This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 07/28/2022 at 21:16:15 (UTC).

MICHAEL FLETCHER ET AL VS CITY OF COMPTON ET AL

Case Summary

On 08/04/2017 MICHAEL FLETCHER filed a Contract - Other Contract lawsuit against CITY OF COMPTON. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judges overseeing this case are MICHAEL JOHNSON, JOSEPH R. KALIN, DAVID J. COWAN, TERESA A. BEAUDET, GREGORY W. ALARCON and LAURA A. SEIGLE. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.
Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****0866

  • Filing Date:

    08/04/2017

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Contract - Other Contract

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judges

MICHAEL JOHNSON

JOSEPH R. KALIN

DAVID J. COWAN

TERESA A. BEAUDET

GREGORY W. ALARCON

LAURA A. SEIGLE

 

Party Details

Plaintiffs

FLETCHER MICHAEL

MILLER ZACH

JCJ CORPORATION

Respondents and Defendants

COMPTON CITY OF

DOES 1 TO 10

OROZCO VICTOR

CITY OF COMPTON CALIFORNIA

OROZCO VICOTOR

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff Attorneys

LOPEZ DE TIRADO SERGIO J

BAILEY BOBBIE RAE

CUMMINGS CHARLES D.

SINA REZA

Respondent and Defendant Attorneys

CRAIG J. CORNWELL CITY OF COMPTON

PAZ JOSE R.

KALUNIAN CAMERON

BIERLY KAYLIN

CORNWELL CRAIG J.

GLASS ZAKIYA

STEFFY JUDITH JOANNE

 

Court Documents

Substitution of Attorney

6/20/2019: Substitution of Attorney

Substitution of Attorney

6/20/2019: Substitution of Attorney

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (TRIAL SETTING CONFERENCE; CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE)

6/21/2019: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (TRIAL SETTING CONFERENCE; CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE)

Opposition - OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' DEMURRER TO SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

6/26/2019: Opposition - OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' DEMURRER TO SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

Reply - REPLY BRIEF

6/28/2019: Reply - REPLY BRIEF

Order - ORDER RULING

7/10/2019: Order - ORDER RULING

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON DEMURRER - WITHOUT MOTION TO STRIKE; CASE MANAGEME...)

7/10/2019: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON DEMURRER - WITHOUT MOTION TO STRIKE; CASE MANAGEME...)

Answer - ANSWER TO THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

8/8/2019: Answer - ANSWER TO THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE)

8/26/2019: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE)

Notice of Ruling

8/28/2019: Notice of Ruling

Declaration - DECLARATION OF REZA SINA RE OSC

9/20/2019: Declaration - DECLARATION OF REZA SINA RE OSC

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE: WHY SANCTIONS SHOULD NOT BE IMPOSED)

9/23/2019: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE: WHY SANCTIONS SHOULD NOT BE IMPOSED)

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (STATUS CONFERENCE RE WHETHER TO ORDER MSC)

1/28/2020: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (STATUS CONFERENCE RE WHETHER TO ORDER MSC)

Declaration - DECLARATION OF JOSE R. PAZ IN RESPONSE TO O.S.C. RE SUBMISSION OF M.S.C. INTAKE FORM

1/30/2020: Declaration - DECLARATION OF JOSE R. PAZ IN RESPONSE TO O.S.C. RE SUBMISSION OF M.S.C. INTAKE FORM

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (COURT ORDER)

2/4/2020: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (COURT ORDER)

Certificate of Mailing for - CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR (COURT ORDER) OF 02/04/2020

2/4/2020: Certificate of Mailing for - CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR (COURT ORDER) OF 02/04/2020

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (STATUS CONFERENCE RE SUBMISSION OF INTAKE FORM)

2/5/2020: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (STATUS CONFERENCE RE SUBMISSION OF INTAKE FORM)

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (COURT ORDER)

3/20/2020: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (COURT ORDER)

330 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 08/01/2022
  • Hearing08/01/2022 at 10:00 AM in Department 50 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Jury Trial

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 07/27/2022
  • Docketat 10:00 AM in Department 50; Hearing on Motion to Compel (Request for Production) - Not Held - Vacated by Court

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 07/26/2022
  • Docketat 10:00 AM in Department 50; Hearing on Motion to Compel (Responses to Supplemental Interrogatories to Michael Fletcher) - Not Held - Vacated by Court

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 07/25/2022
  • Docketat 10:00 AM in Department 50; Hearing on Motion to Compel (Responses to Supplemental Interrogatories from Zach Miller) - Not Held - Vacated by Court

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 07/25/2022
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department 1, David J. Cowan, Presiding; Non-Appearance Case Review (Re Long Cause Determination) - Held

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 07/25/2022
  • DocketMinute Order ((Non-Appearance Case Review Re Long Cause Determination)); Filed by Clerk

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 07/25/2022
  • DocketCertificate of Mailing for ((Non-Appearance Case Review Re Long Cause Determination) of 07/25/2022); Filed by Clerk

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 07/18/2022
  • Docketat 10:00 AM in Department 50, Teresa A. Beaudet, Presiding; Jury Trial - Not Held - Continued - Court's Motion

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 07/18/2022
  • DocketMinute Order ( (Jury Trial)); Filed by Clerk

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 07/15/2022
  • Docketat 10:00 AM in Department 50; Hearing on Motion to Compel (Supplemental Interrogatories to JCJ) - Not Held - Vacated by Court

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
515 More Docket Entries
  • 08/11/2017
  • DocketORDER TO SHOW CAUSE HEARING

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 08/11/2017
  • DocketNotice of Case Management Conference; Filed by Clerk

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 08/11/2017
  • DocketORDER TO SHOW CAUSE HEARING

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 08/11/2017
  • DocketNOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 08/10/2017
  • DocketProof of Service by 1st Class Mail

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 08/10/2017
  • DocketChallenge To Judicial Officer - Peremptory (170.6); Filed by ZACH MILLER (Plaintiff)

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 08/10/2017
  • DocketMOTION FOR PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 08/10/2017
  • DocketPEREMPTORY CHALLENGE TO JUDICIAL OFFICER (CODE CIV. PROC., 170.6)

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 08/04/2017
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by MICHAEL FLETCHER (Plaintiff); ZACH MILLER (Plaintiff)

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 08/04/2017
  • DocketCOMPLAINT FOR: 1. BATTERY; ETC

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less

Tentative Rulings

b'

Case Number: ****0866 Hearing Date: September 1, 2021 Dept: 50

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

MICHAEL FLETCHER, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

CITY OF COMPTON, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.:

****0866

Hearing Date:

September 1, 2021

Hearing Time:

2:00 p.m.

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE:

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION;

MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER TO PREVENT THE DEPOSITIONS OF DAMON BROWN AND BRANDON MIMS

Background

Plaintiffs Michael Fletcher ("Fletcher") and Zach Miller ("Miller") filed this eminent domain action on August.4, 2017 against Defendants City of Compton (the "City") and Victor Orozco ("Orozco"). The operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) adds JCJ Corporation (“JCJ”) as a plaintiff and was filed on May 6, 2019. The lawsuit arises out of the shutdown by the City of the marijuana dispensary named Compton Chronic owned by JCJ and operated by Fletcher and Miller. Orozco is alleged to be an employee of the City. (SAC, ¶ 6.)

The SAC asserts causes of action for (1) eminent domain, (2) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, (3) intentional interference with a contractual relationship, (4) negligent interference with economic advantage, (5) violation of civil rights, (6) violation of civil rights (deprivation of property without due process of law), (7) conspiracy to violate civil rights, (8) battery, (9) conversion, (10) trespass, (11) retaliation and (12) violation of California Constitution, Article I, Section 19.

Fletcher, Miller and JCJ (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) now move for a preliminary injunction against the City. Plaintiffs contend that the City of Compton twice authorized JCJ to begin operating as a fully integrated medical marijuana collective, and then condemned JCJ’s storefront without notice and hearing and without ever initiating a legal proceeding. Consequently, Plaintiffs seek an injunction “authorizing JCJ to resume operation as a fully integrated medical marijuana corporation and dispensary in the City of Compton.” (Not., p. 2:7-9.) The City and Orozco (jointly, “Defendants”) oppose.

Defendants move the Court for a protective order preventing the deposition of Compton City Attorney Damon Brown and Compton City Treasurer Brandon Mims, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.420. Plaintiffs oppose.

Motion for Preliminary Injunction

Request for Judicial Notice

The Court grants Defendants’ request for judicial notice as to Items 1-5.

Evidentiary Objections

The Court rules on Defendants’ evidentiary objections as follows:

Objection 1: sustained

Objection 2: sustained

Objection 3: sustained

Objection 4: sustained

Objection 5: overruled as to “on January 17, 2017, I sent David Dent an email” and sustained as to the remainder

Objection 6: sustained

Objection 7: overruled

Objection 8: sustained

Objection 9: sustained as to the first sentence and overruled as to the second sentence

Discussion

“As its name suggests, a preliminary injunction is an order that is sought by a plaintiff prior to a full adjudication of the merits of its claim.” (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 554 (emphasis omitted).) “[A]n order granting or denying a preliminary injunction does not amount to an adjudication of the ultimate rights in controversy. Its purpose is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the action can be determined.” (Socialist Workers etc. Committee v. Brown (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 879, 890-891 (citations omitted).)

“In determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the trial court considers: (1) the likelihood that the moving party will prevail on the merits and (2) the interim harm to the respective parties if an injunction is granted or denied. The moving party must prevail on both factors to obtain an injunction.” (Pittsburg Unified School Dist. v. S.J. Amoroso Construction Co., Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 808, 813-814.) “The trial court\'s determination must be guided by a ‘mix’ of the potential-merit and interim-harm factors; the greater the plaintiff\'s showing on one, the less must be shown on the other…” (Church of Christ in Hollywood v. Superior Court (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1244, 1251-1252.) “The ultimate goal of any test to be used in deciding whether a preliminary injunction should issue is to minimize the harm which an erroneous interim decision may cause.” (White v. Davis, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 554 (emphasis omitted).) The burden is on the party seeking injunctive relief to show all elements necessary to support issuance of a preliminary injunction. (O\'Connell v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1481.)

Request to Present Oral Testimony.

Plaintiffs have filed a notice that they intend to introduce oral evidence in support of their motion for preliminary injunction pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 and California Rule of Court 3.1306(b). Defendants have filed their objections and opposition to Plaintiffs’ notice.

California Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 has no application to this case since it applies to harassment cases.

California Rule of Court 3.1306(a) provides that “[e]vidence received at a law and motion hearing must be by declaration or request for judicial notice without testimony or cross-examination, unless the court orders otherwise for good cause shown.” California Rule of Court 3.1306(b) provides that “[a] party seeking permission to introduce oral evidence . . . must file, no later than three court days before the hearing, a written statement stating the nature and extent of the evidence proposed to be introduced and a reasonable time estimate for the hearing.

Plaintiffs’ notice, although technically not framed as a request for permission to introduce oral evidence, is construed by the Court to be such a request and the Court finds that it was timely filed. Although the notice does state the nature and extent of the evidence proposed to be introduced, it does not contain “a reasonable time estimate for the hearing.” At most, the notice indicates how much time Plaintiffs believe will be required if Defendants stipulate to what Plaintiffs seek to present. This does not comply with Rule of Court 3.1306(b).

Additionally, the Court, in exercising its discretion to allow oral testimony for good cause, finds that Plaintiffs have failed to establish such good cause. The topics proposed are (a) topics that they already covered in their declaration, (b) topics they could have covered in declarations or covered in more detail in their declaration at the time it was filed, or (c) topics that would not affect the issues raised by the motion or the outcome of the motion. Because Plaintiffs have not complied with CRC 3.1306(b) and they have not established good cause for allowing oral testimony, the request to do so is denied.

  1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

A preliminary injunction must not issue unless it is “reasonably probable that the moving party will prevail on the merits.” (San Francisco Newspaper Printing Co. v. Superior Court (Miller) (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 438, 442.) The “likelihood of success on the merits and the balance-of-harms analysis are ordinarily ‘interrelated’ factors in the decision whether to issue a preliminary injunction.” (White v. Davis, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 561.) “The presence or absence of each factor is usually a matter of degree, and if the party seeking the injunction can make a sufficiently strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits, the trial court has discretion to issue the injunction notwithstanding that party\'s inability to show that the balance of harms tips in his favor.” (Ibid.) However, this does not mean that a trial court may grant a preliminary injunction on the basis of the likelihood-of-success factor alone when the balance of hardships dramatically favors denial of a preliminary injunction. (Ibid.; see also Yu v. University of La Verne (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 779, 787 (a trial court’s order denying a motion for preliminary injunction should be affirmed if the trial court correctly found the moving party failed to satisfy either of the factors).)

Plaintiffs contend that Defendants unconstitutionally impaired JCJ’s property rights by condemning JCJ’s storefront, seizing JCJ’s property, and forbidding JCJ from continuing to operate. (See D & M Financial Corp. v. City of Long Beach (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 165, 174 [“Before taking an action which will affect a property interest protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state must provide ‘notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”]; Bottini v. City of San Diego (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 281, 307 [“The paradigmatic taking requiring just compensation is a direct government appropriation or physical invasion of private property.”].) Plaintiffs contend that they will prevail on the merits of their claim[1] because JCJ was authorized to operate as a fully integrated medical marijuana collective. In support, Plaintiffs offer four “dispositive facts”: (1) David Dent, in his capacity as Director of Licensing for the City of Compton, had the legal authority to delineate the necessary steps for JCJ to obtain city approval to operate a medical marijuana collective under the Compassionate Use Act of 1996; (2) before JCJ began dispensing cannabis, Mr. Dent authorized JCJ to begin to operate once JCJ produced documentation for a nonprofit collective corporation and a city business license, both of which JCJ produced on December 16, 2016; (3) on January 8, 2017, Mr. Dent informed JCJ that to obtain Compton’s approval to continue to operate as a medical marijuana collective, JCJ would have to implement certain changes that JCJ did, in fact, implement; and (4) Compton failed to initiate any legal proceeding against JCJ and failed to afford JCJ notice and hearing before JCJ’s building was condemned.

As an initial evidentiary matter, the Court notes that the evidence to which Plaintiffs cite in support of these four “dispositive facts” is not presented in admissible form. Plaintiffs cite variously to the transcripts of the depositions of Craig Cornwell and David Dent, but the only portion of either deposition offered in admissible form are pages 297:23-25 and 298:1-5 of the deposition of Craig Cornwell. The deposition of David Dent is not offered as evidence, and neither are any of the other cited pages of the deposition of Craig Cornwell. Plaintiffs also fail to provide the necessary foundation for many of the asserted facts. For instance, there is no evidence establishing that David Dent was or is Compton’s Director of Licensing, and there is no evidence establishing that Craig Cornwell has the necessary personal knowledge to attest to the fact that David Dent had any authority to say whether or not JCJ was properly licensed. Without the necessary evidentiary foundation, Plaintiffs’ argument that a city’s interpretation of its own ordinances and regulations is entitled to “deference” is unsuported. Moreover, the “deference” at issue in the cases cited by Plaintiffs is deference vis- -vis the Court of Appeal’s “independent review of the meaning or application of the law.” (Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1091.) This is not the same as arguing that a particular city official’s interpretation of a city ordinance is entitled to deference vis- -vis the city itself. Notably, the City, in this case, is taking the position that JCJ was not entitled to operate a medical marijuana collective, notwithstanding any statements to the contrary purportedly made by Mr. Dent.[2]

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to establish likelihood of success on the merits.

  1. Interim Harm to the Parties

“To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff ordinarily is required to present evidence of the irreparable injury or interim harm that it will suffer if an injunction is not issued pending an adjudication of the merits.” (White v. Davis, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 554.) “In evaluating interim harm, the trial court compares the injury to the plaintiff in the absence of an injunction to the injury the defendant is likely to suffer if an injunction is issued.” (Shoemaker v. County of Los Angeles (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 618, 633.)

Because the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to establish likelihood of success on the merits, the Court need not decide whether Plaintiffs have demonstrated interim harm if an injunction is not issued. In any event, the Court notes that Defendants submit evidence that, as of September 22, 2017, JCJ has been evicted from the premises by their landlord. (RFJN, Item C.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction.

Motion for Protective Order

Evidentiary Objections

The Court rules on Defendants’ evidentiary objections as follows:

Objection 1: sustained

Objection 2: sustained

Objection 3: sustained

Objection 4: sustained

Objection 5: sustained

Objection 6: sustained

Discussion

“The general rule in California and federal court is that agency heads and other top governmental executives are not subject to deposition absent compelling reasons.” (Westly v. Superior Court (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 907, 910.) “The general rule is based upon the recognition that … an official’s time and the exigencies of his everyday business would be severely impeded if every plaintiff filing a complaint against an agency head, in his official capacity, were allowed to take his oral deposition.” (Id. at p. 911 [internal quotation omitted].) “An exception to the rule exists only when the official has direct personal factual information pertaining to material issues in the action and the deposing party shows the information to be gained from the deposition is not available through any other source.” (Ibid. [emphasis in original].)

On August 4, 2021, Plaintiffs served by e-mail notices of the depositions of Compton City Attorney Damon Brown and Compton City Treasurer Brandon Mims. (Steffy Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. 4.) The depositions were noticed to take place on August 9, 2021. On August 5, 2021, Defendants served objections to the notices of depositions of Mr. Brown and Mr. Mims. (Steffy Decl., ¶ 9, Ex. 5.)

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs cannot establish that Mr. Brown or Mr. Mims have unique knowledge of the facts relevant to the issues in this case. Defendants argue that there is no evidence to suggest that Mr. Brown, who took office as City Attorney in 2019, and Mr. Mims, who took office as City Treasurer in 2021, had any role to play in a June 5, 2017, inspection which resulted in the closure of Compton Chronic. Defendants assert that any relevant information regarding Plaintiffs’ claims concerning issuance of the business license, certificate of occupancy, any inspections of the property, and the events of June 5, 2017 have already been provided through sources other than Mr. Brown and Mr. Mims. (Steffy Decl., ¶ 10.) To the extent that Plaintiffs seek to depose Mr. Brown and Mr. Mims because they were present during a July 2021 closed session meeting of the Compton City Council, Defendants argue that the topics of discussion at this closed session are confidential, privileged, and irrelevant to the issues in the instant case.

Plaintiffs counter that they seek to depose Mr. Brown and Mr. Mims because both have personal knowledge of the fact that Defendants’ counsel has made false assertions in this case that has improperly multiplied these proceedings. Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ counsel has claimed in this case that the City of Compton “does not now, nor has it ever, authorized marijuana dispensaries/collectives, whether medical or recreational, to operate anywhere within its borders, no person or entity can claim such a right.” (Opp’n, p. 3:3-5.) Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Mims would testify that this assertion is not true. With respect to Mr. Brown, Plaintiffs assert that they seek to depose him because his colleague City Councilman Jonathon Bowers believes Mr. Brown used illegal and unethical tactics to retaliate against councilmembers who voted to terminate Compton’s City Manager Craig Cornwell. Mr. Cornwell’s ties to this case are evidently based on his “involvement in the illegal condemnation of JCJ’s storefront.” (Opp’n, p. 7:25-26.)

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have not identified any unique, specific knowledge relevant to this case that can only be obtained from Mr. Brown or Mr. Mims. As noted by Defendants, the issues identified by Plaintiffs are not material to any of Plaintiffs’ legal claims in this case, including Mr. Mims’ purported interpretation of Compton’s marijuana dispensary laws as well as allegations about Mr. Brown’s conduct at a city meeting that does not otherwise appear to be related to this case or the June 5, 2017 inspection/shutdown of Compton Chronic. As such, the Court finds that Defendants’ requested protective order is proper.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction is denied.

Defendants’ motion for a protective order preventing the deposition of Compton City Attorney Damon Brown and Compton City Treasurer Brandon Mims is granted.

The Court orders that Plaintiffs may not take the deposition of Compton City Attorney Damon Brown and Compton City Treasurer Brandon Mims.

Defendants are ordered to provide notice of this ruling.

DATED: September 1, 2021

________________________________

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court


[1] Although Plaintiffs do not explicitly so state, it can be inferred that, at minimum, the cause of action at issue is for violation of due process.

[2] The City of Compton prohibits the operation of marijuana dispensaries anywhere within its borders. (RFJN, Item A, Compton City Ordinance Number 2,167 and RFJN, Item B, City of Compton Ordinance Number 2,282.) In addition, Defendants point out that per the City Charter, the City Attorney has to approve all contracts made by the City by endorsing his approval thereon in writing. (RFJN, Item D, Compton City Charter, ; 702(d).) The Compton Municipal Code provides, in pertinent part, that the City cannot be bound by any contract unless the same is in writing, by order or authorization of the City Council, and signed by the City Manager or his/her designee. (RFJN, Item E, Compton Municipal Code ; 4-12(a).)

'


b'

Case Number: ****0866 Hearing Date: August 26, 2021 Dept: 50

BECAUSE NEITHER PARTY PROVIDED COURTESY COPIES TO THE COURT, THIS MATTER MUST BE CONTINUED SO THE PARTIES CAN DO SO. THE COURT WILL DISCUSS A NEW HEARING DATE WITH THE PARTIES. THE COURT DID RECEIVE A COURTESY COPY OF THE DISCOVER PLAN.

'


b'

Case Number: ****0866 Hearing Date: August 4, 2021 Dept: 50

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

MICHAEL FLETCHER, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

CITY OF COMPTON, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.:

BC 670866

Hearing Date:

August 4, 2021

Hearing Time:

8:30 a.m.

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE:

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Background

Plaintiffs Michael Fletcher (“Fletcher”) and Zach Miller (“Miller”) filed this action on August 4, 2017 against Defendants City of Compton (the “City”) and Victor Orozco (“Orozco”). The operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) adds JCJ Corporation (“JCJ”) as a plaintiff and was filed on May 6, 2019. The lawsuit arises out of the shutdown by the City of the marijuana dispensary named Compton Chronic owned by JCJ and operated by Fletcher and Miller. The SAC asserts causes of action for (1) eminent domain, (2) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, (3) intentional interference with a contractual relationship, (4) negligent interference with economic advantage, (5) violation of civil rights, (6) violation of civil rights (deprivation of property without due process of law), (7) conspiracy to violate civil rights, (8) battery, (9) conversion, (10) trespass, (11) retaliation, and (12) violation of California Constitution, Article I, Section 19.

Fletcher, Miller, and JCJ (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) now move for a preliminary injunction against the City. The City and Orozco (jointly, “Defendants”) oppose.

Procedural Issues

First, the Court notes that Plaintiffs failed to file a proper notice of motion. California Rules of Court, rule 3.1112 requires that the papers filed in support of a motion must include the motion itself, a notice of hearing on the motion, and a memorandum of points and authorities in support of the motion. California Rules of Court, rule 3.1110 requires that a notice of motion must state in the opening paragraph the nature of the order being sought and the grounds for issuance of the order. (See also Code Civ. Proc., ; 1010 [“Notices must be in writing, and the notice of a motion, other than for a new trial, must state when, and the grounds upon which it will be made, and the papers, if any, upon which it is to be based.”].) “The purpose of the notice requirements ‘is to cause the moving party to ‘ “sufficiently define the issues for the information and attention of the adverse party and the court.”’” (Kinda v. Carpenter (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1277.) Nevertheless, “a trial court may overlook the failure of a notice of motion to state a ground for relief when the supporting materials discuss and support that ground for relief so that it is clear that relief is sought on that ground.” (Luri v. Greenwald (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1127.) “In that situation, the trial court may treat the supporting papers as curing the defective notice.” (Ibid.) Here, Plaintiffs state in their memorandum of points and authorities that they seek an order enjoining the City from enforcing the condemnation of the Compton Chronic storefront. It can thus be inferred that Plaintiffs seek relief pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527, subdivision (a).

Second, the Court has pointed out to the parties multiple times that the proper caption for this case is Fletcher v. City of Compton, not JCJ Corporation v. City of Compton. In fact, on May 14, 2021, the Court issued an order to the parties to use the proper caption on any further pleadings filed in this case. Plaintiffs’ motion is again improperly captioned. Plaintiffs are admonished that continued failure to properly caption filings may result in rejection of those filings.

Third, among the evidentiary objections interposed by Defendants is the objection that exhibits were not attached to the Declaration of Michael Fletcher. The Declaration of Michael Fletcher that was filed with the Court does contain all of the identified exhibits. However, the Court notes that there is no proof of service filed showing that the motion and supporting documents were served on Defendants. While the Court has discretion to consider the merits of Plaintiffs’ motion in spite of the first two procedural defects, this last procedural defect requires the Court to continue the hearing so that Defendants may be properly served with all documents filed in support of Plaintiffs’ motion.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction is continued to _______________, at ______________, in Dept. 50. The Court orders Plaintiffs to serve Defendants with a complete copy of the motion and all supporting documents within 3 days of the date of this order. If necessary, Defendants may file and serve revised opposition papers, including revised evidentiary objections. If a new opposition is filed and served, then Plaintiffs may file and serve revised reply papers. The filing of revised opposition or reply papers will supersede all previous filings. In other words, the Court will not consider the original opposition if a revised opposition is filed, and the Court will not consider the original reply if a revised reply is filed. Revised opposition and/or reply papers must be filed and served per Code based on the continued hearing date.

Defendants are ordered to provide notice of this ruling.

DATED: August 4, 2021

________________________________

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court

'


Case Number: ****0866    Hearing Date: May 14, 2021    Dept: 50

 

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 50

MICHAEL FLETCHER, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

CITY OF COMPTON, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.:

****0866

Hearing Date:

May 14, 2021

Hearing Time:

11:00 a.m.

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS CITY OF COMPTON AND VICTOR OROZCO’S MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER

Defendants move the Court for a protective order preventing Plaintiffs from taking the deposition of Compton Mayor Aja Brown and Compton City Councilman Isaac Galvan, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.420. Unfortunately, this matter must be continued for three reasons: First, Defendants have not provided the Court with courtesy copies of the moving papers. The Court only received courtesy copies of the Reply and the Objections to Declarations of Fletcher and Miller. Second, Plaintiffs JCJ Corporation, Inc. and Zach Miller (“JCJ and Miller”) have not provided the Court with courtesy copies of their Opposition. Third, JCJ and Miller have filed a 57-page document that they describe as an Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for a Protective Order, but the text of the Opposition consists of only the following:

Plaintiffs, JCJ Corporation, Inc. and Zach Miller base their Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order to Prevent the Depositions of Aja Brown and Isaac Galvan on the previous filed pleadings:

  1. Plaintiffs' Ex Parte Application to Compel the Depositions of Aja Brown, Isaac Galvan, Alitva Godwin, Merle Green and Craig Cornwell. Plaintiffs' Ex Parte Application to Compel the Depositions of Aja Brown, Isaac Galvan, Alitva Godwin, Merle Green and Craig Cornwell was taken off calendar by the Court on April 9, 2021 as there was an Informal Discovery Conference to be held and was held on April 13, 2021. A true correct copy is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.

  2. Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities re Motion to Compel the Depositions Aja Brown and Isaac Galvan filed April 12, 2021. A true correct copy is attached hereto as Exhibit 2.

  3. Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte Application to Compel Email chains And Other Communications Relating to Bate Stamp Document City001201; Memorandum And Declarations In Support Thereof filed April 19, 2021. A true correct copy is attached hereto as Exhibit 3.

This is not a proper memorandum of points and authorities and it also exceeds the page limitation for an opposing brief. The Court will not consider the motion and opposition papers under these circumstances and will address a continuance at the hearing so the parties can properly comply with their obligations.

Finally, this Court has previously pointed out to the parties that the proper caption for this case is Fletcher v City of Compton not JCJ Corporation v City of Compton. The first and second amended complaint have the wrong caption. The original caption from the original complaint remains the caption throughout the life of the case. The parties are ordered to use the proper caption on any further pleadings filed in this case.

Defendants are ordered to provide notice of this ruling.

DATED: May 14, 2021

________________________________

Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet

Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court



Case Number: ****0866    Hearing Date: February 05, 2020    Dept: 50

THE REQUISITE DECLARATION HAS BEEN FILED AND THERE IS NO NEED FOR AN APPEARANCE TOMORROW.



related-case-search

Dig Deeper

Get Deeper Insights on Court Cases


Latest cases where CITY OF COMPTON is a litigant

Latest cases where COMPTON CITY OF is a litigant

Latest cases represented by Lawyer LOPEZ DE TIRADO SERGIO J