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This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 07/01/2019 at 01:02:40 (UTC).

JULIE A ESPHORST VS DARRYL LEANDER HICKS ET AL

Case Summary

On 04/03/2018 JULIE A ESPHORST filed a Personal Injury - Motor Vehicle lawsuit against DARRYL LEANDER HICKS. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Torrance Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judges overseeing this case are YOLANDA OROZCO, LAURA A. SEIGLE and DEIRDRE HILL. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****0634

  • Filing Date:

    04/03/2018

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Personal Injury - Motor Vehicle

  • Court:

    Los Angeles County Superior Courts

  • Courthouse:

    Torrance Courthouse

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judges

YOLANDA OROZCO

LAURA A. SEIGLE

DEIRDRE HILL

 

Party Details

Plaintiffs and Petitioners

ESPHORST JULIE A.

ESPHORST JESSE

Claimant

CALIFORNIA VICTIM COMPENSATION BOARD

Defendants, Respondents, Cross Plaintiffs and Cross Defendants

TORRANCE CITY OF

HICKS DARRYL LEANDER

LOS ANGELES COUNTY OF

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

MING TUNG

DOES 1 TO 75

SHAWNAN

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

ESPHORST JESSE FRANKLIN

SHAWNAN SHAWNAN

HICKS DARRYL LEANDER JR

11 More Parties Available

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff and Petitioner Attorneys

TAYLOR JOHN C. ESQ.

TAYLOR JOHN CORNELL ESQ.

MARDIROSSIAN GARO ESQ.

Claimant Attorney

DELAINI LARENDA RAI

Defendant and Cross Plaintiff Attorneys

VUONG NENA T. DEPUTY ATTORNEY

SPRADLIN DANIEL

WESIERSKI & ZUREK LLP

HYDE SHERAL ANN

SHCERER JEANNE E. CHIEF COUNSEL

STEWART BRIAN K. ESQ.

KAHN RUTH D. ESQ.

COLLINS COLLINS MUIR & STEWART LLP

SPRADLIN DANIEL KEVIN ESQ.

SPRADLIN DANIEL K. ESQ.

Cross Defendant Attorneys

MARKS LAWRENCE

MAKI KEVIN MICHAEL

 

Court Documents

NOTICE OF POSTING JURY FFES BY DEFENDANT SHAWNAN

6/11/2018: NOTICE OF POSTING JURY FFES BY DEFENDANT SHAWNAN

CIVIL DEPOSIT

6/11/2018: CIVIL DEPOSIT

Minute Order

7/26/2018: Minute Order

ANSWER OF DEFENDANT TUNG MING TO COMPLAINT

8/14/2018: ANSWER OF DEFENDANT TUNG MING TO COMPLAINT

CROSS-COMPLAINT OF CITY OF TORRANCE FOR EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT, INDEMNITY AND DECLARATORY RELIEF

8/30/2018: CROSS-COMPLAINT OF CITY OF TORRANCE FOR EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT, INDEMNITY AND DECLARATORY RELIEF

Legacy Document

9/24/2018: Legacy Document

Amended Complaint

10/16/2018: Amended Complaint

Minute Order

1/10/2019: Minute Order

Cross-Complaint

1/22/2019: Cross-Complaint

Answer

1/23/2019: Answer

Notice of Case Management Conference

2/8/2019: Notice of Case Management Conference

Notice

2/21/2019: Notice

Opposition

3/6/2019: Opposition

Reply

3/12/2019: Reply

Minute Order

3/19/2019: Minute Order

Notice of Related Case

4/29/2019: Notice of Related Case

Minute Order

5/24/2018: Minute Order

CIVIL DEPOSIT

5/10/2018: CIVIL DEPOSIT

87 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 06/26/2019
  • at 1:30 PM in Department 4B, Laura A. Seigle, Presiding; Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment - Not Held - Advanced and Vacated

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  • 06/14/2019
  • Notice of Lien; Filed by California Victim Compensation Board (Claimant)

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  • 06/04/2019
  • Stipulation and Order (Re: City of Torrance's Informal Production of Documents to Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.); Filed by Torrance, City of (Defendant)

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  • 05/31/2019
  • Notice (of Court Order Re: Notice of Related Cases); Filed by Julie A. Esphorst (Plaintiff)

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  • 05/23/2019
  • Answer (of City of Torrance to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint); Filed by Torrance, City of (Defendant)

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  • 05/21/2019
  • at 10:32 AM in Department B, Deirdre Hill, Presiding; Court Order

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  • 05/21/2019
  • Minute Order ( (Court Order re: Notice of Related Cases)); Filed by Clerk

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  • 05/21/2019
  • Certificate of Mailing for (Minute Order (Court Order re: Notice of Related Cases) of 05/21/2019); Filed by Clerk

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  • 05/14/2019
  • at 08:30 AM in Department B, Deirdre Hill, Presiding; Case Management Conference (re ruling on all notice of related cases) - Held - Continued

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  • 05/14/2019
  • at 08:30 AM in Department B, Deirdre Hill, Presiding; Hearing on Demurrer - without Motion to Strike - Held

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148 More Docket Entries
  • 05/15/2018
  • PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

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  • 05/15/2018
  • PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

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  • 05/15/2018
  • PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

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  • 05/15/2018
  • PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

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  • 05/10/2018
  • Receipt; Filed by Julie A. Esphorst (Plaintiff)

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  • 05/10/2018
  • CIVIL DEPOSIT

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  • 04/11/2018
  • Complaint; Filed by Jesse Esphorst (Plaintiff)

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  • 04/03/2018
  • PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT

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  • 04/03/2018
  • SUMMONS

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  • 04/03/2018
  • Complaint; Filed by Julie A. Esphorst (Plaintiff)

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Tentative Rulings

Case Number: BC700634    Hearing Date: April 28, 2021    Dept: M

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Southwest District

Torrance Dept. M

JULIE A. ESPHORST,

Plaintiff,

Case No.:

BC700634

vs.

[Tentative] RULING

DARRYL LEANDER HICKS, et al.,

Defendants.

Hearing Date: April 28, 2021

Moving Parties: Plaintiff Julia Esphorst

Responding Party: Defendant Tung Ming

Motion to Compel the In-Person Deposition of Defendant Tung Ming

The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply.

RULING

The motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

On April 3, 2018, plaintiff Julie A. Esphorst filed a complaint against Darryl Leander Hicks, Tung Ming, Caltrans, County of Los Angeles, City of Torrance, and Shawnan for wrongful death – negligence, negligence per se, and dangerous condition of public property based on the death of her son in a vehicle accident.

LEGAL AUTHORITY

CCP §2025.450(a) provides: “If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party, . . , without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any document . . . described in the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponent’s attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document . . . described in the deposition notice.”

CCP §2025.450(b) provides, “A motion under subdivision (a) shall comply with both of the following:

(1) The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice.

(2) The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040, or, when the deponent fails to attend the deposition and produce the documents, electronically stored information, or things described in the deposition notice, by a declaration stating that the petitioner has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance.”

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff requests an order compelling defendant Tung Ming to appear for his deposition in-person.

Plaintiff contends that plaintiff noticed defendant’s deposition twice but that defendant Ming failed to object to either notice but refused to appear for his deposition unless it was taken remotely from an undisclosed location.

Plaintiff argues that she has good cause because during the deposition, counsel needs to show him maps and illustrations so that he can explain when and what occurred at various locations and will necessarily require him to point to, mark up and draw on exhibits; plaintiff intends to show defendant dozens of exhibits and if forced to take the deposition remotely, the deposition may go beyond seven hours; depositions involving multiple parties when taken via remote means “often result in transcript errors”; and plaintiff has filed a separate lawsuit for fraudulent conveyance against Ming and Ming has been avoiding service of the summons and complaint and Ming should be required to personally appear for his deposition so that he can be served. Plaintiff further represents that counsel will provide face masks, sanitizer, and a large enough conference room to allow for distancing.

In opposition, defendant argues that there is no good cause to compel defendant to appear in person at his deposition. Defendant contends that plaintiff’s request “is out of the ordinary for current practices and requiring defendant Ming to appear in person just so he can then be served with another summons and complaint is in no way an authorized reason or basis for ordering a deposition in person.” Defendant argues that the provision of facemasks, sanitizer, and social distancing “do not vitiate applicable public health department rules.” Defendant contends that the use of maps and illustrations can still be done in a virtual deposition. Defendant suggests providing to defense counsel the exhibits to allow defendant to mark the exhibits in person. Defendant also argues that there is no reason to expect transcript errors because the deposition is taken remotely.

In reply, plaintiff asserts that Ming has failed to raise any special health or safety concerns that he has that would require a virtual deposition. Plaintiff argues that a virtual deposition would be prejudicial to plaintiff as there exist numerous technological issues and challenges. As to sharing exhibits ahead of time, it would eliminate the ability to impeach a witness with exhibits. Further, plaintiff contends, defendant is continuing to evade service.

Under CCP §2025.310, “(a) At the election of the deponent or the deposing party, the deposition officer may attend the deposition at a different location than the deponent via remote means. A deponent is not required to be physically present with the deposition officer when being sworn in at the time of the deposition.

(b) Subject to Section 2025.420, any party or attorney of record may, but is not required to, be physically present at the deposition at the location of the deponent.

(c) The procedures to implement this section shall be established by court order in the specific action or proceeding or by the California Rules of Court.

(d) An exercise of the authority granted by subdivision (a) or (b) does not waive any other provision of this title, including, but not limited to, provisions regarding the time, place, or manner in which a deposition shall be conducted. . . .”

Defendant may attend the deposition via remote means at his election. Plaintiff has not shown good cause for defendant and counsel to appear in person.

The motion is thus DENIED.

Plaintiff is ordered to serve notice of this ruling.

Case Number: BC700634    Hearing Date: January 07, 2021    Dept: M

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Southwest District

Torrance Dept. M

JULIE A. ESPHORST,

Plaintiff,

Case No.:

BC700634

vs.

[Tentative] RULING

DARRYL LEANDER HICKS, et al.,

Defendants.

Hearing Date: January 7, 2020

Moving Parties: Plaintiff Julie A. Esphorst

Responding Party: Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department

Motion for Peace Officer Personnel Records (Pitchess)

The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers.

RULING

The motion is GRANTED subject to a protective order as follows: Defendant County of Los Angeles is ordered to produce by February 5, 2021 the following documents for an in camera inspection under Evidence Code §1045:

(1) any and all writings that reflect the training that Jessica Lindsay received prior to March 7, 2017 regarding the duties and responsibilities of 9-1-1 operators;

(2) any and all documents, reports, memorandums, and writings that reflect performance reviews of Jessica Lindsay;

(3) any and all written complaints made against Jessica Lindsay; and

(4) any and all disciplinary records for Jessica Lindsay (including but not limited to those regarding the March 7, 2017 incident).

The motion is DENIED as to any and all documents, reports, memorandums, and writings that reflect the County’s investigation of Jessica Lindsay’s role in the March 7, 2017 incident.

BACKGROUND

On April 3, 2018, plaintiff Julie A. Esphorst filed a complaint against Darryl Leander Hicks, Tung Ming, Caltrans, County of Los Angeles, City of Torrance, and Shawnan for wrongful death – negligence, negligence per se, and dangerous condition of public property based on the death of her son in a vehicle accident.

LEGAL AUTHORITY

“To initiate discovery [of the personnel files of police officers], the defendant must file a motion supported by affidavits showing ‘good cause for the discovery,’ first by demonstrating the materiality of the information to the pending litigation and second by ‘stating upon reasonable belief’ that the police agency has the records or information at issue. This two-part showing of good cause is a ‘relatively low threshold for discovery.’” Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal. 4th 1011, 1019 (citations omitted). “If the trial court finds good cause for the discovery, it reviews the pertinent documents in chambers and discloses only that information falling within the statutorily defined standards of evidence.” Id.

Evidence Code §1043 states: “ (a) In any case in which discovery or disclosure is sought of peace or custodial officer personnel records or records maintained pursuant to Section 832.5 of the Penal Code or information from those records, the party seeking the discovery or disclosure shall file a written motion with the appropriate court or administrative body upon written notice to the governmental agency which has custody and control of the records. . . . (b) The motion shall include all of the following:

(1) Identification of the proceeding in which discovery or disclosure is sought, the party seeking discovery or disclosure, the peace or custodial officer whose records are sought, the governmental agency which has custody and control of the records, and the time and place at which the motion for discovery or disclosure shall be heard.

(2) A description of the type of records or information sought.

(3) Affidavits showing good cause for the discovery or disclosure sought, setting forth the materiality thereof to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation and stating upon reasonable belief that the governmental agency identified has the records or information from the records. . . .”

“The affidavits may be on information and belief and need not be based on personal knowledge, but the information sought must be requested with sufficient specificity to preclude the possibility of a defendant’s simply casting about for any helpful information.” People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal. 4th 1216, 1226 (citation omitted).

“[I]f a defendant has established good cause for the discovery, ‘the trial court proceeds to an in chambers examination of the records to determine whether they have any relevance to the issues presented in the current proceedings.’” Slayton v. Superior Court (2006) 146 Cal. App. 4th 55, 60.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff Julie A. Esphorst requests an order directing County of Los Angeles and Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department and their representatives, the following documents:

(1) any and all writings that reflect the training that Jessica Lindsay received prior to March 7, 2017 regarding the duties and responsibilities of 9-1-1 operators;

(2) any and all documents, reports, memorandums, and writings that reflect performance reviews of Jessica Lindsay;

(3) any and all written complaints made against Jessica Lindsay;

(4) any and all disciplinary records for Jessica Lindsay (including but not limited to those regarding the March 7, 2017 incident)

(5) any and all documents, reports, memorandums, and writings that reflect the County’s investigation of Jessica Lindsay’s role in the March 7, 2017 incident.

Plaintiff asserts that on March 7, 2017, defendants Hicks and Ming were involved in a minor fender bender and when Hicks fled the scene Ming began chasing him. Ming called 911 and informed LA County Sheriff’s Department Watch Deputy (and acting dispatch operator) Jessica Lindsay that he was chasing after the car that hit him. Plaintiff contends that instead of following police protocol by telling Ming to stop chasing Hicks, she told him to “give me the license plate on the vehicle when you can.” As Ming was chasing Hicks, with Deputy Lindsay still on the phone with him, he and Hicks both ran through a red light and struck the Esphorsts’ family van. Plaintiff also contends that at Deputy Lindsay’s deposition on October 30, 2020, she testified that she has a “long history” of “outstanding evaluations” with the County every year, her actions complied with the County’s policies and procedures, and her County superiors ratified her handling of the subject 911 call. Plaintiff argues that the County has a duty to train 911 operators in “hectic and potentially dangerous situations, such as a high-speed car chase” and that whether Deputy Lindsay was trained and how adequately is one of the primary issues with regard to the County’s liability. Plaintiff also argues that the County has a duty to supervise and discipline and that such documents are relevant as potential impeachment evidence.

In opposition, defendant argues that the request is overly broad because the “blanket request for ‘all’ records from the deputy’s file supplants Section 1043’s specificity requirement.” Defendant also agues that plaintiff fails to identify a reasonable time period. Defendant also argues that the affidavit does not set forth good cause for each of the confidential records requested except as to (1). Further, defendant contends, plaintiff is not entitled to disclosure of the Sheriff’s Department’s conclusions or analyses of its investigators. In any event, defendant asserts, the court should issue a protective order for any privileged material.

In reply, plaintiff argues that she has shown good cause and that the declaration in support of the motion is as specific as can reasonably be expected without having inspected the documents themselves.

The court finds that plaintiff has complied with Evidence Code §1043. She has met her burden of showing good cause for defendant’s records of Deputy Lindsay as to (1) through (4) above. The requests are sufficiently specific, and the affidavit is sufficient to show the materiality of the records as they relate to plaintiff’s claims as to the County’s liability regarding training, supervision, and discipline. She has not shown good cause for documents reflecting the County’s investigation, if any, of Lindsay’s role in the incident. See Haggerty v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal. App. 4th 1079, 1088 (“neither the trial court nor Guindazola articulated any possible relevance of the investigating officer’s subjective analysis and conclusions to the issues raised in Guindazola’s lawsuit.”).

The motion is GRANTED as to (1) through (4) and DENIED as to (5).

Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of the ruling.

Case Number: BC700634    Hearing Date: October 29, 2020    Dept: M

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Southwest District

Torrance Dept. M

JULIE A. ESPHORST,

Plaintiff,

Case No.:

BC700634

r/t 19STCV08243

vs.

[Tentative] RULING

DARRYL LEANDER HICKS, et al.,

Defendants.

Hearing Date: October 29, 2020

Moving Parties: Defendant and cross-defendant Shawnan

Responding Party: None

Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement

The court considered the moving papers. No opposition was filed.

RULING

The motion is GRANTED. The court ORDERS that in this action and all related actions, all present claims and cross-complaints of any kind for implied indemnity, equitable comparative contribution and apportionment or partial or comparative indemnity and apportionment based on comparative negligence or comparative fault against Shawnan be and are dismissed with prejudice. Any and all present and future claims against Shawnan by or on behalf of joint tortfeasors or co-obligors are barred.

BACKGROUND

On April 3, 2018, plaintiff Julie A. Esphorst filed a complaint against Darryl Leander Hicks, Tung Ming, Caltrans, County of Los Angeles, City of Torrance, and Shawnan for wrongful death – negligence, negligence per se, and dangerous condition of public property based on the death of her 16-year old son in a vehicle accident.

On October 16, 2018, plaintiff filed a FAC.

On May 21, 2019, this case was related to 19STCV07616 and 19STCV08243.

DISCUSSION

Defendant and cross-defendant Shawnan requests an order that the settlement entered into by and among moving defendant and plaintiffs was made in good faith.

In City of Grand View Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal. App. 3d 1251, 1261, the court provided the following guidance regarding a motion for a good faith settlement determination:

This court notes that of the hundreds of motions for good faith determination presented for trial court approval each year, the overwhelming majority are unopposed and granted summarily by the trial court. At the time of filing in many cases, the moving party does not know if a contest will develop. If each motion required a full recital by declaration or affidavit setting forth a complete factual response to all of the Tech-Bilt factors, literally thousands of attorney hours would be consumed and inch-thick motions would have to be read and considered by trial courts in an exercise which would waste valuable judicial and legal time and clients’ resources. . . . That is to say, when no one objects, the barebones motion which sets forth the ground of good faith, accompanied by a declaration which sets forth a brief background of the case is sufficient.

If the good faith settlement is contested, section 877.6, subdivision (d), sets forth a workable ground rule for the hearing by placing the burden of proving the lack of good faith on the contesting party. Once there is a showing made by the settlor of the settlement, the burden of proof on the issue of good faith shifts to the nonsettlor who asserts that the settlement was not made in good faith. If contested, declarations by the nonsettlor should be filed which in many cases could require the moving party to file responsive counterdeclarations to negate the lack of good faith asserted by the nonsettling contesting party.

192 Cal. App. 3d 1251, 1260-1261 (citation omitted).

“[Code of Civil Procedure] Section 877.6 was enacted by the Legislature in 1980 to establish a statutory procedure for determining if a settlement by an alleged joint tortfeasor has been entered into in good faith and to provide a bar to claims of other alleged joint tortfeasors for equitable contribution or partial or comparative indemnity when good faith is shown.” IRM Corp. v. Carlson (1986) 179 Cal. App. 3d 94, 104.

CCP § 877.6(a)(1) provides, in relevant part, that, on noticed motion, “[a]ny party to an action wherein it is alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors or co-obligors on a contract debt shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith of a settlement entered into by the plaintiff or . . . and one or more alleged tortfeasors or co-obligors . . . .” “A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.” CCP § 877.6(c). Although a determination that a settlement was in good faith does not discharge any other party from liability, “it shall reduce the claims against the others in the amount stipulated” by the settlement. CCP § 877(a).

“The party asserting the lack of good faith shall have the burden of proof on that issue.” CCP § 877.6(d).

In Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499, the California Supreme Court identified the following nonexclusive factors courts are to consider in determining if a settlement is in good faith under section 877.6: “a rough approximation of plaintiffs' total recovery and the settlor's proportionate liability, the amount paid in settlement, the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs, and a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial. Other relevant considerations include the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants, as well as the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling defendants.”

The evaluation of whether a settlement was made in good faith is required to “be made on the basis of information available at the time of settlement.” Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal.3d at 499. “‘[A] defendant’s settlement figure must not be grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the settlement, would estimate the settling defendant’s liability to be.’ [Citation.]” Id. at 499.

“The party asserting the lack of good faith, who has the burden of proof on that issue (§ 877.6, subd. (d)), should be permitted to demonstrate, if he can, that the settlement is so far ‘out of the ballpark’ in relation to these factors as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of the statute. Such a demonstration would establish that the proposed settlement was not a ‘settlement made in good faith’ within the terms of section 877.6.” Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal.3d at 499-500.

“Thus, Tech-Bilt held that in determining whether a settlement was made in good faith for purposes of section 877.6, a key factor a trial court should consider is whether the amount paid in settlement bears a reasonable relationship to the settlor’s proportionate share of liability. (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 499–500 . . . .) This is because one of the main goals of section 877.6 is ‘allocating costs equitably among multiple tortfeasors.’ (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 502 . . . .).” TSI Seismic Tenant Space, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 159, 166. “Accordingly, a court not only looks at the alleged tortfeasor's potential liability to the plaintiff, but it must also consider the culpability of the tortfeasor vis-à-vis other parties alleged to be responsible for the same injury. Potential liability for indemnity to a nonsettling defendant is an important consideration for the trial court in determining whether to approve a settlement by an alleged tortfeasor. [Citation.]” Id. at 166.

Here, although there is no opposition, the court considered the Tech-Bilt factors as applied to the settlement between moving defendant and plaintiffs.

First, as to a rough approximation of plaintiffs’ total recovery, defendant asserts that plaintiff Julie Esphorst is seeking $19,908 for recoverable funeral and burial expenses for the decedent as well as an unknown amount in non-economic damages for the loss of affection, comfort, and society she enjoyed with her son. Plaintiff Jesse Esphorst is seeking a yet to be determined amount in economic and non-economic damages under his own cause of action for negligence.

Second, as to moving defendants’ proportionate liability, defendant contends that its liability is zero. Plaintiffs allege that contractor Shawnan had a duty to exercise reasonable care in performing construction work to design, maintain, construct, inspect, supervise, and/or repair the roadway at or near the intersection of Crenshaw Blvd. and Crest Rd. in Torrance where the incident occurred; Shawnan’s alleged negligence created a dangerous condition of public property and an undiscovered trap, which was a substantial factor in causing the fatal collision; the alleged dangerous condition existed, in part, due to obscured sightlines caused by the design of the roadway, curvature of the roadway, elevation variances, adjoining land features, improper striping and/or signage, ongoing construction, poor lighting, and improper and/or nonfunctioning traffic control signs/signals, leaving drivers exposed to risks, such as chaotic traffic condition and undiscovered trap for motorists using the roadway in a foreseeable manner.

Defendant contends that it was not performing road construction at, on, or around the subject intersection on the date of the incident or any relevant time prior, and therefore had no involvement or causal connection to the incident and/or resulting injuries/damages. There were no lane closures, equipment, or obstacles in the traffic lanes of that area at the time of the incident. Shawnan complied with all approved construction plans, traffic controls, warning signs, and safety/security/housekeeping guidelines on the day of the incident. See Ruth Kahn decl., and accompanying exhibits. Rather, defendant asserts, the cause of the fatal collision and resulting injuries/damages was defendants Hicks and Ming’s criminal conduct and traffic violations.

Third, as to the amount paid in settlement, the parties settled for $30,000.

Fourth, as to the allocation of settlement proceeds, defendant did not address.

Fifth, the court recognizes that defendant should pay less in settlement than if it was found liable after a trial.

Sixth, as to financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendant, the motion does not address.

Seventh, as to whether there is evidence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of the other defendants or cross-defendants, Shawnan asserts that it accepted plaintiffs’ collective settlement demand on September 18, 2020.

After considering the Tech-Bilt factors that were addressed, the court finds and determines that the settlement entered into between moving defendant and plaintiffs was made in good faith within the meaning of CCP § 877.6. Therefore, the motion is GRANTED.

Moving defendant is ordered to give notice of the ruling.

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