action or detail the undisputed material facts and supporting evidence in the same column, as is required by California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350. A motion that fails to comply with these requirements can be denied on that basis. (Quantum Cooking Concepts, Inc. v. LV Associates, Inc. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 927, 933.) However, the court exercises its discretion to hear the motion on its merits.

Second, the court addresses Plaintiff’s due process argument. Plaintiff argues her due process rights were violated because an unredacted Purchase Agreement was not provided until after she filed her original opposition to the motion. The court disagrees. “Where a remedy as drastic as summary judgment is involved, due process requires a party be fully advised of the issues to be addressed and be given adequate notice of what facts it must rebut in order to prevail.” (San Diego Watercrafts, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 308, 316.) Plaintiff was fully advised of the issues to be addressed. Defendant originally submitted a redacted Purchased Agreement. Per the court’s order, Defendant submitted an unredacted copy and gave Plaintiff six weeks to file a supplemental opposition. Plaintiff had adequate time to consider and address the unredacted copy.

Issue No. 1: Violation of the CLRA

Defendant first moves for summary adjudication on the grounds that Plaintiff cannot show that Defendant made a misrepresentation or that she was damaged.

The CLRA declares unlawful “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices undertaken by any person in a transaction intended to result or which results in the sale or lease of goods or services to any consumer.” (Civ. Code § 1770(a).) “Accordingly, plaintiffs in a CLRA action [must] show not only that a defendant's conduct was deceptive but that the deception caused them harm.” (Bower v. AT&T Mobility, LLC

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Defendant made “misrepresentation and concealments concerning: the condition of the Vehicle, the Vehicle's qualities and characteristics as a safe and reliable vehicle, the Vehicle's warranties and Certified Pre -Owned Inspection, and the drivability of the Vehicle.” (Compl., ¶ 26.) She also alleges that she “suffered damages due to Dealer's acts and omissions, including but not limited to, transaction costs. (Id., ¶ 29.) The alleged misrepresentations and harm are tied to when Plaintiff purchased her vehicle on March 27, 2012. (Id., ¶¶ 9, 18.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not identified any affirmative misrepresentation or concealment by Defendant, or that there was any transactional relationship between the parties. There was no misrepresentation because no one knew of the airbags issue at the time Plaintiff purchased her vehicle, and the transaction occurred between Plaintiff and Encino Motor Cars. In support, Defendant states the following: (1) On March 27, 2012, Encino Motor Cars sold the vehicle to Plaintiff. (SS ¶¶ 1, 7-19); (2) Trophy purchased Encino Motor Cars’ dealership on January 17, 2014 under the Asset Purchase Agreement. (SS ¶ 17.); (3) Trophy Assigned its rights and obligations under the Asset Purchase Agreement to Defendant via an Assignment and Assumption Agreement. (SS ¶ 19.) (4) Section 2.4 of the Asset Purchase Agreement states, “[Trophy] will not and will not assume or become liable, or otherwise be responsible, for any obligations or liabilities of [Encino Motor Cars], of any kind whatsoever, fixed or contingent, known or unknown…” (SS ¶ 18.) (5) Per the Assignment and Assumption Agreement, “[Defendant] hereby accepts such assignments and assumes all of [Trophy’s] duties and obligations under the Purchase Agreement…” (SS ¶ 19.) and (6) In October 2015, Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC announced a voluntary recall pertaining to certain vehicle models, including that of Plaintiff’s. (SS ¶ 8.)

Defendant has met its burden in showing that this cause of action has no merit. Plaintiff alleges her vehicle had been advertised and represented to her as a “Certified Pre-Owned” vehicle. (Compl., ¶ 9.) Based on the airbags issue, she alleges that the vehicle should never have been approved as “Certified Pre-Owner.” (Compl., ¶¶ 16-18.) However, the airbags issue was unknown until 2015. (See Graham v. Bank of America, N.A. Additionally, Plaintiff did not transact with Defendant, as she purchased the vehicle from Encino Motor Cars. (See Civ. Code § 1761(e) [“transaction” is “an agreement between a consumer and any other person, whether or not the agreement is a contract enforceable by action, and includes the making of, and the performance pursuant to, that agreement”].)

Accordingly, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to show there are triable issues of fact.

Plaintiff failed to meet her burden. She did not address Defendant’s argument, that there was no misrepresentation by Defendant. A CLRA claim fails without an unfair or deceptive act. (Civ. Code § 1770(a).)

As Plaintiff failed to present any disputes of material fact, Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication is properly granted as to this issue.

Issue No. 2 – Breach of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability

Defendant also moves for summary adjudication on the grounds that Plaintiff purchased her car from another retail seller; Plaintiff’s vehicle was fit for its ordinary purpose of transportation; and Plaintiff’s implied warranty of merchantability has expired.

Civ. Code, section 1792 provides for an implied warranty of merchantability as follows:

Unless disclaimed in the manner prescribed by this chapter, every sale of consumer goods that are sold at retail in this state shall be accompanied by the manufacturer's and the retail seller's implied warranty that the goods are merchantable. The retail seller shall have a right of indemnity against the manufacturer in the amount of any liability under this section.

Civ. Code section 1791.1 states that the implied warranty of merchantability means that the consumer goods meet each of the following: (1) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; (2) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; (3) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled; and (4) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label. The core test of a breach is the fitness for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used. (Isip v. Mercedes Benz USA, LLC (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 19, 26.) Such fitness is shown if the product is in safe condition and substantially free of defects. (Id. at 27.)

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that “the distribution and sale of the subject vehicle was accompanied by Dealer’s implied warranty that the subject vehicle was merchantable.” (Compl., ¶ 34.) This warranty implied “that the subject vehicle was adequately assembled; and that the subject vehicle conformed to the promises or affirmations of fact made to Plaintiff.” (Id., ¶ 35.) However, the car was unmerchantable because of the safety defect with the airbags. (Id. ¶¶ 16, 36.)

Defendant argues that it is not responsible because Plaintiff dealt with Encino Motor Cars when purchasing the vehicle. Alternatively, Plaintiff’s car was not defective or unfit for its purpose, and the 30-day implied warranty following the sale of a used car has expired. In support of it not being a retailer for the purposes of Civ. Code section 1792, Defendant states the following: (1) On March 27, 2012, Encino Motor Cars sold the vehicle to Plaintiff. (SS ¶¶ 1, 7-19.); (2) Trophy purchased Encino Motor Car’s dealership on January 17, 2014 under the Asset Purchase Agreement. (SS ¶ 17.); and (3) Trophy Assigned its rights and obligations under the Asset Purchase Agreement to Defendant via an Assignment and Assumption Agreement. (SS ¶ 19.); That is, Plaintiff purchased the vehicle before Trophy or Defendant owned and/or operated the dealership.

Defendant has met its burden in showing that this cause of action has no merit. Per the evidence detailed above, the retail seller that sold the vehicle to Plaintiff is Encino Motor Cars, not Defendant. As such, there is no privity between the parties. (See Blanco v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.

Accordingly, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to show there is a triable issue of fact. Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden. She argues that that her vehicle had a latent defect, which renders her vehicle unmerchantable. (Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1305 [In case of latent defects, product is rendered unmerchantable, and warranty of merchantability is breached by existence of unseen defect, not by its subsequent discovery].) Though that may be true, that does not address Defendant’s argument, that Plaintiff purchased the car from another entity.

As Plaintiff failed to present any disputes of material fact, Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication is properly granted as to this issue.

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

Moving party is ordered to give notice.

___________________________________________________________________________________________________

Plaintiff Rosa May’s motion for leave to file a First Amended Complaint is GRANTED.

On December 22, 2017, Plaintiff Rosa May (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant breach of warranty complaint against Defendant First Motor Group of Encino LLC (“Defendant” or “FMG”). The Complaint alleges two causes of action for: (1) violation of Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”); and (2) breach of implied warranty of merchantability.

The Complaint alleges that on March 27, 2012, Plaintiff purchased a pre-owned 2009 Mercedes-Benz C300 (the “vehicle”) from Defendant, an auto dealer. In April 2016, the vehicle needed to be serviced by Defendant when the SRS control unit/airbag module needed to be replaced and reprogrammed. In May 2016, Plaintiff received a letter from Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, informing her that a defect related to safety exists. In August 2016, she received a second letter indicating that a safety defect exists. Subsequently, Plaintiff took the vehicle to Defendant many times because she was scared to continue driving herself and others. She wished to either have the defect repaired, or to accept the vehicle for a trade-in/buy-back. Defendant failed to repair or accept the vehicle on a trade in because of the safety defect.

On May 22, 2020, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. Central to the MSJ is that Plaintiff purchased the vehicle in 2012 from a separate entity. Defendant thus argues that it is not the correct entity to sue. As explained in the court’s separate, concurrent ruling, Defendant’s MSJ is granted. As to her CLRA claim, Plaintiff has not created triable issues of fact of any misrepresentation by Defendant. As to her breach of the implied warranty claim, she has not created any triable issues of fact as to her privity with Defendant.

On May 26, 2020, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for leave to file a first amended complaint. She seeks to add two parties, Mercedes Benz Financial Services, USA LLC (“MB Financial”) and Mercedes Benz of Encino (“MB Encino”), previously named as doe defendants.

Legal Standard

If a plaintiff wishes to amend a complaint after the answer has been filed or after the demurrer has been filed and after the hearing on the demurrer, or if he or she has already amended the complaint “of course,” permission of the court must be obtained before the amendment will be allowed. (CCP §§ 473(a)(1), 576.)

Motions for leave to amend the pleadings are directed to the sound discretion of the court. “The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading . . . .” (CCP § 473(a)(1); see CCP § 576.) Policy favors liberally granting leave to amend so that all disputed matters between the parties may be resolved. (See Howard v. County of San Diego (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1428.) Absent prejudice to the adverse party, the court may permit amendments to the complaint “at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial.” (Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 739, 761 [internal quotes omitted].) Where leave is sought to add entirely new claims, the court may grant leave to amend if the new claims are based on the same general set of facts, and the amendment will not prejudice the opposing party. (Austin v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 596, 600-602; Glaser v. Meyers (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 770, 777 [holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting amendment of complaint, which originally alleged constructive eviction, to allege retaliatory eviction where the new claim was based on the same general set of facts].

Although denial is rarely justified, a judge has discretion to deny leave to amend if the party seeking the amendment has been dilatory, and the delay has prejudiced the opposing party. (Morgan v. Sup.Ct. (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530; see also Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 490). An opposing party is prejudiced where the amendment would necessitate a trial delay along with a loss of critical evidence, added preparation expense, increased burden of discovery, etc. (Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 486-488 [leave properly denied where plaintiff sought leave on the eve of trial, nearly two years after the complaint was originally filed and gave no explanation for the delay which prejudiced defendant who did not discover or depose many of the witnesses who would support the new allegations and had not marshaled evidence in opposition of the new allegations].)

Discussion

Procedure

A motion for leave to amend must state with particularity what allegations are to be amended. Namely, it must state what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be deleted and/or added, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number. (CRC, Rule 3.1324(a)(2)-(3).) The motion must be accompanied by a declaration specifying: (1) the effect of the amendment; (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) the reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier. (CRC, Rule 3.1324(b).) The motion must also be accompanied by the proposed amended pleading, numbered to differentiate it from the prior pleadings or amendments. (CRC, Rule 3.1324(a)(1).) It is within the court’s discretion to require compliance with Rule 3.1324 before granting leave to amend. (Hataishi v. First American Home Buyers Protection Corp. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1469.)

Here, Plaintiff’s motion satisfies the above CRC rules. Plaintiff provides a proposed copy of the FAC. (Mot., Appendix.) No new allegations are added. Plaintiff seeks only to add MB Encino and MB Financial, who were previously named as doe defendants. Counsel’s declaration provides the effect of the amendment and an evidentiary basis for the proposed amendment. Thus, Cross-Complainants’ motion is therefore procedurally proper.

Delay

There appear to be no issues with delay. Counsel’s declaration establishes that the roles of MB Encino and MB Financial in the instant action were discovered in October 2019 during the deposition of Defendant’s PMQ. (Ullman Decl., ¶ 8.) A few months after learning of doe defendants’ true names, Plaintiff sought to amend her complaint. (CCP § 474.)

Prejudice

No prejudice is apparent. First, the proposed FAC only names two doe defendants. There are no new allegations or causes of action. Second, as detailed in the court’s concurrent, separate ruling on Defendant’s MSJ, Defendant’s motion is granted. The MSJ disposes of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant and of Defendant as a party. Third, trial is not yet set.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff is to add Encino Motor Cars, LLC dba Mercedes Benz of Encino and Mercedes Benz Financial Services, USA LLC as parties.

Moving party is ordered to give notice.

related-case-search

Dig Deeper

Get Deeper Insights on Court Cases


Latest cases where REDONDO BEACH HOSPITALITY COMPANY LLC DBA SHADE HOTEL REDONDO BEACH is a litigant

Latest cases represented by Lawyer MOUZARI AZAR ESQ.