This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 09/26/2020 at 13:23:54 (UTC).

LAURA AN VS ASAD AYAZ, ET AL.

Case Summary

On 04/11/2019 LAURA AN filed a Contract - Other Contract lawsuit against ASAD AYAZ. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The case status is Other.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    *******2643

  • Filing Date:

    04/11/2019

  • Case Status:

    Other

  • Case Type:

    Contract - Other Contract

  • Courthouse:

    Stanley Mosk Courthouse

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

 

Party Details

Plaintiff

AN LAURA

Defendants

KETABACHI ALI

HARTOUNI HARMA

AYAZ ASAD

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff Attorney

SMITH DAVID CAMPBELL

Defendant Attorney

VOLKOV ALEKSANDR

 

Court Documents

Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)

9/22/2020: Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (NON-APPEARANCE CASE REVIEW)

6/25/2020: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (NON-APPEARANCE CASE REVIEW)

Notice - NOTICE OF RESCHEDULED HEARING

6/29/2020: Notice - NOTICE OF RESCHEDULED HEARING

Demurrer - without Motion to Strike

6/15/2020: Demurrer - without Motion to Strike

Memorandum of Points & Authorities

6/15/2020: Memorandum of Points & Authorities

Case Management Statement

6/10/2020: Case Management Statement

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (NON-APPEARANCE CASE REVIEW RE: SETTING OF THE MOTION TO BE RE...)

6/10/2020: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (NON-APPEARANCE CASE REVIEW RE: SETTING OF THE MOTION TO BE RE...)

Declaration - DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF ATTORNEY'S MOTION TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL

6/4/2020: Declaration - DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF ATTORNEY'S MOTION TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL

Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel

6/4/2020: Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel

Case Management Statement

4/1/2020: Case Management Statement

Proof of Service by Mail

4/2/2020: Proof of Service by Mail

Case Management Statement

2/24/2020: Case Management Statement

Notice - NOTICE OF ADVANCED HEARING DATE OF DEMURRER AND CONTINUED CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

1/7/2020: Notice - NOTICE OF ADVANCED HEARING DATE OF DEMURRER AND CONTINUED CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

Memorandum of Points & Authorities

12/11/2019: Memorandum of Points & Authorities

Amended Complaint - FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

11/12/2019: Amended Complaint - FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Proof of Service by Substituted Service

5/2/2019: Proof of Service by Substituted Service

Summons - SUMMONS ON COMPLAINT

4/17/2019: Summons - SUMMONS ON COMPLAINT

Notice of Case Assignment - Unlimited Civil Case

4/11/2019: Notice of Case Assignment - Unlimited Civil Case

80 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 10/28/2020
  • Hearing10/28/2020 at 08:30 AM in Department 40 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Hearing on Motion - Other For Order and Judgment For Dismissal

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 09/24/2020
  • DocketMotion re: (For Dismissal Of Action With Prejudice And Entry Of Judgment Of Dismissal); Filed by Ali Ketabachi (Defendant); Asad Ayaz (Defendant); Harma Hartouni (Defendant)

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 09/23/2020
  • DocketRequest for Judicial Notice; Filed by Ali Ketabachi (Defendant); Asad Ayaz (Defendant); Harma Hartouni (Defendant)

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 09/23/2020
  • DocketMemorandum of Points & Authorities; Filed by Ali Ketabachi (Defendant); Asad Ayaz (Defendant); Harma Hartouni (Defendant)

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 09/22/2020
  • DocketRequest for Dismissal (REJECTED-Dismissal previously filed and entered as of today 9/22/20.); Filed by Laura An (Plaintiff)

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 09/22/2020
  • DocketRequest for Dismissal (Without prejudice, Entire Action); Filed by Laura An (Plaintiff)

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 09/22/2020
  • DocketProof of Service (not Summons and Complaint); Filed by Laura An (Plaintiff)

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 09/21/2020
  • DocketProof of Service (not Summons and Complaint); Filed by Laura An (Plaintiff)

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 09/21/2020
  • DocketNotice of Ruling; Filed by Laura An (Plaintiff)

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 09/10/2020
  • Docketat 10:00 AM in Department 40; Case Management Conference - Held - Continued

    Read MoreRead Less
96 More Docket Entries
  • 05/02/2019
  • DocketAffidavit (of due Diligence); Filed by Laura An (Plaintiff)

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 05/02/2019
  • DocketProof of Service by Substituted Service; Filed by Laura An (Plaintiff)

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 05/02/2019
  • DocketAffidavit (of due Diligence); Filed by Laura An (Plaintiff)

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 05/02/2019
  • DocketProof of Service by Substituted Service; Filed by Laura An (Plaintiff)

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 04/17/2019
  • DocketSummons (on Complaint); Filed by Laura An (Plaintiff)

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 04/17/2019
  • DocketNotice of Case Management Conference; Filed by Clerk

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 04/17/2019
  • DocketOrder to Show Cause Failure to File Proof of Service; Filed by Clerk

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 04/11/2019
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by Laura An (Plaintiff)

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 04/11/2019
  • DocketCivil Case Cover Sheet; Filed by Laura An (Plaintiff)

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 04/11/2019
  • DocketNotice of Case Assignment - Unlimited Civil Case; Filed by Clerk

    Read MoreRead Less

Tentative Rulings

Case Number: 19STCV12643    Hearing Date: March 03, 2020    Dept: 40

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Asad Ayaz,

Harma Hartouni, and

Ali Ketabchi

OPPOSITION: Plaintiff Laura An

Plaintiff Laura An (“Plaintiff”) is sues her former landlords Defendants Asad Ayaz, Harma Hartouni, and Ali Ketabchi (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging that the lease for her apartment was illegal because the premises violated zoning laws aand that she was evicted from the premises under a false pretense. Plaintiff vacated the premises on November 30, 2014.

On November 12, 2019, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against Defendants alleging causes of action for:

1) Declaratory Relief;

2) Fraudulent Intent to Occupy;

3) Breach of Los Angeles Rent Stabilization Ordinance;

4) Unlawful Business Practices (“UCL”).

Request for Judicial Notice: Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of the FAC and the Los Angeles Rent Stabilization Order. The Court will take notice of these exhibits pursuant to Evidence Code §§ 452(d) and 452(b), respectively an official court record and a legislative enactment.

 

Defendants argue that all four causes of action are time barred. Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s UCL claim is uncertain.

First Cause of Action, Declaratory Relief: SUSTAINED.

In 2002, Plaintiff executed a written lease with Defendants’ predecessors. On November 30, 2014, Plaintiff vacated the premises after Defendants informed her that one of their mothers intended to occupy it as her primary residence. The Los Angeles Rent Stabilization Ordinance (“LARSO”) allows a landlord to recover possession of a rental unit for use and occupancy as a primary residence for certain family members in exchange for compensation. Plaintiff alleges that “sometime on or after September 2016” she learned that none of Defendants’ family members was occupying the premises.

Plaintiff’s first cause of action has two parts. In Part A, Plaintiff alleges that the premises subject to the lease were uninhabitable and illegal under various zoning statutes. In Part B, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants wrongfully evicted her for the pretextual reason that Defendants intended to have a family member occupy the premises. Plaintiff seeks a declaration that she is entitled to restitution and other damages.

Part A: Uninhabitable Premises: Defendants argue that the statute of limitations for Part A is one year pursuant to CCP §340(a). Section 340 provides a one-year limitation for bringing: “An action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture, if the action is given to an individual, or to an individual and the state, except if the statute imposing it prescribes a different limitation.”

Plaintiff argues that the claim is not subject to Section 340 and instead is subject to CCP § 337 and CCP § 343. Section 337 provides a four-year statute of limitations for bringing an action upon a written contract and Section 343 is a “catch all” statute that provides a four-year statute of limitations when no other statute applies. Plaintiff also argues that Defendants citations to Bradenburg v. Eureka Redevelopment Agency (2007) 152 Cal. App. 4th 1350 and Marin Healthcare District v. Sutter Health (2002) 103 Cal. App. 4th 861 (2002) are inapplicable because those courts interpreted Section 340 as it relates to Government Code § 1900, which is about government officials and employees not having a financial interest in any contracts made in their official capacity.

The Court finds that a one-year statute of limitations applies. Plaintiff is correct that the cases cited above analyzed Section 340 in the context of Gov. Code § 1900. However, "the settled rule in California is that statutes which provide for recovery of damages additional to actual losses incurred, such as double or treble damages, are considered penal in nature [citations], and thus governed by the one-year period of limitations stated in section 340, subdivision (1) [citations omitted].” Prudential Home Mortgage Co. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1242-1243. LARSO is a statute which provides for recovery of damages additional to actual losses incurred. LARSO Section 151.30(I), dealing with evictions for occupancy of the premises by the landlord’s family, makes a landlord “liable to any tenant who was displaced from the property for three times the amount of actual damages, exemplary damages, equitable relief, and attorneys' fees.” Section 151.10 (A), which deals with remedies, punishes a landlord who accepts excess rent payments with “damages of three times the amount by which the payment or payments demanded, accepted or retained exceed the maximum rent or maximum adjusted rent which could be lawfully demanded….” (See Sylve v. Riley (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 23, 26, in which the Court of Appeal held that San Francisco’s RSO was subject to CCP § 340’s predecessor because of its mandatory treble damages provision.) LARSO is a statute that is penal in nature and subject to Section 340’s statute of limitations.

Part B: Wrongful Eviction: Defendants argue that “Part B”, the wrongful eviction claim, is subject to the one-year statute of limitations of CCP § 340(a). Defendants cite to Sylve v. Riley (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 23. In Sylve, the tenant was evicted from her apartment, so that the landlord’s family members could move in as allowed by San Francisco’s RSO. On December 27, 1988, tenant vacated the premises and in May 1989, she noticed that her former apartment was vacant. In January 1990, tenant noticed that the premises were still vacant and concluded that she had been wrongfully evicted. On December 31, 1990, tenant field a wrongful eviction claim. The trial court granted a motion for summary judgment against tenant. The Court of Appeal held that summary judgment was inappropriate because there were triable issues of fact as to whether the delayed discovery rule tolled the one-year statute of limitations under CCP § 340’s predecessor statute. (Id. at pg. 27.)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s FAC states that she learned about the wrongful eviction on September 2016 and that the statute of limitations thus expired in September 2017. Plaintiff argues that the FAC does not allege that she learned that she had been wrongfully evicted in violation of the RSO in September 2016. Instead, Plaintiff states that the FAC alleges she learned “sometime after September 2016” about the violation. Plaintiff contends that since she did not specify that she discovered the violation in September 2016, then the statute of limitations did not expire in September 2017.

As noted by Defendants, the FAC states that “[s]ometime on or after September 2016, Plaintiff learned that neither Defendants’ mother, nor any other family member was occupying the Premises as their primary residence.” (FAC, ¶ 23.) The language “sometime on or after” as commonly understood is used to indicate a narrow range of time after the listed date. It is unreasonable to read “sometime on or after September 2016” to mean up to April 2018, which is one year before the original complaint was filed. Plaintiff cites to Sylve and argues that discovery should proceed to establish when she learned of the facts to support her wrongful eviction claim or whether there was any basis to toll the statute. In Sylve, the complaint survived the demurrer presumably because there was an allegation that tenant discovered the wrongful eviction in January 1990, within one year of when she filed her complaint. In this matter, there is no similar allegation.

Second and Third Causes of Action, Fraudulent Intent to Occupy/Breach of LARSO: SUSTAINED.

Plaintiff’s claims rely on the same time barred allegation, the wrongful eviction, discussed in “Part B.” The parties repeat the same arguments discussed in that section.

Fourth Cause of Action, UCL: SUSTAINED.

Plaintiff’s UCL claim is derivative of her other claims. Given that the demurrer has been sustained as to those claims, it must also be SUSTAINED as to the UCL claim.

Conclusion: Defendants’ demurrer is SUSTAINED and Moving Party to provide notice.

Case Number: 19STCV12643    Hearing Date: March 02, 2020    Dept: 40

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Asad Ayaz,

Harma Hartouni, and

Ali Ketabchi

OPPOSITION: Plaintiff Laura An

Plaintiff Laura An (“Plaintiff”) is sues her former landlords Defendants Asad Ayaz, Harma Hartouni, and Ali Ketabchi (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging that the lease for her apartment was illegal because the premises violated zoning laws aand that she was evicted from the premises under a false pretense. Plaintiff vacated the premises on November 30, 2014.

On November 12, 2019, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against Defendants alleging causes of action for:

1) Declaratory Relief;

2) Fraudulent Intent to Occupy;

3) Breach of Los Angeles Rent Stabilization Ordinance;

4) Unlawful Business Practices (“UCL”).

Request for Judicial Notice: Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of the FAC and the Los Angeles Rent Stabilization Order. The Court will take notice of these exhibits pursuant to Evidence Code §§ 452(d) and 452(b), respectively an official court record and a legislative enactment.

 

Defendants argue that all four causes of action are time barred. Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s UCL claim is uncertain.

First Cause of Action, Declaratory Relief: SUSTAINED.

In 2002, Plaintiff executed a written lease with Defendants’ predecessors. On November 30, 2014, Plaintiff vacated the premises after Defendants informed her that one of their mothers intended to occupy it as her primary residence. The Los Angeles Rent Stabilization Ordinance (“LARSO”) allows a landlord to recover possession of a rental unit for use and occupancy as a primary residence for certain family members in exchange for compensation. Plaintiff alleges that “sometime on or after September 2016” she learned that none of Defendants’ family members was occupying the premises.

Plaintiff’s first cause of action has two parts. In Part A, Plaintiff alleges that the premises subject to the lease were uninhabitable and illegal under various zoning statutes. In Part B, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants wrongfully evicted her for the pretextual reason that Defendants intended to have a family member occupy the premises. Plaintiff seeks a declaration that she is entitled to restitution and other damages.

Part A: Uninhabitable Premises: Defendants argue that the statute of limitations for Part A is one year pursuant to CCP §340(a). Section 340 provides a one-year limitation for bringing: “An action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture, if the action is given to an individual, or to an individual and the state, except if the statute imposing it prescribes a different limitation.”

Plaintiff argues that the claim is not subject to Section 340 and instead is subject to CCP § 337 and CCP § 343. Section 337 provides a four-year statute of limitations for bringing an action upon a written contract and Section 343 is a “catch all” statute that provides a four-year statute of limitations when no other statute applies. Plaintiff also argues that Defendants citations to Bradenburg v. Eureka Redevelopment Agency (2007) 152 Cal. App. 4th 1350 and Marin Healthcare District v. Sutter Health (2002) 103 Cal. App. 4th 861 (2002) are inapplicable because those courts interpreted Section 340 as it relates to Government Code § 1900, which is about government officials and employees not having a financial interest in any contracts made in their official capacity.

The Court finds that a one-year statute of limitations applies. Plaintiff is correct that the cases cited above analyzed Section 340 in the context of Gov. Code § 1900. However, "the settled rule in California is that statutes which provide for recovery of damages additional to actual losses incurred, such as double or treble damages, are considered penal in nature [citations], and thus governed by the one-year period of limitations stated in section 340, subdivision (1) [citations omitted].” Prudential Home Mortgage Co. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1242-1243. LARSO is a statute which provides for recovery of damages additional to actual losses incurred. LARSO Section 151.30(I), dealing with evictions for occupancy of the premises by the landlord’s family, makes a landlord “liable to any tenant who was displaced from the property for three times the amount of actual damages, exemplary damages, equitable relief, and attorneys' fees.” Section 151.10 (A), which deals with remedies, punishes a landlord who accepts excess rent payments with “damages of three times the amount by which the payment or payments demanded, accepted or retained exceed the maximum rent or maximum adjusted rent which could be lawfully demanded….” (See Sylve v. Riley (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 23, 26, in which the Court of Appeal held that San Francisco’s RSO was subject to CCP § 340’s predecessor because of its mandatory treble damages provision.) LARSO is a statute that is penal in nature and subject to Section 340’s statute of limitations.

Part B: Wrongful Eviction: Defendants argue that “Part B”, the wrongful eviction claim, is subject to the one-year statute of limitations of CCP § 340(a). Defendants cite to Sylve v. Riley (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 23. In Sylve, the tenant was evicted from her apartment, so that the landlord’s family members could move in as allowed by San Francisco’s RSO. On December 27, 1988, tenant vacated the premises and in May 1989, she noticed that her former apartment was vacant. In January 1990, tenant noticed that the premises were still vacant and concluded that she had been wrongfully evicted. On December 31, 1990, tenant field a wrongful eviction claim. The trial court granted a motion for summary judgment against tenant. The Court of Appeal held that summary judgment was inappropriate because there were triable issues of fact as to whether the delayed discovery rule tolled the one-year statute of limitations under CCP § 340’s predecessor statute. (Id. at pg. 27.)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s FAC states that she learned about the wrongful eviction on September 2016 and that the statute of limitations thus expired in September 2017. Plaintiff argues that the FAC does not allege that she learned that she had been wrongfully evicted in violation of the RSO in September 2016. Instead, Plaintiff states that the FAC alleges she learned “sometime after September 2016” about the violation. Plaintiff contends that since she did not specify that she discovered the violation in September 2016, then the statute of limitations did not expire in September 2017.

As noted by Defendants, the FAC states that “[s]ometime on or after September 2016, Plaintiff learned that neither Defendants’ mother, nor any other family member was occupying the Premises as their primary residence.” (FAC, ¶ 23.) The language “sometime on or after” as commonly understood is used to indicate a narrow range of time after the listed date. It is unreasonable to read “sometime on or after September 2016” to mean up to April 2018, which is one year before the original complaint was filed. Plaintiff cites to Sylve and argues that discovery should proceed to establish when she learned of the facts to support her wrongful eviction claim or whether there was any basis to toll the statute. In Sylve, the complaint survived the demurrer presumably because there was an allegation that tenant discovered the wrongful eviction in January 1990, within one year of when she filed her complaint. In this matter, there is no similar allegation.

Second and Third Causes of Action, Fraudulent Intent to Occupy/Breach of LARSO: SUSTAINED.

Plaintiff’s claims rely on the same time barred allegation, the wrongful eviction, discussed in “Part B.” The parties repeat the same arguments discussed in that section.

Fourth Cause of Action, UCL: SUSTAINED.

Plaintiff’s UCL claim is derivative of her other claims. Given that the demurrer has been sustained as to those claims, it must also be SUSTAINED as to the UCL claim.

Conclusion: Defendants’ demurrer is SUSTAINED and Moving Party to provide notice.

related-case-search

Dig Deeper

Get Deeper Insights on Court Cases


Latest cases represented by Lawyer SMITH DAVID CAMPBELL