This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 05/25/2022 at 10:54:45 (UTC).

MARISELA COVARRUBIAS VS DOWNEY POST ACUTE, A BUSINESS ORGANIZATION FORM UNKNOWN, ET AL.

Case Summary

On 09/30/2021 MARISELA COVARRUBIAS filed a Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury lawsuit against DOWNEY POST ACUTE, A BUSINESS ORGANIZATION FORM UNKNOWN. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Spring Street Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.
Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    *******6120

  • Filing Date:

    09/30/2021

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

 

Party Details

Plaintiff

COVARRUBIAS MARISELA

Defendants

CASTANEDA JOSE JR. AKA JOSE COVARRUBIAS JR.

COVARRUBIAS MARISABLE AKA MARISABEL COVARRUBIAS

COVARRUBIAS SALVADOR

DOWNEY CARE CENTER A BUSINESS ORGANIZATION FORM UNKNOWN

DOWNEY POST ACUTE A BUSINESS ORGANIZATION FORM UNKNOWN

FAGGIANI CYNTHIA

FLAGSTONE HEALTHCARE SOUTH LLC A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY

FLORES STEVE

GOMEZ SILVIA

JOHNSON LINDA

RIO HONDO HEALTHCARE INC. A CORPORATION

SANCHEZ REBECCA

VIRGEN IRENE

WHEELER JASON

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff Attorney

TEETS BRIAN K.

 

Court Documents

Complaint

9/30/2021: Complaint

Summons - SUMMONS ON COMPLAINT

9/30/2021: Summons - SUMMONS ON COMPLAINT

Notice of Case Assignment - Unlimited Civil Case

9/30/2021: Notice of Case Assignment - Unlimited Civil Case

Civil Case Cover Sheet

9/30/2021: Civil Case Cover Sheet

Civil Case Cover Sheet

9/30/2021: Civil Case Cover Sheet

Certificate of Mailing for - CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR [PI GENERAL ORDER], STANDING ORDER RE PI PROCEDURES AND HEARING DATES

11/1/2021: Certificate of Mailing for - CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR [PI GENERAL ORDER], STANDING ORDER RE PI PROCEDURES AND HEARING DATES

PI General Order

11/1/2021: PI General Order

 

Docket Entries

  • 09/26/2024
  • Hearing09/26/2024 at 08:30 AM in Department 32 at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Order to Show Cause Re: Dismissal

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  • 03/30/2023
  • Hearing03/30/2023 at 08:30 AM in Department 32 at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Non-Jury Trial

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  • 03/16/2023
  • Hearing03/16/2023 at 10:00 AM in Department 32 at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Final Status Conference

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  • 11/01/2021
  • DocketPI General Order; Filed by Clerk

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  • 11/01/2021
  • DocketCertificate of Mailing for ([PI General Order], Standing Order re PI Procedures and Hearing Dates); Filed by Clerk

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  • 09/30/2021
  • DocketSummons (on Complaint); Filed by Marisela Covarrubias (Plaintiff)

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  • 09/30/2021
  • DocketNotice of Case Assignment - Unlimited Civil Case; Filed by Clerk

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  • 09/30/2021
  • DocketCivil Case Cover Sheet; Filed by Marisela Covarrubias (Plaintiff)

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  • 09/30/2021
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by Marisela Covarrubias (Plaintiff)

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  • 09/30/2021
  • DocketCivil Case Cover Sheet; Filed by Marisela Covarrubias (Plaintiff)

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Tentative Rulings

Case Number: *******6120 Hearing Date: March 1, 2022 Dept: 40

MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Russell Levert Greene,

dba Russell Levert Greene, Private Investigator

Jane Doe claims that on October 18, 2018, Plaintiff Jason Grainger sexually assaulted her—the description in Jane Doe’s allegation of Grainger’s assault is that of a violent felony.

Defendant Russell L. Greene “was hired as a private investigator by [Jane Doe’s] lawyers” with “instructions … to question witnesses and the potential defendant, and if possible, obtain written statements.” Pursuit of this litigation directive, Greene entered Grainger’s multiple unit apartment building, knocked on Grainger’s door, identified himself as private investigator, showed Grainger his private investigator badge and handed him a business card. Grainger eventually exited his apartment. Greene then sat with Grainger in common hallway area of the complex and, after a while, Grainger expressed shame and remorse towards Jane Doe. Then, after prompts by Greene, it appears that Grainger expressed a desire to apologize to Jane Doe telephonically. Greene disagreed, suggesting instead that Grainger write her a “heartfelt note” apologizing for his conduct and that Greene would make sure Jane Doe received the note.

After Greene left the building, Grainger composed a letter to Jane Doe, emailed it to Greene (via an address on Greene’s business card) (the “Grainger-Doe Letter”).

The above is a neutral summary of the based on the allegations and evidence presented by both sides here. Obviously, the parties disagree on the specifics: Grainger alleges Greene illegally entered his building, made his way to Grainger’s apartment door, banging on it and shouting that Grainger’s “DNA and fingerprints were found at the scene” and that Grainger better “open up” his apartment door. Which Grainger eventually did.

Grainger alleges he was “shocked” by Greene’s “barked” orders, threatening that Grainger would regret not giving Greene what he wanted while Greene tapped on the side of his jacket seemingly suggestive Greene possessed a gun. Greene then “interrogated” Grainger about Jane Doe’s rape allegations, threatened Grainger into writing Jane Doe a letter of apology.

For whatever reason, after Greene left, Grainger composed a note or letter to Jane Doe, then emailed it to Greene so that Greene could direct it to Jane Doe.

One month later, Jane Doe filed a civil suit against Grainger alleging intentional torts of (1) assault, (2) battery, (3) sexual battery, (4) denial of civil rights, (5) gender violence, (6) false imprisonment, and (7), intentional infliction of emotional distress. (See LASC 19STCV37406, “Jane Doe Matter.”)

On March 24, 2021, at Grainger’s deposition related to Jane Doe’s lawsuit, Grainger was confronted and surprised with the Grainger-Doe Letter.

Shortly after this deposition surprise, Grainger filed this action against Greene, based on Grainger’s perception and characterization of Greene’s conduct during Greene’s August 13, 2019, apartment visit. Grainger alleges Greene committed (1) extortion and attempted extortion (the Grainger-Doe Letter), (2) assault and battery, (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (4) respondeat superior against Greene individually and as a business, and against Does 1-25 as Greene’s unidentified employers.

Defendant and private investigator Greene, now moves to strike Grainger’s Complaint entirely pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (“anti-SLAPP Motion”), asserting that Grainger’s “ Complaint, falls squarely within the scope of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, specifically subdivision (e)(2)&(4), because the statements and conduct upon which the causes of action are based were made ‘in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law’ or ‘in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition’” and that “Plaintiff cannot meet his burden under Section 425.16(b)(1)” to show even minimal merit to his claims.

This Court AGREES with Greene.

Judicial Notice

Greene seeks, and this Court GRANTS, judicial notice of the Complaint in the Jane Doe Matter, while both parties seek judicial notice of the March 24, 2021, deposition of Plaintiff Grainger taken in relation to the Jane Doe Matter.

In addition, Greene seeks judicial notice of a complaint and protective order from the State of Iowa, in which Defendant Grainger is named as the defendant: DENIED

Grainger also seeks judicial notice of a California criminal complaint against Greene: DENIED

The Court takes judicial notice of the documents in the Jane Doe Matter pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivisions (d) and (h), but declines to take judicial notice of the remaining documents as irrelevant.

Motion to Strike Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16.: GRANTED

Legal Standard: Standard: In ruling on a defendant’s special motion to strike, the trial court uses a “summary-judgment-like procedure at an early stage of the litigation.” (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 192.) This is a two-step process. First, the defendant must show that the act or acts of which the plaintiff complains were taken “in furtherance of the [defendant]’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue.” (Code of Civ. Proc., 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) Second, if the defendant carries that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the claim. (Code of Civ. Proc., 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) In making both determinations, the trial court is to consider “the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.” (Code of Civ. Proc., 425.16, subd. (b)(2).)

Protected Activity: To satisfy the first prong of the two-prong test, the defendant’s acts that underlie the causes of action must themselves have been in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech. (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 76-78.) The defendant’s acts are protected activity and made in furtherance of protected petition or free speech in connection with a public issue if they entail “any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law ….” (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16, subd. (e)(2).)

The Supreme Court of California provided instruction on the anti-SLAPP analysis of claims that allege protected and non-protected behavior vis- -vis a motion to strike in Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 396.

At the first step, the moving defendant bears the burden of identifying all allegations of protected activity, and the claims for relief supported by them. When relief is sought based on allegations of both protected and unprotected activity, the unprotected activity is disregarded at this stage. If the court determines that relief is sought based on allegations arising from activity protected by the statute, the second step is reached. There, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that each challenged claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient and factually substantiated. The court, without resolving evidentiary conflicts, must determine whether the plaintiff's showing, if accepted by the trier of fact, would be sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. If not, the claim is stricken. Allegations of protected activity supporting the stricken claim are eliminated from the complaint unless they also support a distinct claim on which the plaintiff has shown a probability of prevailing.

(Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 396.)

Here, Plaintiff's Complaint arise from protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute because Plaintiff’s causes of action arise from Greene’s statements and conduct as part of an investigation in anticipation of litigation. (Mot., 16:11-12.) Gallanis -Politis v. Medina (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 600, at 611, provides guidance.

Actions based on oral or written statements made in an investigation in connection with pending litigation may be protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. (Gallanis, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 611.) In Gallanis, a county agency employee sued the agency and her supervisors for retaliation, alleging they improperly investigated her and prepared a “false report.” (Id. at pp. 610.) The defendants moved to strike the claim, arguing that the claim turned on defendants’ protected activity of investigating and preparing the report, which was done at the direction of county counsel. (Id. at pp. 606-07.) That investigation was conducted in response to a discovery request while litigation was already pending, and it was intended to generate information for the pending lawsuit. (Id. at pp. 611-12.) The Court of Appeals for the Second District found that because the investigation was done “in the course of preparing responses to [the plaintiff's] discovery requests,” it constituted protected activity. (Id. at p. 612.)

Defendant shows that “on or about September 19, 2019, [he] was hired as a private investigator by the lawyers of an alleged rape victim,” i.e., Jane Doe, and that his “instructions were to question witnesses and the potential defendant, and if possible, obtain written statements” (Mot., Greene Decl., 2), and that “Plaintiff’s causes of action arise from Greene’s statements and conduct as part of an investigation in anticipation of litigation” and that “[t]he litigation has, in fact, been subsequently filed and is currently pending.” (Mot., 16:11-13.)

Extortion “is the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, […] induced by a wrongful use of force or fear, or under color of official right.” (Pen. Code, 518.) Threats constituting extortion include threats “[t]o do an unlawful injury to the person or property of the individual threatened" and threats “[t]o expose, or to impute to him, her, or them a deformity, disgrace, or crime.” (Pen. Code, 519.) Further, extortionate threats are extortionate whether the victim committed the acts upon which the threat is based and whether the action threatened is itself legal. (Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 330 (“[w]hether [defendant] in fact committed any violations of these various laws is irrelevant”); Philippine Exp. & Foreign Loan Guar. Corp. v. Chuidian (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1058, 1079 (“in many blackmail cases the threat is to do something in itself perfectly legal, but that threat nevertheless becomes illegal when coupled with a demand for money”]; People v. Sales (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 741, 748 [providing that in popular parlance extortion is “sometimes called ‘blackmail’”].) Yet, because the Penal Code's extortion provisions are predicated on a demand for property, it follows that if the defendant seeks to obtain something that is neither property nor an instrument creating a right in property, the defendant's threat does not comprise extortion. (See People v. Kohn (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 368, 375 [defendant’s obtaining a written confession of a crime by allegedly extortionate means held not to be extortion because the confession was not property].) Here, Grainger hangs his extortion claim on Greene’s alleged intimidation causing Grainger to write a letter to Jane Doe with the letter being the property obtained. (See Complaint, 10-16, 21 [extortion claims], 31, 35 [assault and battery], 41-43 [intentional infliction of emotional distress], 58 [respondeat superior].) This conduct, as alleged in Grainger’s complaint cannot--as a matter of law-- be extortion.

To the extent that Grainger intends to argue that the communications alleged here—the investigation which resulted in the Grainger-Doe letter—is the result of duress, the Court disagrees: Greene denies using force or threats to coerce Grainger into writing the Grainger-Doe Letter. (See Mot., Greene Decl., 4-5.) Second, the evidence submitted by the parties does not show duress. (Mot., Ferlauto Decl., Ex. 2 [de; Opp’n, Webberman Decl., Ex. 1.) “Duress, [. . .] includes whatever destroys one’s free agency and constrains [her] to do what is against [her] will, may be exercised by threats, importunity or any species of mental coercion. It is shown where a party ‘intentionally used threats or pressure to induce action or nonaction to the other party’s detriment.’”’ The coercion must induce the assent of the coerced party, who has no reasonable alternative to succumbing.” (In re Marriage of Baltins (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 66, 84 [citations omitted].) However, “an action for duress and menace cannot be sustained when the voluntary action of the apprehensive party is induced by his speculation upon, or anticipation of a future event suggested to him by the defendant but not threatened to induce his conduct. The issue in each instance is whether the defendant intentionally exerted an unlawful pressure on the injured party to deprive him of contractual volition and induce him to act to his own detriment.” (Goldstein v. Enoch (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 891, 894-95.)

Here, Grainger testified in the Jane Doe Matter that on August 13, 2019:

No witnesses viewed the interaction between Grainger and Greene. (See Mot., Ferlauto Decl., Ex. 2, pp. 141:21-142:2.)

Greene’s “threat to Grainger” in Grainger’s apartment building hallway involved Greene “saying that [Grainger] would be in trouble,” Greene not believing Grainger’s responses and, and Greene being “threatening in stature and tone of his voice.” (See Mot., Ferlauto Decl., Ex. 2, pp. 140:1-7, 141:13.)

Greene insisting that Grainger would be in “trouble in general” “for conspiracy,” to stop “lying to [Greene],” that Grainger, in the end, “wrote what the guy [Greene] told [Plaintiff Grainger] to write so that [Grainger] wouldn’t be in trouble” and that Grainger wrote that letter only after Greene had left the apartment complex, to the best of Grainger’s knowledge. (See Mot., Ferlauto Decl., Ex. 2, pp. 140:21-141:10, 142:10-143:9.)

Grainger discovered that Greene was a private investigator through Greene’s business card before Greene left the building while opining that he thought Greene could nevertheless have been a police officer as well. (See Mot., Ferlauto Decl., Ex. 2, pp. 147:3-10.)

Grainger’s speculation that Greene could have had a weapon on his person or could have physically beaten Grainger in the hallway of Grainger’s apartment building, created the fear of which prompted Grainger to write the Grainger-Doe Letter. (See Mot., Ferlauto Decl., Ex. 2, pp. 145:14-25.)

No evidence has been presented that Greene made physical contact with Grainger, or that Greene advanced toward Grainger in a menacing manner to reasonably suggest impending harmful contact. (See Mot., Ferlauto Decl., Ex. 2 generally.) Instead, Grainger testified to writing the Grainger-Doe Letter based on Greene’s statement to Grainger in Grainger’s hallway “saying that [Grainger] would be in trouble” and generally being “threatening in stature and tone of his voice.” (See Mot., Ferlauto Decl., Ex. 2, pp. 140:1-7, 141:13.)

And Grainger’s testimony that,

[Greene] said I -- I would write an apology letter and would be in trouble and that could have meant that he wouldn’t beat me up, that he wouldn’t kill me. I don't know. I didn't know who this guy was. I didn't know what he wanted. I didn't know why he was there. I didn't know who hired him. He could have had a gun. He could have beat me up with one arm tied behind his back. I don't know. It was a frightening encounter. So, when he told me to write this, I wrote it. I would have done whatever he told me to do. (See Mot., Ferlauto Decl., Ex. 2, pp. 145:16-25.)

and Grainger’s admission that wrote the letter after Greene had left supports this conclusion. (See Mot., Ferlauto Decl., Ex. 2, pp. 142:24-143-9.)

The evidence does not show Greene’s conduct was illegal as a matter of law: (1) the evidence does not conclusively show that Greene’s alleged nebulous threats of “problems” in Grainger’s future were more than speculative harm and (2) that Grainger wrote the letter after his conversation with Greene had ended and after being informed Grainger was merely a private investigator, and not a law enforcement officer. (See Mot., Ferlauto Decl., Ex. 2, pp. 147:3-10 [business card].)

The conduct alleged in the Grainger’s complaint and in the evidence presented cannot be excluded from the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 because it is not conclusively illegal as a matter of law.

Defendant thus meets his burden of establishing the conduct alleged in Plaintiff’s claims arose from protected activity, shifting the burden to Grainger to show probability of success on the merits of his claims.

Probability of Plaintiff Prevailing on Claims: “To establish a probability of prevailing, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited. For purposes of this inquiry, the trial court considers the pleadings and evidentiary submissions of both the plaintiff and the defendant; though the court does not weigh the credibility or comparative probative strength of competing evidence, it should grant the motion if, as a matter of law, the defendant’s evidence supporting the motion defeats the plaintiff’s attempt to establish evidentiary support for the claim. In making this assessment it is the court’s responsibility…to accept as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff […]. The plaintiff need only establish that his or her claim has minimal merit to avoid being stricken as a SLAPP.” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291.)

Regarding Civil Extortion & Attempted Civil Extortion: GRANTED

The Court has already determined that Plaintiff’s extortion claims cannot succeed as a matter of law because the Penal Code's extortion provisions are predicated on a demand for property and obtaining a confession letter in an investigation is not property under the law. (See Protected Activity discussion supra; see also Kohn, supra, 258 Cal.App.2d at p. 375 [defendant's obtaining a written confession of a crime by extortionate means held not to be extortion because the confession was not property].) As a result, Plaintiff cannot show minimal merit to any actual or attempted extortion claim as alleged in the Complaint because those allegations are predicated on extortion by way of extraction of written confession. (See Complaint, 10-16, 21 [extortion claims], 31, 35 [assault and battery], 41-43 [intentional infliction of emotional distress], 58 [respondeat superior].)

The Court GRANTS Defendant Greene’s anti-SLAPP Motion against Plaintiff’s First cause of action for Actual and Attempted Extortion.

Assault and Battery: GRANTED

An essential element of civil battery and assault claims is that the defendant touched, acted with intent to cause harmful or offensive contact, or threatened to touch plaintiff in a harmful or offensive manner. (See So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 668-69.) Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot show a battery took place on August 13, 2019, because Plaintiff’s claims are contradicted by his own deposition testimony. (See Mot., 18:9-19-3.) Defendant provides a copy of Grainger’s March 24, 2021, deposition testimony (in the Jane Doe Matter): Grainger never testified that Greene touched Plaintiff. (See Mot., Ferlauto Decl., Ex. 2.) (See Mot., Ferlauto Decl., Ex. 2.)

Defendant carries his burden of showing the battery claim has no merit and that the assault claim has no merit as to harmful contact.

The Court notes that to the extent that Plaintiff premises his assault claim on fear, assault requires that a “plaintiff reasonably believe[] []he was about to be touched in a harmful or offensive manner or it reasonably appeared to plaintiff that defendant was about to carry out the threat.” (So v. Shin, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at pp. 668-69.) Grainger’s deposition shows Grainger’s apprehension was/is based on his speculation that Greene could have had a weapon on his person or could have physically beaten Grainger based on Greene’s “stature” and “tone.” (See Mot., Ferlauto Decl., Ex. 2, pp. 145:14-25.) There is a prima facie lack of merit to Plaintiff’s assault claim as well.

Greene’s anti-SLAPP Motion against Plaintiff’s Second cause of action for battery and assault is GRANTED.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: GRANTED

A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists requires “extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress.” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-51.) Defendant argues that the evidence shows that Greene’s conduct toward Plaintiff Grainger on August 13, 2019, was not outrageous for the purposes of this claim. (Mot., 19:21-25.) A review of the Grainger March 24, 2021, deposition in the Jane Doe Matter shows that Defendant is correct insofar as Greene premises any distress on speculative fear of harm:

[Greene] said I -- I would write an apology letter and would be in trouble and that could have meant that he wouldn’t beat me up, that he wouldn’t kill me. I don't know. I didn't know who this guy was. I didn't know what he wanted. I didn't know why he was there. I didn't know who hired him. He could have had a gun. He could have beat me up with one arm tied behind his back. I don't know. It was a frightening encounter. So when he told me to write this, I wrote it. I would have done whatever he told me to do.

(See Mot., Ferlauto Decl., Ex. 2, pp. 145:16-25.)

Thus, Defendant Greene has carried his burden of showing that the evidence points to lack of merit to Plaintiff Grainger’s IIED claim.

Plaintiff Grainger fails to rebut any argument on the merits for its IIED in its Points and Authorities as he does not present any elaborate any argument whatsoever for the validity of this cause of action outside of an apparent trespass allegation. (See Opp’n, 3:25-4:5 [premising the merits of all the Complaint’s causes of action based on Greene’s alleged illegal entry into Plaintiff’s apartment building, not unit].) Further, the only evidence directly on point as to the outrageousness issue—i.e., Grainger’s deposition—does not show outrageous behavior by Greene to the extent of the Court’s review. (See Mot., Ferlauto Decl., Ex. 2 generally.) As a result, Plaintiff fails to provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate even minimal merit to its IIED claim.

The Court GRANTS Greene’s anti-SLAPP Motion against Grainger’s Third cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Vicarious Liability/Respondeat Superior: GRANTED

“An employer is vicariously liable for the torts of its employees committed within the scope of

the employment. Equally well established, if somewhat surprising on first encounter, is the principle that an employee’s willful, malicious and even criminal torts may fall within the scope of his or her employment for purposes of respondeat superior, even though the employer has not authorized the employee to commit crimes or intentional torts.” (Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital (1995) 12 Cal.4th 291, 296-97 [citations omitted].) Here, the Court has found that the three causes of action on which Plaintiff predicates vicarious liability to the Doe defendants have been struck down on motion. (See First, Second, and Third Causes of Action discussions supra.) It therefore follows, as a matter of law, there is no underlying tort from which respondeat superior liability can flow. As a result, Plaintiff cannot show minimal merit to his vicarious liability claim for lack of an underlying claim to support this cause of action.

The Court GRANTS Greene’s anti-SLAPP Motion against Plaintiff’s Fourth cause of action for vicarious liability and respondeat superior liability on Doe defendants.

Conclusion

Defendant Russell Levert Greene’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff Jason Grainger’s Complaint Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16 is GRANTED.

The Trial related dates are Vacated and Greene is Ordered to submit an ORDER of JUDGMENT.



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