On 03/02/2018 MICHAEL BACA filed a Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury lawsuit against PETER TAMMY. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judge overseeing this case is CHRISTOPHER K. LUI. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.
Pending - Other Pending
Los Angeles County Superior Courts
Stanley Mosk Courthouse
Los Angeles, California
CHRISTOPHER K. LUI
DOES 1 TO 25
PASADENA ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION
CITY OF PASADENA A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
DOES 1 TO 25
PASADENA ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION
FORSYTH THOMAS F. ESQ.
FORSYTH THOMAS FLICKER ESQ.
THIBODO TODD D. ESQ.
CHAPMAN WILLIAM ROY
NICOLSON LAW GROUP PC
SANTA-ROMANA MARK VILAR
SAFARIAN HARRY A. ESQ.
9/27/2019: Ex Parte Application - EX PARTE APPLICATION DEFENDANT/CROSS COMPLAINANT PASADENA ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION'S EX PARTE APPLICATION TO HAVE ITS PREVIOUSLY FILED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SPECIALLY SET IN T
9/4/2019: Notice - NOTICE THAT THE COURT DEEMED CASES BC676381 & BC702981 RELATED
8/28/2019: Stipulation and Order - STIPULATION AND ORDER TO CONSOLIDATED ACTIONS
8/30/2019: Certificate of Mailing for - CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR (COURT ORDER CONSOLIDATING BC696381 WITH BC702981) OF 08/30/2019
8/30/2019: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (COURT ORDER CONSOLIDATING BC696381 WITH BC702981)
8/12/2019: Notice of Related Case
8/23/2019: Certificate of Mailing for - CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR (COURT ORDER RE: NOTICE OF RELATED CASE) OF 08/23/2019
8/26/2019: Certificate of Mailing for - CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR [NOTICE OF RELATED CASE]
6/26/2019: Notice of Rejection - Pleadings
5/14/2019: Notice of Change of Address or Other Contact Information
4/5/2018: CIVIL DEPOSIT -
4/5/2018: NOTICE OF DEPOSIT OF JURY FEES
4/23/2018: CIVIL DEPOSIT -
4/23/2018: DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
4/23/2018: NOTICE OF DEPOSIT OF JURY FEES
3/16/2018: PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS -
3/2/2018: SUMMONS -
3/2/2018: COMPLAINT-PERS. INJURY, PROP DAMAGE, WRONGFUL DEATH (2 PAGES) -
Hearing03/02/2021 at 08:30 AM in Department 4A at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Order to Show Cause Re: DismissalRead MoreRead Less
Hearing04/06/2020 at 08:30 AM in Department 4A at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Jury TrialRead MoreRead Less
Hearing03/25/2020 at 10:00 AM in Department 4A at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Final Status ConferenceRead MoreRead Less
Hearing02/11/2020 at 13:30 PM in Department 4A at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Hearing on Motion for Summary JudgmentRead MoreRead Less
Docketat 08:30 AM in Department 4A, Christopher K. Lui, Presiding; Jury Trial - Not Held - Advanced and Continued - by CourtRead MoreRead Less
Docketat 10:00 AM in Department 4A, Christopher K. Lui, Presiding; Final Status Conference - Not Held - Advanced and Continued - by CourtRead MoreRead Less
DocketNotice of Ruling; Filed by Pasadena Athletic Association (Cross-Complainant)Read MoreRead Less
Docketat 08:30 AM in Department 4A, Christopher K. Lui, Presiding; Hearing on Ex Parte Application (Defendant/Cross Complainant Pasadena Athletic Association's Ex Parte Application To Have Its Previously Filed Motion For Summary Judgment Specially Set In The Related Action Of Baca V. Tamny; Declaration Of Mark Santa Romana) - Held - Motion GrantedRead MoreRead Less
DocketMinute Order ( (Defendant/Cross-Complainant Pasadena Athletic Associations Ex...)); Filed by ClerkRead MoreRead Less
DocketEx Parte Application (to have a Previously Filed Motion For Summary Judgment Specially Set In the Related Action of Baca v. Tammy); Filed by Pasadena Athletic Association (Cross-Complainant)Read MoreRead Less
DocketComplaint; Filed by Peter Tamny (Plaintiff)Read MoreRead Less
DocketReceipt; Filed by Michael Baca (Plaintiff)Read MoreRead Less
DocketCIVIL DEPOSITRead MoreRead Less
DocketNotice; Filed by Michael Baca (Plaintiff)Read MoreRead Less
DocketNOTICE OF DEPOSIT OF JURY FEESRead MoreRead Less
DocketPROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONSRead MoreRead Less
DocketProof of Service (not Summons and Complaint); Filed by Michael Baca (Plaintiff)Read MoreRead Less
DocketCOMPLAINT-PERS. INJURY, PROP DAMAGE, WRONGFUL DEATH (2 PAGES)Read MoreRead Less
DocketSUMMONSRead MoreRead Less
DocketComplaint; Filed by Michael Baca (Plaintiff)Read MoreRead Less
Case Number: BC696381 Hearing Date: February 11, 2020 Dept: 28
Motion for Summary Judgment
Having considered the moving, opposing, and reply papers, the Court rules as follows.
In BC696381, on March 2, 2018, Plaintiff Michael Baca filed a compliant against Defendant Peter Tammy alleging negligence for a bicycle-pedestrian collision that occurred on January 28, 2017.
In BC702981, on April 2018, Plaintiff Peter Tamny filed a complaint against Defendants Michael Baca and City of Pasadena alleging negligence for deficiently maintained and designed crosswalks that caused a bicycle-pedestrian collision that occurred on January 28, 2017.
In BC702981, on January 8, 2019, Plaintiff Peter Tamny filed an amendment to the complaint renaming Doe 1 as Defendant Pasadena Athletic Association.
In BC702981, on February 20, 2019, the Court dismissed Defendant City of Pasadena without prejudice.
In BC702981, on March 18, 2019, Defendant/Cross-Complainant Pasadena Athletic Association filed a cross-complaint against Defendant/Cross-Defendant Michael Baca seeking equitable indemnity, contribution, and declaratory relief.
In BC702981, on August 14, 2019, Defendant/Cross-Complainant Pasadena Athletic Association filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 437c.
On August 30, 2019, the Court consolidated BC696381 with BC702981.
Trial is set for April 6, 2020.
Defendant/Cross-Complainant Pasadena Athletic Association (“Moving Party”) asks the Court to enter summary judgment against Plaintiff Peter Tamny (“Opposing Party”) and in favor of Moving Party because Moving Party did not owe a duty to Opposing Party.
Opposing Party objects to the evidence cited in support of Moving Party’s undisputed material fact number one as lacking foundation as to the personal knowledge of the declarants, being vague as to “sponsor or organize,” constituting a legal conclusion, and being argumentative. The Court only addresses these arguments as they relate to paragraph five of Dennis McCullough’s declaration. Mr. McCullough has foundation for his declaration that Moving Party does not sponsor or organize the Montrose Ride, that it did not take responsibility for the ride, and the ride is analogized as a “pick up game” because Mr. McCullough is the Moving Party’s president. (McCullough Decl., ¶ 3.) The declaration is not vague, is not a legal conclusion, and is not argumentative. As such, these objections to Mr. McCullough’s declaration are OVERRULED. The Court declines to rule on these objections to the other evidence cited in support of Moving Defendant’s undisputed material fact number one because the Court does not rely on that evidence here.
Opposing Party objects to Moving Party’s evidence proffered to show that Defendant/Cross-Defendant Michael Baca was not a member of Moving Party’s at the time of the incident. This objection is SUSTAINED. There is no allegation in the complaint that Defendant/Cross-Defendant Michael Baca was acting as an agent of Moving Party. As such, it is irrelevant whether or not Defendant/Cross-Defendant Michael Baca was a member of Moving Party’s. This membership would not implicate Moving Party’s liability one way or another without an allegation that there was an agency relationship between Moving Party and Defendant/Cross-Defendant Michael Baca.
The purpose of a motion for summary judgment “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)
“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Med. Ctr. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)
“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)
The elements for negligence are: (1) a legal duty owed to the plaintiff to use due care; (2) breach of duty; (3) causation; and (4) damage to the plaintiff. (County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 318.)¿
A party who moves for summary judgment because it did not owe a duty of care must affirmatively negate the existence of duty. (Eriksson v. Nunnink (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 826, 848-850.)
California Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a) states, in part: “[e]veryone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care . . . .” “As a general rule, each person has a duty to use ordinary care and is liable for injuries caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the circumstances.” Romero v. Superior Court (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1080 (citation omitted) (internal quotations omitted).)
The element of duty “may be imposed by law, be assumed by the defendant, or exist by virtue of a special relationship.” Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 985.) “The issue of whether a duty exists is a question of law to be determined by the court . . . .” (Brooks v. Eugene Burger Management Corp. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1611, 1620.)
In Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, the Supreme Court summarized the so-called Rowland factors for determining whether a duty of care exists: “In the Rowland decision, this court identified several considerations that, when balanced together, may justify a departure from the fundamental principle embodied in Civil Code section 1714: ‘the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.’” Id. at p. 771 (citing Rowland, supra, 69 Cal. 2d 108).) Although foreseeability and the extent of the burden to the defendant are ordinarily the crucial considerations, one or more of the Rowland factors may be determinative of the duty analysis in a given case. Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1205, 1213; Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill (2005) 36 Cal.4th 224, 237, fn. 15.)
Moving Party’s undisputed material fact number one shows Moving Party did not sponsor or organize the Montrose Ride. This same material fact also shows Moving Party did not take responsibility for the actions of the riders participating in the event or the safety of nearby pedestrians. Opposing Party argues that Moving Party’s website identifies the Montrose Ride as one of its “club events.” (PUMF No. 15.) But Moving Party points out that Opposing Party neglects to show the court that fact that the website from which Opposing Party found that reference specifically states that the Montrose ride is not a PAA sponsored ride. Opposing Party’s evidence of Defendant/Cross-Defendant Michael Baca’s admission in undisputed material fact number 14 cannot be used against Moving Party. (See Monroy v. City of Los Angeles (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 248, 261 (“[t]he only purpose of requests for admissions is that matters admitted can be used against the party making them.” (Emphasis omitted)).) In sum, then, Moving Party has established that it had no relationship to the Montrose Ride, and, therefore, no duty toward Plaintiff associated with that ride.
The Court finds Moving Party met its burden of establishing that it did not owe a duty to Plaintiff.
The motion is GRANTED.
Moving Party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.