This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 05/31/2021 at 04:42:24 (UTC).

JEWELENE CLARK VS GINGER COLEMAN, ET AL.

Case Summary

On 12/01/2020 JEWELENE CLARK filed a Contract - Other Contract lawsuit against GINGER COLEMAN. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    *******5828

  • Filing Date:

    12/01/2020

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Contract - Other Contract

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

 

Party Details

Plaintiff

CLARK JEWELENE

Defendants

CRENSHAW VILLAS PARTNERS LP A CALIFORNIA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

COLEMAN GINGER

CRENSHAW VILLAS PARTNERS LP

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff Attorney

LAVI DANIEL J. ESQ.

Defendant Attorney

CHARLES STEPHANIE

 

Court Documents

Case Management Statement

5/21/2021: Case Management Statement

Case Management Statement

5/17/2021: Case Management Statement

Notice - NOTICE OF COURT'S SCHEDULING OF GINGER COLEMAN AND CRENSHAW VILLAS PARTNERS, LP'S DEMURRERS AND MOTIONS TO STRIKE

4/28/2021: Notice - NOTICE OF COURT'S SCHEDULING OF GINGER COLEMAN AND CRENSHAW VILLAS PARTNERS, LP'S DEMURRERS AND MOTIONS TO STRIKE

Certificate of Mailing for - CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR [NOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE]

4/14/2021: Certificate of Mailing for - CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR [NOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE]

Notice of Case Management Conference

4/14/2021: Notice of Case Management Conference

Challenge To Judicial Officer - Peremptory (170.6)

3/24/2021: Challenge To Judicial Officer - Peremptory (170.6)

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (COURT ORDER RE NOTICE FOR PEREMPTORY DISQUALIFICATION UNDER C...)

3/26/2021: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (COURT ORDER RE NOTICE FOR PEREMPTORY DISQUALIFICATION UNDER C...)

Notice of Case Reassignment/Vacate Hearings

3/26/2021: Notice of Case Reassignment/Vacate Hearings

Certificate of Mailing for - CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR (COURT ORDER RE NOTICE FOR PEREMPTORY DISQUALIFICATION UNDER C...) OF 03/26/2021

3/26/2021: Certificate of Mailing for - CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR (COURT ORDER RE NOTICE FOR PEREMPTORY DISQUALIFICATION UNDER C...) OF 03/26/2021

Proof of Service by Mail

3/5/2021: Proof of Service by Mail

Proof of Service by Mail

3/5/2021: Proof of Service by Mail

Case Management Statement

3/10/2021: Case Management Statement

Demand for Jury Trial

3/19/2021: Demand for Jury Trial

Motion to Strike (not initial pleading)

3/19/2021: Motion to Strike (not initial pleading)

Case Management Statement

3/19/2021: Case Management Statement

Declaration - DECLARATION OF JOEL BRUCE DOUGLAS RE: ASSIGNMENT OF TRIAL ATTORNEY

3/19/2021: Declaration - DECLARATION OF JOEL BRUCE DOUGLAS RE: ASSIGNMENT OF TRIAL ATTORNEY

Notice of Posting of Jury Fees

3/19/2021: Notice of Posting of Jury Fees

Motion to Strike (not initial pleading)

3/19/2021: Motion to Strike (not initial pleading)

17 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 07/07/2021
  • Hearing07/07/2021 at 08:30 AM in Department 24 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Hearing on Demurrer - with Motion to Strike (CCP 430.10)

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  • 07/07/2021
  • Hearing07/07/2021 at 08:30 AM in Department 24 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Hearing on Demurrer - with Motion to Strike (CCP 430.10)

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  • 06/07/2021
  • Hearing06/07/2021 at 08:30 AM in Department 24 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Case Management Conference

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  • 05/21/2021
  • DocketCase Management Statement; Filed by Jewelene Clark (Plaintiff)

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  • 05/17/2021
  • DocketCase Management Statement; Filed by Ginger Coleman (Defendant); Crenshaw Villas Partners LP (Defendant)

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  • 04/28/2021
  • DocketNotice (OF COURT'S SCHEDULING OF GINGER COLEMAN AND CRENSHAW VILLAS PARTNERS, LP'S DEMURRERS AND MOTIONS TO STRIKE); Filed by Ginger Coleman (Defendant); Crenshaw Villas Partners LP (Defendant)

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  • 04/14/2021
  • DocketCertificate of Mailing for ([Notice of Case Management Conference]); Filed by Clerk

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  • 04/14/2021
  • DocketNotice of Case Management Conference; Filed by Clerk

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  • 03/26/2021
  • Docketat 11:45 AM in Department 78; Court Order

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  • 03/26/2021
  • DocketMinute Order ( (Court Order Re Notice for Peremptory Disqualification Under C...)); Filed by Clerk

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14 More Docket Entries
  • 03/10/2021
  • DocketCase Management Statement; Filed by Jewelene Clark (Plaintiff)

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  • 03/05/2021
  • DocketProof of Service by Mail; Filed by Jewelene Clark (Plaintiff)

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  • 03/05/2021
  • DocketProof of Service by Mail; Filed by Jewelene Clark (Plaintiff)

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  • 12/21/2020
  • DocketNotice of Case Management Conference; Filed by Clerk

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  • 12/02/2020
  • DocketOrder on Court Fee Waiver (Superior Court); Filed by Clerk

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  • 12/01/2020
  • DocketCivil Case Cover Sheet; Filed by Jewelene Clark (Plaintiff)

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  • 12/01/2020
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by Jewelene Clark (Plaintiff)

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  • 12/01/2020
  • DocketNotice of Case Assignment - Unlimited Civil Case; Filed by Clerk

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  • 12/01/2020
  • DocketSummons (on Complaint); Filed by Jewelene Clark (Plaintiff)

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  • 12/01/2020
  • DocketDemand for Jury Trial; Filed by Jewelene Clark (Plaintiff)

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Tentative Rulings

b"

Case Number: 20STCV45828 Hearing Date: July 7, 2021 Dept: 24

On December 1, 2020,\r\nPlaintiff Jewelene Clark filed the instant habitability suit against her\r\nlandlords Defendants Ginger Coleman and Crenshaw Villas Partners LP. The\r\nComplaint states ten causes of action for breach of contract, breach of\r\ncovenant of quiet enjoyment, three counts for breach of covenant of\r\nhabitability, unfair practices under California Business & Professions Code\r\n§17200, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence and premises\r\nliability.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

On March 19, 2021, Defendants filed a demur and motion to\r\nstrike against the Complaint. No opposition was filed.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

Legal Standard

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

A\r\ndemurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action.\r\n(Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th\r\n740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally\r\nand in context. In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the\r\nface of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A\r\ndemurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic\r\nmatters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the\r\npleading or are judicially noticed. (CCP §§ 430.30, 430.70.) At the pleading\r\nstage, a plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts sufficient to apprise the\r\ndefendant of the factual basis for the claim against him. (Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 714, 721.) A “demurrer\r\ndoes not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law\r\nalleged in the pleading, or the construction of instruments pleaded, or facts\r\nimpossible in law.” (S. Shore Land Co. v.\r\nPetersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 732 [internal citations omitted].)

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

Any party, within the time allowed\r\nto respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the\r\nwhole or any part thereof. (CCP § 435(b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, Rule\r\n3.1322(b).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and\r\nupon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper\r\nmatter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any\r\npleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court\r\nrule, or an order of the court. (CCP §§ 436(a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading\r\nwhich is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are\r\nsurplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].)

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

Meet and Confer

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

Before filing a demurrer or motion to strike, the moving party must meet\r\nand confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading to\r\nattempt to reach an agreement that would resolve the objections to the\r\npleading. (CCP §§ 430.41, 435.5.) Counsel’s\r\ndeclaration satisfies the meet and confer requirement.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

Contract\r\nand Habitability Causes

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

Defendants demur to the\r\nhabitability/contract causes (the first through fourth causes of action) on the\r\ngrounds that the facts do not support a breach of any implied or explicit term\r\nof the lease. The Court agrees that the Complaint fails to allege a substantial\r\nhabitability breach.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

To allege a\r\nbreach of contract cause of action, a complainant must plead the contract,\r\ntheir performance or excuse for non-performance, defendant’s breach, and damage\r\nto plaintiff therefrom. (Acoustics, Inc. v. Trepte Constr.\r\nCo. (1971) 14\r\nCal.App.3d 887, 913.) Although a written contract is usually pleaded by\r\nalleging its making and attaching a copy which is incorporated by reference, a\r\nwritten contract can also be pleaded by alleging the making and the substance\r\nof the relevant terms. (Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG\r\nSpecialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 198-199.)

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

Civil Code § 1941 states that “[t]he lessor of a building\r\nintended for the occupation of human beings must, in the absence of an\r\nagreement to the contrary, put it into a condition fit for such occupation, and\r\nrepair all subsequent dilapidations thereof, which render it\r\nuntenantable.” If the dwelling substantially lacks specified\r\n“affirmative standard characteristics” then the dwelling will be deemed\r\nuntenantable. (Civ. Code § 1941.1(a)(1)-(9); see CCP § 1174.2(c) [a\r\n“substantial breach” is the “failure of the landlord to comply with applicable\r\nbuilding and housing code standards which materially affect health and\r\nsafety”].)

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

The warranty of habitability is implied by law in\r\nresidential leases in California. (Green v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 616, 635-37.) “This\r\nimplied warranty of habitability does not require that a landlord ensure that\r\nleased premises are in perfect, aesthetically pleasing condition, but it does\r\nmean that ‘bare living requirements' must be maintained.” (Id.) \r\n“In most cases substantial compliance with those applicable building and\r\nhousing code standards which materially affect health and safety will suffice\r\nto meet the landlord's obligations under the common law implied warranty of\r\nhabitability . . . ‘(m)inor housing code violations standing alone which do not\r\naffect habitability must be considered de minimis and will not entitle the\r\ntenant to reduction in rent.’” (Id. at 637-38.)

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

Through\r\nthe covenant, a tenant can reasonably expect that the landlord will\r\nmaintain the property in a habitable condition by repairing promptly any\r\nconditions, of which the landlord has actual or constructive notice, that arise\r\nduring the tenancy. (Peterson v. Superior Court (1995) 10\r\nCal.4th 1185, 1205-26.) A tenant cannot reasonably expect that the\r\nlandlord will eliminate defects in a rented dwelling of which the landlord was\r\nunaware and which could not have been disclosed by reasonable inspection. (Id.) Thus,\r\nthe landlord’s actual or constructive notice of the alleged uninhabitable\r\ncondition is an essential prerequisite to an actionable breach of habitability\r\nclaim. (Id.)

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

The alleged facts simply do not\r\nsupport a cognizable breach of habitability here. The Complaint alleges that\r\nthat in December 2018, Plaintiff headed to her closet to hang her clothes, but\r\nas she opened the closet, she was met with an overwhelming flood of water.\r\n(Compl., ¶ 20.) She suffered personal injuries and property damage. (Compl., ¶¶\r\n21-22.) . Plaintiff contacted Defendants promptly to report the flooding at the\r\nSubject Property. (Compl., ¶ 26.) While\r\nthe sprinklers were being fixed, Defendants forced Plaintiff to relocate for an\r\nunspecified time, and refused to pay relocation costs. (Compl., 30.) Plaintiff does not allege any notice of\r\nthe defect prior to the water burst, beyond mere conclusions. The only\r\nfact established is the single incident above, without prior notice. More facts\r\nare required to establish a substantial breach.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

Accordingly, Defendants’ demurrer is\r\nSUSTAINED with leave to amend as to these causes.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

Nuisance

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

“Anything which is injurious to\r\nhealth, including, but not limited to, the illegal sale of controlled\r\nsubstances, or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the\r\nfree use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life\r\nor property . . . is a nuisance.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 3479.) “The essence of a\r\nprivate nuisance is an interference with the use and enjoyment of land.” (Friends\r\nof H Street v. City of Sacramento (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 152,\r\n160.) Thus to allege a cause of action for private nuisance, the plaintiff\r\nmust allege injury specific to the use and enjoyment of his land. (See Adams\r\nv. MHC Colony Park Limited Partnership (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 601,\r\n610.) Virtually any disturbance of the enjoyment of property may amount to\r\na nuisance, so long as the interference is substantial and unreasonable. (See\r\nMonks v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 263, 302; see also\r\nMelton v. Boustred (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 521, 542.)

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

Whether the interference is\r\nsubstantial and unreasonable is a question of fact requiring determination of\r\nall the circumstances of the case. (See Mendez v. Rancho Valencia Partners, LLC\r\n(2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 248, 263-64.) “‘The interference with the protected\r\ninterest must not only be substantial, but it must also be unreasonable’\r\n[citations omitted], i.e., it must be ‘of such a nature, duration or amount as\r\nto constitute unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the\r\nland.’ [citations omitted] The primary test for determining whether the\r\ninvasion is unreasonable is whether the gravity of the harm outweighs the\r\nsocial utility of the defendant’s conduct, taking a number of factors into\r\naccount.” (San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 6\r\nCal.4th 893, 938.)

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

The Court agrees that the only\r\nfactually alleged condition is the single incident of a sprinkler system\r\nsuddenly going off in Plaintiff’s closet. This does not describe a situation\r\nordinarily contemplated as an actionable nuisance. The use of a sprinkler\r\nsystem for fire protection has obvious social utility in minimizing the risks\r\nand danger of fires. The facts alleged\r\ndo not establish that the single, repaired, leak was “of such a nature,\r\nduration or amount” as to constitute unreasonable interference.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

Accordingly, Defendants’ demurrer is\r\nSUSTAINED with leave toa mend.

\r\n\r\n

\r\nCiv. Code section 1942.4

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

Civ.\r\nCode § 1942.4(a) provides that a landlord may not demand or collect rent\r\nwhere:

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

(1)\r\nThe dwelling substantially lacks any of the affirmative standard\r\ncharacteristics listed in Section 1941.1 or violates Section 17920.10 of the Health\r\nand Safety Code, or is deemed and declared substandard as set\r\nforth in Section 17920.3 of the Health and Safety Code because conditions\r\nlisted in that section exist to an extent that endangers the life, limb,\r\nhealth, property, safety, or welfare of the public or the occupants of the\r\ndwelling.

\r\n\r\n

(2)\r\nA public officer or employee who is responsible for the enforcement of any\r\nhousing law, after inspecting the premises, has notified the landlord or the\r\nlandlord’s agent in writing of his or her obligations to abate the nuisance or\r\nrepair the substandard conditions.

\r\n\r\n

(3)\r\nThe conditions have existed and have not been abated 35 days beyond the date of\r\nservice of the notice specified in paragraph (2) and the delay is without good\r\ncause. For purposes of this subdivision, service shall be complete at the time\r\nof deposit in the United States mail.

\r\n\r\n

(4)\r\nThe conditions were not caused by an act or omission of the tenant or lessee in\r\nviolation of Section 1929 or 1941.2.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

Lack\r\nof hot running water and lack of adequate heating to an extent that “endangers\r\nthe life, limb, health, property, safety, or welfare” of the occupant is\r\nenumerated in Health & Saf. Code § 17920.3.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

Plaintiff does not allege any of the above statutory\r\nrequirements. Plaintiff does not allege any facts regarding the public\r\nofficer/employee or the 35 day abatement period. Absent an offer of proof\r\nregarding these facts, the Court is not inclined to grant leave for this cause.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

Accordingly,\r\nDefendant’s demurrer is SUSTAINED without leave as to this cause. (See Goodman v.\r\nKennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 347 [leave to amend will\r\nonly be granted if Plaintiff provides sufficient facts that demonstrate a\r\nreasonable probability of successful amendment given the deficiencies discussed\r\nabove].)

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

“The elements of\r\nthe tort for intentional infliction of mental distress are: (1) outrageous\r\nconduct by the defendant, (2) intention to cause or reckless disregard of the\r\nprobability of causing emotional distress, (3) severe emotional suffering and\r\n(4) actual and proximate causation of emotional distress[.]” (Stoiber\r\nv. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 921.) A defendant’s conduct is\r\n“outrageous” when it is so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated\r\nin a civilized community. (Ibid.) The defendant must either intend his\r\nor her conduct to inflict injury or engaged in it with the realization that\r\ninjury will result. (Ibid.) Liability for intentional infliction of\r\nemotional distress does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats,\r\nannoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. (Ibid.)

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

Generally,\r\nthe question of whether the conduct is in fact outrageous is a question of fact\r\nto be determined beyond the pleading stage. (So v. Shin (2013) 212\r\nCal.App.4th 652; Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood\r\nApartments (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1004.) Nonetheless,\r\n“[w]hile those cases say that it is ‘usually’ a question of fact, several\r\ncases have dismissed intentional infliction of emotional distress claims on\r\ndemurrer, concluding that the facts alleged did not amount to outrageous\r\nconduct as a matter of law.” (Barker v. Fox & Associates (2015)\r\n240 Cal.App.4th 333, 355-356; see, e.g., Mintz v. Blue Cross of\r\nCalifornia (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1594, 1608–1609; Coleman v.\r\nRepublic Indemnity Ins. Co. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 403,\r\n416–417.)

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

Courts\r\nhave held that a tenant's emotional distress caused by landlord's alleged\r\n“knowing, intentional, and willful” failure to correct defective conditions of\r\nthe premises can form the basis of an IIED claim. (Stoiber, supra, 101\r\nCal.App.3d at 921.) The Stoiber court held:

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

[I]t\r\nis clear that the availability of a remedy for breach of implied warranty of\r\nhabitability does not preclude a tenant from suing his landlord for intentional\r\ninfliction of mental distress if the landlord's acts are extreme and outrageous\r\nand result in severe mental distress. Whether this is so under the present\r\nallegations, presents a factual question it cannot be said as a matter of law that\r\nappellant has not stated a cause of action.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

(Id. at 922; see\r\nalso Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC¿(2014) 226\r\nCal.App.4th 1281, 1299.)

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

Here,\r\nPlainitf fdoes not allege any knowing or intentional failure to correct\r\ndefective conditions on the premises. Plaintiff only alleges a single incident\r\nof a sudden water burst from the sprinkler system. Plaintiff does not allege\r\nany intentional, outrageous act by Defendants. The facts alleged did not amount to outrageous conduct as a\r\nmatter of law.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

Accordingly,\r\nDefendants’ demurrer is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

UCL Claim

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

To\r\nstate a claim under Bus. & Prof. Code section 17200, a\r\nplaintiff must allege whether the conduct complained of is a fraudulent,\r\nunlawful or an unfair business practice. Under the fraud prong, a\r\nplaintiff must allege an affirmative misrepresentation, conduct, or\r\nbusiness practice on the part of a defendant; or an omission in violation\r\nof a defendant’s duty to disclose; and that is likely to deceive\r\nmembers of the public. (Buller v. Sutter Health (2008) 160\r\nCal.App.4th 981, 986.) Under the UCL, any “unlawful”, “unfair”, or\r\n“fraudulent” business act or practice is deemed to be unfair\r\ncompetition. (State Farm Fire & Casualty v. Superior Court (1996)\r\n45 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1102, criticized on different grounds by Cal-Tech\r\nCommunications, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Telephone (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163,\r\n184.) The UCL’s remedies are limited because UCL actions are equitable in\r\nnature. (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29\r\nCal.4th 1134, 1144.) Consequently, damages cannot be recovered; plaintiffs\r\nare generally limited to injunctive relief and restitution. (Ibid.)

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

The\r\nComplaint fails to establish any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business\r\npractice on the part of Defendants. As discussed, Plaintiff does not factually\r\nsupport the cited violations of the warranty of habitability, Civil Code\r\nsections 1941.1, 1942.4, and 1942.5 or Health & Safety Code section\r\n17920.3.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

Accordingly, Defendants’ demurrer is\r\nSUSUTAINED with leave to amend.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

Negligence

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

Defendants\r\ndemur to the fifth and ninth negligence based causes on the grounds that there\r\nwas no advanced knowledge of the defect in the sprinkler system.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

The\r\nwell-known elements of negligence are: 1) a legal duty owed to plaintiff to use\r\ndue care; 2) breach of duty; 3) causation; and 4) damage to plaintiff. (County\r\nof Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 318.)\r\nPremises liability is a form of negligence where a plaintiff must show 1)\r\ndefendant owed a duty based on his ownership or control of property; 2)\r\ndefendant was negligent in the use, maintenance or management of the property;\r\n3) the plaintiff was harmed; and 4) defendant’s negligence was a substantial\r\nfactor in causing plaintiff’s harm. (Brooks v. Eugene Burger Management\r\nCorp. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1611, 1619.) An injured plaintiff\r\nmust allege the owner had notice of the defect in sufficient time to\r\ncorrect it, but failed to take reasonable steps to do so. (Howard\r\nv. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 403,\r\n43.)

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

“Ordinarily,\r\nnegligence may be alleged in general terms, without specific facts showing how\r\nthe injury occurred, but there are ‘limits to the generality with which a\r\nplaintiff is permitted to state his cause of action, and . . . the plaintiff\r\nmust indicate the acts or omissions which are said to have been negligently\r\nperformed. He may not recover upon the bare statement that the defendant’s\r\nnegligence has caused him injury.’ [Citation].” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007)\r\n152 Cal.App.4th 518, 527.) However, there is no requirement that plaintiff\r\nidentify and allege the precise moment of the injury or the exact nature of the\r\nwrongful act. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

Here,\r\nPlaintiff alleges that Defendants’ failure to address the inadequate and\r\npoorly maintained sprinkler system at the Subject Property harmed her. (Compl.,\r\n¶¶ 78-80.) Plaintiff avers no facts showing prior notice of any need to make\r\nrepairs or precautions regarding the sprinkler system. No facts are alleged\r\nshowing that Defendant could have discovered by means of any reasonable\r\ninspection. Since there are no facts alleged that Defendants had actual or\r\nconstructive notice prior to the leak incident (see Compl., ¶ 26), Defendants’\r\ndemurrer is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

Motion\r\nto Strike

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

The motion to strike is MOOT per the\r\nabove ruling on demurrer.

\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\n

Moving party is ordered to give\r\nnotice.

"
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