MARI MIURA VS SOUTH PASADENA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

Tentative Rulings

Case Number: *******5003 Hearing Date: July 24, 2023 Dept: X

Tentative Ruling

Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X

HEARING DATE: July 24, 2023 TRIAL DATE: April 30, 2023

CASE: MARI MIURA, a minor by and through her guardian ad litem CALVIN JOHN BLASCO, v. SOUTH PASADENA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, a public entity, and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive.

CASE NO.: *******5003

MOTION TO COMPEL DEPOSITION

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Mari Miura

RESPONDING PARTY: No response filed.

SERVICE: Filed June 28, 2023

RELIEF REQUESTED

Plaintiff moves to compel the deposition of Bronwyn Herman.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Mari Miura (“Plaintiff”) brings this claim against Defendant South Pasadena Unified School District (“Defendant”) alleging that Defendant failed to take reasonable steps or implement reasonable safeguards to prevent Plaintiff from being sexually assaulted. Plaintiff alleges that she was sexually molested, raped, assaulted, fondled, groped, and battered by another student (“Assailant”) on October 2, 2021, while she was a student at South Pasadena High School. Plaintiff alleges she informed Defendant, but Defendant failed to prevent Plaintiff from being sexually assaulted on multiple occasions.

Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on December 22, 2022, alleging four causes of action for (1) negligence, (2) negligence, negligent hiring, training, retention, and/or supervision of unfit employees, (3) breach of mandatory statutory duties which proximately caused Plaintiff s sexual assault and battery, and (4) breach of mandatory statutory duties which proximately caused Plaintiff additional damages separate and distinct from her sexual assault and battery.

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff’s motion to compel the deposition of Bronwyn Herman is GRANTED.

LEGAL STANDARD

“If a deponent fails to answer any question or to produce any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing under the deponent’s control that is specified in the deposition notice or a deposition subpoena, the party seeking discovery may move the court for an order compelling that answer or production.” (Code Civ. Proc. 2025.480, subd. (a).)

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff moves to compel the appearance of a nonparty, Bronwyn Herman, for deposition. Plaintiff provides she noticed Herman’s deposition on May 27, 2023, with deposition scheduled for June 4, 2023. (Nalbandyan Decl. 4.) Plaintiffs provide that Herman failed to appear for the deposition. (Motion at p. 6:18-19.)

Plaintiff argues there is good cause to compel Herman to appear because she is a percipient witness. Plaintiff provide that Defendant provided in a response to a form interrogatory that Herman was the person who witnessed the incident, made statements at the scene, and has knowledge of the incident. (Nalbandyan Decl. 2.)

“When a subpoenaed nonparty fails to appear for a deposition or produce documents that were properly requested, the party who subpoenaed the witness may move to compel compliance with the subpoena.” (Sears, Roebucks & Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1351.)

Plaintiff has shown that she noticed Herman’s deposition, but that Herman failed to appear. Plaintiff’s motion to compel the attendance of Bronwyn Herman for deposition is granted.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s motion to compel the deposition of Bronwyn Herman is GRANTED provided that Plaintiff provide proof of service for the deposition notice.

Deposition is to be held within 20 days’ notice of this order or other time stipulated by the parties.

Moving party to give notice of this order.

Dated: July 24, 2023

Joel L. Lofton

Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: *******5003 Hearing Date: April 20, 2023 Dept: X

Tentative Ruling

Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X

HEARING DATE: April 20, 2023 TRIAL DATE: No date set.

CASE: MARI MIURA, a minor by and through her guardian ad litem CALVIN JOHN BLASCO, v. SOUTH PASADENA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, a public entity, and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive.

CASE NO.: *******5003

MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Mari Miura by and through her guardian ad litem Calvin John Blasco (“Plaintiff”)

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant South Pasadena Unified School District

SERVICE: Filed January 23, 2023

OPPOSITION: Filed March 14, 2023

REPLY: Filed April 13, 2023

RELIEF REQUESTED

Plaintiff moves for an order compelling further responses to requests for production of documents (“RFPs”) and requests for admissions (“RFAs”).

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Mari Miura (“Plaintiff”) brings this claim against Defendant South Pasadena Unified School District (“Defendant”) alleging that Defendant failed to take reasonable steps or implement reasonable safeguards to prevent Plaintiff from being sexually assaulted. Plaintiff alleges that she was sexually molested, raped, assaulted, fondled, groped, and battered by another student (“Assailant”) on October 2, 2021, while she was a student at South Pasadena High School. Plaintiff alleges she informed Defendant, but Defendant failed to prevent Plaintiff from being sexually assaulted on multiple occasions.

Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on December 22, 2022, alleging four causes of action for (1) negligence, (2) negligence, negligent hiring, training, retention, and/or supervision of unfit employees, (3) breach of mandatory statutory duties which proximately caused Plaintiff s sexual assault and battery, and (4) breach of mandatory statutory duties which proximately caused Plaintiff additional damages separate and distinct from her sexual assault and battery.

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to her requests for the production of documents is GRANTED. Defendant is ordered to produce documents responsive to Plaintiff’s requests for production of documents numbers 24, 25, 41, and 42.

Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to her requests for admissions is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Defendant is ordered to produce responses to Plaintiff’s requests for requests for admission number 11.

LEGAL STANDARD

On receipt of a response to discovery requests, the party requesting may move for an order compelling further responses for interrogatories (Code Civ. Proc. 2030.300), requests for admission (Cod. Civ. Proc. section 2033.290), and request for production (Code Civ. Proc. section 2031.310). “Unless notice of this motion is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or any specific later date to which the requesting party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the requesting party waives any right to compel further response to the requests for admission.” (Code Civ. Proc. section 2033.290, subd. (c).)

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff provides she served Defendant with her requests for production and requests for admissions on August 17, 2022. (Nalbandyan Decl. 2.) Plaintiff provides Defendant provided responses on October 4, 2022. (Id. 3.) Plaintiff brings the present motions for an order compelling Defendant to provide further responses.

Requests for Production of Documents

RFP No. 24: All DOCUMENTS related to the hiring process of YOUR teachers of the SOUTH PASADENA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT.

RFP No. 25: All DOCUMENTS RELATED to YOUR policies and procedures regarding YOUR teachers and/or staff monitoring SOUTH PASADENA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT during class and/or break by stating the name, authors, recipients and dates of the DOCUMENTS.

RFP No. 41: All DOCUMENTS regarding YOUR policies and procedures to ensure YOUR compliance with the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act.

RFP No. 42: All DOCUMENTS regarding YOUR policies and procedures to ensure YOUR compliance with keeping YOUR children safe at YOUR schools.

Defendant is ordered to produce documents responsive to Plaintiff’s requests for production of documents numbers 24, 25, 41, and 42.

Requests for Admissions

RFA No. 10: Admit that YOU failed to properly supervise the children enrolled in YOUR SOUTH PASADENA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT from three (3) years prior to the INCIDENT, up to and including the date of the INCIDENT.

RFA No. 11: Admit that had YOU the responsibility to supervise and care for children of the community enrolled in YOUR SOUTH PASADENA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT from three (3) years prior to the INCIDENT, up to and including the date of the INCIDENT.

RFA No. 12: Admit that YOU failed to report the child abuse Plaintiff reported to YOUR staff from three (3) years prior to the INCIDENT up to and including the date of the INCIDENT.

Defendant is ordered to produce responses to Plaintiff’s requests for requests for admission number 11. Defendant’s objections are sustained in part as overbroad and vague as to requests for admissions numbers 10 and 12.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to her requests for the production of documents is GRANTED. Defendant is ordered to produce documents responsive to Plaintiff’s requests for production of documents numbers 24, 25, 41, and 42.

Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to her requests for admissions is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Defendant is ordered to produce responses to Plaintiff’s requests for requests for admission number 11.

Tentative Ruling

DEMURRER

MOVING PARTY: Defendant South Pasadena Unified School District

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Mari Miura by and through her guardian ad litem Calvin John Blasco (“Plaintiff”)

SERVICE: Filed January 23, 2023

OPPOSITION: Untimely filed April 13, 2023

REPLY: No reply filed.

RELIEF REQUESTED

Defendant demurrers to Plaintiff’s second cause of action for negligence, negligent hiring, training, retention, and/or supervision of unfit employees.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Mari Miura (“Plaintiff”) brings this claim against Defendant South Pasadena Unified School District (“Defendant”) alleging that Defendant failed to take reasonable steps or implement reasonable safeguards to prevent Plaintiff from being sexually assaulted. Plaintiff alleges that she was sexually molested, raped, assaulted, fondled, groped, and battered by another student (“Assailant”) on October 2, 2021, while she was a student at South Pasadena High School. Plaintiff alleges she informed Defendant, but Defendant failed to prevent Plaintiff from being sexually assaulted on multiple occasions.

Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on December 22, 2022, alleging four causes of action for (1) negligence, (2) negligence, negligent hiring, training, retention, and/or supervision of unfit employees, (3) breach of mandatory statutory duties which proximately caused Plaintiff s sexual assault and battery, and (4) breach of mandatory statutory duties which proximately caused Plaintiff additional damages separate and distinct from her sexual assault and battery.

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s second cause of action is OVERRULED.

LEGAL STANDARD

A general demurrer may be taken to a complaint where “[t]he pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code of Civ. Proc. 430.10(e).) A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc. section 430.30(a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

Additionally, a special demurrer to a complaint may be brought on the ground the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible. Code Civ. Proc section 430.10(f); Beresford Neighborhood Assn. v. City of San Mateo (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1180, 1191.) A demurrer based on uncertainty is disfavored and will be strictly construed even when the pleading is uncertain in some respects. (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) A demurrers based on uncertainty are “granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (Lickiss v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.)

DISCUSSION

Defendant objects to Plaintiff’s second cause of action for negligence, negligent hiring, training, retention, and/or supervision of unfit employees on the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts.

“The elements of a cause of action for negligence are duty, breach, causation, and damages.” (Melton v. Boustred (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 521, 529.) “ ‘An employer may be liable to a third person for the employer's negligence in hiring or retaining an employee who is incompetent or unfit.’ ” (Phillips v. TLC Plumbing, Inc. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1139.) “Negligence liability will be imposed on an employer if it ‘knew or should have known that hiring the employee created a particular risk or hazard and that particular harm materializes.’ ” (Ibid.) “To establish negligent supervision, a plaintiff must show that a person in a supervisorial position over the actor had prior knowledge of the actor's propensity to do the bad act.” (Z.V. v. County of Riverside (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 889, 902.)

This court previously sustained Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s cause of action for negligent hiring. In her FAC, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s employees John Eldrige, Linda Junge, Ed.D., David Speck, and Jill Timothy were unfit in their supervision of students at South Pasadena High School. (FAC 52.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the employees allowed students to disappear from physical education classes for extended periods of time with no supervision. (Ibid.) Plaintiff further alleges that the employees knew or should have known that the restrooms could be locked from the inside, posing danger to students by preventing employees from intervening if a satiation arises. (Id. 53.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant had reason to know that its employees had previously failed to prevent inappropriate conduct and that Defendant failed to use reasonable care to investigate its employees. (Id. 57-59.)

At the pleading stage, Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient. Defendant’s demurrer is overruled.

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s second cause of action is OVERRULED.

Dated: April 20, 2023

Joel L. Lofton

Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: *******5003 Hearing Date: December 5, 2022 Dept: X

Tentative Ruling

Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X

HEARING DATE: December 5, 2022 TRIAL DATE: No date set.

CASE: MARI MIURA, a minor by and through her guardian ad litem CALVIN JOHN BLASCO, v. SOUTH PASADENA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, a public entity, and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive.

CASE NO.: *******5003

DEMURRER WITH MOTION TO STRIKE

MOVING PARTY: Defendant South Pasadena Unified School District

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Mari Miura

SERVICE: Filed August 16, 2022

OPPOSITION: Filed October 19, 2022

REPLY: Filed October 27, 2022

RELIEF REQUESTED

Defendant demurrers to each cause of action in Plaintiff’s complaint.

Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages, attorney’s fees, civil penalties, and treble damages.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Mari Miura (“Plaintiff”) brings this claim against Defendant South Pasadena Unified School District (“Defendant”) alleging that Defendant failed to take reasonable steps or implement reasonable safeguards to prevent Plaintiff from being sexually assaulted. Plaintiff alleges that she was sexually molested, raped, assaulted, fondled, groped, and battered by another student (“Assailant”) on October 2, 2021, while she was a student at South Pasadena High School. Plaintiff alleges she informed Defendant, but Defendant failed to prevent Plaintiff from being sexually assaulted on multiple occasions.

Plaintiff filed this complaint on May 5, 2022, alleging four causes of action for (1) negligence, negligent hiring, training, retention, and/or supervision of unfit employees, (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (3) breach of mandatory statutory duties which proximately caused Plaintiff s sexual assault and battery, and (4) breach of mandatory statutory duties which proximately caused Plaintiff additional damages separate and distinct from her sexual assault and battery.

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action is SUSTAINED with leave 20 days to amend.

Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s third and fourth causes of action is OVERRULED.

Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages is GRANTED without leave to amend.

Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for attorney’s fees is DENIED.

Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for civil penalties and treble damages is GRANTED with 20 days leave to amend.

Demurrer

A general demurrer may be taken to a complaint where “[t]he pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code of Civ. Proc. 430.10(e).) A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc. section 430.30(a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

Additionally, a special demurrer to a complaint may be brought on the ground the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible. Code Civ. Proc section 430.10(f); Beresford Neighborhood Assn. v. City of San Mateo (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1180, 1191.) A demurrer based on uncertainty is disfavored and will be strictly construed even when the pleading is uncertain in some respects. (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) A demurrers based on uncertainty are “granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (Lickiss v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.)

Motion to Strike

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike a pleading or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., 435, subd. (b)(1).) The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., 436, subd. (a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with California law, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., 436, subd. (b).) An immaterial or irrelevant allegation is one that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense; is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense; or a demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., 431.10, subd. (b).) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., 437.)

DISCUSSION

First Cause of Action

Defendant demurrers to Plaintiff’s first cause of action for negligence, negligent hiring, training, retention, and/or supervision of unfit employees.

Defendant first argues that Plaintiff’s first cause of action is uncertain because it combines two separate theories of liability. Plaintiff concedes that her first cause of action should be separated into two separate causes of action and agrees to do so in an amended pleading.

Additionally, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s claim for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention fails to allege sufficient facts to state a cause of action. Defendant argues that Plaintiff broadly alleges that Defendant engaged in negligent hiring, supervision, or retention without identifying any employee that Defendant negligently hired, supervised, or retained. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff fails to allege facts that support her claim that Defendant knew or should have known its employees failed to act.

“The elements of a cause of action for negligence are duty, breach, causation, and damages.” (Melton v. Boustred (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 521, 529.) “ ‘An employer may be liable to a third person for the employer's negligence in hiring or retaining an employee who is incompetent or unfit.’ ” (Phillips v. TLC Plumbing, Inc. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1139.) “Negligence liability will be imposed on an employer if it ‘knew or should have known that hiring the employee created a particular risk or hazard and that particular harm materializes.’ ” (Ibid.) “To establish negligent supervision, a plaintiff must show that a person in a supervisorial position over the actor had prior knowledge of the actor's propensity to do the bad act.” (Z.V. v. County of Riverside (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 889, 902.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues her complaint pleads sufficient “ultimate facts”. However, “a demurrer accepts as true all well pleaded facts and those facts of which the court can take judicial notice but not deductions, contentions, or conclusions of law or fact.” (Fox v. JAMDAT Mobile, Inc. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1078.) Here, Plaintiff’s claim for negligent hiring does not identify any employee that is alleged to be unfit or incompetent. Further, Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege how Defendant negligently hired, supervised, or retained any unfit employee. Plaintiff’s claim here amounts to a legal conclusion that Defendant negligently hired employees because Plaintiff suffered harm. Plaintiff’s complaint fails to sufficiently state facts to allege a claim for negligent hiring, training, retention, or supervision.

Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s first cause of action is sustained with leave to amend.

Second Cause of Action

“ ‘ “[T]o state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress a plaintiff must show: (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant's intention of causing or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.” ’ ” (Vasquez v. Franklin Management Real Estate Fund, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 819, 832.) “ ‘Conduct, to be “ ‘outrageous’ ” must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized society.’ ” (Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1259.)

Defendant demurrers to Plaintiff’s second cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress on the grounds that Plaintiff fails to allege that any of Defendant’s employees acted outrageously or intended to cause Plaintiff emotional distress. In opposition, Plaintiff agrees to withdraw her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s second cause of action is sustained.

Third and Fourth Causes of Action

Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to identify the specific employee that failed to act as and cites statutes inapplicable to the facts alleged.

Government Code section 815.6 provides: “Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.”

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant was informed that Assailant had sexually abused other students prior to October 2, 2021, including specific actions against Plaintiff. (Complaint 74.) Plaintiff alleges that she reported the abuse to Defendant, but Defendant’s employees trivialized the incident, denied wrongdoing, and stated there was nothing to investigate or report. (Id. 77.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to comply with Penal Code section 11166, subdivision (a).

Penal Code section 11166, subdivision (a), provide: “Except as provided in subdivision (d), and in Section 11166.05, a mandated reporter shall make a report to an agency specified in Section 11165.9 whenever the mandated reporter, in the mandated reporter’s professional capacity or within the scope of the mandated reporter’s employment, has knowledge of or observes a child whom the mandated reporter knows or reasonably suspects has been the victim of child abuse or neglect. The mandated reporter shall make an initial report by telephone to the agency immediately or as soon as is practicably possible, and shall prepare and send, fax, or electronically transmit a written follow up report within 36 hours of receiving the information concerning the incident. The mandated reporter may include with the report any nonprivileged documentary evidence the mandated reporter possesses relating to the incident.”

At this stage of the proceedings, Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to allege that Defendant failed to follow its statutory obligations under Government Code section 815.6 and Penal Code section 11166, subdivision (a). Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s claim fails because she fails to identify the specific employees is rejected. This claim is distinct from Plaintiff’s first cause of action for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention because Plaintiff’s first cause of action was dependent on Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant hired an employee that was incompetent and unfit, which Plaintiff failed to support with factual allegations. Plaintiff’s first cause of action relied almost entirely on legal conclusions. Plaintiff’s third cause of action, however, alleges that Defendant and its employees had a statutory duty but failed to follow that duty after Defendant learned of Assailant’s sexual abuse of other students and Plaintiff.

Further, Defendant similarly argues that Plaintiff fails to allege a claim for violation of other statutes because Plaintiff does not identify which employee was informed of Assailant’s actions. Defendant cites no authority for the proposition that Plaintiff is required to plead the identity of the mandated reported that failed to comply with his or her statutory duty. Defendant cites Doe v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Services (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 675, but the language Defendant cites from pertained to the plaintiff’s negligence claim rather than a claim for breach of statutory duty. At the pleading stage, Plaintiff’s claims are sufficient.

Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s third and fourth causes of action is overruled.

Motion to Strike

Defendant moves to strike language in Plaintiff’s complaint that pertains to Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages, attorney’s fees, civil penalties, and treble damages.

Punitive Damages

Government Code section 818 provides: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a public entity is not liable for damages awarded under Section 3294 of the Civil Code or other damages imposed primarily for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.”

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages is improper. Plaintiff concedes that point and agrees to withdraw her request for punitive damages in an amended pleading.

Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages is granted.

Attorney’s Fees

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s prayer for attorney’s fees is improper under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, “three requirements must be met in order for a successful party to recover attorney fees: (1) the action has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest, (2) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, and (3) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement make the award appropriate.” (Planned Parenthood v. Aukhus (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 162, 169-170.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims only benefit Plaintiff personally as opposed to affecting the public interest and that Plaintiff has a significant stake in the present litigation. Defendant’s arguments pertain to questions of fact not determined at the pleading stage. Here, Plaintiff alleges that she is advancing an important public interest right and that the public will receive a benefit. (Complaint 81 and 91.) At this stage, Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient.

Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for attorney’s fees is denied.

Civil Penalties and Treble Damages

Defendant also argues that Plaintiff fails to indicate the basis for civil penalties and treble damages. Plaintiff concedes this point and offers to provide further context in an amended pleading.

Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for civil penalties and treble damages is granted.

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action is SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend.

Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s third and fourth causes of action is OVERRULED.

Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages is GRANTED without leave to amend.

Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for attorney’s fees is DENIED.

Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for civil penalties and treble damages is GRANTED with 20 days leave to amend.

Moving party to give notice.

Dated: December 5, 2022

Joel L. Lofton

Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court indicating their

intention to submit. Parties intending to appear are strongly encouraged to appear remotely. alhdeptx@lacourt.org