This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 08/20/2020 at 21:56:46 (UTC).

KATELYN SANCHEZ VS CITY OF LONG BEACH ET AL

Case Summary

On 01/10/2018 KATELYN SANCHEZ filed a Personal Injury - Motor Vehicle lawsuit against CITY OF LONG BEACH. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Governor George Deukmejian Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judges overseeing this case are LAURA A. SEIGLE, MICHAEL P. VICENCIA, MARK C. KIM and EDWARD B. MORETON. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****9551

  • Filing Date:

    01/10/2018

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Personal Injury - Motor Vehicle

  • Court:

    Los Angeles County Superior Courts

  • Courthouse:

    Governor George Deukmejian Courthouse

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judges

LAURA A. SEIGLE

MICHAEL P. VICENCIA

MARK C. KIM

EDWARD B. MORETON

 

Party Details

Plaintiff and Petitioner

SANCHEZ KATELYN

Defendants, Respondents and Cross Defendants

LOS ANGELES CITY OF

LOS ANGELES COUNTY OF

DOES 1 TO 100 INCLUSIVE

HERNANDEZ ARMANDO

LONG BEACH CITY OF

HERNANDEZ JR. RAY

CITY OF LOS ANGELES

HERNANDEZ RAY JR.

CITY OF LONG BEACH

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

Defendant and Cross Plaintiff

CITY OF LONG BEACH

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff and Petitioner Attorneys

GEOULLA DANIEL D. ESQ.

GEOULLA DANIEL DANNY ESQ.

HOMAMPOUR ARASH

Defendant Attorneys

VIGUS TODD

STOCKALPER PATRICK EDWARD

BEVAN KYLE R.

 

Court Documents

Brief - BRIEF DEFENDANT CITY OF LONG BEACH'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL

2/5/2020: Brief - BRIEF DEFENDANT CITY OF LONG BEACH'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (COURT ORDER)

2/6/2020: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (COURT ORDER)

Certificate of Mailing for - CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR (COURT ORDER) OF 02/06/2020

2/6/2020: Certificate of Mailing for - CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR (COURT ORDER) OF 02/06/2020

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL)

2/13/2020: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL)

Proof of Service by Mail

2/21/2020: Proof of Service by Mail

Reply - REPLY REPLY TO DEFENDANT CITY OF LONG BEACH'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

2/27/2020: Reply - REPLY REPLY TO DEFENDANT CITY OF LONG BEACH'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Motion to Compel - MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT CITY OF LONG BEACH'S MOTION FOR AN ORDER COMPELLING COMPLIANCE WITH SUBOPENA FOR STUDENT RECORDS

4/1/2020: Motion to Compel - MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT CITY OF LONG BEACH'S MOTION FOR AN ORDER COMPELLING COMPLIANCE WITH SUBOPENA FOR STUDENT RECORDS

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER DISCOVERY RESPONSES; HEAR...)

7/2/2020: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER DISCOVERY RESPONSES; HEAR...)

Application And Order For Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem - APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOR KATELYN

7/18/2019: Application And Order For Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem - APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOR KATELYN

Answer

8/19/2019: Answer

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A CROSS-COMPLAINT)

10/23/2019: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A CROSS-COMPLAINT)

Summons - SUMMONS CROSS-COMPLAINT

10/24/2019: Summons - SUMMONS CROSS-COMPLAINT

Cross-Complaint

10/24/2019: Cross-Complaint

Request for Dismissal

11/5/2019: Request for Dismissal

Notice - NOTICE DEFENDANT COUNTY OF LOS ANGELESS NOTICE OF TAKING MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFFS RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, SET ONE OFF CALENDAR

11/20/2019: Notice - NOTICE DEFENDANT COUNTY OF LOS ANGELESS NOTICE OF TAKING MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFFS RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, SET ONE OFF CALENDAR

Answer - ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

5/1/2019: Answer - ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

CoverSheet -

1/10/2018: CoverSheet -

Complaint -

1/10/2018: Complaint -

66 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 01/19/2021
  • Hearing01/19/2021 at 08:30 AM in Department S27 at 275 Magnolia, Long Beach, CA 90802; Jury Trial

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  • 01/14/2021
  • Hearing01/14/2021 at 08:30 AM in Department S27 at 275 Magnolia, Long Beach, CA 90802; Final Status Conference

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  • 12/17/2020
  • Hearing12/17/2020 at 08:30 AM in Department S27 at 275 Magnolia, Long Beach, CA 90802; Hearing on Motion for Sanctions

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  • 11/10/2020
  • Hearing11/10/2020 at 08:30 AM in Department S27 at 275 Magnolia, Long Beach, CA 90802; Hearing on Motion for Sanctions

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  • 09/01/2020
  • Hearing09/01/2020 at 08:30 AM in Department S27 at 275 Magnolia, Long Beach, CA 90802; Case Management Conference

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  • 09/01/2020
  • Hearing09/01/2020 at 08:30 AM in Department S27 at 275 Magnolia, Long Beach, CA 90802; Hearing on Demurrer - without Motion to Strike

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  • 08/19/2020
  • DocketAssociation of Attorney; Filed by Katelyn Sanchez (Plaintiff)

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  • 08/17/2020
  • DocketCase Management Statement; Filed by Katelyn Sanchez (Plaintiff)

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  • 08/17/2020
  • DocketCase Management Statement; Filed by City of Long Beach (Defendant)

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  • 08/06/2020
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department S27, Mark C. Kim, Presiding; Status Conference (re discovery) - Held

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96 More Docket Entries
  • 06/03/2019
  • DocketNotice of Ruling; Filed by Katelyn Sanchez (Plaintiff)

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  • 05/31/2019
  • Docketat 1:30 PM in Department 4B; Hearing on Motion to Continue Trial - Held - Motion Granted

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  • 05/31/2019
  • DocketMinute Order ( (Hearing on Motion to Continue Trial)); Filed by Clerk

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  • 05/07/2019
  • DocketMotion to Continue Trial Date; Filed by Katelyn Sanchez (Plaintiff)

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  • 05/01/2019
  • DocketAnswer (to Complaint); Filed by City of Long Beach (Defendant)

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  • 04/30/2019
  • DocketRequest for Dismissal; Filed by Katelyn Sanchez (Plaintiff)

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  • 01/10/2018
  • DocketComplaint

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  • 01/10/2018
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by Katelyn Sanchez (Plaintiff)

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  • 01/10/2018
  • DocketCivil Case Cover Sheet

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  • 01/10/2018
  • DocketSummons; Filed by Katelyn Sanchez (Plaintiff)

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Tentative Rulings

Case Number: BC689551    Hearing Date: August 06, 2020    Dept: S27

Plaintiff, Katelyn Sanchez filed this action against Defendants, City of Long Beach, Ray Hernandez, Jr., and Armando Hernandez for damages arising out of an automobile accident. Plaintiff’s operative First Amended Complaint, filed on 4/03/20, includes causes of action for motor vehicle negligence and general negligence against the Hernandezes and for dangerous condition of public property against the City.

On 5/04/20, the City of Long Beach filed a demurrer to the operative First Amended Complaint; the demurrer indicated the hearing date and time were “TBD” in light of the ongoing court closure due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Clerk’s office scheduled the hearing on the demurrer for 8/06/20. To date, however, there is no notice of hearing in the file, and there is no opposition to the demurrer in the file. The Court is concerned that Plaintiff did not oppose the demurrer because Plaintiff did not have notice of the demurrer.

The hearing on the demurrer is therefore continued to Tuesday, 9/01/20 at 8:30 a.m. in Department S27 of the Long Beach Courthouse. Opposition and reply are due per Code.

The City is ordered to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at gdcdepts27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If the parties do not submit on the tentative, they should arrange to appear remotely.

Case Number: BC689551    Hearing Date: July 02, 2020    Dept: S27

  1. Background Facts

Plaintiff, Katelyn Sanchez filed this action against Defendants, City of Long Beach, Ray Hernandez, Jr., and Armando Hernandez for damages arising out of an automobile accident. Plaintiff’s operative First Amended Complaint, filed on 4/03/20, includes causes of action for motor vehicle negligence and general negligence against the Hernandezes and for dangerous condition of public property against the City.

  1. Motion to Compel Compliance with Deposition Subpoena

The City moves to compel Whittier Elementary School to comply with a deposition subpoena for production of business records that the City propounded on 1/21/20.

The motion is denied for two reasons. First, the subpoena, attached to the moving papers as Exhibit B, includes a mostly blank proof of service. The proof of service does not indicate who was served, where, what date, what time, etc. The proof of service is also not signed. CCP § 2020.220(b) requires a subpoena to be personally served on the non-party deponent. Absent proof of service, the Court will not compel compliance.

Additionally, per CRC 3.1346, when moving to compel a non-party to comply with a deposition subpoena, all moving papers must be served on the non-party by personal service. The City filed proof of service of the motion on Plaintiff by mail. There is, however, no proof of service of the moving papers on Deponent. This is insufficient. The motion is therefore denied on this ground as well.

  1. Motion to Compel Further Responses to RPDs

Plaintiff propounded RFPs on the City, and the City responded. Despite attempts to meet and confer, the parties have been unable to resolve outstanding issues relating to RPDs 21-29. RPD 21 seeks identification of and production of any and all Traffic Collision Reports involving pedestrians at the intersection of Burnett Street and Pacific Avenue in Long Beach. RPDs 22-29 seek identification of and production of the Traffic Collision Reports for various specific accidents (previously identified between the parties) that occurred at the subject intersection, including notes, statements, interviews, videos, and/or photographs relating to the Traffic Collision Reports.

Plaintiff moves to compel further responses to these RPDs, and argues the responses are deficient for four separate reasons. Specifically, Plaintiff contends:

  1. Which Documents Respond to Which Requests

    Plaintiff contends the City has failed to identify which documents respond to which requests. CCP § 2031.280(a) provides, “Any documents or category of documents produced in response to a demand for inspection…shall be identified with the specific request number to which the documents respond.”

    The City, in its opposition to the motion, does not address this argument. In its opposing separate statement, the City contends each police report produced is affixed with a unique DR # that identifies the report. The City’s production is clearly not code-compliant, as the Code requires the documents produced to be identified with the specific request number; a DR# is not a substitute for this requirement. Counsel must meet and confer to resolve these issues, and the City must produce documents in a code-compliant manner.

  2. All relevant Traffic Collision Reports

    RDP 21 seeks production of all traffic collision reports involving pedestrians at the subject intersection. Plaintiff contends SWITRS reports indicate that at least 47 other accidents have occurred at the subject location since 2007, but the City has only produced a handful of reports. Plaintiff seeks identification of and production of all the reports. The City does not address this argument in its opposing memorandum or opposing separate statement. The City must identify and produce all the subject traffic collision reports.

  3. Redacted Reports

    The City redacted all the reports it produced to eliminate any identifying information about the persons involved in the prior accidents. Plaintiff seeks an order that the reports cannot be redacted. Plaintiff contends this information is necessary so Plaintiff can contact the persons and inquire about how the accident occurred; if the accidents were substantially similar to the one that forms the basis of this lawsuit, Plaintiff contends this will support her showing that the intersection was dangerous. The parties disagree concerning whether the third parties’ information is private and, if so, whether the need for the information outweighs the right to privacy.

    Plaintiff argues the third parties’ identifying information is in a public database, and that names, addresses, and phone numbers of third party witnesses are generally discoverable. Notably, Plaintiff does not clarify whether the database is public in the sense that a public entity maintains the database, or in the sense that the public can access the database; it appears to be the former, as Plaintiff would otherwise simply obtain the information sought from the database itself. The City contends these third parties are not percipient witnesses and, therefore, their identities are not discoverable. Plaintiff relies on Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360, 367 and Puerto v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1251-52 to support her position, and the City relies on Coito v. Superior Court (2012) 54 Cal.4th 480, 502 to support its position.

    Information pertaining to a third person may be within the recognized “zone of privacy” protected from discovery in an action between other parties. Coito, supra, at 502. Where nonparties' identity is relevant to the action (e.g., because they have suffered similar injuries), a party may be compelled to disclose their names, addresses and phone numbers, provided the nonparties are notified and given an opportunity to object to disclosure of their contact information. Pioneer Electronics, supra, at 367.

    Although disclosure may invade their privacy, there is generally no protection for the identity, addresses and phone numbers of percipient witnesses. Thus, a court may not require the party seeking discovery to obtain the witnesses' consent to disclosure: “[A] percipient witness's willingness to participate in civil discovery has never been considered relevant—witnesses may be compelled to appear and testify whether they want to or not.” Puerto, supra, at 1251-1252.

    Notably, Coito, Pioneer Electronics, and Puerto are all distinguishable from the facts of the instant case. Coito concerned percipient witnesses, and the issue was attorney work product protection; attorney work product protection is not raised or at issue here. Pioneer Electronics involved searching for potential additional class members, all of whom would then have a vested interest in the outcome of the litigation itself. Puerto involved percipient witnesses in the true sense of the word, as the witnesses had actually seen the incident that formed the basis of this litigation.

    In this case, the witnesses’ relationship to the incident falls somewhere between the witnesses’ relationship in Pioneer Electronics and in Puerto. The witnesses will not, under any circumstances, become parties to this litigation. They are not, however, true percipient witnesses, as they did not witness the incident that forms the basis of this litigation.

    Notably, a protective order may limit the discovering party's use and dissemination of a witness' contact information. Puerto at 1259. In this case, the Court is inclined to require the City to provide the unredacted contact information, subject to a protective order making clear that Plaintiff and her attorney can use the information only for purposes of this litigation. Counsel are ordered to meet and confer to draft a protective order in this regard.

    d. Code-Compliant Response

    Plaintiff’s final argument is that Defendant’s responses are not code-compliant, as they do not indicate whether the remainder of the documents sought are not being produced because they never existed, were lost or destroyed, etc. Defendant’s responses merely state the City made a diligent search but does not have any remaining documents. CCP § 2031.230 requires a party who cannot comply with a demand to specify whether the inability to comply is because the particular item or category has never existed, has been destroyed, has been lost, misplaced, or stolen, or has never been, or is no longer, in the possession, custody, or control of the responding party.

    Defendant merely stated that, after a diligent search and reasonable inquiry, it does not have certain responsive documents. This is not code-compliant per the above discussion. The City must therefore provide further, code-compliant responses.

  1. Sanctions

    Plaintiff seeks sanctions in the amount of $60 (Plaintiff’s filing fee) against the City. The City argues sanctions should not be imposed because it is taking its position in good faith. The Court appreciates Plaintiff’s restraint in only seeking to recover her filing fees. The Court finds the City failed to address many of the arguments advanced, such that a $60 sanction is eminently reasonable. The sanction is sought and imposed jointly and severally against the City and its attorney of record; they must pay the sanction to Plaintiff, by and through her attorney of record, within twenty days.

  1. Conclusion

The City’s motion to compel compliance with deposition subpoena is denied. Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to RPDs is granted. Plaintiff’s request for sanctions is granted.

Plaintiff is ordered to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at gdcdepts27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If the parties do not submit on the tentative, they should arrange to appear remotely.

Case Number: BC689551    Hearing Date: March 05, 2020    Dept: S27

TR: Defendant City of Long Beach’s motion is GRANTED with leave to amend within 20 days.

INTRODUCTION:

On January 10, 2018, Plaintiff Katelyn Sanchez (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants City of Long Beach (“City”), City of Los Angeles, County of Los Angeles, Ray Hernandez, Jr. (“Ray”), and Armando Hernandez (“Armando”) for general negligence, motor vehicle negligence, and dangerous condition of public property.

On October 24, 2019, City filed a Cross-Complaint against Ray and Armando.

Trial is currently set for September 8, 2020.

ALLEGATIONS:

Only the third cause of action for dangerous condition of property is claimed against City. Plaintiff alleges that on January 14, 2017, she was seriously injured by a vehicle driven by Ray while she was walking across a cross-walk in Long Beach. (Complaint, ¶ DCP-2.) City permitted the intersection to constitute a dangerous condition of public property in that it lacked proper safety measures, namely, an only partially operational street light, flashing intermittently. (Id. at ¶ DCP-5.) Ray’s vehicle colliding into a pedestrian, i.e., Plaintiff was foreseeable to City because they failed to take measures to insure the streetlights were fully-operational. (Id. at ¶ DCP-7.) Further signs, warnings, or other devices were necessary to warn of these dangerous conditions. (Id. at ¶ DCP-11.)

I. Judgment on the Pleadings

When the moving party is a defendant, a motion for judgment on the pleading may be granted where either of the following conditions exist: (i) the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the complaint, or (ii) the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant. (CCP § 438(c)(1)(B).)

The motion may be made to the entire complaint or answer, or one of the causes of actions or affirmative defenses. (Id. at (c)(2).) The motion may be made only after the defendant has filed an answer to the complaint and the time to demur to the complaint has expired. (Id. at (f)(2).) Further, the grounds for this motion must appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court may take judicial notice. (Id. at (d); Sebago, Inc. v. City of Alameda (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1372, 1380.)

Judgment on the pleadings must be denied where there are material factual issues that require evidentiary resolution. (See Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons (2000) 24 Cal.4th 468, 515-516; Lance Camper Manufacturing Corp. v. Republic Indemnity Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 194, 198; Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999.)

Before filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the moving party shall meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion to determine if an agreement can be reached. (CCP § 439(a).) However, a determination by the Court that the meet and confer process was insufficient is not grounds to grant or deny the motion. (Id. at (a)(4).)

City has complied with the meet and confer requirement. (Bevan Decl., ¶¶ 2-4.)

  1. Judicial Notice

Defendant requests judicial notice of Long Beach Municipal Code §§ 21.47.030 subsections B, C, and D.3., 14.28.020, 14.28.030, and 14.28.040. The request for judicial notice is GRANTED. (Evid. Code § 452.)

  1. Dangerous Condition of Public Property

“The California Tort Claims Act provides that ‘a public entity is not liable for an injury,’ ‘except as otherwise provided by statute.’ (Gov. Code, § 815, subd. (a).) As that language indicates, the intent of the Tort Claims Act is to confine potential governmental liability, not expand it.” (Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1179.) Public entities cannot be liable for common law theories of general negligence. (Miklosy v. Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 899 [“section 815 abolishes common law tort liability for public entities”].) Therefore, liability against a public entity must be authorized by statute. (Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1179; Gov. Code, § 815, subd. (a) [“A public entity is not liable for an injury . . . except as otherwise provided by statute”].)

“Ordinarily, negligence may be pleaded in general terms and the plaintiff need not specify the precise act or omission alleged to constitute the breach of duty. [Citation]. However, because under the Tort Claims Act all governmental tort liability is based on statute, the general rule that statutory causes of action must be pleaded with particularity is applicable. Thus, ‘to state a cause of action against a public entity, every fact material to the existence of its statutory liability must be pleaded with particularity.’” (Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780, 795.)

Here, as City’s reply points out, the opposition provides additional allegations of other dangerous conditions existing at the intersections that are not in the Complaint such as: (1) Two nearby street lights not operating properly; (2) No mandated speed drop as it was nearby a school; (3) A line of trees obstructing the view of both pedestrians on the cross-walk and drivers; (4) The intersection constituted a heavy traffic area due to local businesses; (5) The pedestrian walking zone did not feature light-up warning signs or appropriate lighting to warn drivers to slow down; and (6) The intersection had inadequate markings, traffic controls, and warnings. These are facts material to the existence of City’s statutory liability and as such must be pled. Thus, the allegations in the Complaint are not pled with sufficient particularity against City and the motion must be granted.

City also argues that it is immune from liability based on Government Code § 830.4. Government Code section 830.4 provides that, “[a] condition is not a dangerous condition within the meaning of this chapter merely because of the failure to provide regulatory traffic control signals, stop signs, yield right-of-way signs, or speed restriction signs, as described by the Vehicle Code, or distinctive roadway markings…”

However, “[c]ases interpreting this statute have held that it provides a shield against liability only in those situations where the alleged dangerous condition exists solely as a result of the public entity's failure to provide a regulatory traffic device or street marking. If a traffic intersection is dangerous for reasons other than the failure to provide regulatory signals or street markings, the statute provides no immunity.” (Washington v. City and County of San Francisco (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1531, 1534-1535.) Based on the additional allegations in the opposition, this immunity may not apply.

Conclusion

City’s Motion for Judgement on the Pleadings is GRANTED with leave to amend within 20 days.