MARIA LILIANA RAMIREZ VS CITRUS COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT

Tentative Rulings

Case Number: ****4056 Hearing Date: November 1, 2021 Dept: O

After considering the evidence and arguments presented in the record, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff Maria Liliana Ramirez’s Motion for Protective Order, as follows:

1. Defendant Citrus Community College District will withdraw its Special Interrogatories, Set One, Requests for Admissions, Set One, and Form Interrogatories, Set Two, propounded on May 21, 2021;

2. Defendant Citrus Community College District then propound the latter discovery requests under the following conditions:

a. Defendant may only propound a maximum of 60 SROGs;

b. Defendant may propound RFAs. While there is no limit on the number of RFAs that can be made relating to the genuineness of documents (CCP ; 2033.030(a)), the Defendant may not propound more than 35 RFAs as to matters other than the genuineness of documents (CCP ; 2033.030(a)); and

c. Defendant may propound FROGS; however,

d. Plaintiff may use its previous responses from the Alvarez Case in the instant action to avoid serving responses to discovery that has already been propounded in the Alvarez Case. Justice so requires.

Last, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff Maria Liliana Ramirez’s request for monetary sanctions against Defendant Citrus Community College District in the amount of $1,185.00 for costs, including attorney’s fees, incurred by Plaintiff herein. (CCP ;; 2030.090(d), 2033.080(d).) Sanctions are to be made payable to Boucher LLP.

Meet and Confer

The motion for a protective order must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration. (CCP ; 2031.060(a).) The parties’ meet and confer efforts must be a significant attempt at informal resolution of the dispute. (Stewart v. Colonial Western Agency, Inc. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1016 (internal quotations and citations omitted); CCP ; 2016.040).)

Here, the parties have satisfied the meet and confer requirement pursuant to CCP section 2031.060(a).

Legal Standard

California Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section 2030.090 provides that “[w]hen interrogatories have been propounded, the responding party, and any other party or affected natural person or organization may promptly move for a protective order....” (CCP ; 2030.090(a).)

“The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense.” (CCP ; 2030.090(b).) “In considering whether the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, the court takes into account ‘the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation.’ ” (People ex rel. Harris v. Sarpas (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1552 [citing CCP ; 2019.030(a)(2) ].)

As with other objections in response to interrogatories, the party opposing discovery has an obligation to supply the basis for this determination. An ‘objection based upon burden must be sustained by evidence showing the quantum of work required.’ ” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 549; W. Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417.)

The concept of good cause requires a showing of specific facts demonstrating undue burden, etc., and justifying the relief sought. ;(See ;Goodman v. Citizens Life & Casualty Ins. Co. ;(1967) 253 Cal.App.3d 807, 819.) ;The facts are normally established in declarations by counsel for the party seeking the protective order. ;The declaration must contain competent evidence - i.e., first-hand knowledge of the facts. ; ;Hearsay allegations ;on information and belief ;and conclusory statements that particular relief is ;necessary ;are not enough. ;(Id.)

A trial court “shall limit the scope of discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (CCP ; 2017.020(a).)

A protective order may include the direction that “the set of interrogatories, or particular interrogatories in the set, need not be answered,” “the response be made only on specified terms and conditions,” or “the method of discovery be an oral deposition instead of interrogatories to a party.” (CCP ;; 2030.090(b)(1), (b)(4), (b)(5) (5).) Protective orders of a similar nature are also available for inspection demands and requests for admission. (See id., ;; 2031.060, 2033.080.)

The Motion at Hand is Granted.

Here, Plaintiff moves the Court for a protective order pursuant to CCP sections 2030.090 and 2033.080 excusing Plaintiff from responding to the Defendant District’s SROGs, FROGs, and RFAs served on May 21, 2021.

Two Cause of Action is in Controversy

Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for Supervisory Liability is alleged against Defendants Sammis and Magallon, in their individual capacities. (Arjang Decl. ¶ 3, Exh. 1.) Nominally, the cause of action is titled “Supervisory Liability.” To establish supervisory liability under section 1983, a plaintiff is required to prove: (1) the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge of the [subordinate’s] wrongful conduct; (2) the supervisor’s response was so inadequate as to show ‘deliberate indifference’ to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices; and (3) the existence of an ‘affirmative causal link’ between the supervisor’s inaction and [plaintiffs’] injuries.” (Grassilli v. Barr (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1279-1280.)

Plaintiff has alleged a wide variety of facts against Mr. Sammis, the Director of Human Resources, and Mr. Magallon, the bookstore supervisor. (Complaint, ¶¶ 8-9, 90-103.)

For example, Plaintiff alleges that “notwithstanding the former sexual harassment complaint, of which PLAINTIFF is informed and believes SAMMIS and MAGELLAN were aware, PATINO continued to be employed by Defendant COLLEGE and Defendants SAMMIS and MAGELLAN made no effort to improve the education and training related to sexual harassment at the Bookstore and Café.” (Complaint, ¶ 98.)

Additionally, the Complaint’s recital of facts include allegations that several other employees of Defendant were “[s]upervisors-in title or, if not by title, by virtue of the job functions and responsibilities entrusted to them by Defendant…included Carmelita Alvarez, Todd Wilcox, and VINCENT PATTINO” (Complaint, ¶ 15.)

In addition, the fourth cause of action for gender based discrimination includes Patino,

Discovery Requests Pertaining to the Instant Action

On January 19, 2018, Plaintiff Ramirez served comprehensive responses to Defendant’s Form Interrogatories, Set One. (Bush Decl. ¶ 7.) Defendant’s Form Interrogatories, Set One, contained forty-six (46) individually numbered interrogatories propounded to each of the Plaintiffs, not including the subparts of those interrogatories. (Id. at ¶ 7(a).) Defendant’s Form Interrogatories included the basic background interrogatories (2-series questions), damages and treatment interrogatories (6-series questions), loss of earnings interrogatories (8-series questions), additional damages interrogatories (9-series questions), preexisting condition interrogatories (10-series questions), past claims interrogatories (11-series questions), witness and document identification and substance interrogatories (12-series questions), surveillance interrogatories (13-series questions), and legal violation contention interrogatories (14- series questions). (Id. at ¶ 7(b).)

On January 26, 2018, Plaintiff served comprehensive responses to Defendant Vincent Patino’s Form Interrogatories and Requests for Admissions, Requests for Production and Special Interrogatories, Sets One, copying her responses to the Citrus College defendants. (Bush Decl. ¶ 9.)

On May 21, 2021, Defendant propounded the SROGs to all Plaintiffs, including Ms. Ramirez, seeking (among other discovery requests) all the facts in support of Plaintiff’s contentions that Defendants Mr. Sammis and Mr. Magallon violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. (Arjang Decl. ¶ 5, Exh. 2.) The SROGs contained a total of 144 special interrogatories. (Id.)The latter discovery requests had been previously propounded in the related matter, Case No. BC681378.

On May 21, 2021, Defendant also propounded the RFAs on all Plaintiffs, including Ms. Ramirez, seeking an admission (among other discovery requests) from Plaintiff that Defendants Mr. Sammis and Mr. Magallon had no prior notice of Defendant Patino’s conduct. (Arjang Decl. ¶ 6, Exh. 3.) The RFAs contained a total of 64 special interrogatories. (Id.) The latter discovery requests had also been previously propounded in the related matter, Case No. BC681378.

In addition, on May 21, 2021, Defendant also propounded the Second FROGs on all Plaintiffs, including Ms. Ramirez, consisting of Form Interrogatory 17.1, which, taken together with the Requests for Admissions (assuming denials to each) and including the three subparts of 17.1, consists of 192 interrogatory subparts. (Bush Decl. ¶ 30.)

Good Cause Shown for Limited Purposes

Here, court finds that Plaintiff has shown good cause for the pending motion on limited ground, while Defendants have not met their burden of justifying the SROGs, RFAs, or Second FROGs on those limited grounds. “In considering whether the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, the court takes into account ‘the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation.’ ” (Sarpas, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1552 [citing CCP ; 2019.030(a)(2) ].)

Some of Defendants’ requests are unduly burdensome in that they request information that are repeated, in one form or another, in several of the subject discovery requests.

For example, the Complaint’s recital of facts includes allegations that several other employees of Defendant, other than Sammis and Magellan were “[s]upervisors-in title or, if not by title, by virtue of the job functions and responsibilities entrusted to them by Defendant…included Carmelita Alvarez, Todd Wilcox, and VINCENT PATINO.” (Complaint, ¶ 15.)

Yet, the subject discovery requests ask Plaintiff to essentially reaffirm the unambiguous allegations, as follows. With respect to the SROGs, SROG No. 129 asks: “Do you contend that Patino was a supervisor?” (Bush Decl., Exh. 6, p. 17:23-24.) SROG No. 133 asks: “Do you contend that Carmelita was a supervisor?” (Id., Exh. 6, p. 18:5-6.) SROG No. 137 asks: “Do you contend that Rose was a supervisor?” (Id., Exh. 6, p. 18:16-17.)

With respect to the RFAs, RFA No. 21 requests Plaintiff admit that “Patino was not your supervisor.” (Bush Decl., Exh. 7, p. 4:24-26.) RFA No. 37 requests Plaintiff admit that “during YOUR employment with the DISTRICT, Todd Wilcox was not YOUR supervisor.” (Bush Decl., Exh. 7, p. 6:17-19.)

The requests also redundant because they sought to settle issues that were clearly disputed by the Complaint. The Complaint alleged that Patino, Wilcox, and Alvarez, though not nominally supervisors, had actual or apparent authority. (Complaint, ¶¶ 7-9, 15-34.) Yet, the subject discovery requests directed some redundant requests by asking Plaintiff to admit either Patino, Wilcox, or Alvarez, were not supervisors. The crux of the Complaint’s allegations is that the latter individuals had actual or apparent authority, even if not nominally titled supervisors. (Id. at ¶¶ 7-9.) What the requests in question sought did not distinguish Plaintiff’s reliance on allegations of actual authority despite a lack of title.

The better approach would have been to propound an interrogatory that requested the evidence that supported Plaintiff’s assertions. Yet, the subject discovery requests went on to repeat other redundant requests that essentially sought to make out Defendant’s case for summary judgment.

Next, Plaintiff’s counsel provides that, at a minimum, the subject discovery requests will result in approximately 44 hours of attorney time to simply compile partial responses. This time does not include the additional time it will take to comb through documents to ensure that responses are also consistent with the evidence in the documents that have been produced in this case. The additional work will increase the time required beyond 55 hours of attorney time in order to duplicate responses that Defendant already has from prior discovery requests in this action. (Bush Decl., ¶ 34.)

In opposition, Defendant District argues that the fifth cause of action invokes other constitutional claims. The Complaint, however, asserts two causes of action including the fifth cause of action for Supervisory Liability and the fourth cause of action for Unconstitutional Gender Based Discrimination. The number of questions in the SROGs (134) are not warranted because the complexity and the quantity of the existing and potential issues in this particular case are limited.

Thus, the Court makes a limited finding that some of the individual requests under the SROGs, FROGs, and RFAs burden Plaintiff such that their burden clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (CCP ; 2017.020(a).)

Modified Protective Order

However, the subject discovery requests also made valid requests for information that Plaintiff did not bother to distinguish. Defendant District met its burden in propounding more than 35 SROGs, etc., though not for all of 134 interrogatories and not for all requests under the RFAs and FROGs. A court may make any order that justice requires to protect a party or other natural person from “unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression or undue burden and expense.” (CCP ; 2030.090(b).)

Under the Complaint, the fifth cause of action incorporates the preceding fourth causes of action and the 46 paragraphs of factual allegations that prefaced them. Thus, the allegations are numerous for even one cause of action. Considering the circumstances, the Court will limit the maximum number of SROGs which Defendant may propound to a total of 60.

Further, while there is no limit on the number of RFAs that can be made relating to the genuineness of documents (CCP ; 2033.030(a)), the Defendant may not propound more than 35 RFAs as to matters other than the genuineness of documents. (CCP ; 2033.030(a).)

As to the FROGs, Defendant District may propound the FROGs anew. However, Plaintiff may use the same responses from the Alvarez Case in the instant action to avoid serving responses to (any) discovery that has already been propounded in the related case. Here, Plaintiff argued that the subject discovery requests were burdensome and argued, in part, that the requests had been previously propounded in the Alvarez Case.

Sanctions

Here, Plaintiff requests an award of monetary sanctions in the amount of $1,185.00 pursuant to CCP sections 2030.090(d) and 2033.080(d). Defendant has unsuccessfully opposed the pending motion. Moreover, the Court does not find that sanctions under the circumstances would be unjust.

Next, Plaintiff’s counsel, Brian M. Bush (“Bush”) provides that his standard hourly rate is $395.00/hour. (Bush Decl., ¶ 40.) Bush states that he expended 1.9 hours drafting his declaration (as a revised version of a previous declaration used to move for a protective order in the Alvarez case) inclusive of the time necessary to compile, audit and summarize the information, documents, and prior responses necessary to set forth the detailed description of prior discovery activity included in paragraphs 7-35. (Id. at 41.)

In addition, Plaintiff’s counsel expended: (a) 1 hour drafting the pending Motion for Protective Order filed concurrently herewith (as a revised version of a previous motion used to move for a protective order in the Alvarez case); and (b) 0.1 hours drafting the Proposed Order filed concurrently herewith. In total, Plaintiff’s counsel expended 3 hours at $395/hr., and therefore requests an order of sanctions against Defendants in the amount of $1,185.00 made payable to Boucher LLP. (Bush Decl., ¶¶ 42-44.)

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s stated costs were reasonably and necessarily incurred for purposes of the pending.

Therefore, the Court grants Plaintiff’s request for monetary sanctions against Defendant Citrus Community College District in the amount of $1,185.00 for costs, including attorney’s fees, incurred by Plaintiff herein. (CCP ;; 2030.090(d), 2033.080(d).)

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff Maria Liliana Ramirez’s Motion for Protective Order, as follows

1. Defendant Citrus Community College District will withdraw its Special Interrogatories, Set One, Requests for Admissions, Set One, and Form Interrogatories, Set Two, propounded on May 21, 2021;

2. Defendant Citrus Community College District then propound the latter discovery requests under the following conditions:

a. Defendant may only propound a maximum of 60 SROGs;

b. Defendant may propound RFAs. While there is no limit on the number of RFAs that can be made relating to the genuineness of documents (CCP ; 2033.030(a)), the Defendant may not propound more than 35 RFAs as to matters other than the genuineness of documents (CCP ; 2033.030(a)); and

c. Defendant may propound FROGS; however,

d. Plaintiff may use its previous responses from the Alvarez Case in the instant action to avoid serving responses to discovery that has already been propounded in the Alvarez Case. Justice so requires.

Last, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff Maria Liliana Ramirez’s request for monetary sanctions against Defendant Citrus Community College District in the amount of $1,185.00 for costs, including attorney’s fees, incurred by Plaintiff herein. (CCP ;; 2030.090(d), 2033.080(d).) Sanctions are to be made payable to Boucher LLP.