LUIS CEJA, ET AL. VS NATALYA BYZOVA, ET AL.

Tentative Rulings

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Case Number: *******5075 Hearing Date: November 2, 2021 Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

TENTATIVE RULING

LUIS CEJA, et al. vs. NATALYA BYZOVA DBA IMPERIUM LAW CORPORATION, et al.

Case No.: *******5075 Hearing Date: November 2, 2021

Natalya Byzova dba Imperium Law Corporation’s special motion to strike is GRANTED.

On 11/24/2020, Plaintiffs Luis, Rosalia, and Marina Ceja filed a complaint against Natalya Byzova dba Imperium Law Corporation and Cecilia Jimenez alleging twenty-six causes of action.

On 6/3/2021, Plaintiffs dismissed Cecilia Jimenez and the Law Office of Cecilia Jimenez from this action.

Now, Natalya Byzova dba Imperium Law Corporation (Defendant) move for a special motion to strike Plaintiff’s Complaint.

Legal Standard

A court employs a two-step analysis in determining whether a claim should be stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute. “In the first step, the defendant bears the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that the claim ‘aris[es] from any act of that person in furtherance of the person\'s right of petition or free speech.’ [Citation].” (Lee v. Silveira (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 527, 538 (Lee).) “If the defendant meets this threshold burden, in the second step the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to ‘establish[] that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.’ [Citation]” (Lee, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 538.)

“Subdivision (e) of section 425.16 provides that an ‘‘act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue” includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”

Timeliness

Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s motion is untimely. However, given that Plaintiff was able to substantively oppose the motion, the Court finds insufficient evidence of prejudice. Accordingly, the Court considers the motion on its merits.

Factual Background

In November 2019, Marina Ceja filed an unlawful detainer against her father. As part of that action, Marina sought to remove her parents, Luis and Rosalia, from the home which they claimed to own, but which Marina disputed. Several other disputed properties were involved in the litigation.

Defendant here was hired to represent Luis and Rosalia in the action. Because Luis and Rosalia did not speak English, Defendant communicated with her clients through Luis’ daughter, Yolanda Hernandez, who acted as translator throughout the duration of the attorney-client relationship. Because Luis and Rosalia believed they still owned the properties, and that Marina had used fraudulent means to obtain title to the property, they filed a complaint against Marina for: (1) Quiet Title; (2) Slander of Title; (3) Declaratory Relief and Mandatory Injunction; (4) Cancellation of Instrument; (5) Elder Abuse; (6) Fraud and Deceit; (7) Negligent Misrepresentation; (8) Conversion; and (9) Declaratory Relief.

After filing the action for Quiet Title, Byzova, on behalf of her clients, filed a lis pendens for each disputed property. (Byzova Decl., ¶7, Exs. 5-7 in RJN.)

The claim here is now asserted by Marina, Luis, and Rosalia, on the grounds that Defendant induced Luis and Rosalia to execute verifications written in English only, and thereafter filed and served a complaint with the signed verifications from them that they didn’t understand, and filed a false complaint which disparaged Marina’s title to the properties.

Discussion

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff, in opposition, agreed to voluntarily withdraw her 22nd, 24th, and 25 causes of action against Defendant. This leaves only the 23rd cause of action for slander of title and 26th cause of action for abuse of process.

I. Protected Activity

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s causes of action against her arise out of protected activity because the gravamen of the claims against her concern her prior legal representation of Plaintiffs Luis and Rosalia during which time she filed a complaint for quiet title on behalf of Plaintiffs Luis and Rosalia and filed the required lis pendens for the properties at issue.

Plaintiff’s first cause of action here is based on allegations that:

Defendants Natalya Byzova and Does 1-1 00, and each of them, published, in an unprivileged, malicious manner, false statements that disparaged Marina E. Ceja’s title to the Ceja Properties commonly known as: (a) the real property commonly known as 14955 Foothill Blvd., Sylmar, CA 91342 (APN 2502-002-004); (b) the real property commonly known as 43938 Hinkley Road, Hinkley, CA 92347 (APN 0489-241-05-0000); and (c) the real property commonly known as 12528 San Fernando Road, Sylmar, CA 91342 (APN 2506-035-009) (\'"Ceja Properties") and have thereby caused Marina E. Ceja pecuniary loss. Said disparagement affected, restricted, or injured the salability of the Ceja Properties. As a result of the disparagement, Marina E. Ceja has suffered financial loss as a result according to proof.

(Complaint ¶ 189.)

Given that this cause of action is based on Defendant’s filing of a legal complaint for quiet title, it clearly targets a “… writing made before a… judicial proceeding….” (CCP ; 425.16, subd. (e).)

Similarly, Plaintiff’s second cause of action is based on allegations that:

Defendants Natalya Byzova and Does 1-100, and each of them wrongfully induced Mr. & Mrs. Luis Ceja to execute verifications written in English only, and thereafter filed and served a complaint with the signed verifications for the matter entitled, Luis C. Ceja, Rosalia Escalera Ceja aka Rosa Ceja vs. Marina Escalera Ceja aka Marina E. Ceja; United Wholesale Mortgage Case LASC Case No. 19CHV00989 along with filing and recording of at least three (3) lis pendens against the Ceja Properties without Mr. & Mrs. Luis Ceja’s consent or knowledge. Marina E. Ceja was required to defend herself in the matter entitled, Luis C. Ceja, Rosalia Escalera Ceja aka Rosa Ceja vs. Marina Escalera Ceja aka Marina E. Ceja; United Wholesale Mortgage Case LASC Case No. 19CHV00989 and to deal with the ramifications of the filing and/or recording of at least three (3) lis pendens against the Ceja Properties.

(Complaint ¶ 200.)

Given that this cause of action is based on Defendant’s filing of lis pendens connected with an pending lawsuit , it clearly targets a “…writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a … judicial body….” (CCP ; 425.16, subd. (e); See La Jolla Group II v. Bruce (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 461, 471.)

In sum, the Court concludes that Defendants’ evidence establishes that the claims against them arise out of protected activity. Having satisfied their burden to show that Plaintiffs’ claim arises from an act in furtherance of the person’s right of petition, the burden shifts to Plaintiffs to establish a probability that the Plaintiffs will prevail on the claim. (Lee, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 538.)

II. Probability of Success

Civil Code section 47(b) provides an absolute privilege for communications made in any legislative proceeding, in any judicial proceeding, in any other official proceeding authorized by law, or in the initiation or course of any other proceeding authorized by law. (See Civ. Code, ; 47(b); Hagberg v. California Federal Bank FSB (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, 360.) Section 47(b) bars all tort causes of action except malicious prosecution. (See Hagberg, supra, 32 Cal.4th at 360.) Section 47(b) only applies to communicative acts, not tortious conduct. (Id. at 423.) “The threshold issue in determining whether the litigation privilege applies is whether the defendant’s conduct was communicative or noncommunicative.” (Id.)

California Courts have applied the absolute privilege of Civil Code section 47(b) to the recording of lis pendens. As noted in La Jolla Group II, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 725, “[i]f the publication has a reasonable relation to the action and is permitted by law, the absolute privilege attaches. [] It therefore attaches to the recordation of a notice of lis pendens, for such a publication is permitted by law, and like other documents that may be filed in an action, it has a reasonable relation thereto and it is immaterial that it is recorded with the county recorder instead of being filed with the county clerk.”

California Courts have also applied the absolute privilege to abuse of process claims where the gravamen of the cause of action is based on communicative acts. For example, in Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, a lower court had concluded that defendant’s conduct was not absolutely privileged because the complaint targeted the wrongful act of levying on property in the execution of a judgment and thus was not communicative. Our Supreme Court reversed that ruling, concluding that:

On close analysis, the gravamen of the action was not the levying act, but the procurement of the judgment based on the use of allegedly perjured declarations of service. Because these declarations were communications “(1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action” (Silberg supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 212, 266 Cal.Rptr. 638, 786 P.2d 365), the litigation privilege applies to the declarations and protects against torts arising from the privileged declarations. (Id. at p. 214, 266 Cal.Rptr. 638, 786 P.2d 365.) Moreover, as Cohen argues, since a party may not be liable for submitting false testimony or evidence in the course of judicial proceedings which are used to obtain a judgment, the party should likewise be immune from abuse of process claims for subsequent acts necessary to enforce it. Otherwise, application of the litigation privilege would be thwarted. Thus, where the gravamen of the complaint is a privileged communication (i.e., allegedly perjured declarations of service) the privilege extends to necessarily related noncommunicative acts (i.e., act of levying).

(Rusheen, supra, 128 P.3d at p. 722)

Here, similarly, Plaintiffs’ allegations against Defendant are that she “induced Mr & Mrs. Luis Ceja to execute verifications written in English only, and thereafter filed and served a complaint with the signed verifications for the matter entitled.” (Complaint ¶ 200.) Thus, Plaintiffs’ abuse of process cause of action is clearly concerned with the communicative act of obtaining and filing allegedly false verifications as part of the Complaint. These communications are privileged. (Rusheen, supra, 128 P.3d at p. 722.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs repeatedly advance arguments which speak to the merits of their underlying allegations, and contend that Plaintiff improperly relied upon Yolanda Hernandez as a Spanish translator. However, the litigation privilege is not concerned with whether or not the underlying alleged conduct was wrong, but rather the type of communication that it was and its underlying purpose.

The cases cited to by Plaintiff do not persuade the Court otherwise. For example, Plaintiff cites to Benasra v. Mitchell Silverberg & Knupp LLP (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1179 to argue that breaches of a professional duty do not fall within the purview of section 425.16. However, in that case, a law firm was being sued for violating the Rules of Professional Conduct with respect to conflicts of interest, and was not “based on written oral statements made on [client’s] behalf in the arbitration.” (Benasra, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 1186.) Here, by contrast, the Court is limited to the allegations of the Complaint, and Plaintiffs do not allege a breach of loyalty or a breach of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Plaintiffs also do not assert any cause of action for legal malpractice. Rather, Plaintiffs assert causes of action for slander of title—which is based on the very act of filing a complaint for quiet tile and filing lis pendens—and thus is undeniably related to writing made by Defendant on her clients’ behalf—and on abuse process which is similarly based on the act of filing lis pendens and written verifications with the Court.

Accordingly, the communications at issue here are absolutely privileged, and Defendant is immune from liability on the basis of these communications. Because these communications form the basis of Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant, Plaintiffs cannot establish a probability of prevailing of their claims against Defendant.

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion is granted.

It is so ordered.

Dated: November , 2021

Hon. Jon R. Takasugi Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order. If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar.

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