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This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 04/16/2021 at 16:11:11 (UTC).

MICHAEL HAWKINS ET AL VS DURESSA SOLOMON ET AL

Case Summary

On 04/11/2018 MICHAEL HAWKINS filed a Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury lawsuit against DURESSA SOLOMON. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judges overseeing this case are JON R. TAKASUGI, HOLLY E. KENDIG and THOMAS D. LONG. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****1846

  • Filing Date:

    04/11/2018

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury

  • Court:

    Los Angeles County Superior Courts

  • Courthouse:

    Stanley Mosk Courthouse

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judges

JON R. TAKASUGI

HOLLY E. KENDIG

THOMAS D. LONG

 

Party Details

Plaintiffs and Petitioners

HAWKINS MICHAEL

HAWKINS SHEILA

Defendants, Respondents and Cross Defendants

CHUMLEY WILLIAM

DOES 1 TO 30 INCLUSIVE

SOLOMON DURESSA

NATHANIEL SOLOMON DOE1

ISABEL SOLOMON DOE2

DURESSA SOLOMON

SHENKUTE HIWOT

MENDOZA TONY

Defendants, Respondents and Cross Plaintiffs

NATHANIEL SOLOMON DOE1

ISABEL SOLOMON DOE2

DURESSA SOLOMON

SHENKUTE HIWOT

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff and Petitioner Attorneys

DIDONATO PETER R. ESQ.

DIDONATO PETER RUSSELL ESQ.

Defendant and Respondent Attorneys

MCCLAUGHERTY & ASSOCIATES

MCCLAUGHERTY JAY STEPHEN

MCCLAUGHERTY JAY S.

MCCLAUGHERTY JAY S

Defendant and Cross Plaintiff Attorney

MCCLAUGHERTY JAY S.

 

Court Documents

Declaration - DECLARATION PLAINTIFFS' DECLARATION OF EXPERT WITNESS RICHARD H. POLSKY, PHD, IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

2/19/2021: Declaration - DECLARATION PLAINTIFFS' DECLARATION OF EXPERT WITNESS RICHARD H. POLSKY, PHD, IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Proof of Service by Substituted Service

1/21/2021: Proof of Service by Substituted Service

Opposition - OPPOSITION PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTON FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENTON PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; MEMORANDU OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

12/21/2020: Opposition - OPPOSITION PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTON FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENTON PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; MEMORANDU OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Motion for Summary Judgment

8/26/2020: Motion for Summary Judgment

Separate Statement

8/26/2020: Separate Statement

Answer

3/30/2020: Answer

Notice Re: Continuance of Hearing and Order

3/18/2020: Notice Re: Continuance of Hearing and Order

Case Management Statement

2/14/2020: Case Management Statement

Notice - NOTICE OF VACATING COURT DATES:SCHEDULING OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

2/5/2020: Notice - NOTICE OF VACATING COURT DATES:SCHEDULING OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

Certificate of Mailing for - CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR (HEARING ON MOTION FOR ORDER MOTION FOR ORDER TO FILE FIRST AM...) OF 01/13/2020

1/13/2020: Certificate of Mailing for - CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR (HEARING ON MOTION FOR ORDER MOTION FOR ORDER TO FILE FIRST AM...) OF 01/13/2020

Separate Statement

11/27/2019: Separate Statement

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATOR...)

8/2/2019: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATOR...)

Reply - REPLY OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL

7/19/2019: Reply - REPLY OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSIO...)

7/25/2019: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSIO...)

Notice - NOTICE OF ERRATA OF CORRECT HEARING DATE FOR MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO FORM INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE TO NATHANIEL SOLOMON

7/15/2019: Notice - NOTICE OF ERRATA OF CORRECT HEARING DATE FOR MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO FORM INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE TO NATHANIEL SOLOMON

Notice - NOTICE OF ERRATA OF CORRECT HEARING DATE FOR MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE TO NATHANIEL SOLOMON

7/15/2019: Notice - NOTICE OF ERRATA OF CORRECT HEARING DATE FOR MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE TO NATHANIEL SOLOMON

AMENDMENT TO COMPLAINT -

5/29/2018: AMENDMENT TO COMPLAINT -

AMENDMENT TO COMPLAINT -

5/29/2018: AMENDMENT TO COMPLAINT -

113 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 08/09/2021
  • Hearing08/09/2021 at 10:00 AM in Department 24 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Jury Trial

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  • 07/27/2021
  • Hearing07/27/2021 at 09:30 AM in Department 24 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Final Status Conference

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  • 05/12/2021
  • Hearing05/12/2021 at 08:30 AM in Department 24 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Status Conference

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  • 04/12/2021
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department 31, Thomas D. Long, Presiding; (OSC RE Dismissal) - Not Held - Advanced and Vacated

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  • 03/22/2021
  • DocketNotice of Ruling; Filed by Michael Hawkins (Plaintiff)

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  • 03/10/2021
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department 24; Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment - Held

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  • 03/10/2021
  • DocketOrder Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore

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  • 03/10/2021
  • DocketMinute Order ( (Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment)); Filed by Clerk

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  • 03/03/2021
  • DocketReply (to Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants Motion For Summary Judgment); Filed by Solomon Duressa (Cross-Complainant)

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  • 02/25/2021
  • DocketRequest for Judicial Notice (FOURTH REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE RE FELONY CONVICTIONS OF WILLIAM CHUMLEY IN OPPOSITION T MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF PETER R. diDONATO); Filed by Michael Hawkins (Plaintiff); Sheila Hawkins (Plaintiff)

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160 More Docket Entries
  • 05/29/2018
  • DocketAMENDMENT TO COMPLAINT

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  • 05/29/2018
  • DocketAmendment to Complaint; Filed by Michael Hawkins (Plaintiff); Sheila Hawkins (Plaintiff)

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  • 05/18/2018
  • DocketProof-Service/Summons; Filed by Michael Hawkins (Plaintiff)

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  • 05/18/2018
  • DocketProof-Service/Summons; Filed by Michael Hawkins (Plaintiff); Sheila Hawkins (Plaintiff)

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  • 05/18/2018
  • DocketProof of Service of Summons and Complaint

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  • 05/18/2018
  • DocketProof of Service of Summons and Complaint

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  • 04/11/2018
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by Michael Hawkins (Plaintiff); Sheila Hawkins (Plaintiff)

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  • 04/11/2018
  • DocketCivil Case Cover Sheet /Addendum

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  • 04/11/2018
  • DocketComplaint

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  • 04/11/2018
  • DocketSummons; Filed by Michael Hawkins (Plaintiff); Sheila Hawkins (Plaintiff)

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Tentative Rulings

Case Number: BC701846    Hearing Date: March 10, 2021    Dept: 24

Defendants Solomon Duressa and Hiwot Shenkute’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

On April 11, 2018, Plaintiffs Michael and Sheila Hawkins filed the instant dog-bite action against Defendants Solomon Duressa, William Chumley, Isabel Solomon, Nathaniel Solomon, Hiwot Shenkute, and Tony Mendoza. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants owned two dogs that attacked Michael on January 26, 2018 outside of his house. The operative First Complaint alleges three causes of action for: 1) negligence (strict liability); 2) negligence; and 3) negligent infliction of emotional distress.

On October 14, 2020, Duressa, Ms. Solomon, Mr. Solomon, and Shenkute moved for summary judgment. On December 21, 2020, Plaintiffs filed an opposition. On December 29, 2020, the moving defendants submitted a reply.

On January 4, 2021, the Court heard oral arguments on the MSJ. The Court denied the MSJ as to Isabel and Nathaniel Solomon. The Court granted Plaintiffs’ request to depose Mendoza and Chumley. On January 27, 2021, Plaintiff dismissed Mendoza. On February 19, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a supplemental opposition. On March 3, 2021, Duressa and Shenkute filed a reply.

Summary Judgment Standard

A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action, affirmative defenses, claims for damages, or issues of duty if that party contends that there is no merit to the cause of action, defense, or claim for damages, or if the party contends that there is no duty owed. (See CCP §437c(f)(1).) “A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Ibid.) A cause of action has no merit if: (1) one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be separately established, even if that element is separately pleaded, or (2) a defendant establishes an affirmative defense to that cause of action. (See CCP §437c(n); Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573, 583.) Once the defendant has shown that a cause of action has no merit, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action. (See CCP §437c(o)(2); Union Bank, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at 583.)

In order to obtain summary judgment, “all that the defendant need do is to show that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action.” (See Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853; see also Mitchell v. United National Ins. Co. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 457.) “Although he remains free to do so, the defendant need not himself conclusively negate any such element.” (Ibid.) “Once the defendant has made such a showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or as to a defense to the cause of action. If the plaintiff does not make such a showing, summary judgment in favor of the defendant is appropriate.” (See Mitchell, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at 467.)

Until the defendant meets this evidentiary burden, the plaintiff has no burden to present evidence showing a triable issue of fact. (See Hagen v. Hickenbottom (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 168, 178; see also Hawkins v. Wilton (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 936, 940, citing Duckett v. Pistoresi Ambulance Service, Inc. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1525, 1533 [“[w]here the evidence presented by defendant does not support judgment in his favor, the motion must be denied without looking at the opposing evidence, if any, submitted by plaintiff”].)

Request for Judicial Notice

Plaintiff requests judicial notice of a certain Administrative Order After Hearing from City of Los Angeles, Department of Animal Services General Manager Brenda F. Barnette, dated September 13, 2018, addressed to Nathanial Solomon and Isabel Solomon. This request is GRANTED. (Evid. Code § 452(c).)

Plaintiff requests judicial notice of the State of California, Employment Development Department (EDD) "2020 Household Employer's Guide, Cover, Director's Letter, and pages 3-4. This request is also GRANTED.

Plaintiff requests judicial notice of the City of Los Angeles Municipal Code §§53.06.2 (a), 53.34 and 53.34.1. This request is GRANTED.

Plaintiff requests judicial notice of Chumley’s former felony convictions. These felony convictions include possession of cocaine base for sale, receiving stolen property, and burglary. This request is GRANTED.

Actual Knowledge of Viciousness

Plaintiffs bring supplemental briefing on the issue of Duressa and Shenkute’s actual knowledge of the dogs’ vicious propensities.

“Under California law, a landlord who does not have actual knowledge of a tenant’s dog’s vicious nature cannot be held liable when the dog attacks a third person. In other words, where a third person is bitten or attacked by a tenant’s dog, the landlord’s duty of reasonable care to the injured third person depends on whether the dog’s vicious behavior was reasonably foreseeable. Without knowledge of a dog’s propensities a landlord will not be able to foresee Donchin

“[T]his inquiry into the landlord’s duty involves a two-step approach. The first step is to determine the landlord’s knowledge of the dog’s vicious nature… a landlord can only be liable if he or she had actual knowledge of the dog’s vicious propensity… However, [this requirement] can be satisfied by circumstantial evidence the landlord must have known about the dog’s dangerousness as well as direct evidence he actually knew.”  (Donchin, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at 1838, emphasis added.) “ ‘Actual knowledge can be inferred from the circumstances only if, in light of the evidence, such inference is not based on speculation or conjecture… [o]nly where the circumstances are such that the defendant 'must have known' and not 'should have known' will an inference of actual knowledge be permitted.’ ” (Id., at 1839.) Second, the Court asks whether the landlord had the ability to prevent the foreseeable harm. (Ibid.)

Examining the evidence discussed in case law, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s evidence substantial enough to create a dispute of fact as to Duressa and Shenkute’s knowledge. In Donchin, the tenant's dogs displayed vicious propensities that would have been apparent to anyone, including the landlord, who regularly visited the property. (Id., at 1843.) A neighbor attested that he was “afraid of the rottweilers” and recited incidents justifying that fear, such as “the dogs frequently ran loose around the neighborhood, lunging towards both people and other dogs.” (Id. at 1836, 1841.) In addition, a UPS employee described the behavior of the dogs as “threatening” such that he would “toss the packages over the fence into the yard because he feared the two rottweilers.” (Ibid.) The UPS employee stated that “every time he entered their area they would ‘growl and show their teeth, ram the wood fence, attempt to jump the fence and appeared extremely ferocious.’ ” (Id. at 1843.) This evidence, in conjunction with expert testimony regarding the dogs’ behavior, was sufficient circumstantial evidence to find that the landlords must have known of the dogs’ vicious propensities.

In Yuzon, the court noted that “pushing, barking, and jumping at a screen door” would not have given actual notice of dog’s vicious propensities. (Yuzon v. Collins (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 149, 164.) Yuzon found that evidence showing that a dog ran around the neighborhood and scared neighbors would be insufficient to establish actual knowledge, without evidence of that the dog “lunged at people or other dogs before the incident, or that he ever growled, bared his teeth, rammed a fence (or other barrier), or appeared extremely (or even slightly) ferocious.” (Id., at 164-165.) Further, there was no direct evidence that the landlord observed, or had such an incident reported to him before the relevant bite. (Id. at 165) Further, there was no evidence that this incident was aggressive, or that of any reports to the landlord of any problems with the dogs being aggressive. (Id.) In Yuzon, the dog was kept inside the house, away from view of those walking by the home, such that if the landlords were “in the front yard walking by,” he would not have had a chance to see the dogs. (Id.)

Here, Plaintiffs present evidence that these defendants must have known about the dogs’ dangerous propensities. First, there is no reasonable dispute that the dogs resided at the premises with Duressa and Shenkute prior to the incident. This is significant, since many of the cases cited involve landlords that did not live at the property and claimed that they were unaware of the dogs and their nature. Duressa and Shenkute lived at the property, and thus “must have known” about the propensities of the dogs if such propensities existed and were frequently displayed.

Plaintiffs produce evidence that the dogs were generally aggressive and loud, such that people felt unsafe near the dogs and feared attack. For instance, the Hawkins attempted to have a Super Bowl party in their backyard, but the dogs were barking loudly and aggressively from the other yard, so the party went inside. (M. Hawkins Decl., ¶ 5.) Other gatherings were interrupted by the dogs aggressive barking from the other yard, such that people would flee into the house out of fear of being attacked. (Id., ¶ 6.) The dogs would often bark aggressively, such that Sheila felt too fearful to take out the trash. (Id., ¶ 7.) In one instance, a dog jumped over the fence into their yard, which caused a guest to be extremely frightened and run into the house. (Id., ¶ 8; S. Hawkins Decl., ¶ 8.) Numerous third-party witnesses observed the dogs “aggressively” barking on multiple occasions, such that they feared being attacked. (Cavin Decl., ¶¶ 4-6; Harris Decl., ¶¶ 3-5; Blount Decl., ¶ 4.) A neighbor also declares that the Solomon’s had vicious dogs in their yard (Gatlin Decl., ¶ 6.) He describes an incident where he visited the Hawkins residence and saw one of the dogs appearing “unfriendly” and “growling,” and that he felt that the dog would attack, so he left. (Id.) Hawkins personally complained of the dogs aggressive and frightening behavior to Shenkute five to six times in the six months leading up to the attack. (M. Hawkins Decl., ¶ 9.)

Plaintiffs also present the declaration of Richard H. Polsky, PhD, an animal behavior expert (the same expert in Donchin and Yuzon). Polsky opines that the dogs must have possessed vicious tendencies prior to the incident. Second, Polsky opines that Duressa and Shenkute must have known about the vicious tendencies. (Polsky Decl., ¶¶ 17-19.) He relies on the information that Hawkins complained to Shenkute and Soloman on multiple occasions and that Duressa and Shenkute lived on the premises, such that they had ample time to observe the dogs and become familiar with their habits. (Id., ¶¶ 17-18.) Further, the gardener suggested that the dogs were dangerous, and that Shenkute told him that the pit bulls were vicious and need to be put away before he came. (Id., ¶ 19.) He found it is inconceivable that the dogs’ habits, given their strength, were not displayed in the presence of the defendants at least on some occasions. Despite the denial of the defendants, he concludes that the aggressive and potentially dangerous nature of these dogs had to have been displayed in the presence of the defendants before January 26, 2018, and hence, the defendants knew about these dangerous tendencies. (Id., ¶ 24.)

Defendants argue that Polsky cannot infer this information, since he is not an expert on human psychology and is testifying as to Defendants’ state of mind. However, in this instance, he is testifying as to animal behavior. He states that the dogs possessed vicious tendencies prior to the incident, which in animal behavior. (Polsky Decl., ¶¶ 11-16.) He then infers from Defendants’ presence at the property (which is undisputed) and multiple warnings of the behavior (which is supported by substantial evidence) that they also observed the dogs’ vicious behavior prior to the incident. (Polsky Decl., ¶¶ 17-19.)

The discussion in Yuzon court sheds light on Polsky’s declaration here. Yuzon found that his declaration would not have changed the outcome of the motion there, since it failed to shed any light on what the landlords knew or must have known about the dog’s vicious propensities. (Yuzon, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at 167-168.) Yuzon distinguished Donchin, since it was based on principally on the false exculpatory evidence rule, and the evidence materially differed. Importantly here, the evidence of the Rottweilers' vicious propensities in Donchin, unlike in Yuzon, were on “regular display” for all to see in the front yard of the home. (Id. at 168.) “[O]n the other hand, there is no evidence that [the dog] was kept in front of the house or that he displayed the same or similar sorts of aggressive behaviors that were present in the Donchin case. While it may have been reasonable for Dr. Polsky to infer in Donchin that the landlord must have seen the Rottweilers' vicious propensities when he regularly visited the property, due to the very different facts of this case, it was entirely speculative for Dr. Polsky to infer that [the landlords] must have seen [the dog’s] vicious propensities when he visited the property.” (Yuzon, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at 168.) Here, Duressa and Shenkute lived at the property, and therefore must have observed the dogs’ vicious propensities. This is the same inference that Polsky could make in Donchin, given that that the landlord regularly interacted with the dogs. The facts are therefore more in-line with Donchin than Yuzon, since the record shows Duressa and Shenkute regularly interacted with the dogs in their own home. The Court finds that the above evidence creates a dispute of fact as to Duressa and Shenkute’s knowledge of the dogs’ propensities.

Plaintiffs also provide direct evidence that “Mrs. Solomon” knew of the dogs’ vicious propensities through the declaration of Defendants’ gardener Moises Mendoza Tafolla (former co-defendant Mendoza). The opposition suggests that this is Shenkute, but the declaration itself is unclear. The Tafolla Declaration does not state which “Solomon” he is referring to specifically, i.e., whether he is referring to Shenkute (who apparently does not go by Solomon, and is married to Duressa), or Isabel Solomon (the record does not show that she is married). Notably, the title Mrs. suggests that he is referring to someone who is married. Further, a gardener would be more likely to speak with the owners of the home, rather than the tenants. Also, Shenkute declares that she gave certain instructions to Tafolla regarding the gate. (Shenkute Decl., ¶ 5.) Thus, Tafolla is probably is referring to Shenkute, though this would need to be clarified before relying on it as evidence. The Court does not need to consider this evidence to deny the motion, though accepting this evidence would certainly require denial as to Shenkute.

As discussed previously, the Court would find material disputes of fact as to foreseeability. For instance, there are disputes over whether the gate was left open, and that the dogs had an apparent history of escaping due to the extremely low fence. (See UMF 6; S. Hawkins Decl., ¶ 8.) Given the vicious propensities discussed above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs create a dispute of fact as to foreseeability.

Since the issue regarding Duressa and Shenkute’s ownership or control of the dogs would only dispose of the first cause of action for strict liability under Civ. Code § 3342(a), and there is no alternative motion for summary adjudication as to that cause, the Court cannot adjudicate that issue.

Accordingly, Duressa and Shenkute’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

Case Number: BC701846    Hearing Date: January 04, 2021    Dept: 24

Defendants Solomon Duressa and Hiwot Shenkute’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Defendant Isabel Solomon and Nathaniel Solomon’s motion is DENIED.

On April 11, 2018, Plaintiffs Michael and Sheila Hawkins filed the instant dog-bite action against Defendants Solomon Duressa, William Chumley, Isabel Solomon, Nathaniel Solomon, Hiwot Shenkute, and Tony Mendoza. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants owned two dogs that attacked Michael on January 26, 2018 outside of his house. The operative First Complaint alleges three causes of action for: 1) negligence (strict liability); 2) negligence; and 3) negligent infliction of emotional distress.

On October 14, 2020, Duressa, Ms. Solomon, Mr. Solomon, and Shenkute (“Defendants”) moved for summary judgment. On December 21, 2020, Plaintiffs filed an opposition. On December 29, 2020, Defendants submitted a reply.

Continuance

summary judgment motion, and why [the witness’s] deposition had not been taken in the two years since the complaint was filed”].)

Summary Judgment Standard

Request for Judicial Notice

Department (EDD) "2020 Household Employer's Guide, Cover, Director's Letter, and pages 3-4. This request is also GRANTED. (Evid. Code § 452(c).)

Discussion

Case Number: BC701846    Hearing Date: January 13, 2020    Dept: 3

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – CENTRAL DISTRICT

MICHAEL HAWKINS, ET AL. ;

Plaintiff,

v.

DURESSA SOLOMON, ET AL.,

Defendants.

Case No.: BC701846

ORDER TRANSFERRING COMPLICATED PERSONAL INJURY (PI) CASE TO AN INDEPENDENT CALENDAR (IC) COURT

After review of the court file, the Court makes the following order:

Department 3 of the Personal Injury Court has determined that the above entitled action is complicated based upon the number of pretrial hearings and/or the complexity of the issues presented.

AT THE DIRECTION OF DEPARTMENT 1:

This case is hereby transferred and reassigned to the following Independent Calendar Court in THE CENTRAL DISTRICT, JUDGE PATRICIA D. NIETO presiding in DEPT. 24 of the STANLEY MOSK Courthouse, for all purposes except trial. Department 1 hereby delegates to the Independent Calendar Court the authority to assign the cause for trial to that Independent Calendar Court.

The Order is signed and filed this date, and incorporated herein by reference. Any pending motions or hearings, including trial and status conferences, will be reset, continued or vacated at the direction of the newly assigned Independent Calendar court.

Upon receipt of this notice, counsel for Plaintiff shall give notice to all parties of record.

DATED: January 13, 2020 ___________________________

Hon. Jon Takasugi

Judge of the Superior Court

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