This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 07/14/2019 at 00:44:47 (UTC).

MELINDA JOHNSTONE VS KHATIDZA HOSSAIN ET AL

Case Summary

On 05/30/2018 a Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury case was filed by MELINDA JOHNSTONE against KHATIDZA HOSSAIN in the jurisdiction of Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****8076

  • Filing Date:

    05/30/2018

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury

  • Court:

    Los Angeles County Superior Courts

  • Courthouse:

    Stanley Mosk Courthouse

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

STEPHEN I. GOORVITCH

 

Party Details

Petitioner and Plaintiff

JOHNSTONE MELINDA

Respondents and Defendants

HOSSAIN RASUL

LOS ANGELES CITY OF

HOSSAIN KHATIDZA

DOES 1-50

LOS ANGELES COUNTY OF

 

Court Documents

SUMMONS

5/30/2018: SUMMONS

COMPLAINT-PERS. INJURY, PROP DAMAGE, WRONGFUL DEATH (2 PAGES)

5/30/2018: COMPLAINT-PERS. INJURY, PROP DAMAGE, WRONGFUL DEATH (2 PAGES)

 

Docket Entries

  • 06/28/2019
  • at 1:30 PM in Department 5, Stephen I. Goorvitch, Presiding; Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment - Not Held - Rescheduled by Party

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  • 04/29/2019
  • Notice of Deposit - Jury; Filed by Khatidza Hossain (Legacy Party); Rasul Hossain (Legacy Party)

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  • 11/29/2018
  • Answer; Filed by Rasul Hossain (Cross-Complainant); Khatidza Hossain (Cross-Complainant)

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  • 10/30/2018
  • Answer (to Cross Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial); Filed by Los Angeles, City Of (Legacy Party)

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  • 09/14/2018
  • Amendment to Complaint (Fictitious/Incorrect Name); Filed by Los Angeles, City Of (Legacy Party)

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  • 09/14/2018
  • AMENDMENT TO COMPLAINT

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  • 08/06/2018
  • ANSWER OF THE DEFENDANT CITY OF LOS ANGELES TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

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  • 08/06/2018
  • Answer; Filed by Los Angeles, City Of (Legacy Party)

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  • 08/06/2018
  • Cross-Complaint; Filed by Los Angeles, City Of (Cross-Complainant)

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  • 08/06/2018
  • CROSS COMPLAINT - PERS. INJURY PROPERTY DAMAGE, WRONG DEATH (2 PAGES)

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2 More Docket Entries
  • 08/03/2018
  • Cross-Complaint; Filed by Khatidza Hossain (Legacy Party); Rasul Hossain (Legacy Party)

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  • 08/03/2018
  • Answer KHATIDZA HOSSAIN & RASUL HOSSAIN

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  • 08/03/2018
  • Answer; Filed by Khatidza Hossain (Legacy Party); Rasul Hossain (Legacy Party)

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  • 08/03/2018
  • Cross-Complaint; Filed by Rasul Hossain (Cross-Complainant); Khatidza Hossain (Cross-Complainant)

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  • 08/03/2018
  • Demand for Jury Trial; Filed by Khatidza Hossain (Legacy Party); Rasul Hossain (Legacy Party)

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  • 08/03/2018
  • Cross-Complaint HOSSAIN & RASUL HOSSAIN

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  • 08/03/2018
  • Demand for Jury Trial

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  • 05/30/2018
  • Complaint; Filed by Melinda Johnstone (Plaintiff)

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  • 05/30/2018
  • COMPLAINT-PERS. INJURY, PROP DAMAGE, WRONGFUL DEATH (2 PAGES)

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  • 05/30/2018
  • SUMMONS

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Tentative Rulings

Case Number: BC708076    Hearing Date: March 06, 2020    Dept: 32

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Spring Street Courthouse, Department 32

melinda johnstone

Plaintiff,

v.

kahtidza hossain, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: BC708076

Hearing Date: March 6, 2020

[TENTATIVE] order RE:

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

NOTICE

Judge Goorvitch was sworn-in as a Superior Court Judge on December 15, 2015.  Prior to that time, Judge Goorvitch made the following campaign contributions to Michael N. Feuer: (1) $100 to Mr. Feuer’s 2008 campaign for the 42nd Assembly District on or about November 9, 2007; (2) $100 to Mr. Feuer’s 2010 campaign for the 42nd Assembly District on or about October 19, 2010; and (3) $100 to Mr. Feuer’s 2013 campaign for Los Angeles City Attorney on or about May 30, 2012.  Judge Goorvitch has no personal relationship with Mr. Feuer and has had no communications with Mr. Feuer since he became the City Attorney.  The Court can be fair and impartial in this matter. 

Background

Plaintiff Melinda Johnstone (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against the City of Los Angeles (“Defendant”) based on an accident in which Plaintiff slipped and fell on accumulated leaves and berries on a sidewalk within the city limits. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Kahtidza Hossain and Rasul Hossain (collectively, “Hossains”) owned the property adjacent to the section of sidewalk on which Plaintiff fell. Defendant moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s complaint and the Hossains’ cross-complaint. The motion is unopposed and is granted.

LEGAL STANDARD

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.]  There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.”  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)  “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.”  (Ibid.)  In ruling on the motion, “the court may not weigh the plaintiff's evidence or inferences against the defendant[’s] as though it were sitting as the trier of fact.”  (Id. at 856.)  However, the court “must . . . determine what any evidence or inference could show or imply to a reasonable trier of fact.”  (Ibid., emphasis original.)  

DISCUSSION

Government Code section 815 provides that “[a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person” except as provided by statute. (Govt. Code, § 815(a); see Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School Dist. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 925, 932.) “[D]irect tort liability of public entities must be based on a specific statute declaring them to be liable, or at least creating some specific duty of care, and not on the general tort provisions of Civil Code section 1714. Otherwise, the general rule of immunity for public entities would be largely eroded by the routine application of general tort principles.” (Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1183.)

Government Code section 835 sets out the exclusive conditions under which a public entity is liable for injuries caused by a dangerous condition of public property. (Metcalf v. County of San Joaquin (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1121, 1129, citing Brown v. Poway Unified School Dist. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 820, 829; see also Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112.) Per Government Code section 835, “a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either: [¶] (a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or [¶] (b) The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition . . . a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.” (Gov. Code, § 835.) A public entity has actual notice of a dangerous condition “if it had actual knowledge of the existence of the condition and knew or should have known of its dangerous character.” (Gov. Code, § 835.2, subd. (a).) A public entity has constructive notice of a dangerous condition only if “the condition had existed for such a period of time and was of such an obvious nature that the public entity, in the exercise of due care, should have discovered the condition and its dangerous character. (Gov. Code, § 835.2, subd. (b).)

“‘Constructive notice,’ under section 835.2, subdivision (b), requires a plaintiff to establish that the dangerous condition existed for such a period of time and was of such an obvious nature that the public entity, in the exercise of due care, should have discovered the condition and its dangerous character. Admissible evidence for establishing constructive notice is defined by statute as including whether a reasonably adequate inspection system would have informed the public entity, and whether it maintained and operated such an inspection system with due care.” (Heskel v. City of San Diego (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 313, 317.) A public entity may create “a reasonable inference that the condition was not obvious” by, for example, “show[ing] that [its] workers had been in the area and did not see the condition within at least the one-year period leading up to [an] accident . . . .” (Id. at 318.)

DISCUSSION

Defendant argues it lacked actual and constructive notice of the dangerous condition on which Plaintiff purportedly tripped. Defendant advances a declaration from De’antana Sampson (“Sampson”), a claims investigator for Defendant. Sampson states that, prior to Plaintiff’s accident, Defendant did not receive any reports of accidents in the location where Plaintiff’s fall occurred. (Declaration of De’antana Sampson, ¶ 3.)

Defendant also argues that it was not responsible for the sidewalk. Per Los Angeles Municipal Code section 41.46, the Hossains were required to “keep the sidewalk in front of [their] house, place of business or premises in a clean and wholesome condition.” (L.A. Municipal Code, § 41.46.)

This evidence is sufficient to satisfy Defendant’s burden of proof, shifting the burden to Plaintiff. Plaintiff filed no opposition, and there is no evidence in the record suggesting there is a triable issue. As Plaintiff has failed to raise triable issues of material fact as to whether Defendant is liable to Plaintiff, the Hossains’ cross-complaint fails. (See Children's Hospital v. Sedgwick (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1780, 1787.)

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted. Defendant shall provide notice and file proof of such with the Court.

DATED: March 6, 2020 ___________________________

Stephen I. Goorvitch

Judge of the Superior Court