This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 10/28/2020 at 10:02:53 (UTC).

KAYLEIGH LUCERO VS JASON GUO ET AL

Case Summary

On 04/04/2018 KAYLEIGH LUCERO filed a Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury lawsuit against JASON GUO. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judges overseeing this case are JON R. TAKASUGI, HOLLY E. KENDIG and THOMAS D. LONG. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****0787

  • Filing Date:

    04/04/2018

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury

  • Court:

    Los Angeles County Superior Courts

  • Courthouse:

    Stanley Mosk Courthouse

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judges

JON R. TAKASUGI

HOLLY E. KENDIG

THOMAS D. LONG

 

Party Details

Plaintiff and Petitioner

LUCERO KAYLEIGH

Defendants and Respondents

DOES 1 TO 10

FUKUMORI GRACE

CENTURY 21 ASTROS

GUO JASON

FUKUMORI BOON

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff and Petitioner Attorney

MONTECLARO JAIME G. ESQ.

Defendant Attorneys

KOTHARY PRITESH S

TAN DOMINGO R

MUHAR GEORGE

PERALTA REGINA Z.

 

Court Documents

Judgment - JUDGMENT [PROPOSED] AMENDED JUDGEMENT AFTER HEARING ON DEFENDANTS HORIZON ADVENTURES INC., BOON FUKUMORI AND GRACE FUKUMORI'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

8/26/2020: Judgment - JUDGMENT [PROPOSED] AMENDED JUDGEMENT AFTER HEARING ON DEFENDANTS HORIZON ADVENTURES INC., BOON FUKUMORI AND GRACE FUKUMORI'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT)

8/20/2020: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT)

Reply - REPLY TO PLAINTIFF KAYLEIGH LUCEROS OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF DEFENDANT, JASON GUO

8/17/2020: Reply - REPLY TO PLAINTIFF KAYLEIGH LUCEROS OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF DEFENDANT, JASON GUO

Declaration - DECLARATION DECLARATION OF JAIME G. MONTECLARO, ESQ. IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

8/10/2020: Declaration - DECLARATION DECLARATION OF JAIME G. MONTECLARO, ESQ. IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Certificate of Mailing for - CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR (COURT ORDER RE RESCHEDULING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DUE T...) OF 06/08/2020

6/8/2020: Certificate of Mailing for - CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR (COURT ORDER RE RESCHEDULING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DUE T...) OF 06/08/2020

Notice of Lodging - NOTICE OF LODGING ORIGINAL DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF KAYLEIGH LUCERO

5/29/2020: Notice of Lodging - NOTICE OF LODGING ORIGINAL DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF KAYLEIGH LUCERO

Memorandum of Costs (Summary)

4/10/2020: Memorandum of Costs (Summary)

Judgment - JUDGMENT SUMMARY JUDGMENT

3/27/2020: Judgment - JUDGMENT SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Objection - OBJECTION TO NOTICE OF RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT

2/14/2020: Objection - OBJECTION TO NOTICE OF RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT

Order - ORDER (PROPOSED) ORDER

1/24/2020: Order - ORDER (PROPOSED) ORDER

Ex Parte Application - EX PARTE APPLICATION TO CONTINUE TRIAL

1/24/2020: Ex Parte Application - EX PARTE APPLICATION TO CONTINUE TRIAL

Order Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore

1/28/2020: Order Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore

Notice of Ruling

1/30/2020: Notice of Ruling

Notice of Ruling

2/3/2020: Notice of Ruling

Declaration - DECLARATION DECLARATION OF KAYLEIGH LUCERO IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION FOR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND OPPOSITION TO SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

1/15/2020: Declaration - DECLARATION DECLARATION OF KAYLEIGH LUCERO IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION FOR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND OPPOSITION TO SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

Opposition - OPPOSITION PLAINTIFF KAYLEIGH LUCERO STATEMENT OF DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS

1/15/2020: Opposition - OPPOSITION PLAINTIFF KAYLEIGH LUCERO STATEMENT OF DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS

General Denial

10/22/2018: General Denial

SUMMONS -

4/17/2018: SUMMONS -

44 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 04/05/2021
  • Hearing04/05/2021 at 08:30 AM in Department 31 at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Order to Show Cause Re: Dismissal

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  • 10/13/2020
  • DocketNotice (OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT OR ORDER); Filed by Century 21 Astros (Defendant); Boon Fukumori (Defendant); Grace Fukumori (Defendant)

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  • 09/25/2020
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department 31, Thomas D. Long, Presiding; Jury Trial - Not Held - Vacated by Court

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  • 09/23/2020
  • DocketMemorandum of Costs (Summary); Filed by Jason Guo (Defendant)

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  • 09/23/2020
  • DocketNotice (OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT OR ORDER); Filed by Jason Guo (Defendant)

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 09/11/2020
  • Docketat 10:00 AM in Department 31, Thomas D. Long, Presiding; Final Status Conference ((Remaining DeftsJason Guo and Does 1-10)) - Not Held - Vacated by Court

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  • 08/27/2020
  • DocketNotice of Ruling; Filed by Jason Guo (Defendant)

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  • 08/26/2020
  • DocketJudgment ([PROPOSED] AMENDED JUDGEMENT AFTER HEARING ON DEFENDANTS HORIZON ADVENTURES INC., BOON FUKUMORI AND GRACE FUKUMORI'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT); Filed by Century 21 Astros (Defendant); Boon Fukumori (Defendant); Grace Fukumori (Defendant)

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  • 08/20/2020
  • Docketat 1:30 PM in Department 31, Thomas D. Long, Presiding; Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment - Held - Motion Granted

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  • 08/20/2020
  • DocketMinute Order ( (Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment)); Filed by Clerk

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52 More Docket Entries
  • 06/19/2019
  • Docket[Proposed Order] and Stipulation to Continue Trial, FSC (and Related Motion/Discovery Dates) Personal Injury Courts Only (Central District); Filed by Jason Guo (Defendant)

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  • 11/06/2018
  • DocketNotice of Deposit - Jury (Fees); Filed by Century 21 Astros (Defendant); Boon Fukumori (Defendant); Grace Fukumori (Defendant)

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  • 11/06/2018
  • DocketAnswer; Filed by Century 21 Astros (Defendant); Boon Fukumori (Defendant); Grace Fukumori (Defendant)

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  • 10/22/2018
  • DocketNotice Of Change of Firm Address; Filed by Jason Guo (Defendant)

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  • 10/22/2018
  • DocketNotice of Posting of Jury Fees; Filed by Jason Guo (Defendant)

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  • 10/22/2018
  • DocketGeneral Denial; Filed by Jason Guo (Defendant)

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  • 04/17/2018
  • DocketSUMMONS

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  • 04/17/2018
  • DocketSummons Issued; Filed by Kayleigh Lucero (Plaintiff)

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  • 04/04/2018
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by Kayleigh Lucero (Plaintiff)

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  • 04/04/2018
  • DocketCOMPLAINT-PERS. INJURY, PROP DAMAGE, WRONGFUL DEATH (2 PAGES)

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Tentative Rulings

Case Number: BC700787    Hearing Date: August 20, 2020    Dept: 31

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

KAYLEIGH LUCERO,

Plaintiff(s),

vs.

JASON GUO, ET AL.,

Defendant(s).

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CASE NO: BC700787

[TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Dept. 31

1:30 p.m.

August 20, 2020

  1. Background Facts

    Plaintiff, Kayleigh Lucero filed this action against Defendants, Jason Guo, Century 21 Astros, Boon Fukumori, and Grace Fukumori for premises liability/negligence. Plaintiff alleges she was attending an open house at a home owned/being shown by Defendants, and Defendants failed to warn her of a small step between the common area and the master bedroom.

  2. Motion for Summary Judgment

    At this time, Defendant, Jason Guo (“Guo”), who owned the premises, moves for summary judgment arguing that the condition was open and obvious such that Guo is relieved of any duty to warn of the condition.

  1. Moving Argument

    Guo contends there is no evidence to show he was negligent or breached a duty to notify Plaintiff because the alleged condition- a stair with two different types of flooring was open and obvious.

  2. Opposing Argument

    Plaintiff argues she was owed a duty of care as an invitee, but there was no verbal or written warning by Gou’s agents during the open house of his property of the dangerous condition. Plaintiff further argues that although the condition was open and obvious, Guo still had a duty to warn because the danger of the condition was foreseeable. In addition, Plaintiff asserts that co-defendant Grace Fukumori failed to give notice or warning to Plaintiff despite having an opportunity to do so. Plaintiff contends that as a result, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether Guo, through his agent, failed to warn Plaintiff of the dangerous condition.

  3. Burdens on Summary Judgment

    Summary judgment is proper “if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc. §437c(c).) Where a defendant seeks summary judgment or adjudication, he must show that either “one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action.” (Id. at §437c(o)(2).) A defendant may satisfy this burden by showing that the claim “cannot be established” because of the lack of evidence on some essential element of the claim. (Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 574, 590.) Once the defendant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or defense thereto.” (Ibid.)

    The moving party bears the initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) A defendant moving for summary judgment must show either (1) that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established or (2) that there is a complete defense to that cause of action. (Id. at §437c(p).) A defendant may discharge this burden by furnishing either (1) affirmative evidence of the required facts or (2) discovery responses conceding that the plaintiff lacks evidence to establish an essential element of the plaintiff's case. If a defendant chooses the latter option he or she must present evidence “and not simply point out that plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence….” Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 865-66,

    [A] defendant may simply show the plaintiff cannot establish an essential element of the cause of action “by showing that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” (Id. at p. 854.) Thus, rather than affirmatively disproving or negating an element (e.g., causation), a defendant moving for summary judgment has the option of presenting evidence reflecting the plaintiff does not possess evidence to prove that element. “The defendant may, but need not, present evidence that conclusively negates an element of the plaintiff's cause of action. The defendant may also present evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence—as through admissions by the plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing” to support an essential element of his case. (Aguilar, supra, at p. 855.) Under the latter approach, a defendant's initial evidentiary showing may “consist of the deposition testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses, the plaintiff's factually devoid discovery responses, or admissions by the plaintiff in deposition or in response to requests for admission that he or she has not discovered anything that supports an essential element of the cause of action.” (Lona v. Citibank, N.A., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 110.) In other words, a defendant may show the plaintiff does not possess evidence to support an element of the cause of action by means of presenting the plaintiff's factually devoid discovery responses from which an absence of evidence may be reasonably inferred. (Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Construction Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 83.)

    Thus, a moving defendant has two means by which to shift the burden of proof under the summary judgment statute: “The defendant may rely upon factually insufficient discovery responses by the plaintiff to show that the plaintiff cannot establish an essential element of the cause of action sued upon. [Citation.] [Or a]lternatively, the defendant may utilize the tried and true technique of negating (‘disproving’) an essential element of the plaintiff's cause of action.” (Brantly v. Pisaro (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1591, 1598.)

    Leyva v. Garcia (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1095, 1103.

    Until the moving defendant has discharged its burden of proof, the opposing plaintiff has no burden to come forward with any evidence. Once the moving defendant has discharged its burden as to a particular cause of action, however, the plaintiff may defeat the motion by producing evidence showing that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action. (Id. at §437c(p)(2).) On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party's supporting documents are strictly construed and those of his opponent liberally construed, and doubts as to the propriety of summary judgment should be resolved against granting the motion. (D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 21.)

  4. Analysis

    Guo contends that Plaintiff herself was aware of the stair and noticed it when she entered the bedroom, and thus, Plaintiff had actual and constructive notice of the stair. Guo contends that as a result, Plaintiff’s injuries were caused by her own failure to use reasonable care while exiting the bedroom.

    The elements of a premises liability and negligence cause of action are the same: duty, breach, causation and damages. (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.) “The owner of premises is under a duty to exercise ordinary care in the management of such premises in order to avoid exposing persons to an unreasonable risk of harm. A failure to fulfill this duty is negligence.” (Brooks v. Eugene Burger Management Corp. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1611, 1619; Annocki v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 37.)

    “Generally, if a danger is so obvious that a person could reasonably be expected to see it, the condition itself serves as a warning, and the landowner is under no further duty to remedy or warn of the condition.” (Krongos v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 387, 393.) However, this is not always the case. (Ibid.) “[T]he obviousness of a condition does not necessarily excuse the potential duty of a landowner, not simply to warn of the condition but to rectify it.” (Martinez v. Chippewa Enterprises, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1184.) The obviousness of a danger “may obviate the duty to warn of its existence,” but if “if it is foreseeable that the danger may cause injury despite the fact that it is obvious (e.g, when necessity requires persons to encounter it), there may be a duty to remedy the danger, and the breach of that duty may in turn form the basis for liability . . .” (Osborn v. Mission Ready Mix (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 104, 122.)

    The Court may, in appropriate circumstances, determine a condition is open and obvious where “photographs prima facie established the obviousness” of the condition. (Martinez, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1184.) In examining photographs, the court should consider: (1) the photograph’s subject (i.e., its focal point); (2) the view of the subject (e.g., close-up, distant isolated, in context); (3) the photograph’s perspective (e.g., eye-level, overhead, ground-level); (4) the use of any plain-view altering devices (e.g., camera color filter, fish-eye lens, computer-manipulation); (5) the characteristics of the photograph (e.g., sharp and clear, blurry, grainy, color or black and white); (6) whether the photograph was taken under identical or substantially similar conditions (e.g., timing, lighting, weather); and (7) any other relevant circumstances (e.g., addition of extrinsic aids, such as a ruler or pointer). (Kasparian, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at pp. 24-25.)

    Here, the basic facts in this action are undisputed. Plaintiff entered the master bedroom and successfully navigated the one stair between the common area and the bedroom. She was in the bedroom for approximately two minutes, and when she left the bedroom she did not notice the step and fell on the step. (UMF 4-11.)

    Guo’s evidence is sufficient to establish the stair was open and obvious. The court has reviewed the photos of the stair and finds the “photographs prima facie established the obviousness” of the condition. (Martinez, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1184; see Mot. Exh. B; see also Opp. Exh. B.) The stair is obvious to anyone walking to or from the bedroom, and Plaintiff herself had successfully navigated the star walking into the bedroom before she subsequently fell on it. Further, Plaintiff does not cite any authority to support a finding that a real estate agent, such as Grace Fukumori, should essentially be required to stand at the stair and warn each person of its existence.

    Plaintiff, in opposition, argues that despite the condition being open and obvious, it was foreseeable the condition could cause injury, and thus, Guo had a duty to warn Plaintiff of the condition. Plaintiff primarily cites to three cases in making this argument: Osborn v. Mission Ready Mix (1990) 224 Cal. App. 3d 104; Alcaraz v. Vece (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1149, 1155-62, and

    In Osborn v. Mission Ready Mix, the main case relied upon by Plaintiffs, the plaintiff was required to walk across rubble consisting of dirt mixed with broken pieces of concrete carrying a heavy hose in order to load his truck, and fell while doing so. (224 Cal. App. 3d 104, 109-110.) As a result, the plaintiff's job duties necessitated that he expose himself to the dangerous condition on the defendant's property. (See Id.) The Court noted that although the subject condition may have been obvious and negated the duty to warn, there may still have been a duty to remedy the condition if it was foreseeable that the condition might cause injury despite its obvious nature. (Id. at 119-20.) “Thus, although the obviousness of a danger may obviate the duty to warn of its existence, if it is foreseeable that the danger may cause injury despite the fact that it is obvious (for example, when necessity requires persons to encounter it), there may be a duty to remedy the danger, and the breach of that duty may in turn form the basis for liability, if the breach of duty was a proximate cause of any injury.” (Id. at 122.)

    In Alcaraz v. Vece, a tenant was injured after stepping into a broken water meter. The tenant sued his landlord. It was undisputed that the property line did not extend to the water meter, because the water meter was located on a strip of land approximately two-feet wide between the sidewalk and the landlord's property line, which was owned by the city. However, the Supreme Court concluded the landlord could nevertheless be held liable if the tenant produced sufficient evidence to demonstrate the landlord (1) was aware of the hazard, and (2) exercised control over that portion of property. The Court found that the landlord was aware of the defect from complaints it had received. The Court also held that there were, at a minimum, triable issues of material fact regarding the issue of control, given both that the landlord mowed the lawn surrounding the meter as if the land was part of its property and that the landlord later built a fence around the property that included the two-foot strip of land. (Alcaraz v. Vece (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1149, 1155-62.)

    In Jacobs v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co., plaintiff, a prospective purchaser of property, was injured when he stood on a diving board adjacent to an empty swimming pool, the diving board broke, and plaintiff fell into the empty pool. (14 Cal.App.5th 443, 446.) The issue there was “whether there was any evidence from which a trier of fact could find that, as a practical necessity, [plaintiff] was foreseeably required to expose himself to the danger of falling into the empty pool.” (Id. at 447.) The plaintiff failed to plead the empty pool theory, but even if he had, where there was “no foreseeable practical necessity” requiring plaintiff to encounter the danger, defendant had no duty to protect plaintiff from the “open and obvious danger of the empty pool.” (Id. at 446.) The potential buyer did not have to approach the dangerous condition in order to inspect the backyard; the buyer could easily avoid the edge of the empty pool as they viewed the property. (Id. at 448.)

    The court finds none of these cases to be on point. Unlike in Osborn, where there was a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant breached the duty to repair a dangerous condition, Plaintiff here is not alleging that Guo breached any duty to remedy the condition, or even arguing that the subject stair needed to be repaired in any manner. Further, unlike in Alcaraz, there are no issues here as to whether Guo had control over the condition. In addition, while Plaintiff suggests that despite the obviousness of the dangers of an empty swimming pool in Jacobs, the listing agent posted a warning concerning the swimming pool. The court in Jacobs expressly held that the defendant was under no duty to warn because it was not foreseeable the plaintiff would use a diving board for an unintended purpose, but did not hold or address whether the defendant was required to give the warning it did in the listing. (State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. Pietak (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 600, 614 [“Cases are not authority for propositions not considered therein.”].) Accordingly, these cases did not hold a landowner had a duty to warn under the circumstances presented here.

    Moreover, Plaintiff argues her injuries were foreseeable because she was being led by another person around the premises, and because the floor appeared level when Plaintiff was walking. However, Plaintiff fails to explain or provide evidence showing that her injuries are foreseeable simply because she is being led around the premises by another person, especially when considering the undisputed evidence shows that Plaintiff had already traversed the stair without issue approximately two minutes before the incident. Further, as analyzed above, the evidence establishes that subject stair was open obvious, and Plaintiff does not otherwise defective or in need of any repair. What is more, Plaintiff does not submit any evidence showing Guo was aware the stair posed a danger or risk of injury to other persons.

    Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff fails to raise a triable issue of fact regarding any duty to warn by Guo. The motion for summary judgment is therefore granted.

    Moving Defendant is ordered to give notice.

    Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at sscdept31@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If the parties do not submit on the tentative, they should arrange to appear remotely.

    Dated this 20th day of August, 2020

Hon. Thomas D. Long

Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: BC700787    Hearing Date: January 28, 2020    Dept: 31

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

KAYLEIGH LUCERO,

Plaintiff(s),

vs.

JASON GUO, ET AL.,

Defendant(s).

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)

)

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)

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CASE NO: BC700787

[TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Dept. 31

1:30 p.m.

January 28, 2020

1. Background Facts

Plaintiff, Kayleigh Lucero filed this action against Defendants, Jason Guo, Century 21 Astros, Boon Fukumori, and Grace Fukumori for premises liability/negligence. Plaintiff alleges she was attending an open house at a home owned/being shown by Defendants, and Defendants failed to warn her of a small step between the common area and the master bedroom.

2. Motion for Summary Judgment

At this time, Horizon Adventures, Inc. dba Century 21 Astro (erroneously named as Century 21 Astro) and the Fukumoris move for summary judgment on the complaint, contending the condition was open and obvious such that they had no duty to warn of the condition.

a. Initial Note

The Court’s First Amended General Order Re: Mandatory Electronic Filing for Civil, dated 5/03/19, ¶9(b)(vi, requires parties to lodge tabbed courtesy copies of all papers in support of or opposition to a summary judgment motion. The Court notes that neither Defendants nor Plaintiff provided the required courtesy copies of the moving, opposition, and/or reply papers. The Court will rule on the motion despite this failure, but asks Counsel to ensure courtesy copies are provided in the future in connection with this and other actions.

b. Evidentiary Objections

Defendants object to all of Plaintiff’s submitted exhibits on the ground that the exhibits were not included with the copy of the opposition served on Defendants. The objections are sustained. The exhibits were also not included with the copy of the opposition filed with the Court. The Court will permit Plaintiff to bring copies of the exhibits to the hearing if she chooses to do so, and will consider continuing the hearing on the motion if review of the exhibits tends to support denial of the motion.

c. Analysis

The basic facts relating to this action are undisputed. Plaintiff entered the master bedroom and successfully navigated the one stair between the common area and the bedroom. She was in the bedroom for approximately two minutes, and when she left the bedroom she did not notice the step and fell on the step.

The parties discuss the ruling in Hall v. Radcliff Realtors (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1141 in connection with the issue of whether Defendants had an obligation to warn Plaintiff about the stair between the common area and the master bedroom. In Hall, there was a stairway ladder that was in disrepair. An inspector of the property had recommended replacing the ladder under a heading “Health and Safety Repairs – Group 1” in his report, which report had been given to the agents. The plaintiff was injured on the defective stairway ladder when a hinge broke and the ladder failed.

The Court finds Hall is not on point. The defects in the ladder were concealed defects. There is nothing about a stair between a bedroom and a common area that is a “concealed defect.” The stair is obvious to anyone who looks at it. The Court notes that steps into bedrooms are common and can serve a variety of purposes. The Court also notes that a ruling requiring a real estate agent to essentially stand by the stair and warn each person of its existence would drastically deviate from the ordinary duties imposed on a real estate agent. Finally, the Court notes that Plaintiff herself had successfully navigated the stair before she subsequently fell on the stair.

The Court finds there is no concealed defect at issue, and therefore no duty to warn arises. The motion for summary judgment is granted. Defendant is ordered to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at sscdept31@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.

Dated this 28th day of January, 2020

Hon. Jon Takasugi

Judge of the Superior Court