Tentative Rulings
Case Number: BC666678 Hearing Date: August 06, 2020 Dept: O
Case Name: Babylan, et al. v. Watts, et al.
Case No.: BC666678
Hearing: 8-6-20
Calendar #: 10
Notice: OK
Complaint Filed: 6-28-17
Motion C/O: 5-5-21
Discovery C/O: 4-19-21
Trial Date: 5-17-21
______________________________________________________________________________
SUBJECT: (1) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(2) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MOVING PARTY: (1) Plaintiff Michelle Babalyan
(2) Defendants Alexander Harper Watts, Andrew Watts and Cathy Watts
JOINED BY: (1) Defendants Watts, et al.
(1) Defendant The City of Los Angeles
RESP. PARTY: (1) AND (2) Plaintiff Ken Babalyan
TENTATIVE RULING
Plaintiff Michelle Babalyan’s Motion for Summary Judgment (joined by Defendants Alexander Watts, Andrew Watts, Cathy Watts, and the City of Los Angeles) is DENIED. Plaintiff Michelle’s RJN is GRANTED as to Exhibit 1 but not as to its contents and DENIED as to the copies of the reporter’s transcripts attached as Exhibits 2 and 3.
Defendants Alexander Watts, Andrew Watts and Cathy Watts’ (collectively referred to as “Watts”) Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
Plaintiff Ken failed to submit evidentiary objections in compliance with CRC Rule 3.1345. Ken includes his evidentiary objections as responses to Michelle’s statements of fact.
Triable issues of fact remain as to whether Ken was financially dependent on David at the time of David’s death for purposes of standing under CCP §377.60(b). Moving parties fail to meet their initial burden on summary judgment and even if they had, Ken’s evidence in opposition raises a material issue of fact precluding summary judgment.
(1) Plaintiff Michelle’s Motion for Summary Judgment seeks summary judgment of Plaintiff Ken’s complaint. Plaintiff Michelle fails to cite any authority that would allow her to attack Ken’s standing to assert the causes of action in his complaint. Plaintiff Michelle is not a defendant in Ken’s action. Michelle is not seeking summary judgment of her complaint against Plaintiff Ken, nor is there any authority provided for Michelle to name Ken as a “nominal defendant” in her complaint.
(2) Both Plaintiff Michelle and Defendants Watts fail to satisfy their burden as the parties moving for summary judgment. Michelle and Watts argue Plaintiff Ken lacks standing under CCP §377.60(b) as “dependent” parent of decedent David Babalyan.
CCP §377.60(b) allows the parents of a decedent to sue for wrongful death if “they were dependent on the decedent” and regardless of whether the decedent had children. “For purposes of this subdivision, dependence refers to financial support…Financial dependency should be the test for parents who are not heirs of the decedent…[¶] Financial dependence generally presents a question of fact, which should be determined on a case-by-case basis.” Chavez v. Carpenter (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1445; see also Soto v. BorgWarner Morse TEC Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 165, 191 (interpreting CCP §377.60(c) by relying on case law interpreting CCP §377.60(b) and affirming nonsuit of great-grandson’s claims on grounds that decedent’s child care services were not financial necessities where parents admitted they could afford child care if decedent had not provided it)
While there is no “strict formula” for determining financial dependence, case law has developed criteria in evaluating whether a parent establishes dependences under CCP §377.60(b). Id. First, dependency is evaluated “at the time of the child’s death.” Id. (citing Hazelwood v. Hazelwood (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 693, 698). Second, only “financial support from their child which aids them in obtaining the things, such as shelter, clothing, food and medical treatment, which one cannot and should not do without” qualifies as financial dependence under CCP §377.60(b), as opposed to financial support that merely provides for “niceties” in life. Id. at 1446.
Plaintiff Michelle and Defendants Watts fail to negate Ken’s allegation that he was “dependent” on decedent at the time of David’s death. Moving parties rely on decedent’s 2014 testimony that he did not support his father. See Plaintiff Michelle’s SSUMF Nos. 9-10; Defendant Watts’ SSUMF Nos. 9-10. Such evidence is not probative of whether decedent was supporting Ken at the time of decedent’s death in June 2017.
Moving parties also fail to establish that Ken is judicially estopped from contradicting David’s statements at the 2014 child support hearing. Judicial estoppel should “quite clearly should be applied in the following situation: when (1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true); (4) the two positions are totally inconsistent; and (5) the first position was not taken as a result of ignorance, fraud, or mistake.” Thomas v. Gordon (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 113, 118.
Ken and David are not the same person or party, nor were David’s statements “agreements” that could bind Ken in a wrongful action proceeding. “Although a wrongful death claim is an independent action, wrongful death plaintiffs may be bound by agreements entered into by decedent that limit the scope of the wrongful death action.” Ruiz v. Podolsky (2010) 50 Cal.4th 838, 851–852. A wrongful death plaintiff may also be “bound by defenses applicable to the decedent if the statute giving rise to the defense is construed to intend such application.” Id. at 852.
In addition, David’s 2014 testimony that he was not providing any support to his father in 2014 is not wholly inconsistent with Ken’s position that David was providing financial support to him in 2017, as defined under CCP §377.60(b). David could not have been providing such support in 2014 but could have been doing so in 2017.
(3) A defendant may satisfy its initial burden on summary judgment by showing that the claim “cannot be established” because of the lack of evidence on some essential element of the claim. See Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 574, 590. The showing of lack of evidence may be made with a party’s factually devoid discovery responses. Id.
In an attempt to satisfy their initial burden based on lack of evidence on the essential element of standing, moving parties rely on Defendant Ken’s admission during discovery that he has no documentation to support his claim of financial dependence on David when David died. However, documentation of David’s payments is only one form of evidence, and the lack of one form of evidence is not the same as the lack of any evidence of standing.
Moreover, Ken submits direct evidence supporting his claim of financial dependence, namely his deposition testimony. See Dec. of L. Marks filed on 7-21-20, ¶4, Ex. 1. Ken testified during deposition that David paid his father’s monthly expenses for groceries ($400), utilities ($280) and medications ($50), transportation ($250), $300 for automobile insurance and $450 for telephone service. Id. at 28:4-8, 28:21-29:14, 51:15-52:3. These expenses qualify as basic necessities under Chavez. Ken also submits evidence that he needed David’s financial assistance for such basic necessities, because he could not otherwise afford them. Id. at 35:5-22. Ken also testified that David performed the grocery shopping, ran errands, administered Ken’s medication, chauffeured him and provided therapeutic/medical services to him. Id. at 92:20-93:23. Ken’s deposition testimony is evidence that raises a triable issue of fact as to his financial dependence on David when David died. CCP §437c(b)(2)(opposition “shall consist of … depositions…”).
(4) Michelle’s argument that Ken’s claims “compete” with her claims is also unpersuasive. Michelle cites her own complaint in support of this assertion. Michelle’s complaint is irrelevant and inadmissible for this point.
Moreover, Ken is suing for a very specific, distinct loss, i.e. loss of the specific financial support that David provided to him, not to Michelle. “The death of that child in this type of situation results in a distinct pecuniary loss to the parent which requires the parent to find aid elsewhere for the basic things we all need.” Id. at 1446. Such a loss includes loss of not just pure monetary support but may include loss of specific services the child provided, including grocery shopping and maintenance of the parent’s property. Id. at 1447 (trial court erred in determining parents were not dependent on decedent under CCP §377.60 on summary judgment where parents submitted evidence of money and services provided by decedent at time of death and parents testified they relied on decedent’s contributions of money and services to make ends meet).
Case Number: BC666678 Hearing Date: July 14, 2020 Dept: O
Case Name: Babylan, et al. v. Watts, et al.
Case No.: BC666678
Hearing: 7-14-20
Calendar #: 8
Notice: OK
Complaint Filed: 6/28/17
Motion C/O: 1/20/20
Discovery C/O: 1/3/20
Trial Date: 2/3/20
______________________________________________________________________________
SUBJECT: MOTION TO COMPEL COMPLIANCE WITH DEPOSITION SUBPOENA
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Ken Babalyan
RESP. PARTY: Hrach Gasparyan
TENTATIVE RULING
Plaintiff Ken Babalyan’s Motion to Compel Compliance with Deposition Subpoena by Hrach Gasparyan is GRANTED per CCP §1987.1. The only remaining issue in dispute is whether Gasparyan is required to appear for deposition in person. Given the pandemic, the Court orders that the deposition be taken by video conference. Gasparyan is ordered to appear for deposition on _____________________. Plaintiff Ken Babalyan did not request sanctions. Gasparyan’s request for sanctions is denied.
CCP §1987.1
“If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court's own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.” CCP §1987.1.