This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 07/28/2020 at 01:12:14 (UTC).

NATALIE PAGE VS TROY CONRAD ET AL

Case Summary

On 03/16/2018 NATALIE PAGE filed a Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury lawsuit against TROY CONRAD. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judges overseeing this case are ELAINE LU and STEPHEN I. GOORVITCH. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****8163

  • Filing Date:

    03/16/2018

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury

  • Court:

    Los Angeles County Superior Courts

  • Courthouse:

    Stanley Mosk Courthouse

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judges

ELAINE LU

STEPHEN I. GOORVITCH

 

Party Details

Plaintiff and Petitioner

PAGE NATALIE

Defendants, Respondents and Cross Plaintiffs

7080 HOLLYWOOD LLC

TIAGO COFFEE BAR AND KITCHEN

DOES 1 TO 100

CONRAD TROY

AGUSFUNK HOLLYWOOD INC. DBA TIAGO ESPRESSO BAR & KITCHEN

Defendants, Respondents and Cross Defendants

CONRAD TROY

ROES 1-50

CYBER JAVA @ HOLLYWOOD DBA TIAGO COFFEE BAR

CYBER JAVA @ HOLLYWOOD LLC

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff and Petitioner Attorneys

KASHANI JONATHAN M.

BURTON LINDSAY N.

Defendant, Respondent and Cross Plaintiff Attorneys

GHAEMI DORDANEH

JENKINS MICHAEL E.

LEON LUCIO

 

Court Documents

Certificate of Mailing for - CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR (COURT ORDER RE: MAY 06, 2020) OF 04/02/2020

4/2/2020: Certificate of Mailing for - CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR (COURT ORDER RE: MAY 06, 2020) OF 04/02/2020

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (COURT ORDER RE: MAY 06, 2020)

4/2/2020: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (COURT ORDER RE: MAY 06, 2020)

Request for Dismissal

1/17/2020: Request for Dismissal

Declaration - DECLARATION DECLARATION OF NATALIE PAGE IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

11/21/2019: Declaration - DECLARATION DECLARATION OF NATALIE PAGE IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)

11/25/2019: Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)

Motion for Summary Judgment

9/17/2019: Motion for Summary Judgment

Separate Statement

9/17/2019: Separate Statement

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON EX PARTE APPLICATION TO STAY ENTIRE PROCEEDING AS ...)

7/30/2019: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON EX PARTE APPLICATION TO STAY ENTIRE PROCEEDING AS ...)

Certificate of Mailing for - CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON MOTION - OTHER NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR A S...) OF 04/05/2019

4/5/2019: Certificate of Mailing for - CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON MOTION - OTHER NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR A S...) OF 04/05/2019

Motion re: - MOTION RE: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SECURITY UNDER-TAKING PURSUANT TO CCP 1030

3/13/2019: Motion re: - MOTION RE: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SECURITY UNDER-TAKING PURSUANT TO CCP 1030

Amendment to Cross-Complaint (Fictitious/Incorrect Name) - Amendment to Cross-Complaint (Fictitious/Incorrect Name)

10/22/2018: Amendment to Cross-Complaint (Fictitious/Incorrect Name) - Amendment to Cross-Complaint (Fictitious/Incorrect Name)

CROSS-COMPLAINT

7/23/2018: CROSS-COMPLAINT

PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS -

6/28/2018: PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS -

Proof of Service by 1st Class Mail -

6/1/2018: Proof of Service by 1st Class Mail -

DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT

5/29/2018: DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT

PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER OF DEFENPANT 7080 HOLLYWOOD, LLC; MEMORANDUM OF POITS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF JONATHAN M. KASHANT

5/18/2018: PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER OF DEFENPANT 7080 HOLLYWOOD, LLC; MEMORANDUM OF POITS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF JONATHAN M. KASHANT

PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS -

4/20/2018: PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS -

PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS -

3/28/2018: PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS -

64 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 11/09/2020
  • Hearing11/09/2020 at 08:30 AM in Department 32 at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Order to Show Cause Re: Dismissal (Settlement)

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  • 07/23/2020
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department 32, Stephen I. Goorvitch, Presiding; Trial Setting Conference - Not Held - Advanced and Vacated

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  • 07/23/2020
  • DocketMinute Order ( (Trial Setting Conference)); Filed by Clerk

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  • 07/23/2020
  • DocketNotice of Ruling; Filed by Tiago Coffee Bar and Kitchen (Defendant)

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  • 05/20/2020
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department 32, Stephen I. Goorvitch, Presiding; Jury Trial (- NFC) - Not Held - Vacated by Court

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  • 05/06/2020
  • Docketat 10:00 AM in Department 32, Stephen I. Goorvitch, Presiding; Final Status Conference - Not Held - Vacated by Court

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  • 05/05/2020
  • DocketCertificate of Mailing for ([Certificate of Mailing for (Court Order re: May 06, 2020) of 04/02/2020, Minute Order (Court Order re: May 06, 2020)]); Filed by Clerk

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  • 05/05/2020
  • DocketRETURNED MAIL (to counsel for plff J. M. Kashani); Filed by Clerk

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  • 04/02/2020
  • Docketat 3:57 PM in Department 32, Stephen I. Goorvitch, Presiding; Court Order

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  • 04/02/2020
  • DocketMinute Order ( (Court Order re: May 06, 2020)); Filed by Clerk

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96 More Docket Entries
  • 04/25/2018
  • DocketNOTICE OF DEMURRER AND DEMURRER; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF DORDANEH GHAEMI;

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  • 04/20/2018
  • DocketProof-Service/Summons; Filed by Natalie Page (Plaintiff)

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  • 04/20/2018
  • DocketPROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

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  • 03/28/2018
  • DocketPROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

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  • 03/28/2018
  • DocketProof-Service/Summons; Filed by Natalie Page (Plaintiff)

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  • 03/28/2018
  • DocketProof-Service/Summons; Filed by Natalie Page (Plaintiff)

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  • 03/28/2018
  • DocketPROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

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  • 03/16/2018
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by Natalie Page (Plaintiff)

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  • 03/16/2018
  • DocketCOMPLATNT FOR PERSONAL INJURIES

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  • 03/16/2018
  • DocketSUMMONS

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Tentative Rulings

Case Number: BC698163    Hearing Date: January 07, 2020    Dept: 5

 

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 5

Natalie page,

Plaintiff,

v.

troy conrad, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: BC698163

Hearing Date: January 7, 2020

[TENTATIVE] order RE:

Plaintiff’s motion to compel inspection and copying of garfunkel declaration from defendant agusfunk hollywood

Plaintiff Natalie Page (“Plaintiff”) alleges that she was attacked by a dog owned by Troy Conrad, a patron of a coffee shop owned and operated by Defendant Agusfunk Hollywood Inc. (“Defendant”). Plaintiff asserts causes of action for negligence and premises liability. Defendant previously moved for summary judgment, a motion which the Court denied on December 5, 2019. Now, Plaintiff seeks to compel an original signed declaration of Santiago Garfunkel or, in the alternative, for an order excluding the declaration as evidence in support of Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Because the Court has already denied that motion, the pending motion is taken off-calendar as moot. Plaintiff shall provide notice and file proof of such with the Court.

DATED: January 7, 2020 ___________________________

Stephen I. Goorvitch

Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: BC698163    Hearing Date: December 05, 2019    Dept: 5

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 5

natalie page,

Plaintiff,

v.

troy conrad, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: BC698163

Hearing Date: December 5, 2019

[TENTATIVE] order RE:

Defendant’s MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Natalie Page (“Plaintiff”) alleges that she was attacked by a dog owned by Troy Conrad, a patron of a coffee shop owned and operated by Defendant Agusfunk Hollywood Inc. (“Defendant”). Plaintiff asserts causes of action for negligence and premises liability. Now, Defendant moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s complaint, which Plaintiff opposes. The motion is denied.

LEGAL STANDARD

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.]  There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.”  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)  “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.”  (Ibid.)  

DISCUSSION

The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages.  (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.)  Those who own, possess, or control property generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in managing the property to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm.  (Annocki

As an initial matter, Defendant relies on the wrong standard. Defendant argues that “[a] possessor of property only has a duty to prevent foreseeable harm to a plaintiff” and that “a defendant must have knowledge of the foreseeable harm in order for a duty to be imposed.” (Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities, p.3:7-12.) Defendant also argues that “[w]hen there is no knowledge of a dog’s vicious propensity, the harm is not foreseeable and there is no duty to take measures to prevent the attack.” Id., p. 3:13-15.) However, the primary cases cited by Defendant—Martinez v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass’n (2002) 82 Cal.App.4th 883, 891 and Uccello v. Laudenslayer (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 504, 512—address a landlord’s duty when the dog is owned and kept by a tenant who has control over the premises. The other case cited by Defendant—Hillman v. Garcia-Ruby (1955) 44 Cal.2d 625, 626—addressed a pet owner’s responsibility to control his dog while walking on a public sidewalk.

There is no dispute that this case involves a dog that was unleashed and uncontrolled at a premises occupied by Defendant. A different standard applies to such cases, as articulated by the District Court of Appeal in Salinas v. Martin:

[T]he cases that decline to impose a duty of care unless a landlord has actual knowledge of the animal, coupled with the right to have it removed from the premises, are not dispositive. Under the facts presented in the case before us, we do not merely examine the evidence for proof of respondent’s actual knowledge of the vicious nature of the dogs and his ability to prevent the attack, as we would if he was a residential landlord. Instead, we must examine the totality of the factors “set forth in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 [70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561].” That are pertinent to determination of the scope of respondent’s duty.

(Salinas v. Martin (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 404, 414-415, citations omitted.) Specifically, the Court must consider three factors. First, the Court must consider “foreseeability of the risk.” (Id., p. 415.) “The scope of the duty is determined in part by balancing the foreseeability of the harm against the burden of the duty to be imposed.” (Ibid., citations omitted.) Second, the Court must consider whether Defendant had “the unfettered ability to prevent the dangerous condition on the property.” (Id., p. 416.) Third, the Court must consider whether “the extent of the burden imposed on [Defendant] to exercise due care was minimal.” (Ibid.)

Defendant relies on a declaration from Santiago Garfunkel (“Garfunkel”), its chief executive officer. Garfunkel states that he manages the day-to-day operations of the coffee shop. (Declaration of Santiago Garfunkel, ¶ 2.) Garfunkel observed Conrad’s dog at the coffee shop on various prior occasions but never witnessed any aggressive behavior by the dog. (Id., ¶¶ 4, 7, 9.) Nor had Defendant received any prior complaints about the dog or any reports of aggressive behavior. (Id., ¶ 8, 10.)

Defendant relies on Plaintiff’s discovery responses, which state that Plaintiff had seen the dog approximately 40 times prior to the attack. (Declaration of Jie Lien, Exhibit B, p. 5.) The discovery responses also state that Plaintiff does not know whether the dog displayed dangerous propensities prior to the attack, and has no knowledge of facts to support her contention that Defendant knew of the dog’s violent propensities prior to the incident. (Declaration of Jie Lien, Exhibit C, pp. 5-6.) This evidence satisfies Defendant’s burden, shifting the burden to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff relies on her own declaration, which states that Conrad brought the dog to the coffee shop without a leash. (Declaration of Natalie Page, ¶¶ 4-5.) Page states that Conrad did not control the dog and allowed him to roam freely on the patio. (Id., ¶ 5.) Page states that the patio is “readily visible/viewable from the indoor portion of [the coffee shop].” (Id., ¶ 6.) Page states that Defendant’s employees saw the dog, off its leash and not under Conrad’s control, because employees “passed by” Conrad and the dog prior to the attack. (Id., ¶ 7.) According to Plaintiff, at no time did Defendant’s employees ask Conrad to restrain his dog or leave the coffee shop. (Id., ¶¶ 7-9.) Nor did anyone intervene to stop the dog after he attacked Plaintiff. (Id., ¶ 10.) At the time of the attack, Conrad had left the dog unsupervised on the patio because he had gone inside to order coffee. (Id., ¶ 8.)

Plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient to create a triable issue whether Defendant was negligent, in consideration of the factors per Salinas v. Martin. First, the Court cannot conclude the risk was unforeseeable as a matter of law. Although Defendant may not have had notice of prior issues with the dog, there is a risk that an unrestrained dog will become panicked and react negatively when separated from his owner amidst a group of strangers. Indeed, the Court must consider the “risk” of harm, not just whether there was notice of prior incidents. (Salinas, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 415.) More important, Defendant had the “unfettered ability to prevent the dangerous condition” and the burden of requiring Conrad to leash the dog or remain with the dog would have been minimal. Simply, there is evidence that Defendant’s employees saw the unleashed and uncontrolled dog, did not ask Conrad to restrain the dog or remove the dog from the coffee shop, and did not stop the attack. Therefore, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that there is no triable issue.

Defendant argues that foreseeability is the dispositive issue, noting that the District Court of Appeal in Salinas v. Martin still focused on the foreseeability of a “guard dog” attacking a perceived trespasser. There are two problems with Defendant’s argument. First, “foreseeability” is not the sole criteria. The Court also must consider whether Defendant had the ability to prevent the dangerous condition and whether the burden would be minimal, neither of which favors Defendant’s position. Second, as discussed, there is a foreseeable risk that an unrestrained dog will become panicked and reacted negatively when separated from his owner amidst a crowd of strangers.

In sum, Defendant raises a series of issues that fall within the province of the trier of fact. While Defendant may have a viable defense at trial, this Court cannot conclude that there is no triable issue whether Defendant was negligent. Therefore, the Court must deny the motion.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied. Defendant shall provide notice and file proof of such with the Court.

DATED: December 5, 2019 ___________________________

Stephen I. Goorvitch

Judge of the Superior Court