This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 06/28/2020 at 18:03:16 (UTC).

MARCUS GARLAND VS TITUS YOUNG ET AL

Case Summary

On 01/24/2018 MARCUS GARLAND filed a Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury lawsuit against TITUS YOUNG. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judges overseeing this case are DENNIS J. LANDIN, CHRISTOPHER K. LUI, EDWARD B. MORETON, DANIEL M. CROWLEY and THERESA M. TRABER. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****1260

  • Filing Date:

    01/24/2018

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury

  • Court:

    Los Angeles County Superior Courts

  • Courthouse:

    Stanley Mosk Courthouse

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judges

DENNIS J. LANDIN

CHRISTOPHER K. LUI

EDWARD B. MORETON

DANIEL M. CROWLEY

THERESA M. TRABER

 

Party Details

Plaintiff and Petitioner

GARLAND MARCUS

Defendants and Respondents

YOUNG ROBERT

YOUNG TERESA

DOES 1 TO 50

YOUNG TITUS

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff and Petitioner Attorneys

MASTROIANNI A. DOUGLAS ESQ.

MASTROIANNI ALBERT DOUGLAS

Defendant and Respondent Attorneys

DEMLER ARMSTRONG & ROWLAND LAW O/O

OBAS REMY

 

Court Documents

Ex Parte Application - EX PARTE APPLICATION TO EXTEND TIME TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF

2/14/2020: Ex Parte Application - EX PARTE APPLICATION TO EXTEND TIME TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF

Certificate of Mailing for - CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR (EX-PARTE PROCEEDINGS TO CONTINUE BRIEFING SCHEDULE PURSUANT T...) OF 02/18/2020

2/18/2020: Certificate of Mailing for - CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR (EX-PARTE PROCEEDINGS TO CONTINUE BRIEFING SCHEDULE PURSUANT T...) OF 02/18/2020

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (EX-PARTE PROCEEDINGS TO CONTINUE BRIEFING SCHEDULE PURSUANT T...)

2/18/2020: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (EX-PARTE PROCEEDINGS TO CONTINUE BRIEFING SCHEDULE PURSUANT T...)

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (NON-APPEARANCE CASE REVIEW RE: MOTION TO SET ASIDE ENTRY OF D...)

2/13/2020: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (NON-APPEARANCE CASE REVIEW RE: MOTION TO SET ASIDE ENTRY OF D...)

Answer

11/12/2019: Answer

Declaration - DECLARATION OF A. DOUGLAS MASTROIANNI IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENT

12/2/2019: Declaration - DECLARATION OF A. DOUGLAS MASTROIANNI IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Declaration - DECLARATION OF A. DOUGLAS MASTROIANNI IN SUPPORT OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT

3/28/2019: Declaration - DECLARATION OF A. DOUGLAS MASTROIANNI IN SUPPORT OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Request for Entry of Default / Judgment

3/28/2019: Request for Entry of Default / Judgment

Request for Entry of Default / Judgment

1/14/2019: Request for Entry of Default / Judgment

Notice - Notice OF INTENT TO RECOVER PUNITIVE DAMAGES

12/11/2018: Notice - Notice OF INTENT TO RECOVER PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Notice -

10/4/2018: Notice -

NOTICE OF APPEAL/CROSS-APPEAL(UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE)

9/7/2018: NOTICE OF APPEAL/CROSS-APPEAL(UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE)

NOTICE OF FILING OF NOTICE OF APPEAL (UNLIMITED JURISDICTION)

9/10/2018: NOTICE OF FILING OF NOTICE OF APPEAL (UNLIMITED JURISDICTION)

NOTICE OF NO OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER OF DEFENDANTS RICHARD YOUNG AND TERESA YOUNG TO PLAINTIFF?S AMENDED COMPLAINT

7/6/2018: NOTICE OF NO OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER OF DEFENDANTS RICHARD YOUNG AND TERESA YOUNG TO PLAINTIFF?S AMENDED COMPLAINT

NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND DEMURRER OF DEFENDANTS RICHARD YOUNG AND TERESA YOUNG TO PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT;

5/31/2018: NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND DEMURRER OF DEFENDANTS RICHARD YOUNG AND TERESA YOUNG TO PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT;

PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS -

3/26/2018: PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS -

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT

4/16/2018: REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT

SUMMONS -

1/24/2018: SUMMONS -

51 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 01/25/2021
  • Hearing01/25/2021 at 08:30 AM in Department 28 at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Order to Show Cause Re: Dismissal

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  • 02/20/2020
  • DocketAnswer; Filed by Titus Young (Defendant)

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  • 02/18/2020
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department U, Theresa M. Traber, Presiding; Ex-Parte Proceedings (to continue briefing schedule pursuant to the court's January 13, 2020 order and set a further hearing on motion to set aside the default) - Held - Motion Denied

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  • 02/18/2020
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department 28, Daniel M. Crowley, Presiding; Hearing on Ex Parte Application (to continue briefing schedule pursuant to the court's January 13, 2020 order and set a further hearing on motion to set aside the default) - Not Held - Clerical Error

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  • 02/18/2020
  • DocketMinute Order ( (Ex-Parte Proceedings to continue briefing schedule pursuant t...)); Filed by Clerk

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  • 02/18/2020
  • DocketCertificate of Mailing for ((Ex-Parte Proceedings to continue briefing schedule pursuant t...) of 02/18/2020); Filed by Clerk

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  • 02/14/2020
  • DocketNotice of Ruling; Filed by Titus Young (Defendant); Teresa Young (Defendant)

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  • 02/14/2020
  • DocketEx Parte Application (to Extend Time to File Supplemental Brief); Filed by Marcus Garland (Plaintiff)

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  • 02/14/2020
  • DocketNotice (of Representation); Filed by Marcus Garland (Plaintiff)

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  • 02/14/2020
  • DocketOpposition (Opposition to plaintiff's ex parte application to continue briefing schedule and set a frthr hearing on motion); Filed by Titus Young (Defendant); Teresa Young (Defendant)

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83 More Docket Entries
  • 04/16/2018
  • DocketNOTICE OF DEMURRER AND DEMURRER OF DEFENDANTS RICHARD YOUNG AND TERESA YOUNG TO COMPLAINT;AND ETC.

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  • 03/26/2018
  • DocketPROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

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  • 03/26/2018
  • DocketProof of Service (not Summons and Complaint); Filed by Marcus Garland (Plaintiff)

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  • 03/26/2018
  • DocketProof of Service (not Summons and Complaint); Filed by Marcus Garland (Plaintiff)

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  • 03/26/2018
  • DocketProof of Service (not Summons and Complaint); Filed by Marcus Garland (Plaintiff)

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  • 03/26/2018
  • DocketPROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

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  • 03/26/2018
  • DocketPROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

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  • 01/24/2018
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by Marcus Garland (Plaintiff)

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  • 01/24/2018
  • DocketSUMMONS

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  • 01/24/2018
  • DocketCOMPLAINT FOR NEGLIGENCE

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Tentative Rulings

Case Number: BC691260    Hearing Date: December 13, 2019    Dept: 4A

Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default and Default Judgment

Having considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers, the Court rules as follows.

BACKGROUND

On January 24, 2018, Plaintiff Marcus Garland (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendant Titus Young (“Defendant”), Robert Young, and Teresa Young for battery and negligence arising from an unprovoked attack that occurred on January 30, 2016.

On May 2, 2018, Plaintiff filed the operative first amended complaint.

On July 11, 2018, the Court sustained Defendants Richard Young[1]’s (“Richard”[2]) and Teresa Young (“Teresa”)’s demurrer and motion to strike the first amended complaint. Richard and Teresa are Defendant’s parents and successfully argued that they did not have a special relationship either to Defendant Titus Young or Plaintiff Marcus Garland that would establish a duty of care to Plaintiff. Plaintiff appealed this order which was upheld by the Court of Appeal on September 25, 2019.

On January 14, 2019, default was entered against Defendant Titus Young.

On May 15, 2019, the Court granted default judgment against Defendant Titus Young in the amount of $200,435.

On September 12, 2019, Defendant Titus Young filed the instant motion to set aside entry of default and default judgment.

PARTIES’ REQUESTS

Defendant requests relief from default judgment entered against him under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) on the grounds that his counsel was not informed of the lawsuit because Defendant Titus Young was not properly served with the action while incarcerated at a state mental hospital. Defendant also requests relief pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d) arguing that he never received actual notice of the complaint because of Plaintiff’s failure to properly serve him with the summons and complaint, rendering the judgment void against him. Additionally, Defendant moves under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5, subdivision (a) on the grounds that he was not on actual notice of the summons and first amended complaint for reasons stated above and did not have the capacity to respond due to his status as a conservatee. Finally, Defendant seeks equitable relief from default because (1) Defendant has a meritorious defense (such as comparative fault, assumption of the risk, and exclusive remedy), (2) Defendant has a satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defense (being unaware of service of the first amended complaint), and (3) Defendant has been diligent to set aside this default once his conservators received notice of the complaint and there is no prejudice to Plaintiff’s because of the extrinsic mistake of ineffective service.

Plaintiff argues that Defendant cannot move to set aside entry of default or default judgment because he was appointed a conservator on September 7, 2016. Accordingly, Defendant is legally incapacitated from retaining counsel without either first seeking approval from the Probate Court, having an interested person petition the Court, having a friend or relative file a petition to terminate the conservatorship, or having counsel appointed on a contingency basis upon a Probate Court order. Moreover, Defendant cannot establish that he was not served in this action because there is no evidence that conclusively establishes that he did not receive service and summons of the complaint while he was incarcerated at the California Health Care Facility in Stockton. Defendant’s only evidence that he was not served with a document demonstrates that he was not served with a Notice of Intent to Recover Punitive Damages. Plaintiff contends that this is irrelevant because Plaintiff abandoned punitive damages and moved for default without seeking punitive damages.

Plaintiff asserts that pursuant to Penal Code section 4013 and Code of Civil Procedure section 413.10, service upon a prison official is deemed service on the inmate.

Plaintiff also argues that Defendant’s evidence of his illness/disability in support of his request for relief is not specific enough. Moreover, the Court should not weigh the evidence in favor of Defendant because Plaintiff suffered from a brutal beating at Defendant’s hands without compensation.

Plaintiff raises several additional procedural grounds including (1) untimeliness because Defendant filed this motion 10 weeks after Plaintiff’s petition for entry of default judgment; (2) that mail service on a prisoner is sufficient; (3) Takehara’s declaration is misleading because Defendant was only deprived of the Notice of Intent to Recover Punitive Damages; (4) Defendant is not entitled to contend that he has a meritorious defense to the suit because of his prior criminal conviction or his claim that he did not receive actual notice; and (5) Defendant is not entitled to equitable relief because his counsel has obstructed discovery that would lead to information about whether Defendant had actual notice of the suit.

LEGAL STANDARD

  1. Relief Under Section 473(b) – Excusable Neglect

“The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) Application for this relief shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken. (Id.) “[T]he court shall, whenever an application for relief is made no more than six months after entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied by an attorney’s sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, vacate any (1) resulting default entered by the clerk against his or her client, and which will result in entry of a default judgment, or (2) resulting default judgment or dismissal entered against his or her client, unless the court finds that the default or dismissal was not in fact caused by the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.” (Ibid.)

Relief is proper if the default was entered as a result of excusable neglect which generally means the moving party must show some reasonable excuse for the default. (Davis v. Thayer (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 892, 905.) In that regard, evidence that the defendant was seriously ill or feeble or unable to understand that he was being served with process is sufficient to justify relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b). (Kesselman v. Kesselman (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 196, 207–208.) A defendant who lost paperwork and later failed to contact a lawyer in a timely manner, also shows “excusable neglect.” (Bernards v. Grey (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 679, 683.)

  1. Relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d) – Actual Notice

Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d) provides that “[t]he court may . . . on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (d).) A default judgment is void against a defendant who was not served with a summons in the manner prescribed by statute. (See Sakaguchi v. Sakaguchi (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 852, 858 (Sakaguchi); Yeung v. Soos (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 576, 582.).) Relief pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d) may be made at any time. (Manson, Iver & York v. Black (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 36, 47 (Manson).)

Substituted service is a well-recognized method of service that has been held to satisfy the constitutional requirements of service. (See Korea Exchange Bank v. Yang (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1471, 1474.) When substituted service is used to serve a defendant, a copy of the summons and complaint must thereafter be mailed to the person to be served at the place where the copy of the summons and complaint were left. (Code Civ. Proc., § 415.20, subd. (a)-(b).)

Service of process on a prisoner by mail, by sending summons and complaint to the prison litigation coordinator who was authorized to receive service, is effective, even though the litigation coordinator rather than prisoner signed the acknowledgement of receipt, absent evidence that prison personnel failed to carry out their statutory duty to deliver the papers to prisoner forthwith. (Sakaguchi, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 858.)

  1. Relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5

Where service of summons has not resulted in actual notice to a party in time to defend an action, the court is empowered to grant relief from a default or default judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473.5, subd. (a).) A motion under section 473.5 must be sought within a “reasonable” time but in no event later than the earlier of either 2 years after entry of judgment or 180 days after service of written notice that default or default judgment has been entered. (Ibid.) A defendant seeking relief under this section must show that his or her lack of actual notice in time to defend was not caused by inexcusable neglect or avoidance of service. (Id. at subd. (b).) The moving party shall file with the motion a copy of the pleading proposed to be filed in the action. (Ibid.)

The phrase “actual notice” means “genuine knowledge of the party litigant” and does not include constructive or imputed notice to the client. (Tunis v. Barrow (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1069, 1077.)

California’s public policy favoring the resolution of actions on the merits supports construing “actual knowledge” strictly and liberally granting relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5. (Olvera v. Olvera (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 32, 40-41; see also Goya v. P.E.R.U. Enterprises (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 886, 891.)

  1. Equitable Relief from Default

Relief from default or default judgment can be sought at any time on the ground of extrinsic mistake. (Olivera v. Grace (1942) 19 Cal.2d 570, 576; Sporn v. Home Depot USA, Inc. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1300.) This is a form of equitable relief, rather than statutory relief, and is based on a finding by the court that the judgment is void. (See Trackman v. Kenney (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 175, 180-81 [contrasting Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (d) and extrinsic fraud and mistake]; Manson, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 47 [“After the six-month period for statutory relief has passed, the court may still grant relief on equitable grounds, including extrinsic fraud or mistake.”].) Extrinsic mistake occurs “when circumstances extrinsic to the litigation have unfairly cost a party a hearing on the merits.” (Manson, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 47.)

There are three essential requirements to obtain relief on this ground: (1) a meritorious defense; (2) diligence in seeking relief once the default or default judgment is discovered; and (3) a satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defense to the original action. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 982 (Rappleyea).) The statutory time limits on relief under Code of Civil Procedure sections 473, subdivision (b) and 473.5 do not apply, but once the purported extrinsic fraud or mistake is discovered, a party is expected to proceed diligently to seek relief. This requirement is inextricably intertwined with prejudice to the plaintiff. (Id., at pp. 983–984.)

DISCUSSION

  1. Excusable Neglect – Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b)

Defendant Titus Young moves to set aside the default judgment entered on May 15, 2019 pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) based on attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.

Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant lacks capacity to retain counsel to set aside the default judgment entered against him supports Defendant’s theory that he is entitled to relief on excusable neglect. In 2016, the probate court found that Defendant lacked capacity and appointed his mother and sister as co-conservators. (Mother Decl.) There is no evidence that Defendant regained capacity such that he could defend the action filed against him on January 24, 2018. Due to Defendant’s status as a conservatee, it is excusable that he did not defend the lawsuit.

The Court also finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated entitlement to relief pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b). Defendant’s conservator, Teresa Young, states that in 2016, her son, Defendant Titus Young encountered some serious mental and physical health issues as a result of brain trauma he suffered while playing professional football. (Teresa Young Decl., 3.) Teresa further attests that on October 13, 2016, she and her daughter, Tiffany Young (“Tiffany”) were appointed conservators to the Estate of Titus Young. (Id. at ¶ 4.) Teresa declare that she was never informed that a summons and first amended complaint were served on Titus Young, and she was never served as conservator of the Estate of Titus Young. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Teresa also declares that she was never informed by a litigation officer at one of Titus’s treating facilities that they had been served with a summons and complaint for Titus or received a mailed copy of the summons and first amended complaint indicating that Titus Young had been served by substituted service. (Ibid.) This is sufficient to demonstrate that the default was taken against Defendant due to excusable neglect of Defendant, his conservators (who were charged with retaining counsel), and counsel (who was ultimately retained upon conservators’ notice of default) in failing to defend that action based on lack of service of the first amended complaint.

  1. Void Judgment – Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d)

Defendant provides the declaration of the litigation coordinator at California Health Care Facility in Stockton, Erin Takehara (“Takehara”). Takehara declares that she was unable to provide the summons and first amended complaint to Defendant prior to his transfer to Atascadero State Hospital on December 14, 2018. (Takehara Decl., ¶¶ 4, 6-7.) Takehara also attests that she did not inform Defendant’s conservators of the attempted service of the complaint. (Takehara Decl., ¶ 5.)

The evidence supports a finding that Defendant Titus Young was not properly served. While there is a law stating that an inmate can be served by personal service on a litigation officer, it also requires delivery of the papers to the inmate/prisoner. (Pen. Code, § 4013.) The service in that circumstance can only be via substituted service and, while the litigation officer is a valid person over the age of 18 and authorized to receive the paperwork, there is no evidence the it was ever actually delivered to Defendant Titus Young, and/or subsequently mailed under Code of Civil Procedure section 415.20, subdivisions (a) - (b). In fact, there is affirmative proof he was not. (Takehara Decl., ¶¶ 3-7.)

Moreover, Defendant was never personally served with the summons, first amended complaint, and statement of damages, and only learned of the case after his conservators were advised that a default had been taken. What is more, Titus’s conservators were never informed that Titus had been served and only learned of that fact after a default had been entered. (Young Decl., ¶¶ 7-9.) Nor is there anything in the proof of service stating that the FAC was mailed to him as part of the process of substituted service. Finally, as previously stated, the documents were never provided to Titus while incarcerated at California Health Care Facility and there is no evidence of an attempted service to the litigation coordinator or Defendant at the facility in Atascadero, California.

Taken together with Teresa’s declaration, this evidence demonstrates Plaintiff has not served Defendant with the summons and first amended complaint, thus rendering the judgment void on its face.

  1. Actual Notice – Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5

As discussed above, service was defective and did not result in actual notice to Defendant to defend the action. Defendant properly seeks relief within 180 days of entry of judgment in this case. Default judgment was entered on May 15, 2019 and this motion was filed 120 days later on September 12, 2019. As such, Defendant has demonstrated his entitlement to have the judgment set aside pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5.

  1. Equitable Relief

For the reasons discussed above, the evidence before the Court demonstrates that Defendant was not properly served with Plaintiff’s summons and first amended complaint. Given this determination, the Court does not reach a discussion of whether Defendant is entitled to equitable relief from default and default judgment.

  1. Procedural Requirements

    1. Timeliness

Plaintiff argues that this motion is untimely because the “Petition” was served more than 10 weeks (70 days) before Defendant filed his motion. Plaintiff does not refer to the 180-day period allowed for a Defendant to seek relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5 after service of written notice that default or default judgment has been entered.

Here, Defendant presents evidence that he first learned of this matter after default had been entered against him. (Teresa Young Decl., ¶ 8.) Default judgment was entered on May 15, 2019. It is not clear in what manner, if any, Plaintiff served Defendant with the notice of default judgment. However, Defendant filed this motion on September 12, 2019, only 120 days after entry of default judgment. Therefore, regardless of manner or method of service, this motion is timely under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5.

    1. Proposed Pleading

Defendant attached to this motion a proposed answer to Plaintiff’s first amended complaint. (Mot., Obas Decl., ¶ 6, Exh. D.) The requirement that the moving party attach the proposed pleading is sufficiently met.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Defendant has presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the default was taken against him because of his excusable neglect and that of his conservators (who were charged with retaining counsel) and counsel (who was ultimately retained upon conservators’ notice of default) in failing to defend that action based on lack of service of the first amended complaint. Moreover, Defendant presents evidence that he was not properly served with the summons and first amended complaint. Lack of proper service is grounds to find a judgment void on its face; accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 473, subdivision (d) and 473.5.

Based on the foregoing, Defendant Titus Young’s motion to set aside default and default judgment is GRANTED and the entry of default and default judgment against Defendant are set aside.

Defendant is ordered to file the proposed answer attached to his motion.

Trial is set for August 12, 2020 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 4A and the Final Status Conference is set for July 29, 2020 at 10:00 a.m. in Department 4A.

Defendant Titus Young is ordered to give notice of this ruling.


[1] Erroneously sued as “Robert Young.”

[2] The Court refers to the parties by first name for clarity, not out of familiarity or disrespect.