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This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 06/03/2019 at 04:28:42 (UTC).

JOSIF KRUPER ET AL VS FARHAD AMIN ET AL

Case Summary

On 09/15/2017 JOSIF KRUPER filed a Contract - Other Contract lawsuit against FARHAD AMIN. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judge overseeing this case is RICHARD E. RICO. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****6110

  • Filing Date:

    09/15/2017

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Contract - Other Contract

  • Court:

    Los Angeles County Superior Courts

  • Courthouse:

    Stanley Mosk Courthouse

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judge

RICHARD E. RICO

 

Party Details

Plaintiffs and Petitioners

BH KRUPER RENOVATION INC.

KRUPER BELLA

KRUPER JOSIF

Defendants and Respondents

BHK WINDOWS AND DOORS INC.

DOES 1 TO 100

MONTERO LANIE

AMIN FARHAD

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff and Petitioner Attorney

ETEHAD SIMON P. ESQ.

 

Court Documents

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

1/24/2018: FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

Unknown

6/12/2018: Unknown

NOTICE OF CIVIL DEPOSIT OF JURY FEES

6/21/2018: NOTICE OF CIVIL DEPOSIT OF JURY FEES

Unknown

8/9/2018: Unknown

Minute Order

11/26/2018: Minute Order

Substitution of Attorney

4/2/2019: Substitution of Attorney

Notice of Stay of Proceedings

4/2/2019: Notice of Stay of Proceedings

Notice of Stay of Proceedings

4/2/2019: Notice of Stay of Proceedings

Exhibit List

4/2/2019: Exhibit List

Substitution of Attorney

4/4/2019: Substitution of Attorney

Substitution of Attorney

4/4/2019: Substitution of Attorney

Substitution of Attorney

4/8/2019: Substitution of Attorney

Minute Order

4/9/2019: Minute Order

Unknown

1/16/2018: Unknown

Minute Order

11/14/2017: Minute Order

Unknown

11/13/2017: Unknown

PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

11/7/2017: PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

SUMMONS

9/15/2017: SUMMONS

35 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 04/09/2019
  • at 09:00 AM in Department 17, Richard E. Rico, Presiding; Jury Trial - Not Held - Vacated by Court

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  • 04/09/2019
  • Minute Order ( (Jury Trial)); Filed by Clerk

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  • 04/08/2019
  • Notice ( of Stay of Action and Status Conference); Filed by Josif Kruper (Plaintiff); Bella Kruper (Plaintiff); BH Kruper Renovation, Inc. (Plaintiff)

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  • 04/08/2019
  • Substitution of Attorney; Filed by BHK Windows and Doors, Inc. (Defendant)

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  • 04/04/2019
  • at 08:30 AM in Department 17, Richard E. Rico, Presiding; Final Status Conference - Not Held - Taken Off Calendar by Court

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  • 04/04/2019
  • Minute Order ( (Final Status Conference)); Filed by Clerk

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  • 04/04/2019
  • Substitution of Attorney; Filed by Farhad Amin (Defendant)

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  • 04/04/2019
  • Substitution of Attorney; Filed by Lanie Montero (Defendant)

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  • 04/04/2019
  • Substitution of Attorney; Filed by Farhad Amin (Defendant)

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  • 04/02/2019
  • Exhibit List; Filed by Josif Kruper (Plaintiff); Bella Kruper (Plaintiff); BH Kruper Renovation, Inc. (Plaintiff)

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69 More Docket Entries
  • 11/07/2017
  • PROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

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  • 11/07/2017
  • Proof-Service/Summons; Filed by Josif Kruper (Plaintiff)

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  • 11/07/2017
  • Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint); Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

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  • 11/07/2017
  • Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint); Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

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  • 11/07/2017
  • Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint); Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

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  • 09/15/2017
  • COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 1. FRAUD ;ETC

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  • 09/15/2017
  • SUMMONS

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  • 09/15/2017
  • Complaint; Filed by Josif Kruper (Plaintiff); Bella Kruper (Plaintiff); BH Kruper Renovation, Inc. (Plaintiff)

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  • 11/14/2007
  • at 08:30 AM in Department 17; Court Order - Held

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  • 11/14/2007
  • Minute order entered: 2007-11-14 00:00:00; Filed by Clerk

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Tentative Rulings

Case Number: BC676110    Hearing Date: February 19, 2021    Dept: 17


Case Number: BC713115    Hearing Date: February 19, 2021    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

TENTATIVE RULING

WINNETKA VADEN

vs.

LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF WATER AND POWER

Case No.: BC713115

Hearing Date: February 19, 2021

LADWP’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s TAC is SUSTAINED in part, OVERRULED in part. Plaintiff’s TAC is SUSTAINED, WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as to the first, second, and third causes of action. Plaintiff’s TAC is OVERRULED as to the fourth cause of action.

LADWP’s motion to strike is DENIED.

Plaintiff Winnetka Vaden (Plaintiff) initiated this action against the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP). On 10/02/2020, Plaintiff filed a third amended complaint (TAC). Plaintiff’s claims are for 1) strict liability; 2) negligence; 3) premises liability; and 4) dangerous condition of property.

LADWP now demurs to Plaintiff’ TAC on the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim.

Legal Standard

Where pleadings are defective, a party may raise the defect by way of a demurrer.  (Coyne v. Krempels (1950) 36 Cal.2d 257, 262.) A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a pleading, and the grounds for a demurrer must appear on the face of the pleading or from judicially noticeable matters.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a); Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) In evaluating a demurrer, the court accepts the complainant’s properly-pled facts as true, and ignores contentions, deductions, and conclusory statements. (Daar

Discussion

I. Strict Liability for Ultra-Hazardous Activity

LADWP argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts because the operation of a water main system is not an ultra-hazardous activity as a matter of law.

In Luthringer v. Moore (1948) 31 Cal.2d 489, 498, the California Supreme Court defined an activity as ultrahazardous if “it (a) necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels of others which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care, and (b) is not a matter of common usage. ... An activity is a matter of common usage if it is customarily carried on by the great mass of mankind or by many people in the community. “

Here, Plaintiff alleges on September 7, 2016, a LADWP-owned water main running underneath her residence burst, submerging the premises with dirty, unsanitary water. However, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts which could show that the operation of a water main system is not a matter of common usage, or that the risks of harm in its operation cannot normally be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care. The Court is persuaded by the caselaw cited to by LADWP including State Far Fire & casualty Co v. Anchorage (1990) 788 P.2d 726, 729, wherein the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that “Because we believe that water delivery systems, in contrast to explosives, can be made quite safe by the use of reasonable care, and such systems are common indeed, we decline to hold that the operation of such systems constitutes an ultrahazardous activity. We thus join the majority of the American Jurisdictions that do not apply strict liability to water line breaks.”

Based on the foregoing, LADWP’s demurrer to the first cause of action is sustained. Because Plaintiff has been afford three opportunities to amend, and because there is no reason to believe Plaintiff can allege additional facts which could show that the water main operation was an ultrahazardous activity, the Court does not afford leave to amend for this cause of action.

II. Negligence

LADWP argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for negligence because she has not alleged a statutory basis for her claim.

The well-known elements of negligence are (1) a legal duty to use due care; (2) breach of that legal duty; and (3) the breach was a proximate or legal cause of injury. (Orey v. Superior Court (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1255.)

Government Code section 815, subdivision (b) immunizes public entities from liability, unless otherwise provided by statute.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Government Code section 835 provides the basis for liability.

Section 835 provides:

“Except as provided by statute, a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either:

(a)¿A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or

(b)¿The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have

taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.”

However, the Court agrees with LADWP that section 835 does not provide a statutory basic for general negligence. Rather, section 835 provides a statutory basis for a claim of injury arising from a dangerous condition of public property. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not alleged a statutory basis for her negligence cause of action.

Based on the foregoing, LADWP’s demurrer is sustained. Given that Plaintiff has been afford three opportunities to amend, there is no reason to believe that Plaintiff will be able to identity a statutory basis to support her negligence cause of action against a public entity. This is largely because, when it comes to government liability, “immunity is the rule, and liability is the exception.” (Teter v. City of Newport Beach (2003) 30 C.4th 446, 451.)

III. Premises Liability

Here, similarly, Plaintiff alleges section 835 as the statutory basis for this claim. However, as set forth above, section 835 provides a statutory basis for a dangerous condition cause of action, not for premises liability.

Based on the foregoing, LADWP’s demurrer is sustained, without leave to amend.

IV. Dangerous Condition

LADWP’s argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim because she has failed to state a statutory basis for liability, and fails to allege her cause of action with the requisite specificity.

As set forth above, Government Code section 835 reads:

“Except as provided by statute, a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either:

(a)¿A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or

(b)¿The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.”

Here, the Court is unpersuaded by LADWP’s argument that Plaintiff has failed to set forth the statutory basis for her claim. LADWP’s own motion argued that Plaintiff’s first three causes of action could not be supported by section 835 because section 835 only provides a statutory basis for a dangerous condition cause of action. Given that Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action is, in fact, a dangerous condition cause of action, LADWP’s argument appears weakened.

Moreover, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for a dangerous condition on public property. Plaintiff alleges that the water-main system was in a dangerous condition, that the burst of this water-main system proximately caused her house to fill with sewer water, and that this was a foreseeable type of harm in light of the dangerous condition. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that LADWP has a “long-standing, unwritten practice” wherein LADWP and the City prioritize repair, improvements, and service in affluent communities, at the expense of low income communities. As a result of this policy, Plaintiff alleges that LADWP knew, or should have known, that the pipes in her community were in a dangerous condition after years of “refus[ing] to reasonably maintain and/or repair said pipes as a result of the foregoing policy (and otherwise).” (TAC ¶ 10.) This allegation is sufficient to show that LADWP had constructive notice (i.e., should have known) that the pipes were in a dangerous condition.

Based on the foregoing, LADWP’s demurrer to the fourth cause of action is overruled.

“The court may…at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strikeout any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (CCP § 436.)

Here, LADWP argues that Plaintiff’s TAC should be struck because it was filed outside of the 10 day window afforded to Plaintiff to file an amended complaint.

Plaintiff is to obey court ordered deadlines,. While the Court declines to strike Plaintiff’s TAC for untimeliness at this time, the Court notes that it will consider sanction requests in the future should Plaintiff continue to ignore deadlines.

It is so ordered.

Dated: February , 2021

Hon. Jon R. Takasugi Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order. If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar.

Due to Covid-19, the court is strongly discouraging in-person appearances. Parties, counsel, and court reporters present are subject to temperature checks and health inquiries, and will be denied entry if admission could create a public health risk. The court encourages the parties wishing to argue to appear via L.A. Court Connect. For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517. Your understanding during these difficult times is appreciated.

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