This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 02/15/2020 at 00:01:14 (UTC).

JOE ALLEN VS DEHUMIDIFICATION TECHNOLOGIES INC

Case Summary

On 10/20/2017 JOE ALLEN filed a Labor - Other Labor lawsuit against DEHUMIDIFICATION TECHNOLOGIES INC. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judge overseeing this case is MARC MARMARO. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.
Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****0514

  • Filing Date:

    10/20/2017

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Labor - Other Labor

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judge

MARC MARMARO

 

Party Details

Plaintiff and Petitioner

ALLEN JOE

Defendants and Respondents

DEHUMIDIFICATION TECHNOLOGIES INC.

DOES 1-100

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff and Petitioner Attorneys

ABRAMSON LABOR GROUP

BEGAKIS CHRISTINA ELENI

GINDI JACK J.

ABRAMSON WILLIAM ZEV

ABRAMSON W ZEV

Defendant and Respondent Attorneys

MALONEY PATRICK M. ESQ.

LESTER DAVID M. ESQ.

COLLENDER MICHELE LYNN

LESTER DAVID M.

GARBACZ GREGORY

GARBACZ GREGORY A. ESQ.

 

Court Documents

Notice - NOTICE OF DESIGNATION OF DEPOSITION TESTIMONY OF BRIAN KEITH GREGG AT TRIAL

2/10/2020: Notice - NOTICE OF DESIGNATION OF DEPOSITION TESTIMONY OF BRIAN KEITH GREGG AT TRIAL

Motion in Limine - MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 5 TO EXCLUDE IRRELEVANT CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN THE DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF BRIAN GREGG

2/10/2020: Motion in Limine - MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 5 TO EXCLUDE IRRELEVANT CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN THE DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF BRIAN GREGG

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (JURY TRIAL)

2/11/2020: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (JURY TRIAL)

Opposition - OPPOSITION OPPOSITION TO MIL NO 5

2/13/2020: Opposition - OPPOSITION OPPOSITION TO MIL NO 5

Declaration - DECLARATION DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OPPOSITION

2/13/2020: Declaration - DECLARATION DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OPPOSITION

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (JURY TRIAL)

2/13/2020: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (JURY TRIAL)

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (FINAL STATUS CONFERENCE)

12/6/2019: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (FINAL STATUS CONFERENCE)

Opposition - OPPOSITION TO MIL NO. 2

11/27/2019: Opposition - OPPOSITION TO MIL NO. 2

Request for Judicial Notice

11/27/2019: Request for Judicial Notice

Declaration - DECLARATION OF SYLVIA V. PANOSIAN ISO OPPOSITION TO MIL NO. 3

11/27/2019: Declaration - DECLARATION OF SYLVIA V. PANOSIAN ISO OPPOSITION TO MIL NO. 3

Declaration - DECLARATION OF SYLVIA V. PANOSIAN ISO OPPOSITION TO MIL NO. 4

11/27/2019: Declaration - DECLARATION OF SYLVIA V. PANOSIAN ISO OPPOSITION TO MIL NO. 4

Declaration - DECLARATION OF SYLBVIA V. PANOSIAN ISO OPPOSITION TO MIL NO. 2

11/27/2019: Declaration - DECLARATION OF SYLBVIA V. PANOSIAN ISO OPPOSITION TO MIL NO. 2

Opposition - OPPOSITION TO MIL NO. 3

11/27/2019: Opposition - OPPOSITION TO MIL NO. 3

Opposition - OPPOSITION TO MIL NO. 4

11/27/2019: Opposition - OPPOSITION TO MIL NO. 4

Request for Judicial Notice

11/27/2019: Request for Judicial Notice

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (FINAL STATUS CONFERENCE; HEARING ON MOTION - OTHER FOR BIFURC...)

12/3/2019: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (FINAL STATUS CONFERENCE; HEARING ON MOTION - OTHER FOR BIFURC...)

Opposition - OPPOSITION DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MIL NO. 1 TO EXCLUDE REFERENCES TO PLAINTIFF'S PRIOR FELONY CONVICTION

11/21/2019: Opposition - OPPOSITION DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MIL NO. 1 TO EXCLUDE REFERENCES TO PLAINTIFF'S PRIOR FELONY CONVICTION

Declaration - DECLARATION OF SYLVIA V. PANOSIAN IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MIL N0.1

11/21/2019: Declaration - DECLARATION OF SYLVIA V. PANOSIAN IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MIL N0.1

86 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 02/18/2020
  • Hearing02/18/2020 at 09:30 AM in Department 37 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Jury Trial

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  • 02/13/2020
  • Docketat 10:00 AM in Department 37; Jury Trial - Held - Continued

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  • 02/13/2020
  • DocketDeclaration (Declaration In Support Opposition); Filed by Dehumidification Technologies, Inc. (Defendant)

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  • 02/13/2020
  • DocketMinute Order ( (Jury Trial)); Filed by Clerk

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  • 02/13/2020
  • DocketOpposition (Opposition TO Mil No 5); Filed by Dehumidification Technologies, Inc. (Defendant)

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  • 02/11/2020
  • Docketat 10:00 AM in Department 37; Jury Trial - Held - Continued

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  • 02/11/2020
  • DocketMinute Order ( (Jury Trial)); Filed by Clerk

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  • 02/10/2020
  • DocketNotice (of Designation of Deposition Testimony of Brian Keith Gregg at Trial); Filed by Dehumidification Technologies, Inc. (Defendant)

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  • 02/10/2020
  • DocketMotion in Limine ( No. 5 to Exclude Irrelevant Character Evidence in the Deposition Transcript of Brian Gregg); Filed by Joe Allen (Plaintiff)

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  • 12/10/2019
  • Docketat 10:00 AM in Department 37; Jury Trial - Not Held - Advanced and Continued - by Court

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118 More Docket Entries
  • 02/08/2018
  • DocketCase Management Statement; Filed by Joe Allen (Plaintiff)

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  • 02/05/2018
  • DocketProof-Service/Summons

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  • 02/05/2018
  • DocketPROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

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  • 01/05/2018
  • DocketOSC-RE Other (Miscellaneous); Filed by Clerk

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  • 01/05/2018
  • DocketNotice of Case Management Conference; Filed by Clerk

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  • 01/05/2018
  • DocketNOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

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  • 01/05/2018
  • DocketORDER TO SHOW CAUSE HEARING

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  • 10/20/2017
  • DocketSUMMONS

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  • 10/20/2017
  • DocketCOMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL: 1. WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY ;ETC

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  • 10/20/2017
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by Joe Allen (Plaintiff)

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Tentative Rulings

Case Number: ****0514    Hearing Date: December 08, 2020    Dept: 37

HEARING DATE: December 8, 2020

CASE NUMBER: ****0514

CASE NAME: Joe Allen v. Dehumidification Technologies, Inc.

MOVING PARTY: Christina Eleni Begakis and Abramson Labor Group, counsel for Plaintiff Joe Allen

OPPOSING PARTY: None

TRIAL DATE: None – Judgment on Special Verdict March 24, 2020

PROOF OF SERVICE: OK

MOTION: Christina Begakis/Abramson Labor Group’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel for Plaintiff Joe Allen

TENTATIVE: Christina Begakis/Abramson Labor Group’s Motion is GRANTED. Moving counsel is to give notice.

Procedural Requirements

The moving party must comply with the requirements of California Rules of Court, rule 3.1362 before a motion to be relieved as counsel may be granted.

Notice: Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1362(a) and Code Civil Procedure, section 284, Notice of Motion and Motion to be relieved as counsel must be served on the client and made on the Notice of Motion and Motion to be Relieved as Counsel – Form MC-051.

Served on client – Yes

On Form MC-051 – Yes

Declaration: California Rules of Court, rule 3.1362(c) requires that the motion be accompanied by a declaration of counsel on the Declaration in Support of Attorney’s Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel – Form MC-052 and state in general terms, without compromising confidentiality, the basis for withdrawal.

Grounds for Motion – Moving counsel attests that she seeks to withdraw based on completion of representation pursuant to the retainer agreement.

General terms, without compromising confidentiality – Yes

On Form MC-052 – Yes

Service: California Rules of Court, rule 3.1362(d) requires that the notice of motion and motion, declaration, and proposed order are served on the client and on all other parties who have appeared in the case. When served by mail under Code of Civil Procedures, section 1013, the notice must be accompanied a declaration confirming the address of the client.

Client served – Yes, by overnight delivery.

Client Address confirmed – Yes, by telephone.

Opposing Counsel served – Yes

Timely Served and Filed – Yes

Order: California Rules of Court, rule 3.1362(e) requires the proposed order relieving counsel be prepared on the Order Granting Attorney’s Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel – Form MC-053 and specify all hearing dates scheduled in the action.

On Form MC-053 – Yes

Specify hearing dates – Yes

Substantive Merits

Unlike their clients, attorneys do not have an absolute right to withdraw from representation at any time with or without cause. “The right of counsel to withdraw from pending litigation is not absolute.” (Vann v. Shilleh (1975) 54 Cal.App.3d 192, 197 (Vann).) Even where grounds for termination exist, attorneys seeking to withdraw must comply with the procedures set forth in California Rule of Professional Conduct, rule 3-700 and are subject to discipline for failure to do so. Where withdrawal is not mandatory, an attorney normally must continue representation on the matter undertaken. The fact the client or matter proves unpleasant or unprofitable does not excuse attorney performance. The rules have been liberally construed to protect clients. (See Vann, supra, 54 Cal.App.3d. at p. 197; Chaleff v. Sup. Ct. (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 721; Ramirez v. Sturdevant (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 904, 915.) An attorney, either with client’s consent or court’s approval, may withdraw from a case when withdrawal can be accomplished without undue prejudice to the client’s interests. A lawyer violates his or her ethical mandate by abandoning a client (Pineda v. State Bar, 49 Cal.3d 753, 758-759), or by withdrawing at a critical point and thereby prejudicing the client’s case (Vann, supra, 54 Cal.App.3d at 197).

Where the procedures are properly followed, withdrawal is permitted in the appropriate circumstances. Pursuant to California Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1.16(a), “…a lawyer…shall withdraw from the representation of a client if:

  1. “The lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the client is bringing an action, conducting a defense, asserting a position in litigation, or taking an appeal, without probable cause and for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring any person;

  2. The lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the representation will result in violation of these rules or of the State Bar Act;

  3. The lawyer’s mental or physical condition renders it unreasonably difficult to carry out the representation effectively; or

  4. The client discharges the lawyer.”

Further, rule 1.16(b) provides for ten circumstances under which a lawyer is permitted to withdraw from representation of a client.

Moving counsel attests that she and her firm are seeking to withdraw based on completion of representation of Plaintiff and pursuant to the retainer agreement. Moving counsel served Plaintiff by overnight delivery at his home address and served opposing counsel at his business address.

Judgment was entered pursuant to a special verdict on March 24, 2020. There are no hearing dates pending in this action.

Moving counsel has demonstrated good cause to be relieved as counsel. Thus, the motion is GRANTED.

Conclusion

Christina Begakis/Abramson Labor Group’s Motion is GRANTED. Moving counsel is to give notice.



Case Number: ****0514    Hearing Date: September 28, 2020    Dept: 37

HEARING DATE: September 28, 2020

CASE NUMBER: ****0514

CASE NAME: Joe Allen v. Dehumidification Technologies, Inc., et al.

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff, Joe Allen

OPPOSING PARTY: Defendant, Dehumidification Technologies, LP 

TRIAL DATE: None – Judgment on Special Verdict March 24, 2020

PROOF OF SERVICE: OK

MOTION: Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendant’s Memorandum of Costs

OPPOSITION: September 15, 2020

REPLY: September 21, 2020

TENTATIVE: Plaintiff’s motion to strike Defendant’s memorandum of costs is DENIED. Defendant’s costs are taxed in the amount of $5,844.89. Plaintiff is to give notice.

Background

This wrongful termination action arises in connection with Plaintiff Joe Allen’s (“Allen”) employment with Defendant Dehumidification Technologies, LP (“Defendant” erroneously sued as Dehumidification Technologies, Inc).  Plaintiff alleges that he began working for Defendant on or about February 9, 2015 and that his employment ended on or about March 10, 2017.  According to Plaintiff, Defendant required him to operate trucks that required a Class A or Class B license, despite the fact that he only had a Class C Driver’s License, and to operate a forklift despite the fact that he was not certified to operate a forklift.  Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant failed to train employees on hazardous energy control procedures and failed to provide employees with necessary personal protective equipment. 

On or about March 10, 2017, Plaintiff allegedly refused an order from Defendant to operate a forklift and informed his manager that he would not violate the law.  Plaintiff alleges that Defendant terminated him on the same date for refusing to operate the forklift and in retaliation for filing a complaint with Cal/OSHA.  In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges two causes of action for: (1) wrongful termination in violation of public policy and (2) retaliation in violation of Labor Code, ; 1102.5.   

Trial in this matter began on February 18, 2020. On February 26, 2020, the jury returned with a special verdict in favor of Defendant.

On March 24, 2020, judgment was entered in favor of Defendant pursuant to the special verdict. The clerk gave notice of judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 664.5 on the same day. (see March 24, 2020 In Chambers Court Order Regarding Notice of Entry of Judgment and March 24, 2020 Notice of Entry of Judgment.) However, that notice was addressed to suite 250 and returned to the court. (See notice of returned mail filed July 6, 2020.) Counsel’s accurate mailing address as reflected on all the pleadings he file and on later notices is at suite 1250. Accordingly, the March 24, 2020 Notice of Entry of Judgment was not served on Defendant.

On March 30, 2020, Defendant filed and served a Notice of Entry of Judgment. That is the operative notice of entry. On April 21, 2020, Defendant filed its memorandum of costs.

Plaintiff now moves to strike Defendant’s memorandum of costs in its entirety on the grounds that it was untimely filed. Defendant opposes the motion.

Discussion

California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1700, subdivision (a) provides a deadline for claiming prejudgment costs, as follows:

  1. “Claiming costs

(1)  Trial costs

A prevailing party who claims costs must serve and file a memorandum of costs within 15 days after the date of service of the notice of entry of judgment or dismissal by the clerk under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.5 or the date of service of written notice of entry of judgment or dismissal, or within 180 days after entry of judgment, whichever is first. The memorandum of costs must be verified by a statement of the party, attorney, or agent that to the best of his or her knowledge the items of cost are correct and were necessarily incurred in the case.”

“The time provisions relating to the filing of a memorandum of costs, while not jurisdictional, are mandatory.” (Hydratec, Inc. v. Sun Valley 260 Orchard & Vineyard Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 924, 929.)

Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s memorandum of costs must be stricken because it was filed more than 15 days after the clerk gave Notice of Entry of Judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 664.5. (Motion, 4-5.) However, Plaintiff did not know the court’s notice was misaddressed.

In opposition, Defendant correctly contends its memorandum of costs was timely because it was filed within 15 days of its March 30, 2020 Notice of Entry of Judgment. (Opposition, 2-3.)

Motion to Tax Costs

 

Defendant’s memorandum of costs seeks a total of $18,432.99 in costs. Plaintiff challenges 4 items, as follows:

  1. Item No. 4: Deposition Costs of $7,247.52

Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s requested costs for deposition is excessive generally. (Motion, 7.) Additionally, Plaintiff specifically requests that the costs for Brian Battle, Julie Ferris, Bryan Gregg, Kenneth Armstrong and Rusty Burch be reduced because Plaintiff noticed and paid for those depositions, in the total amount of $3,415.04. (Id.)

In opposition, Defendant has submitted invoices in support of its request for deposition costs. (Panosian Decl., Exhibit 5.) Defendant argues that its deposition costs were reasonable and that Plaintiff’s argument in support of reducing costs by $3,415.04 must fail because Plaintiff has cited no authority for the proposition that costs must be reduced if the opposing party noticed the deposition. (Opposition, 9.)

The court agrees with Defendant. The court notes that the Panosian Declaration submitted in support of Defendant’s opposition alleges that Exhibit 5 represents invoices for all of these individuals’ depositions. Thus, Defendant has now produced invoices in support of its request for deposition costs. Further, Defendant is correct that it may recover costs for obtaining copies of deposition transcripts. (Code Civ. Proc. ; 1033.5, subdivision (a)(3)(A).) Thus, Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant’s memorandum of costs must be reduced by the depositions that Plaintiff noticed and paid for fails.

For these reasons, the court does not tax item 4 of Defendant’s memorandum of costs.

  1. Item No. 5: Service of Process Costs of $1,089.07

Plaintiff argues that item 5 of Defendant’s memorandum of costs must be reduced by the costs for subpoenas to witnesses who did not appear and testify at trial. (Motion, 6.) In opposition, Defendant argues that these costs should not be reduced because Defendant intended to examine the witnesses at trial but each witness disobeyed the subpoena by failing to appear. (Opposition, 10.)

Costs for service of process are recoverable. (Code Civ. Proc. ; 1033.5, subdivision (a)(4).) Plaintiff cites to no authority for the proposition that costs for service of process are not recoverable if the witness did not testify at trial.

For these reasons, the court does not tax item 5 of Defendant’s memorandum of costs.

  1. Item No. 11: Models, Enlargements and Photocopy Costs of $6,969.89

Plaintiff argues that item 11 of Defendant’s memorandum of costs must be taxed because costs for exhibits not actually used at trial are not recoverable, as they are not “reasonably helpful.” (Motion, 8-9.) Specifically, Plaintiff argues that $6,969.89 of Defendant’s costs must be taxed for this item because Defendant’s memorandum has not specified the nature of costs in this category. (Id.)

In opposition, Defendant argues that its memorandum of costs should not be taxed for this item because Defendant prevailed in this matter and thus, the trier of fact must have found the exhibits helpful. (Opposition, 10.) Defendant also contends that invoices in support of this item are submitted as Exhibit 6 to the Panosian Declaration. However, Exhibit 6 contains only one invoice for models, enlargements and photocopy or electronic presentation of exhibits. (See Code Civ. Proc. ; 1033.5, subdivision (a)(13).) The amount of $5,844.89 will be taxed.

  1. Item No. 14: Fees for Electronic Filing of $1,179.19]

Plaintiff argues that item number 14 must be taxed because Defendant’s costs for filing and service have already been included in items 1 and 5. (Motion, 9.) In opposition, Defendant argues that item 14 is reasonable because items 1 and 5 only include the filing fees for Defendant’s answer and the Ex Parte Application to Stay the Deposition Pending Protective Order. (Opposition, 10-11.) Further, Defendant argues that recovering costs for electronic filing is reasonable because electronic filing is now required. (Id.)

The court agrees with Defendant. Fees for electronic filing or service are recoverable by statute if the court requires electronic filing or service. Code Civ. Proc. ; 1033.5, subdivision (a)(14).) Thus, the court does not tax this item from Defendant’s memorandum.

Conclusion

Plaintiff’s motion to strike Defendant’s memorandum of costs is DENIED. Defendant’s costs are taxed in the amount of $5,844.89. Plaintiff is to give notice.



Case Number: ****0514    Hearing Date: November 01, 2019    Dept: 37

HEARING DATE: November 1, 2019

CASE NUMBER: ****0514

CASE NAME: Joe Allen v. Dehumidification Technologies, Inc., et al.

TRIAL DATE: December 10, 2019

PROOF OF SERVICE: OK

MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER DISCOVERY RESPONSES BY DEFENDANT TO PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS (SET THREE)

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Joe Allen

OPPOSING PARTY: Defendant Dehumidification Technologies

MOTION: Filed May 20, 2019

OPPOSITION: Filed October 21, 2019

REPLY: Filed October 25, 2019

TENTATIVE: The motion to compel further discovery responses is DENIED. Plaintiff’s request for sanctions is DENIED. Counsel for the moving party to provide notice.

BACKGROUND

This wrongful termination action arises in connection with Plaintiff Joe Allen (“Allen”)’s alleged employment with Defendant Dehumidification Technologies, LP (“DH Tech,” erroneously sued as Dehumidification Technologies, Inc). Plaintiff alleges that he began working for Defendant on or about February 9, 2015 and that his employment ended on or about March 10, 2017. According to Plaintiff, Defendant required him to operate trucks that required a Class A or Class B license, despite the fact that he only had a Class C Driver’s License, and to operate a forklift despite the fact that he was not certified to operate a forklift. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant failed to train employees on hazardous energy control procedures and failed to provide employees with necessary personal protective equipment. Plaintiff allegedly filed a complaint with the California Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Occupational Safety and Health (“Cal/OSHA”) regarding Defendant’s safety violations and allegedly illegal business practices.

On or about March 10, 2017, Plaintiff allegedly refused an order from Defendant to operate a forklift and informed his manager that he would not violate the law. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant terminated him on the same date for refusing to operate the forklift and in retaliation for filing a complaint with Cal/OSHA. In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges two causes of action for: (1) wrongful termination in violation of public policy and (2) retaliation in violation of Labor Code, ; 1102.5.

On January 22, 2019, this court granted Plaintiff’s motion to compel further discovery responses in-part and ordered Defendant to serve substantive supplemental responses to Plaintiff’s request for production no. 64, along with all responsive documents, for all employees who operated its forklifts on or after January 1, 2015. (Minute Order, January 22, 2019.) In addition, the minute order states that the discovery cut-off was to remain in effect except as to the outstanding discovery as discussed this date and as to the unique and special knowledge of Kenneth Armstrong. (Ibid.)

On February 22, 2019, Plaintiff served Requests for Production (Set Three) on Defendant by overnight mail. On March 26, 2019, Defendant served responses to Plaintiff’s discovery requests via regular mail.

Plaintiff now moves this court for an order compelling further responses to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production (Set Three) Nos. 71-78 and for monetary sanctions in the amount of $2,860.00.

MEET AND CONFER REQUIREMENTS

A motion to compel further responses “shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration.”  (Code Civ. Proc., ; 2030.300, subd. (b).) The declaration must state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented in the motion.  (Code Civ. Proc., ; 2016.040.)  “[A] reasonable and good faith attempt at informal resolution entails something more than bickering with [opposing] counsel….  Rather, the law requires that counsel attempt to talk the matter over, compare their views, consult, and deliberate.”  (Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1294.)  “A determination of whether an attempt at informal resolution is adequate involves the exercise of discretion.”  (Stewart v. Colonial W. Agency (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1016, internal ellipses omitted.)  Where a party fails to make any real effort at informal resolution, a particularly egregious failure may justify an immediate and outright denial of further discovery.  (Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 433-34, citing Townsend v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1437.) 

In support of the subject motion, Plaintiff filed the Declaration of Christina Begakis. The Begakis Declaration states that on April 8, 2019, Plaintiff’s counsel sent a meet and confer letter regarding Defendant’s inadequate responses to Plaintiff’s Request for Production (Set Three), but that no response was ever received. (Begakis Decl. ¶¶ 7-8.) This single meet and confer letter sent to Defendant’s Counsel approximately one month prior to the filing of this motion is insufficient to satisfy the meet and confer requirements set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300.

DISCUSSION

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Under the Discovery Act, “any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., ; 2017.010.)

On receipt of responses to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that any of the following apply: (1) an answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete; (2) An exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate; or (3) an objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc. ; 2030.300.) The moving party must also include reasons why further answers should be ordered: legal or factual arguments why the answers given were incomplete or nonresponsive, or the objections invalid. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(c).) The responding party has the burden to justify objections in response to a motion filed to compel further responses. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.)

“Unless notice of this motion is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the propounding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the propounding party waives any right to compel a further response to the interrogatories.” (Code of Civ. Proc. 2030.300 ; subd.(c))

II. ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs moves this court for an order compelling Defendant to further respond to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production (Set Three) Nos. 71-78. (Mot. at p. 4.)

In opposition, Defendant argues that the motion should be denied because (1) the discovery motion is untimely and (2) the subject discovery requests are not within the limited scope for which the 60-day extension was provided. Additionally, Defendant seeks monetary sanctions in the amount of $900.00 for Plaintiff’s counsel’s continuing discovery abuse.

As previously mentioned, on January 22, 2019 this court granted Plaintiff’s motion to compel further discovery responses in-part and ordered Defendant to serve supplemental responses to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production by February 12, 2018. (Minute Order, January 22, 2019.) In addition, the minute order for that hearing specifically provided that “[d]iscovery cut-off to remain in effect except as to the outstanding discovery as discussed this date and as to the unique and special knowledge of Kenneth Armstrong.” (Ibid.) Based on Plaintiff’s Notice of Ruling, the discovery cut-off for the identified discovery was extended for 60 days starting from January 22, 2019. (Begakis Decl., Exh. A.) However, plaintiff’s notice of ruling, which was apparently not filed with the court, is inconsistent with the minute order which says nothing about a 60-day extension for other discovery.

Moreover, the minute order said nothing about reopening the timing for filing motions to compel, which had already expired at the time of the order. Thus, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses is not timely.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, the Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses to Requests for Production (Set Three) is DENIED. Plaintiff’s request for monetary sanctions is DENIED.