This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 10/23/2020 at 09:56:08 (UTC).

NORMA ROJAS VS DIN TAI FUNG ET AL

Case Summary

On 03/08/2018 NORMA ROJAS filed a Labor - Wrongful Termination lawsuit against DIN TAI FUNG. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judges overseeing this case are TERESA A. BEAUDET and CHRISTOPHER K. LUI. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****7069

  • Filing Date:

    03/08/2018

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Labor - Wrongful Termination

  • Court:

    Los Angeles County Superior Courts

  • Courthouse:

    Stanley Mosk Courthouse

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judges

TERESA A. BEAUDET

CHRISTOPHER K. LUI

 

Party Details

Plaintiffs and Petitioners

ROJAS NORMA

WU SHARON LEE

Defendants and Respondents

DOES 1 THROUGH 25

ELIAS ROLANDO

FUNG DIN TAI

DIN TAI FUNG

DIN TAI FUNG RESTAURANT #2 INC.

DIN TAI FUNG RESTAURANT INC

DIN TAI FUNG GLENDALE LLC

DIN TAI FUNG GLENDALE RESTAURANT LLC

DIN TAI FUNG GLENDALE RESTAURANT LLC DOE 1

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff and Petitioner Attorneys

TORRES EDWARD A.

PLOTKIN MICHAEL ELLIOTT

Defendant Attorneys

DE LA CRUZ AL M.

MORA TONYA N.

 

Court Documents

Opposition - OPPOSITION [MEMORANDUM OF POINT AND AUTHORITIES] TO DEMURRER

7/16/2020: Opposition - OPPOSITION [MEMORANDUM OF POINT AND AUTHORITIES] TO DEMURRER

Reply - REPLY DEFENDANT DIN TAI FUNG (GLENDALE) RESTAURANT, LLC'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SANCTIONS UNDER CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 128.7

7/22/2020: Reply - REPLY DEFENDANT DIN TAI FUNG (GLENDALE) RESTAURANT, LLC'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SANCTIONS UNDER CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 128.7

Amendment to Complaint (Fictitious/Incorrect Name)

2/24/2020: Amendment to Complaint (Fictitious/Incorrect Name)

Order - ORDER RE; DEMURRER

12/4/2019: Order - ORDER RE; DEMURRER

Declaration - DECLARATION OF TONYA N. MORA, ESQ. IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT DIN TAI FUNG (GLENDALE) RESTAURANT, LLC'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

11/26/2019: Declaration - DECLARATION OF TONYA N. MORA, ESQ. IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT DIN TAI FUNG (GLENDALE) RESTAURANT, LLC'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

Reply - REPLY DEFENDANT DIN TAI FUNG (GLENDALE) RESTAURANT, LLC'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

11/26/2019: Reply - REPLY DEFENDANT DIN TAI FUNG (GLENDALE) RESTAURANT, LLC'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

Case Management Statement

9/12/2019: Case Management Statement

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (COURT ORDER)

9/6/2019: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (COURT ORDER)

Demurrer - without Motion to Strike

9/6/2019: Demurrer - without Motion to Strike

CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT -

9/19/2018: CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT -

AMENDED CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT

9/20/2018: AMENDED CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT

Minute Order - Minute Order (Status Conference)

10/24/2018: Minute Order - Minute Order (Status Conference)

Minute Order - Minute Order (Status Conference)

12/13/2018: Minute Order - Minute Order (Status Conference)

Other - - Second Amended Complaint For Damages

11/20/2018: Other - - Second Amended Complaint For Damages

Request for Entry of Default / Judgment -

9/26/2018: Request for Entry of Default / Judgment -

SUMMONS

6/21/2018: SUMMONS

SECOND AMENDED SUMMONS

7/6/2018: SECOND AMENDED SUMMONS

PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS -

7/12/2018: PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS -

62 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 12/08/2020
  • Hearing12/08/2020 at 09:00 AM in Department 76 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Case Management Conference

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  • 08/07/2020
  • DocketAnswer; Filed by Din Tai Fung (Glendale) Restaurant, LLC (Doe 1) (Defendant)

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  • 07/29/2020
  • Docketat 1:30 PM in Department 76, Christopher K. Lui, Presiding; Hearing on Motion for Sanctions (Under Code of Civil Procedure 128.7) - Held - Motion Denied

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  • 07/29/2020
  • Docketat 1:30 PM in Department 76, Christopher K. Lui, Presiding; Hearing on Demurrer - without Motion to Strike (to Plaintiff Fourth Amended Complaint, Filed by Defendant Din Tai Fung (Glendale) Restaurant, LLC;) - Held

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  • 07/29/2020
  • Docketat 1:30 PM in Department 76, Christopher K. Lui, Presiding; Case Management Conference - Not Held - Continued - Court's Motion

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  • 07/29/2020
  • DocketMinute Order ( (Case Management Conference; Hearing on Demurrer - without Mot...)); Filed by Clerk

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  • 07/29/2020
  • DocketCertificate of Mailing for ((Case Management Conference; Hearing on Demurrer - without Mot...) of 07/29/2020); Filed by Clerk

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  • 07/29/2020
  • DocketOrder Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore; Filed by Clerk

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  • 07/22/2020
  • DocketReply (DEFENDANT DIN TAI FUNG (GLENDALE) RESTAURANT, LLC'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SANCTIONS UNDER CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 128.7); Filed by Din Tai Fung (Glendale) Restaurant, LLC (Doe 1) (Defendant)

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  • 07/22/2020
  • DocketReply (IN SUPPORT OF ITS DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT); Filed by Din Tai Fung (Glendale) Restaurant, LLC (Doe 1) (Defendant)

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94 More Docket Entries
  • 06/22/2018
  • DocketCase Management Statement; Filed by Norma Rojas (Plaintiff)

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  • 06/21/2018
  • DocketSUMMONS

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  • 06/21/2018
  • DocketComplaint (1st); Filed by Norma Rojas (Plaintiff)

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  • 06/21/2018
  • DocketFirst Amended Complaint; Filed by Norma Rojas (Plaintiff)

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  • 06/21/2018
  • DocketSummons; Filed by Clerk

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  • 06/21/2018
  • DocketFIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

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  • 03/23/2018
  • DocketNOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

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  • 03/23/2018
  • DocketNotice of Case Management Conference; Filed by Clerk

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  • 03/08/2018
  • DocketCOMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

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  • 03/08/2018
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by Norma Rojas (Plaintiff)

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Tentative Rulings

Case Number: BC697069    Hearing Date: July 29, 2020    Dept: 76

Plaintiff alleges that she was sexually harassed by her supervisor, Defendant Rolando Elias, while working for Defendant Din Tai Fung, and that when Plaintiff complained, she was ignored, retaliated against, and ultimately terminated.

Defendant Din Tai Fung (Glendale) LLC moves for sanctions pursuant to CCP § 128.7 against Plaintiff Norma Rojas and her attorneys of record based upon the refusal to voluntarily dismiss Defendant with respect to the first through fifth causes of action in the Fourth Amended Complaint.

Defendant Din Tai Fung (Glendale) LLC also demurs to the Fourth Amended Complaint.

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Din Tai Fung (Glendale) LLC’s motion for sanctions pursuant to CCP § 128.7 is DENIED.

Defendant’s demurrer to the Fourth Amended Complaint is OVERRULED as to the first through fifth causes of action.

Defendant is ordered to answer the Fourth Amended Complaint within 10 days.

ANALYSIS

Motion For CCP § 128.7 Sanctions

Safe-Harbor Provision

This motion was served on January 20, 2020 and filed 30 days later on February 19, 2019, in compliance with the 21-day safe harbor provision set forth in CCP § 128.7(c)(1).

Discussion

Defendant Din Tai Fung (Glendale) LLC moves for sanctions pursuant to CCP § 128.7 against Plaintiff Norma Rojas and her attorneys of record based upon the refusal to voluntarily dismiss Defendant with respect to the first through fifth causes of action in the Fourth Amended Complaint.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff was allegedly wrongfully terminated on December 22, 2016, and up until that point sexually harassed, and thus that statute of limitations has run on Plaintiff’s first through fifth causes of action.

The first, second and fourth causes of action are FEHA-based, the third cause of action is for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, and the fifth cause of action is for violation of B & P Code § 17200.

Defendant claims that the statute of limitations began to run from the date of her termination, December 22, 2016, as pled in the Complaint ¶ 9. This is not persuasive as it pertains to the filing of Plaintiff’s lawsuit. Rather, at the time Plaintiff’s FEHA claims arose in 2016[1], the time for Plaintiff to file a complaint with the DFEH would begin to run on this date, and Plaintiff had one year to file the DFEH complaint. (then existing Gov. Code, § 12960; Romano v. Rockwell Internat., Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 479, 492.)

After Plaintiff received a right-to-sue notice, she had one year to file this action. (Gov. Code § 12965(b).)

The 4AC attaches a right-to-sue letter dated March 17, 2017 as Exh. 1A. Plaintiff thus had until March 17, 2018 to file this lawsuit. She timely filed the Complaint in this action on March 8, 2018. Whether or not Plaintiff’s DFEH complaint against “Din Tai Fung” was sufficient as against moving Defendant Din Tai Fung (Glendale) LLC, and whether her claims against this Defendant, who was substituted in as Doe 1, relate back to the filing of the initial complaint are issues which are more appropriately challenged by other motions, as they require consideration of evidence extrinsic to the complaint. Indeed, Defendant does not address the liberal construction of DFEH complaints, especially where the full legal name of an entity was not used in the DFEH complaint. “[W]hat is submitted to the DFEH must not only be construed liberally in favor of plaintiff, it must be construed in light of what might be uncovered by a reasonable investigation.” (Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 268.)

Nor does Defendant address the doe amendment procedures under CCP § 474 (Woo v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 169, 176), nor why it suffered prejudice from the delay in the correct naming of the employer. (Winding Creek v. McGlashan (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 933, 942-943.)

The general rule is that an amended complaint that adds a new defendant does not relate back to the date of filing the original complaint and the statute of limitations is applied as of the date the amended complaint is filed, not the date the original complaint is filed. (Citations omitted.) A recognized exception to the general rule is the substitution under section 474 of a new defendant for a fictitious Doe defendant named in the original complaint as to whom a cause of action was stated in the original complaint. (Citations omitted.) If the requirements of section 474 are satisfied, the amended complaint substituting a new defendant for a fictitious Doe defendant filed after the statute of limitations has expired is deemed filed as of the date the original complaint was filed. (Citation omitted.)

Among the requirements for application of the section 474 relation back doctrine is that the new defendant in an amended complaint be substituted for an existing fictitious Doe defendant named in the original complaint. (Citation omitted.)

(Woo v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 169, 176.)

Once suit has been filed, unreasonable delay in filing an amended pleading after discovering a Doe defendant's identity may bar a plaintiff from using the fictitious name device. To preclude relation back on this basis, however, the opposing party must show the plaintiff was dilatory and that the defendant was prejudiced by the delay. ( Barrows v. American Motors Corp. (1983) 144 Cal. App. 3d 1, 9 [192 Cal. Rptr. 380]; Sobeck & Associates, Inc. v. B & R Investments No. 24 (1989) 215 Cal. App. 3d 861, 869 [264 Cal. Rptr. 156], citing Barrows with approval; see Hazel v. Hewlett (1988) 201 Cal. App. 3d 1458, 1466 [247 Cal. Rptr. 723].) The attorney defendants have made no showing of  [*943]  prejudice here and, in fact, agree that "unreasonable delay and prejudice are irrelevant to this action."

(Winding Creek v. McGlashan (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 933, 942-943.)

Moreover, Plaintiff’s wrongful termination cause of action is subject to a two-year statute of limitations set forth in CCP § 335.1. This statute of limitations would have expired on December 22, 2018—well after Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on March 8, 2018.

Plaintiff argues that, because the B & P Code § 17200 claim is derivative of the other claims, it must also fail. For the reasons discussed above, this argument is not persuasive.

Accordingly, the Court does not find that Plaintiff and her counsel have violated CCP § 128.7(b), which provides:

(b) By presenting to the court, whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating, a pleading, petition, written notice of motion, or other similar paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, all of the following conditions are met:

(1) It is not being presented primarily for an improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.

(2) The claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law.

(3) The allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.

(4) The denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.

(Code Civ. Proc., § 128.7 (Deering).)

Defendant’s motion for sanctions pursuant to CCP § 128.7 is DENIED.

Demurrer

Meet and Confer

The Declaration of Tonya N. Mora reflects that Plaintiff’s counsel did not respond in to meet and confer efforts. This satisfies CCP § 430.41(a)(3)(B).

Discussion

Defendant Din Tai Fung (Glendale) LLC demurs to the Fourth Amended Complaint (“4AC”).

1. First Cause of Action (Sexual Harassment); Second Cause of Action (Retaliation); Fourth Cause of Action (Failure to Prevent Discrimination and Harassment).

Re: Inability To Name The Correct Entity Employer.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to name the correct entity as the defendant after five attempts. Plaintiff names Din Tai Fung (Glendale) LLC. (4AC, ¶ 2.) Defendant argues that this entity was not her employer, as no such entity exists according to the Secretary of State website. Defendant argues that Plaintiff should know the correct name of her former employer from her paychecks and paperwork. Defendant argues that the actual employer was Din Tai Fung (Glendale) Restaurant, LLC, which has not been named in this lawsuit, nor served.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot name the proper party because she knows the statute of limitations for her to file suit against her actual employer has run. Defendant argues that the DFEH right to sue notice was issued against Din Tai Fung, but this does not constitute a right to sue notice against Din Tai Fung (Glendale) Restaurant, LLC. As such, Defendant argues, Plaintiff’s FEHA-based claims are time-barred.

For the reasons discussed above re: the motion for sanctions, this argument is not persuasive.

If Plaintiff wishes to formally amend the name of Defendant, Plaintiff may file a noticed motion to file an amendment to the complaint) in this regard. Moreover, as pointed out by Plaintiff, on November 19, 2019 (and against on February 24, 2020), Din Tai Fung (Glendale) Restaurant, LLC was substituted in as Doe 1.

Defendant’s argument that it did not receive the required notice, based upon the Declaration of Frank Yang, may not be considered on demurrer because it relies on extrinsic evidence. “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed (Citations omitted.)”(Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

By that same token, Defendant’s argument that there is a misjoinder of parties is not persuasive on demurrer. (Verizon California Inc. v. Board of Equalization (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 666, 680.)

This case comes to us following judgment on demurrer.  A demurrer is particularly unsuited to resolving questions of fact regarding the misjoinder parties demurrer misjoinder parties demurrer  (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 426, 429 [73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646].)

(Verizon California Inc. v. Board of Equalization (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 666, 680.)

If Defendant wishes to move for summary judgment or summary adjudication based upon evidence demonstrating the failure to timely exhaust administrative remedies and/or on the grounds of the statute of limitations, it may do so, taking into the consideration the issues identified by the Court in ruling on the motion for sanctions, above.

The demurrer to the first, second and fourth causes of action is OVERRULED.

3. Third Cause of Action (Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy).

Defendant argues that this cause of action is also time-barred.

Plaintiff’s wrongful termination cause of action is subject to a two-year statute of limitations set forth in CCP § 335.1. This statute of limitations would have expired on December 22, 2018—well after Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on March 8, 2018.

If Defendant wishes to move for summary judgment or summary adjudication based upon evidence demonstrating the failure to timely exhaust administrative remedies and/or on the grounds of the statute of limitations, it may do so, taking into the consideration the issues identified by the Court in ruling on the motion for sanctions, above.

The demurrer to the third cause of action is OVERRULED.

5. Fifth Cause of Action (Unfair Business Practices in Violation of Business and Professions Code § 17200).

Plaintiff argues that, because the B & P Code § 17200 claim is derivative of the other claims, it must also fail. For the reasons discussed above, this argument is not persuasive.

The demurrer to the fifth cause of action is OVERRULED.

Defendant Din Tai Fung (Glendale) Restaurant, LLC is ordered to answer the Fourth Amended Complaint within 10 days.


[1] Effective January 1, 2020, a plaintiff has three years from the date of a FEHA violation to file a complaint with the DFEH. (Gov. Code, § 12960.)

Case Number: BC697069    Hearing Date: December 04, 2019    Dept: 50

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

norma rojas,

Plaintiff,

vs.

din tai fung restaurant, inc., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.:

BC 697069

Hearing Date:

December 4, 2019

Hearing Time:

8:30 a.m.

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE:

DEFENDANT DIN TAI FUNG (GLENDALE) RESTAURANT, LLC’S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

Background

On March 8, 2018, Plaintiff Norma Rojas (“Rojas”) filed this employment action. The operative Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) was filed on May 22, 2019. In the TAC, Rojas asserts causes of action for sexual harassment in violation of FEHA, retaliation in violation of FEHA, wrongful termination in violation of public policy, failure to prevent discrimination and harassment in violation of FEHA, and unfair business practices.

Defendant Din Tai Fung (Glendale) Restaurant, LLC[1] (“DTF”) now demurs to each and every cause of action. Rojas opposes.

Request for Judicial Notice

The Court grants DTF’s request for judicial notice as to Exhibits A and B.

Discussion

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. ((Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff's proof need not be alleged.” ((C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. ((Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.) A demurrer “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” ((Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)

Statute of Limitations

“Before filing a lawsuit [based on a FEHA cause of action], a party must file an administrative complaint with the DFEH.” ((Trovato v. Beckman Coulter, Inc. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 319, 323.) “The administrative complaint must be filed within one year of the date on which the unlawful practice occurred.” ((Ibid., citing Gov. Code, § 12960, subd. (d).) Once the DFEH issues a right-to-sue notice, the aggrieved party may file a civil action within one year from the date of the notice. ((Gov. Code, § 12965, subd. (b).)

In the TAC, Rojas does not allege that she filed an administrative complaint with the DFEH, nor does Rojas allege when she was subjected to any unlawful employment practice. Rojas merely alleges that she was terminated from her position on or around December 2016. (TAC, ¶ 27.) Nevertheless, the Court notes that Rojas attaches as an exhibit to her opposition to the demurrer copies of the purported right-to-sue notices from the DFEH. (Torres Decl., Exs. 1, 2.) The right-to-sue notice is dated March 17, 2017. Even if the Court were to take judicial notice of the March 17, 2017 letter (and the Court notes that no request was made by Rojas), the Court notes that Rojas did not attach a copy of her actual DFEH complaint, so it is unclear what conduct was the basis of the DFEH complaint (and whether that is the same conduct alleged in the TAC). In other words, Rojas has not alleged sufficient facts to show that she exhausted her administrative remedies in a timely manner on her retaliation claim. Rojas has also alleged no dates in connection with her sexual harassment and failure to prevent claims. Rojas does not allege when she was employed by DTF or when she was subjected to sexually harassing conduct by her supervisor. The only time-related allegation is contained in paragraph 34, where Rojas alleges that “[f]rom October to November 2013 Defendant EMPLOYER permitted Plaintiff to be retaliated, discriminated and terminated on the basis of her physical disability.” (TAC, ¶ 34.) Therefore, the Court finds that Rojas has failed to allege facts sufficient to constitute causes of action under FEHA.

Although DTF refers to the third cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy as a FEHA cause of action, wrongful termination in violation of public policy is a nonstatutory common law claim. “[A] plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies under FEHA [does] not preclude his assertion of a nonstatutory (i.e., common law) tort claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.” ((Prue v. Brady Co./San Diego, Inc. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1383.) Because DTF does not argue that the wrongful termination claim is independently time-barred, the Court overrules the demurrer to the third cause of action.

Finally, DTF argues that the fifth cause of action for unfair business practices must fail because the underlying FEHA claims are time-barred. “By proscribing any unlawful business practice, section 17200 borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable.” ((Aleksick v. 7-Eleven, Inc. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1176, 1185 [internal quotations omitted].) “When a statutory claim fails, a derivative UCL claim also fails.” ((Ibid. .) Here, because Rojas’s claim for unfair business practices (under Business and Professions Code section 17200) is based on the same conduct underlying the FEHA claims, the Court finds that the claim for unfair business practices fails.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, DTF’s demurrer to the first, second, fourth, and fifth causes of action is sustained with leave to amend. DTF’s demurrer to the third cause of action is overruled.

The Court orders Rojas to file and serve an amended complaint, if any, within 20 days of the date of this order. If no amended complaint is filed within 20 days, the Court orders DTF to file and serve its answer within 30 days of the date of this order.

Rojas is to give notice of this ruling.

DATED: December 4, 2019 ________________________________

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court


[1] Defendant asserts that it was erroneously sued as Din Tai Fung Restaurant, Inc. and Din Tai Fung Restaurant #2, Inc.