This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 11/09/2020 at 07:31:16 (UTC).

MICHAEL JAMES BOGHDAN ET AL VS JACQUELINE PACE ET AL

Case Summary

On 12/08/2017 MICHAEL JAMES BOGHDAN filed a Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury lawsuit against JACQUELINE PACE. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Governor George Deukmejian Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judges overseeing this case are MICHAEL P. VICENCIA, MARK C. KIM and ELAINE LU. The case status is Disposed - Judgment Entered.
Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****6150

  • Filing Date:

    12/08/2017

  • Case Status:

    Disposed - Judgment Entered

  • Case Type:

    Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judges

MICHAEL P. VICENCIA

MARK C. KIM

ELAINE LU

 

Party Details

Minors and Plaintiffs

BOGDAN TATE

BOGDAN KRISTEN NOELLE AND INDIVIDUALLY

BOGHDAN MICHAEL JAMES AND INDIVIDUALLY

BOGDAN ANABELLE

KRISTEN NOELLE BOGDAN AN INDIVIDUAL

MICHAEL JAMES BOGDAN AN INDIVIDUAL

ANABELLE BOGDAN

TATE BOGDAN

MICHAEL JAMES BOGDAN AN

KRISTEN NOELLE BOGDAN AN

BOGDAN MICHAEL JAMES

BOGDAN KRISTEN NOELLE

KRISTEN BOGDAN

Plaintiff and Appellant

BOGDAN MICHAEL JAMES

Respondents and Defendants

CFJ EMPROVEMENT

DOES 1 TO 50

PACE JACQUELINE

DOES 1-50 INCLUSIVE

JACQUELINE PACE AN INDIVIDUAL

JACQUELINE PACE AN

EMPROVEMENT CFJ

Guardian Ad Litems and Plaintiffs

BOGDAN KRISTEN NOELLE AND INDIVIDUALLY

BOGHDAN MICHAEL JAMES AND INDIVIDUALLY

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Minor and Plaintiff Attorneys

WINTERS JONATHAN D. ESQ.

LAW OFFICES OF JONATHAN D. WINTERS

WINTERS JONATHAN DANIEL ESQ.

WINTERS JONATHAN DANIEL

Respondent and Defendant Attorneys

FELDMAN MARC S. ESQ.

KOLETSKY MANCINI FELDMAN & MORROW

FELDMAN MARC STEPHAN

 

Court Documents

Opposition - OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR RELIEF

11/2/2020: Opposition - OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR RELIEF

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (JURY TRIAL)

2/6/2020: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (JURY TRIAL)

Objection - OBJECTION NOTICE OF ERRATA

8/12/2020: Objection - OBJECTION NOTICE OF ERRATA

Notice - NOTICE NOTICE OF ERRATA

8/12/2020: Notice - NOTICE NOTICE OF ERRATA

Objection - OBJECTION 2ND OBJECTION TO NOTICE OF ERRATA

8/14/2020: Objection - OBJECTION 2ND OBJECTION TO NOTICE OF ERRATA

Motion for Attorney Fees

8/18/2020: Motion for Attorney Fees

Response - RESPONSE DEFENDANTS RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE AND/OR TAX DEFENDANT'S COSTS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF ROBERT S. KAHN

8/18/2020: Response - RESPONSE DEFENDANTS RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE AND/OR TAX DEFENDANT'S COSTS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF ROBERT S. KAHN

Motion for Order - MOTION FOR ORDER MOTION FOR RELIEF PURSUANT TO CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE SECTION 473(B)

8/18/2020: Motion for Order - MOTION FOR ORDER MOTION FOR RELIEF PURSUANT TO CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE SECTION 473(B)

Opposition - OPPOSITION DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE AND/OR T AX DEFENDANT'S COSTS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF ROBERT S. KAHN

8/18/2020: Opposition - OPPOSITION DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE AND/OR T AX DEFENDANT'S COSTS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF ROBERT S. KAHN

Opposition - OPPOSITION DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR ORDER REQUIRING DEFENDANT TO PAY COST OF PROOF SANCTIONS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF ROBERT S. KAHN

8/18/2020: Opposition - OPPOSITION DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR ORDER REQUIRING DEFENDANT TO PAY COST OF PROOF SANCTIONS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF ROBERT S. KAHN

Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)

8/18/2020: Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)

Objection - OBJECTION OPPOSITION TO EX-PARTE

8/20/2020: Objection - OBJECTION OPPOSITION TO EX-PARTE

Ex Parte Application - EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME ON HEARING ON MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES

8/20/2020: Ex Parte Application - EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME ON HEARING ON MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME ON...)

8/21/2020: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME ON...)

Objection - OBJECTION THIRD OBJECTION TO NOTICE OF ERRATA

8/24/2020: Objection - OBJECTION THIRD OBJECTION TO NOTICE OF ERRATA

Reply - REPLY TO OPPOSITION MTS

8/25/2020: Reply - REPLY TO OPPOSITION MTS

Appeal - Notice Court Reporter to Prepare Appeal Transcript - APPEAL - NOTICE COURT REPORTER TO PREPARE APPEAL TRANSCRIPT ;NOA 5/14/20;

8/31/2020: Appeal - Notice Court Reporter to Prepare Appeal Transcript - APPEAL - NOTICE COURT REPORTER TO PREPARE APPEAL TRANSCRIPT ;NOA 5/14/20;

Notice - NOTICE TO CONTINUE HEARING

9/2/2020: Notice - NOTICE TO CONTINUE HEARING

154 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 12/01/2020
  • Hearing12/01/2020 at 08:30 AM in Department S27 at 275 Magnolia, Long Beach, CA 90802; Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees

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  • 12/01/2020
  • Hearing12/01/2020 at 08:30 AM in Department S27 at 275 Magnolia, Long Beach, CA 90802; Hearing on Motion for Sanctions

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  • 12/01/2020
  • Hearing12/01/2020 at 08:30 AM in Department S27 at 275 Magnolia, Long Beach, CA 90802; Hearing on Motion to Tax Costs

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  • 12/01/2020
  • Hearing12/01/2020 at 08:30 AM in Department S27 at 275 Magnolia, Long Beach, CA 90802; Hearing on Motion - Other Motion for Relief Pursuant to CCP 473

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  • 11/03/2020
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department S27, Mark C. Kim, Presiding; Hearing on Motion to Tax Costs - Held - Continued

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  • 11/03/2020
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department S27, Mark C. Kim, Presiding; Hearing on Motion for Sanctions - Held - Continued

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  • 11/03/2020
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department S27, Mark C. Kim, Presiding; Hearing on Motion - Other (Motion for Relief Pursuant to CCP 473) - Held - Continued

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  • 11/03/2020
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department S27, Mark C. Kim, Presiding; Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees - Held - Continued

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  • 11/02/2020
  • DocketOpposition (to MOTION FOR RELIEF); Filed by BOGHDAN, MICHAEL JAMES, AND INDIVIDUALLY (Plaintiff)

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  • 10/19/2020
  • DocketMotion re: (DEFENDANT JACQUELINE PACE'S NOTICE AND MOTION FOR RELIEF PURSUANT TO CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE 473(b); MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF; DECLARATION OF ROBERTS. KAHN; [PROPOSED] ORDER); Filed by Jacqueline Pace (Defendant)

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234 More Docket Entries
  • 01/24/2018
  • DocketPROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

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  • 01/24/2018
  • DocketRtn of Service of Summons & Compl; Filed by Michael James Bogdan (Plaintiff); Kristen Noelle Bogdan (Plaintiff); ANABELLE BOGDAN (Plaintiff) et al.

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  • 01/24/2018
  • DocketProof-Service/Summons; Filed by BOGHDAN, MICHAEL JAMES, AND INDIVIDUALLY (Plaintiff)

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  • 01/24/2018
  • DocketProof-Service/Summons; Filed by Attorney for Plaintiff/Petitioner

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  • 12/08/2017
  • DocketComplaint

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  • 12/08/2017
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by Michael James Bogdan (Plaintiff); Kristen Noelle Bogdan (Plaintiff); ANABELLE BOGDAN (Plaintiff) et al.

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  • 12/08/2017
  • DocketSUMMONS

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  • 12/08/2017
  • DocketSummons; Filed by Michael James Bogdan (Plaintiff); Kristen Noelle Bogdan (Plaintiff); ANABELLE BOGDAN (Plaintiff) et al.

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  • 12/08/2017
  • DocketCOMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES: 1) BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY 2) RETALIATORY EVICTION; ETC

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  • 12/08/2017
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by Michael James Bogdan (Plaintiff); Kristen Noelle Bogdan (Plaintiff); ANABELLE BOGDAN (Plaintiff) et al.

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Tentative Rulings

Case Number: ****6150 Hearing Date: April 5, 2022 Dept: S27

  1. Background Facts

Plaintiffs, Michael James Bogdan, Kristin Noelle Bogdan, Anabelle Bogdan, and Michael Tate Bogdan (“Plaintiffs”), filed their action against Defendant Jacqueline Pace (“Defendant”) on December 8, 2017. Plaintiffs alleged breach of the implied warranty of habitability, breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, private nuisance, premises liability, and negligence, among other causes of action.

On January 23, 2020, a trial was held on the five causes of action detailed above. On February 26, 2020, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendant on all causes of action. On March 6, 2020, the court disposed of the action due to the jury verdict.

Plaintiffs have appealed the verdict and resulting judgment.

On 5/28/21, Defendant passed away.

  1. 11/30/21 Motion to Substitute

On 11/31/21, the Court heard Defendant’s motion to substitute Defendant/Decedent’s husband for Defendant/Decedent (the Court will hereafter refer to Decedent’s husband as “Defendant,” even though he has not yet substituted into the action). The Court denied the motion without prejudice because the motion was brought pursuant to CCP 377.31, which applies to plaintiffs’ motions to substitute, rather than 377.41, which applies to defendants’ motions to substitute.

  1. Instant Motion to Substitute

  1. Parties’ Positions

Defendant has re-filed the motion pursuant to 377.41. Defendant contends all requirements of 377.41 have been complied with, and the motion should be granted.

Plaintiff opposes the motion. He argues the Court of Appeals’ ruling operates as an automatic stay of any judgment for costs. He argues Defendant should wait until appellate proceedings are complete before seeking relief. He argues there is no pending action against Defendant, and therefore 377.41 does not apply. He argues Defendant has not given notice to all creditors of the proceedings against him and has not complied with all statutory predicates to seeking relief.

  1. Analysis

The crux of Plaintiff’s opposition is that Defendant should not be allowed to substitute into the action because Defendant’s sole purpose in doing so is to violate the automatic stay against collection of his costs award. A ruling permitting Defendant to substitute into the action would have no effect, one way or the other, on any stay that is in place. If a stay is in place, it will apply to Defendant, just as it applied to Decedent when she was alive. The issue of whether or not there is a stay in place is not before the Court at this time, as no party has sought any relief relating to collection of the costs award.

Plaintiff’s other argument is that the motion is not properly brought per 377.41. However, Plaintiff successfully argued the motion was not properly brought per 377.31. The Court wishes to hear from Plaintiff, at the hearing, concerning what relief is appropriate at this point and pursuant to what statute. Decedent has passed away. She obviously cannot participate in the action any longer. She does, however, have rights and remedies necessary and ongoing relating to the action. Notably, the Court of Appeals permitted Defendant to substitute into the action at the appellate level. If Defendant cannot substitute in per 377.31, and he cannot substitute in per 377.41, what is he to do? Simply allow the action to sit?

Plaintiff’s final argument is that Defendant has not complied with the statutory requirements of 377.41. Those requirements, however, relate to notice to creditors. As discussed in connection with the 377.31 motion, this is a situation where there is a costs award in favor of Defendant; there are, therefore, no creditors affected by the substitution. The only way creditors could be affected is if the Court of Appeals ultimately reverses the entire judgment, remands for further proceedings, and ultimately Plaintiff prevails on a second trial. However, what is Defendant to do in the interim? How does the action even proceed if Defendant has not substituted in?

Plaintiff also briefly argues that Defendant gave the co-trustee of Dececent’s estate (along with Defendant), Farmers and Merchants Trust Company, notice only of the hearing date on the motion, and not of the motion itself. It is odd that F&M is not on the proof of service of the moving papers. The Court wishes to hear from Defendant, at the hearing on the motion, concerning whether or not the actual moving papers were served on F&M. If they were not, the Court will again deny the motion without prejudice and require Defendant to serve the moving papers on F&M.

The Court is not inclined to put form over substance. There does not appear to be a code section that directly applies to a situation like the instant one, where the defendant who has passed away has a costs award in her favor and there is an appeal pending as to the merits of the judgment. The Court finds Decedent’s husband has shown he is the proper person, per 377.41, as he is the sole beneficiary of Decedent’s estate, to substitute into the action.

  1. Conclusion

The Court is inclined to grant the motion, assuming Defendant has provided F&M with a copy of the moving papers and not just given notice of the hearing on the motion. The Court wishes to hear from the parties concerning service of the moving papers and concerning Plaintiff’s proposed remedy in the event the motion is denied.

If the parties submit on the tentative, the motion will be GRANTED and Defendant will be ordered to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at gdcdepts27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.


b'

Case Number: ****6150 Hearing Date: November 30, 2021 Dept: S27

  1. Background Facts

Plaintiffs, Michael James Bogdan, Kristin Noelle Bogdan, Anabelle Bogdan, and Michael Tate Bogdan (“Plaintiffs”), filed their action against Defendant Jacqueline Pace (“Defendant”) on December 8, 2017. Plaintiffs alleged breach of the implied warranty of habitability, breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, private nuisance, premises liability, and negligence, among other causes of action.

On January 23, 2020, a trial was held on the five causes of action detailed above. On February 26, 2020, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendant on all causes of action. On March 6, 2020, the court disposed of the action due to the jury verdict.

Plaintiffs have appealed the verdict and resulting judgment.

On 5/28/21, Defendant passed away.

  1. Motion to Substitute
  1. Parties’ Positions

    Defendant’s husband, Michael J. Polak, moves to be substituted into the action as his wife’s successor-in-interest. He contends his wife passed away, and he is the proper person to succeed her in defending this action per CCP ;377.31.

    Plaintiffs oppose the motion. They contend ;377.31 does not apply; there is no copy of the death certificate with the moving papers; notice is defective; Plaintiffs will be prejudiced if the motion is granted; there will be no prejudice to Defendant if the motion is denied.

  2. CCP ;377.31

    Defendant moves for substitution per CCP ;377.31. Plaintiffs correctly note that this statute applies to plaintiffs, not to defendants. ;377.31 refers to actions “after the death of a person who commenced” the action or proceeding. Defendant herein did not commence the action or proceeding; she defended it.

    The statute that applies to defendants is ;377.41, which permits substitution in a proceeding “against the decedent.” However, ;377.41 expressly requires the person moving to substitute to establish compliance with Part 4 (commencing with Section 9000) of Division 7 of the Probate Code.

    The Court notes that this is a unique situation, as the litigation is substantively complete, and the judgment is in favor of Defendant, as opposed to being in favor of Plaintiffs. Thus, Defendant is standing in shoes more akin to those of a plaintiff in normal litigation, seeking to collect money rather than defending against a claim for money. Indeed, it doesn’t make sense to give notice to creditors under this circumstance, as the purpose of the notice is to let them know that the defendant/estate is being sued, and there could be an additional debt to pay if the plaintiff succeeds in his prosecution of the action. ;377.31, which relates to plaintiffs, contains no such provision.

    Regardless, Defendant is technically governed by ;377.41, not ;377.31, and therefore the Court will deny the motion without prejudice to Defendant’s right to renew the motion using the proper code section and making the necessary showing of compliance with the probate code.

  3. Death Certificate

Plaintiffs also argue the motion should be denied because ;377.32 requires a copy of the death certificate, and none was provided. ;377.32, however, applies to substitution of plaintiffs, not substitution of defendants. Plaintiffs failed to show a defect. If there is a requirement that a substituting defendant provide a copy of the death certificate, Defendant must be sure to do so in connection with a future motion; the Court has located no such requirement in the Code.

  1. Notice

Plaintiffs argue notice may need to be given to others besides Plaintiffs because Decedent had a trust and probably had a pour-over will. Plaintiffs note that the moving party identified himself as the co-trustee with Farmers & Merchants Bank, which was not given notice of the motion. Defendant must comply with all requirements of ;377.41 and the relevant portions of the probate code when the motion is re-filed.

  1. Prejudice

Plaintiffs contend they will be prejudiced if this motion is granted, because they will likely prevail on appeal. Plaintiffs would not be prejudiced by the appointment of a successor in interest to the defendant, as they will simply stand in the same position they would have stood in had Defendant not passed away.

  1. Conclusion

Defendant’s motion is denied without prejudice for the reasons set forth above.

Defendant is ordered to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at gdcdepts27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.

'


Case Number: ****6150    Hearing Date: June 3, 2021    Dept: S27

  1. Background Facts

Plaintiffs, Michael James Bogdan, Kristin Noelle Bogdan, Anabelle Bogdan, and Michael Tate Bogdan (“Plaintiffs”), filed their action against Defendant Jacqueline Pace (“Defendant”) on December 8, 2017. Plaintiffs alleged breach of the implied warranty of habitability, breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, private nuisance, premises liability, and negligence, among other causes of action.

On January 23, 2020, a trial was held on the five causes of action detailed above. On February 26, 2020, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendant on all causes of action. On March 6, 2020, the court disposed of the action due to the jury verdict.

Plaintiffs have appealed the verdict and resulting judgment.

  1. Motion to Stay Issuance of a Writ of Execution/Enforcement of Judgment
  1. Parties’ Positions

    Plaintiffs concede they are required to post bond to avoid issuance of a writ of execution and consequent enforcement of the ;998 costs award in Defendant’s favor. Plaintiffs argue they are indigent and therefore they should not be required to post the otherwise required bond.

    Defendant concedes she is only able to collect on the ;998 portion of her costs award in the face of an appeal, and collection of the remaining costs award is stayed. She contends, however, that Plaintiffs have failed to make an adequate showing that they are indigent, and therefore the bond requirement should not be waived.

  2. Analysis

    The sole issue for determination by the Court is whether Defendant can record a writ of execution and enforce its $48,168.73 ;998 costs award in the absence of an appeal bond filed by Plaintiffs. Specifically, the Court must determine whether Plaintiffs should be excused from filing an appeal bond due to their claimed indigent status.

    Plaintiffs rely on CCP ;1030 and Baltayan v. Estate of Getemvan (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1427, 1433 to support their position. CCP ;1030 governs bonds required of out-of-state plaintiffs to maintain their actions. The exceptions to the ;1030 bond requirement are substantially the same as the exceptions to the instant bond requirement, such that the analysis is similar. In Baltayan, the Court held the trial court has the discretion to waive bond if the trial court finds the plaintiff is indigent and cannot post bond.

    The trial court has discretion to waive a bond or undertaking requirement if the appellant is “indigent” and “unable to obtain sufficient sureties.” CCP ;995.240; see Roberts v. Superior Court (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 235, 236-237, 241, holding an appeal bond was waived based on a declaration of indigency and affidavits from two bonding companies refusing to give requisite bond. In Williams v. Freedomcard, Inc. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 609, 614-615, the Court of Appeals found no abuse of discretion when the trial court refused to waive the appeal bond where there was no showing of indigency or unsuccessful attempt to obtain bond. The Williams Court relied on Baltayan, supra, to affirm the trial court’s discretion to deny a waiver of bond based on a “weak and incomplete showing of indigency.”

    While not cite by the parties, the Court finds Alshafie v. Lallande (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 421, 429 provides the necessary information to determine whether or not a plaintiff has made an indigence showing. In Alshafie, the Court held (citations omitted):

    Even if the defendant establishes the grounds for an undertaking, the trial court may waive the requirement if the plaintiff establishes indigency. Section 995.240, which “codifie[d] the common law authority of the courts” provides, “The court may, in its discretion, waive a provision for a bond in an action or proceeding and make such orders as may be appropriate as if the bond were given, if the court determines that the principal is unable to give the bond because the principal is indigent and is unable to obtain sufficient sureties, whether personal or admitted surety insurers. In exercising its discretion the court shall take into consideration all factors it deems relevant, including but not limited to the character of the action or proceeding, the nature of the beneficiary, whether public or private, and the potential harm to the beneficiary if the provision for the bond is waived.”

    The public policy underlying an indigent's entitlement to a waiver of security costs is essentially “access trumps comfort.” “In ruling indigents are entitled to a waiver of security for costs, [the State is] saying one party's economic interest in receiving its costs of litigation should it win cannot be used to deny an indigent party his fundamental right of access to the courts.”

    The Court went on to discuss whether and when a plaintiff meets his/her burden to establish entitlement to relief from the obligation to post bond via an indigency argument, holding (citations omitted):

    In the first instance the “party seeking relief from the requirement of posting a bond or undertaking has the burden of proof to show entitlement to such relief.” It is by no means certain, however, what the nature of that showing must be. On one end of the spectrum, a sworn statement of hardship that includes some financial information but no supporting documentation may be sufficient. For example, in Hood v. Superior Court, Division One of this court held—in a slightly different context, but, like here, with the potential of barring a litigant from the courthouse—a litigant's sworn declaration an order obligating him to pay discovery referee's fees would be a financial hardship and a statement of his income and expenses are sufficient to justify a fee waiver, absent something in the declaration giving the court reason to doubt its veracity. The court reversed the trial court's order requiring the litigant to provide documentation of his income, whether by tax records or other documents.

    On the other end of the spectrum, a party formally seeking in forma pauperis status to be relieved of paying specified court fees and costs, which we believe could include a section 1030 undertaking as an additional court fee or cost (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.62(6)), must complete a mandatory Judicial Council form (currently designated form FW-001) and provide the specified financial information. 7 (Rule 3.51(a). An applicant who is not receiving government benefits from certain public assistance and supplemental income programs or whose monthly income exceeds 125 percent of the current monthly federal poverty guidelines may nevertheless qualify to proceed in forma pauperis if his or her income is not sufficient to pay for court fees and costs as well as the common necessaries of life for the applicant and the applicant's family. In such a case, the applicant must complete the section of form FW-001 requiring disclosure of detailed financial information, including all sources of income for the applicant and any family members living in the home who depend in whole or part on the applicant for support; interests in property such as cash, checking and savings accounts, vehicles and real estate; and monthly expenses such as rent, food, household supplies, clothing, medical, child care and transportation.

    The Court went on to conclude that a plaintiff seeking relief from the obligation to provide a bond should provide the trial court with the same information that a plaintiff seeking to proceed in forma pauperis must provide in seeking such relief.

    Plaintiffs herein failed to provide sufficient information to support a showing that they are indigent. Plaintiffs support their motion with their attorney’s declaration, but he lacks personal knowledge concerning their finances. They also support their motion with the Declaration of Plaintiff, Kristen Bogdan. She declares her husband has had work hours significantly decreased due to Covid-19, and she had to take FMLA leave due to Covid-19, which has resulted in a financial hardship. She declares their utility bills have risen due to stay-at-home orders. She declares her family has incurred substantial costs to prosecute this action, and her family is on a payment plan to reimburse those costs. She declares another financial burden would be “impossible,” and indicates she has sought out a surety company; she fails to state what the result of that contact was.

    Plaintiffs’ declaration lacks much necessary information to support the relief sought. By way of example, while Plaintiff declares her family’s income has been greatly reduced, she fails to declare what it was reduced from or what it has been reduced to. She fails to provide details about any of her expenses. The Court notes that people use payment plans for all sorts of reasons, many of which do not equate to indigency. She fails to provide any information about bank accounts, real estate holdings, or other assets she and her family have. As noted above, she fails to state the outcome of her contact with the surety.

    The Court finds the evidence in support of the motion is grossly insufficient to support a showing of indigency, and therefore denies the motion to stay issuance of a writ of execution and subsequent enforcement of the judgment.

    Defendant is ordered to give notice.

    Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at gdcdepts27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.orgIf the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.



Case Number: ****6150    Hearing Date: December 01, 2020    Dept: S27

  1. Background Facts

Plaintiffs, Michael James Bogdan, Kristin Noelle Bogdan, Anabelle Bogdan, and Michael Tate Bogdan (“Plaintiffs”), filed their action against Defendant Jacqueline Pace (“Defendant”) on December 8, 2017. Plaintiffs alleged breach of the implied warranty of habitability, breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, private nuisance, premises liability, and negligence, among other causes of action.

On January 23, 2020, a trial was held on the five causes of action detailed above. On February 26, 2020, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendant on all causes of action. On March 6, 2020, the court disposed of the action due to the jury verdict.

  1. Motion For CCP ;473(b) Relief

Defendant failed to (a) timely file a verified memorandum of costs, and (b) timely file a motion for attorneys’ fees. Defendant moves for relief from this failure pursuant to CCP ;473(b). Defendant contends the failure to timely complete these two acts was due to Defense Counsel’s excusable neglect in light of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.

  1. Memorandum of Costs

Defendant filed a timely memorandum of costs, but it was unverified. On 3/10/20, Plaintiffs filed a motion to tax the costs, in part on the ground that the costs memorandum was not verified. Due to COVID-19, the motion was not scheduled for hearing until 9/01/20. Defense Counsel therefore did not look at the motion until August of 2020, at which time Defense Counsel discovered the mistake. Defense Counsel immediately filed a Notice of Errata upon realizing the mistake.

The Court finds the above is not “excusable neglect” caused by COVID-19. The memorandum was due and filed before the pandemic orders were issued or the courts were closed. Even if Plaintiffs’ motion had been set to be heard the minimum sixteen court days after Plaintiffs filed it, the time to fix the memorandum would have expired.

Regardless, as discussed below in connection with the motion to tax costs, the Court finds the timely memorandum “substantially complied” with the requirements for a memorandum, and therefore the Court will not strike the memorandum due to Defendant’s failure to sign the memorandum.

  1. Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

Defendant’s motion for attorneys’ fees was due on or before 6/12/20. Defendant did not file the motion until 8/18/20. Defendant contends her failure to do so was due to excusable neglect in believing that the ongoing COVID-19 orders deemed the intervening dates “holidays” such that filings were excused. Defendant relies on various orders issued by the judicial council in this regard. The orders, however, only state that the subject dates are deemed holidays “if the above-described emergency conditions substantially interfere with the public’s ability to file papers in a court facility on those dates.”

CCP ;473(b) applies to the failure to timely file a motion for attorneys’ fees; the failure must, however, be the result of “excusable” neglect. See Ron Burns Const. Co., Inc. v. Moore (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1413-1416.

On 5/20/20, Defendant filed and served a notice of ruling. This proves that Defendant had no difficulty filing and/or serving a document despite the pandemic. It also proves Defendant was aware that LA Superior Court was able to accept filings during this time. Defendant makes no argument that she tried to timely file the motion for attorneys’ fees and the filing was rejected. She makes no argument that her attorney’s office was completely closed, her attorney was unable to work from home, her attorney was ill, or some other circumstance caused by the pandemic rendered the failure to timely file the motion “excusable neglect” per ;473(b).

The motion for relief from the failure to timely file the motion for attorneys’ fees is denied.

  1. Motion to Strike/Tax Costs
  1. History of Motion

    On February 20, 2020, Defendant filed her Memorandum of Costs. (“Memorandum”) On March 10, 2020, Plaintiffs filed their motion to strike and/or tax Defendant’s Memorandum (“Motion.”) On August 12, 2020, Defendant filed a Notice of Errata as to her Memorandum. The previously filed Memorandum was unsigned, so Defendant filed a signed Memorandum. On August 12 and 14, 2020, Plaintiffs filed objections to the Notice of Errata. On August 18, 2020, Defendant responded to Plaintiffs’ two objections. On August 18, 2020, Defendant opposed Plaintiffs’ Motion. On August 24, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a third objection to Defendant’s Notice of Errata. On August 25, 2020, Plaintiffs filed their reply. On September 1, 2020, the Court continued the hearing on the motion so it could be heard contemporaneously with the other matters on calendar today.

  2. Legal Standard

    Generally, a “prevailing party” is entitled to costs. (Code of Civ. Proc. ; 1032(b); Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 606.). A prevailing party includes “a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered.” (Code of Civ. Proc. ; 1032(a)(4).) “A prevailing party who claims costs must serve and file a memorandum of costs within 15 days after the date of mailing of the notice of entry of judgment…The memorandum of costs must be verified by a statement of the party, attorney, or agent that to the best of his or her knowledge the items of cost are correct and were necessarily incurred in the case.”

    The losing party may contest the costs that a prevailing party seeks. (CCP ;1034(a).) The challenging party has the burden of demonstrating that those costs are unreasonable or unnecessary. (Adams v. Ford Motor Co., (2011) 199 Cal. App. 4th 1475, 1486; 612 South LLC v. Laconic Limited Partnership, (2010) 184 Cal. App. 4th 1270, 1285.)

    Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5 sets forth the costs recoverable by the prevailing party. (Code Civ. Proc., ; 1033.5.) “Allowable costs shall be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation.” (Code Civ. Proc., ;1033.5(c)(2); Perko’s Enterprises, Inc. v. RRNS Enterprises (l992) 4 Cal.App.4th 238, 244.) A “properly verified memorandum of costs is considered prima facie evidence that the costs listed in the memorandum were necessarily incurred.” (Bach v. County of Butte (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 294, 308; see also Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.) The memorandum of costs need not contain invoices, billings, or statements. (Bach, at p. 308.) (See also Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1700(a)(1) [only verification required].)

    “Documentation must be submitted only when a party dissatisfied with the costs claimed in the memorandum challenges them by filing a motion to tax costs.” (Bach v. County of Butte, supra, at p. 308.) This puts the burden on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. (Ladas v. California State Automotive Assoc. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 773-74.) If items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs. (Id.) “Defendant's mere statements in the points and authorities accompanying its notice of motion to strike cost bill and the declaration of its counsel are insufficient to rebut the prima facie showing.” (Rappenecker v. Sea-Land Service, Inc. (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 256, 266.)

  3. Analysis

    Plaintiffs move to strike the following items from Defendant’s Memorandum: (1) filing and motion fees; (2) deposition costs; (3) service of process; (4) attorney’s fees; (5) court reporter fees; and (6) expert fees.

    The court first analyzes any procedural defects in Defendant’s Memorandum. In their Motion and First, Second, and Third Objections to the Notice of Errata, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s Memorandum is defective because it was premature, untimely, did not include a memorandum worksheet (Form MC-011) or an amount for attorney’s fees. As discussed below, the court overrules Plaintiffs’ objections.

    The court finds that Defendant’s Memorandum does not fail for being premature, as premature memorandums of cost may be considered timely. (Laurel Hills Homeowners Assn. v. City Council (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 515, 528 [court treated developer’s premature cost bill as if it had been timely filed].)

    The court finds that Defendant’s Memorandum does not fail for lacking a signature, being filed in August 2020, or lacking an amount for attorney’s fees. Defendant filed her unsigned Memorandum on February 20, 2020. However, California Rules of Court, rule 3.17000 requires that a verified memorandum of costs be filed. Defendant filed a verified memorandum on August 12, 2020 upon filing her Notice of Errata. Defendant substantially complied with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1700. A comparison of the verified and unverified memorandums show that the only difference is the signature, meaning that in both memorandums, Defendant detailed costs that were necessarily incurred in the case. (Robertson v. Health Net of California, Inc. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1430 [substantial compliance “doctrine excuses literal noncompliance only when there has been actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of the statute”], citation omitted.) As to attorney’s fees, Defendant has filed a 473(b) motion on August 18, 2018 to obtain court approval to file a motion for attorney’s fees

    The court finds that Plaintiff is not required to use Form MC-011. The form is for optional use in requesting costs. (Code Civ. Proc. ; 1034; California Rules of Court, rule 3.1700(a).)

    Satisfied that Defendant met the procedural requirements, the court now analyzes the merits of Plaintiffs’ Motion.

  1. Filing and Motion Fees (Item 1)

Defendant claims to have incurred $2,969.86 in filing and motion fees. Plaintiffs seek to strike and/or tax the full amount on grounds that this amount is not reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and there is no proof that this amount was actually incurred. (Mot., 4:26-28.)

Defendant may recover filing and motion fees. (Code Civ. Proc. ; 1033.5(a)(1).) Defendant incurred a total of $2,969.86 in filing fees. (Kahn Decl., ¶ 8, Exh. E) Plaintiffs have not shown that this amount was not reasonable or necessary. (Ladas v. California State Automotive Assoc. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 773-774 [“If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that [they] were not reasonable or necessary.”].) Accordingly, the motion to tax Item 1 is denied.

  1. Deposition Costs (Item 4)

Defendant claims to have incurred $9,690.17 in deposition costs. Plaintiffs seek to strike and/or tax the full amount on grounds that deposition costs are not allowable costs, Defendant has not provided proof that such an amount was incurred, and the amount was not reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation. (Mot., 5:2-9.)

Defendant may recover deposition costs. (Code Civ. Proc. ; 1033.5(a)(3).) Defendant incurred $9,690.17 in obtaining transcripts for some of the depositions taken. (Kahn Decl., ¶ 9, Exh. E-F) Plaintiffs have not shown that this amount was not reasonable or necessary. (Ladas v. California State Automotive Assoc. (1993), supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at pp. 773-774 [“If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that [they] were not reasonable or necessary.”].) Accordingly, the motion to tax Item 4 is denied.

  1. Service of Process (Item 5)

Defendant claims to have incurred $5,873.15 in service of process costs. Plaintiffs seek to strike and/or tax the full amount on grounds that this amount is not reasonably calculated to the conduct of litigation, and there is no proof that Defendant incurred this amount. (Mot., 5:11-14.)

Defendant may recover service of process costs. (Code Civ. Proc. ; 1033.5(a)(4).) The court also has discretion to award costs for items not mentioned in section 1033.5. (Id. ; 1033.5(c)(4).) Defendant incurred $5,873.15 in service of process fees. (Kahn Decl., 10, Exh. E.) Plaintiffs have not shown that this amount was not reasonable or necessary. (Ladas v. California State Automotive Assoc. (1993), supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at pp. 773-774 [“If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that [they] were not reasonable or necessary.”].) Accordingly, the motion to tax Item 5 is denied.

  1. Attorney Fees (Item 10)

Defendant claims to have incurred an amount that is to be determined in attorney fees. Plaintiffs seek to strike and/or tax any amount claimed above $500. Pursuant to the parties’ lease rental agreement, attorney’s fees are capped in the amount of $500. (Mot, 5:15-7:6; Exh. B, clause 15.)

As discussed more fully above, the motion for relief from failure to file the motion for attorneys’ fees is denied. As clarified below, the motion for attorneys’ fees is denied. Thus, this issue is moot.

  1. Court Reporter Fees (Item 11)

Defendant claims to have incurred $14,061.30 in court reporter fees. Plaintiffs seek to strike and/or tax the full amount on grounds that there is no proof that Defendant incurred this amount, and the Code of Civil Procedure does not allow recovery of court reporter costs unless there is a court order. (Mot., 7:8-22.)

Defendant may recover court reporter fees. (Code Civ. Proc. ; 1033.5(a)(11).) The parties and the court agreed that the parties would provide a court reporter for trial and would evenly split the costs. (Kahn Decl., ¶ 11.) Plaintiffs did not pay for their half, leaving Defendant to pay for the full amount of $14,061.30 in court reporter fees. (Kahn Decl., ¶¶ 12-13, Exh. G.) Plaintiffs have not shown that this amount was not reasonable or necessary. (Ladas v. California State Automotive Assoc. (1993), supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at pp. 773-774 [“If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that [they] were not reasonable or necessary.”].) Accordingly, the motion to tax Item 11 is denied.

  1. Expert Fees (Item 16)

Defendant claims to have incurred $46,168.73 in expert fees that were incurred after offers under Code of Civil Procedure section 998 were served on Plaintiffs on June 17, 2019. (Kahn Decl. 14, Exh. H.) Plaintiffs seek to strike and/or tax the full amount on grounds that the award for expert fees for failure to accept a 998 offer is discretionary, not automatic. (See Santantonio v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 102, 121-124.) Plaintiffs also move on grounds that the 998 offers were made in bad faith and without a reasonable expectation that Plaintiffs would accept because Plaintiffs would recover nothing after deducting the cost of litigation. (Mot., 8:7-11:16; See Jones v. Dumrichob (1998) 63 Cal App 4th 1258 [998 offer is to encourage settlement and must be made in good faith].)

Defendant may recover expert fees. (Code Civ. Proc. ; 998 [if plaintiff refuses offer, plaintiff must pay defendants’ costs from time of offer].) The court finds that the 998 offers were not made in bad faith. Defendant has consistently maintained she had no liability; she made offers to all four Plaintiffs with a sum total of $50,004; trial occurred six months after the 998 offers were served, and at trial, the jury returned a verdict favoring Defendant on all of Plaintiffs’ causes of action. (Bates v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital, Inc. Adams v. Ford Motor Co. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1475, 1484 [“Whether a section 998 offer was reasonable and made in good faith is left to “the sound discretion of the trial court.”], citation omitted.) Defendant claims to have reasonably incurred expert fees in the sum of $46,168.73. (Kahn Decl., 15, Exh. I.) Plaintiffs have not shown that this amount was not reasonable or necessary. (Ladas v. California State Automotive Assoc. (1993), supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at pp. 773-774 [“If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that [they] were not reasonable or necessary.”].) Accordingly, the motion to tax Item 16 is denied.

  1. Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

Due to the above order denying Defendant’s motion for relief pursuant to CCP ;473(b), the motion for attorneys’ fees is denied as untimely.

  1. Motion for Cost of Proof Sanctions

Plaintiff moves to recover cost of proof sanctions pursuant to CCP ;2033.420. CCP ;2033.420 provides, “If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter when requested to do so under this section, and if the party requesting that admission thereafter proves the genuineness of that document or the truth of that matter, the party requesting the admission may move the court for an order requiring the party to whom the request was directed to pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney's fees. The court shall make this order unless it finds that (1) an objection to the request was sustained or a response to it was waived under subdivision (l), (2) the admission sought was of no substantial importance, (3) the party failing to make the admission had reasonable ground to believe that that party would prevail on the matter, or (4) there was other good reason for the failure to admit.”

The determination of whether a party is entitled to expenses under section 2033.420 is within the sound discretion of the trial court. More specifically, ;2033.420 clearly vests in the trial judge the authority to determine whether the party propounding the admission thereafter proved the truth of the matter which was denied. An abuse of discretion occurs only where it is shown that the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. The primary purpose of requests for admissions is to set at rest triable issues so that they will not have to be tried; they are aimed at expediting trial. [Citation.] The basis for imposing sanctions ... is directly related to that purpose. Unlike other discovery sanctions, an award of expenses ... is not a penalty. Instead, it is designed to reimburse reasonable expenses incurred by a party in proving the truth of a requested admission ... [citations] such that trial would have been expedited or shortened if the request had been admitted." (Brooks v. American Broadcasting Co. (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 500, 509.) In determining whether a party had no good reasons for denial of the request for admission so as to warrant imposition of expenses, the Court may properly consider whether, at the time denial was made, the party making the denial reasonably entertained a good faith belief that the party would prevail on the issue at trial; it is not enough for the party making the denial to "hotly contest" the issue, but, rather, there must be some reasonable basis for contesting the issue in question before sanctions can be avoided. (Id.)

Plaintiffs list a variety of RFAs and then contend they proved up these facts at trial. The RFAs, collectively, would establish Plaintiffs’ case in full. Plaintiffs failed, however, to prevail at trial. It is therefore non-sensical that they “proved up” all of the RFAs at issue. The motion for cost of proof sanctions is denied.

  1. Conclusion

Defendant’s motion for relief pursuant to CCP ;473(b) is denied. Plaintiffs’ motion to tax costs is denied. Defendant’s motion for attorneys’ fees is denied. Plaintiff’s motion for cost of proof sanctions is denied.

Defendant is ordered to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at gdcdepts27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.orgIf the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If the parties do not submit on the tentative, they should arrange to appear remotely.



Case Number: ****6150    Hearing Date: September 02, 2020    Dept: S27

  1. Background Facts

Plaintiffs, Michael James Bogdan, Kristin Noelle Bogdan, Anabelle Bogdan, and Michael Tate Bogdan (“Plaintiffs”), filed their action against Defendant Jacqueline Pace (“Defendant”) on December 8, 2017. Plaintiffs alleged breach of the implied warranty of habitability, breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, private nuisance, premises liability, and negligence, among other causes of action.

On January 23, 2020, a trial was held on the five causes of action detailed above. On February 26, 2020, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendant on all causes of action. On March 6, 2020, the court disposed of the action due to the jury verdict.

On March 13, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a motion for cost of proof sanctions against Defendant for her alleged failure to admit facts in her responses to Plaintiffs’ requests for admissions.

  1. Cost of Proof Sanctions
  1. Legal Standard

    “If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter when requested to do so under this chapter, and if the party requesting that admission thereafter proves the genuineness of that document or the truth of that matter, the party requesting the admission may move the court for an order requiring the party to whom the request was directed to pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney’s fees.” (Code Civ. Proc. ; 2033.420(a).) The court must award reasonable expenses unless: “(1) An objection to the request was sustained or a response to it was waived under Section 2033.290. (2) The admission sought was of no substantial importance. (3) The party failing to make the admission had reasonable ground to believe that that party would prevail on the matter. (4) There was other good reason for the failure to admit.” (Id. ; 2033.420(b).)

  2. Analysis

    On April 2, 2018, Plaintiffs served Defendant with a First Set of Requests for Admission. (Winters Decl., ¶ 2, Exh. A.) On May 7, 2018, Defendant served her Response to the First Set of Requests for Admission. (Winters Decl., ¶ 3, Exh. B.)

    In their motion, Plaintiffs bring the court’s attention to Requests for Admission Nos. 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, 16, 20, 22, 23, 27, 29, and 30. (Mot., pp. 5-6.) Plaintiffs assert that Defendant improperly denied Plaintiffs’ requests. At trial, Plaintiffs proved that Defendant wrongfully denied them. Thus, Plaintiffs request that the court award Plaintiffs with reasonable expenses in the amount of $23,625.

    In opposition, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have waived their right to seek reasonable expenses. The court agrees.

    The court must award reasonable expenses unless “[a]n objection to the request was sustained or a response to it was waived under Section 2033.290.” (Code Civ. Proc. ; 2033.420(b)(1).) Section 2033.290 permits a propounding party to file a motion to compel further responses where the responding party’s responses are evasive or incomplete, or where the responding party’s objections are without merit or too general. (Id. ; 2033.290(a).) The propounding party must file the motion to compel within 45 days of the service of the verified responses or pursuant to a date stipulated to by the parties. If the motion is not timely filed, the propounding party waives any right to compel further responses to the requests for admission. (Id. ; 2033.290(b).)

    Here, Plaintiffs waived their right to compel further responses. The parties did not stipulate to a date by which Plaintiffs had to file their motion to compel, meaning that Plaintiffs had 45 days from when Defendant served them with her responses to file their motion. Plaintiffs were served with Defendants’ responses on May 7, 2018, so Plaintiffs had until June 21, 2018 to file their motion. Plaintiffs never filed a motion to compel further answers, thereby waiving Defendant’s responses under section 2033.290.

    Based on the foregoing, the court denies Plaintiffs’ request for reasonable expenses under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420.

    Defendant is ordered to give notice.

    Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at gdcdepts27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.orgIf the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.



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