JASON CAMP VS LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

Tentative Rulings

Case Number: BC673403 Hearing Date: May 17, 2022 Dept: 54

Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles
Jason Camp,	Plaintiff,	Case No.:	BC673403
vs.		Tentative Ruling
Los Angeles Unified School District, et al.,	Defendants.

Hearing Date: May 17, 2022

Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter

Motion to Tax Costs

Moving Party: Defendant LAUSD

Responding Party: Plaintiff Jason Camp

T/R: DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO TAX COSTS IS GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. COSTS DISALLOWED BY CCP 1033.5 AND PREJUDGMENT INTEREST ARE TAXED.

Defendant to notice.

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:30 am on the day of the hearing.

The Court considers the moving papers, opposition, reply, and supplemental briefs.

BACKGROUND

On August 22, 2017, Plaintiff Jason Camp sued Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District. Ultimately, on November 19, 2018, Plaintiff filed the operative fourth amended complaint (“4AC”), asserting causes of action for (1) unlawful retaliation in violation of Labor Code 1102.5; (2) defamation; (3) tortious interference with contract; (4) tortious interference with economic advantage; and (5) retaliation in violation of FEHA. On January 16, 2019, the Court sustained Defendants’ demurrer to the 4AC as to the second, third and fourth causes of action without leave to amend.

Plaintiff was employed as a Principal of Owensmouth Continuation High School for the 2016-2017 school year. Plaintiff alleges he was dismissed for reporting misuse of Title 1 funds and national origin discrimination.

The case proceeded to trial on the first and fifth causes of action. On November 8, 2021, the jury found in favor of Plaintiff on his Labor Code claim and awarded $2,500,000.00 in damages.

ANALYSIS

Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding.” (CCP 1032(b).) “Allowable costs shall be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation.” (CCP 1033.5(c)(2).) “If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary.” (Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal. App. 4th 761, 774.) “On the other hand, if the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs.” (Ibid.)

On February 18, 2022, Plaintiff filed a memorandum of costs seeking $838,897.62.

A. Costs Disallowed by CCP 1033.5(b)

Defendant moves to tax Plaintiff’s requests for $1,712.46 in postage and photocopying costs, $23,473.65 in jury investigation and voir dire preparation costs, and $27,300.90 non-court ordered transcript costs. These costs are explicitly disallowed under CCP 1033.5(b) and must be taxed.

B. Prejudgment Interest

Defendant moves to tax Plaintiff’s request for $674,657.53 in prejudgment interest. Civ. Code 3287(a) provides, “[a] person who is entitled to recover damages certain, or capable of being made certain by calculation, and the right to recover which is vested in the person upon a particular day, is entitled also to recover interest thereon from that day, except when the debtor is prevented by law, or by the act of the creditor from paying the debt.” Plaintiff’s damages were not capable of being made certain by calculation; Plaintiff has no right to prejudgment interest under this section.

Plaintiff asserts he is entitled to prejudgment interest under Civ. Code 3291, which allows for an award of prejudgment interest in personal injury actions where the Defendant rejects a 998 offer. This provision, however, expressly excludes public entities. (Civ. Code 3291 [“This section shall not apply to a public entity, or to a public employee for an act or omission within the scope of employment, and neither the public entity nor the public employee shall be liable, directly or indirectly, to any person for any interest imposed by this section.”])

Plaintiff is not entitled to prejudgment interest.

C. Remaining Litigation Costs

The Court finds the remainder of litigation costs, except for expert witness fees, were reasonable and necessary. These costs will not be taxed.

D. Expert Witness Fees

Defendant moves to strike $56,873.66 in expert witness fees. Plaintiff asserts he is entitled to fees because Defendant rejected Plaintiff’s CCP 998 offer to compromise for $750,000.00. Defendant argues the 998 offer was conditional and invalid. At the first hearing on this motion, the Court requested the further briefing on the validity of the offer.

Defendant argues the offer was “uncertain” because it contained “conditional” language requiring that Plaintiff be paid the settlement sum within 30 days of acceptance of the offer. Defendant asserts it could not have determined whether the offer was reasonable in 30 days. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff cannot establish he obtained a more favorable judgment because the amount of attorney’s fees and costs at the time of the offer was not known.

Defendant’s arguments are unpersuasive. Defendant does not cite authority showing a 998 offer like the one at hand is uncertain or invalid. Plaintiff’s offer was contained in a standard Judicial Council Form CIV-090. The items added to paragraph 2 do not render the offer conditional or uncertain. Plaintiff obtained a $2.5 million judgment plus fees and costs, which is more favorable than the offer of $750,000.00 plus fees and costs. Plaintiff is entitled to expert costs.

Case Number: BC673403 Hearing Date: April 21, 2022 Dept: 54

Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles
Jason Camp,	Plaintiff,	Case No.:	BC673403
vs.		Tentative Ruling
Los Angeles Unified School District, et al.,	Defendants.

Hearing Date: April 21, 2022

Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter

Motion to Stay Enforcement of Judgment

Moving Party: Defendant LAUSD

Responding Party: D Plaintiff Jason Camp

T/R: DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STAY ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENT IS GRANTED.

DEFENDANT to notice.

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:30 am on the day of the hearing.

The Court considers the moving papers. No opposition has been received.

CCP 918 provides,

(a) Subject to subdivision (b), the trial court may stay the enforcement of any judgment or order.

(b) If the enforcement of the judgment or order would be stayed on appeal only by the giving of an undertaking, a trial court shall not have power, without the consent of the adverse party, to stay the enforcement thereof pursuant to this section for a period which extends for more than 10 days beyond the last date on which a notice of appeal could be filed.

(c) This section applies whether or not an appeal will be taken from the judgment or order and whether or not a notice of appeal has been filed.

Defendant asks the Court to stay the judgment for 10 days beyond the last date on which a notice of appeal could be filed. CCP 918(b) allows the Court to grant such a stay.

Defendant’s motion is GRANTED.

Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles
Jason Camp,	Plaintiff,	Case No.:	BC673403
vs.		Tentative Ruling
Los Angeles Unified School District, et al.,	Defendants.

Hearing Date: April 21, 2022

Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter

Motion for Attorney’s Fees

Moving Party: Plaintiff Jason Camp

Responding Party: Defendant LAUSD

T/R: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES IS GRANTED IN THE REDUCED AMOUNT OF $1,111,277.20.

PLAINTIFF to notice.

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:30 am on the day of the hearing.

The Court considers the moving papers, opposition and reply.

BACKGROUND

On August 22, 2017, Plaintiff Jason Camp sued Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District. Ultimately, on November 19, 2018, Plaintiff filed the operative fourth amended complaint (“4AC”), asserting causes of action for (1) unlawful retaliation in violation of Labor Code 1102.5; (2) defamation; (3) tortious interference with contract; (4) tortious interference with economic advantage; and (5) retaliation in violation of FEHA. On January 16, 2019, the Court sustained Defendants’ demurrer to the 4AC as to the second, third and fourth causes of action without leave to amend.

Plaintiff was employed as a Principal of Owensmouth Continuation High School for the 2016-2017 school year. Plaintiff alleges he was dismissed for reporting misuse of Title 1 funds and national origin discrimination.

The case proceeded to trial on the first and fifth causes of action. On November 8, 2021, the jury found in favor of Plaintiff on his Labor Code claim and awarded $2,500,000.00 in damages.

ANALYSIS

Labor Code 1102.5(j) allows the Court to award attorney’s fees to the prevailing plaintiff in an action for violation of this statute.[1]

A. Reasonableness of Fees

“The verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.” (Horsford v. Board Of Trustees Of California State University (2005) 132 Cal. App. 4th 359, 396.) If the motion is supported by evidence, the opposing party must respond with specific evidence showing that the fees are unreasonable. (Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys. v. California Ins. Guarantee Ass’n (2008) 163 Cal. App. 4th 550, 560–63.) The Court has discretion to reduce fees that result from inefficient or duplicative use of time. (Horsford, supra at 395.)

“The determination of what constitutes a reasonable fee generally ‘begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate….’” “[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award….” (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 140, 154.)

Plaintiff moves for attorney’s fees in the lodestar amount of $1,451,187.50. Plaintiff’s counsel declares that 2,127 hours at $45.00 to $800.00 per hour were spent prosecuting this action.

1. Hourly Rate

“The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Grp. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The ‘experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong’ — meaning that it abused its discretion.” (Id.)

Plaintiff’s lead counsel, Renuka V. Jain, declares she spent 1600.1 hours at $800.00 per hour prosecuting this action. Plaintiff presents the declarations of other employment attorneys attesting that $800 per hour is a reasonable rate in the community. But Plaintiff does not provide any statistical information to support this claim. Ms. Jain also asserts she was awarded a rate of $600 per hour in other cases in Los Angeles Superior Court in 2014. Based on all the information presented and the Court’s knowledge and familiarity with the Los Angeles legal market, the Court finds that, for an attorney of Ms. Jain’s experience and skill, $700 per hour is the prevailing rate for similar work.

The Court finds that the hourly rates for other timekeepers are reasonable.

2. Number of Hours

Plaintiff asserts that the number of hours spent is reasonable given the length and complexity of the action. The Court agrees that this case was litigated extensively over a long period of time. Most of the time entries are reasonable and appropriate, and the Court defers to Plaintiff’s counsel on the number of hours necessary to complete various tasks. But the Court finds certain billing entries to be unreasonable, unnecessary or unsupported. Specifically, the Court finds inappropriate the hours spent to prosecute the non-Labor Code claims, hours spent to bring the motion for sanctions, and hours of contract counsel. Defendants have identified specific time entries associated with these matters. The Court has independently reviewed these time entries and finds they represent time spent on unreasonable or unnecessary tasks.

Plaintiff’s counsel spent 99 hours drafting the third and fourth amended complaints and opposing Defendant’s demurrer. These complaints contained causes of action for defamation and tortious interference which did not survive demurrer, and the claim for FEHA retaliation which was rejected by the jury. And counsel spent 104 hours prosecuting the FEHA claim. These claims were unsuccessful and unnecessary to prosecute Plaintiff’s Labor Code claim. Plaintiff’s counsel also expended 54 hours on the motion for sanctions. This motion was unnecessary and unsuccessful.

The Court will allow 1,343.1 hours at $700.00 per hour for the work of Ms. Jain, for a total of $940,170.00.

B. Multiplier

The Court is permitted, but not required, to apply a multiplier to an award for attorney’s fees. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1138.) Relevant factors to determine whether an enhancement is appropriate include (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. (Id. at 1132.)

Plaintiff asks the Court to award a 2.5 multiplier to the fee award. Plaintiff asserts that the case was particularly novel and complex because of the mistrial caused by the start of the COVID pandemic, and because Counsel represented Plaintiff on a contingent basis. Though this action was heavily litigated, the Court does not find that a multiplier is appropriate. The case did not present unusually novel or difficult issues, and while the delay caused by the mistrial increased the number of hours required and the overall length of litigation it did not make the case more complicated. Counsel will be awarded the fees reasonably incurred.

Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $1,111,277.20.

Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles
Jason Camp,	Plaintiff,	Case No.:	BC673403
vs.		Tentative Ruling
Los Angeles Unified School District, et al.,	Defendants.

Hearing Date: April 21, 2022

Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter

Motion to Tax Costs

Moving Party: Defendant LAUSD

Responding Party: Plaintiff Jason Camp

T/R: THE MOTION TO TAX COSTS IS CONTINUED TO MAY 17, 2022 AT 9:00AM.

THE PARTIES ARE ORDERED TO PROVIDE SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING, NOT TO EXCEED 5 PAGES, ON THE VALIDITY OF THE 998 OFFER NO LATER THAN MAY 9, 2022. PLAINTIFF TO PROVIDE AN AUTHENTICATED COPY OF THE 998 OFFER WITH THE BRIEFING.

Defendant to notice.

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:30 am on the day of the hearing.

The Court considers the moving papers, opposition and reply.

BACKGROUND

On August 22, 2017, Plaintiff Jason Camp sued Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District. Ultimately, on November 19, 2018, Plaintiff filed the operative fourth amended complaint (“4AC”), asserting causes of action for (1) unlawful retaliation in violation of Labor Code 1102.5; (2) defamation; (3) tortious interference with contract; (4) tortious interference with economic advantage; and (5) retaliation in violation of FEHA. On January 16, 2019, the Court sustained Defendants’ demurrer to the 4AC as to the second, third and fourth causes of action without leave to amend.

Plaintiff was employed as a Principal of Owensmouth Continuation High School for the 2016-2017 school year. Plaintiff alleges he was dismissed for reporting misuse of Title 1 funds and national origin discrimination.

The case proceeded to trial on the first and fifth causes of action. On November 8, 2021, the jury found in favor of Plaintiff on his Labor Code claim and awarded $2,500,000.00 in damages.

ANALYSIS

Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding.” (CCP 1032(b).) “Allowable costs shall be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation.” (CCP 1033.5(c)(2).) “If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary.” (Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal. App. 4th 761, 774.) “On the other hand, if the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs.” (Ibid.)

On February 18, 2022, Plaintiff filed a memorandum of costs seeking $838,897.62.

A. Costs Disallowed by CCP 1033.5(b)

Defendant moves to tax Plaintiff’s requests for $712.46 in postage and photocopying costs, $23,473.65 in jury investigation and voir dire preparation costs, and $27,300.90 non-court ordered transcript costs. These costs are explicitly disallowed under CCP 1033.5(b) and must be taxed.

B. Prejudgment Interest

Defendant moves to tax Plaintiff’s request for $674,657.53 in prejudgment interest. Civ. Code 3287(a) provides, “[a] person who is entitled to recover damages certain, or capable of being made certain by calculation, and the right to recover which is vested in the person upon a particular day, is entitled also to recover interest thereon from that day, except when the debtor is prevented by law, or by the act of the creditor from paying the debt.” Plaintiff’s damages were not capable of being made certain by calculation and Plaintiff has no right to prejudgment interest under this section.

Plaintiff asserts he is entitled to prejudgment interest under Civ. Code 3291, which allows for an award of prejudgment interest in personal injury actions where the Defendant rejects a 998 offer. This provision, however, expressly excludes public entities. (Civ. Code 3291 [“This section shall not apply to a public entity, or to a public employee for an act or omission within the scope of employment, and neither the public entity nor the public employee shall be liable, directly or indirectly, to any person for any interest imposed by this section.”])

Plaintiff is not entitled to prejudgment interest.

C. Remaining Litigation Costs

The Court finds that the remainder of litigation costs, except for expert witness fees, were reasonable and necessary. These costs need not be taxed.

D. Expert Witness Fees

Defendant also moves to strike $56,873.66 in expert witness fees. Plaintiff asserts he is entitled to fees because Defendant rejected Plaintiff’s CCP 998 offer to compromise for $750,000.00. Defendant argues that the 998 offer was conditional and invalid.

Neither party has provided the 998 offer to the Court. The Court cannot determine its validity based on the information presented. The motion to tax costs is continued to May 17, 2022 at 9:00 am. The parties are ordered to provide supplemental briefing, not to exceed 5 pages, on the validity of the 998 offer no later than May 9, 2022. Plaintiff shall provide an authenticated copy of the 998 offer with the briefing.

Case Number: BC673403 Hearing Date: March 11, 2022 Dept: 54

Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles
Jason Camp,	Plaintiff,	Case No.:	BC673403
vs.		Tentative Ruling
Los Angeles Unified School District, et al.,	Defendants.

Hearing Date: March 11, 2022

Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter

Motion for New Trial;

Motion for Sanctions

Moving Party: Plaintiff Jason Camp

Responding Party: Defendants Los Angeles Unified School District, Vivian Ekchian, and Robert Perry

T/R: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL IS DENIED.

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS IS DENIED.

PLAINTIFF to notice.

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:30 am on the day of the hearing.

The Court considers the moving papers, opposition and reply.

BACKGROUND

On August 22, 2017, Plaintiff Jason Camp sued Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District and others. Plaintiff was employed as Principal of Owensmouth Continuation High School for the 2016-2017 school year. Plaintiff alleges he was dismissed for reporting misuse of Title 1 funds and national origin discrimination.

After lengthy pretrial proceedings the case proceeded to a jury trial against LAUSD on two causes of action: unlawful retaliation in violation of Labor Code 1102.5; and retaliation in violation of FEHA. On November 8, 2021, the jury found in favor of Plaintiff on his Labor Code claim and awarded $2,500,000.00 in damages.

ANALYSIS

A. Motion for New Trial

“The principal statutory authority for new trial motions is CCP 657. “The right to a new trial is purely statutory, and a motion for a new trial can be granted only on one of the grounds enumerated in the statute.” (Fomco, Inc. v. Joe Maggio, Inc. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 162, 166.) The grounds enumerated in CCP 657 include:

1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order of the court or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial.

2. Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by a resort to the determination of chance, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.

3. Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.

4. Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial.

5. Excessive or inadequate damages.

6. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or the verdict or other decision is against law.

7. Error in law, occurring at the trial and excepted to by the party making the application.

(CCP 657.)

Plaintiff moves for new trial under subsections (5)-(7). Plaintiff asserts that defense counsel’s questioning of witness Alex Placencio concerning a sexual abuse allegation against Plaintiff was an irregularity in the proceeding and attorney misconduct. Plaintiff says this questioning was improper because these allegations are false, were never disclosed in discovery, and were not at issue in this action. Plaintiff argues that the questioning impaired his ability to testify competently and prejudiced the jury.

The Court is unpersuaded that this conduct is an irregularity or error. Plaintiff did not object to the initial questioning on this subject, during which Dr. Placencio testified, without providing details, that a young woman had written a note that Plaintiff had been “inappropriate” with her but the police had said there was no merit to the accusation. When Plaintiff subsequently objected to this line of questioning the Court sustained the objection and instructed defense counsel to move to another subject. (Supp. Decl. Jain, Exh. A.) After consulting with counsel outside the jury’s presence and reviewing material submitted to the Court on this issue, the Court held that neither side may raise it again in front of the jury. The Court then instructed the jury as follows:

Earlier in the trial you heard testimony concerning an accusation that Mr. Camp had engaged in inappropriate conduct with a female student. Mr. Camp denied the accusation and filed a complaint concerning that accusation. The accuser was never identified or found despite efforts by the LAPD to locate her. The supposedly corroborating witness denied seeing any such improper conduct. LAUSD closed the matter without taking any action against Mr. Camp. I have determined it is unnecessary for Mr. Camp to present any evidence to address this matter. You are instructed to disregard that accusation and any testimony about it.

(Supplemental Jain Declaration Exh. A.)

There is no indication the jury did not follow this instruction. Plaintiff’s contention that Plaintiff was thrown off by these questions does not warrant a new trial. Nor does Defendant’s failure to disclose information about this allegation in discovery justify a new trial; it is undisputed Plaintiff was aware of this incident.

Plaintiff alternatively asks the Court to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s FEHA claim and award an additional $500,000.00 in damages. Plaintiff did not notice a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Court cannot consider this request.

Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial is DENIED.

B. Motion for Sanctions

CCP 128.5 provides that “[a] trial court may order a party, the party’s attorney, or both, to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by another party as a result of actions or tactics, made in bad faith, that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.” (CCP 128.5(a).) “‘Actions or tactics’ include, but are not limited to, the making or opposing of motions or the filing and service of a complaint, cross-complaint, answer, or other responsive pleading.” (CCP 128.5(b)(1).) “‘Frivolous’ means totally and completely without merit or for the sole purpose of harassing an opposing party.” (CCP 128.5(b)(2).)

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant engaged in sanctionable conduct by questioning Dr. Placencio about the sexual abuse accusations against Plaintiff, misrepresenting facts, and misleading the jury. As discussed above, there is no support for the claim that Defendant’s questioning of Dr. Placencio prejudiced the jury. The Court finds Plaintiff’s remaining arguments unpersuasive as well. Plaintiff has failed to establish that Defendant’s actions were harassing or frivolous. The Court addressed the issue during the trial; the complained-of conduct does not rise to a level justifying sanctions under CCP 128.5.

Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions is DENIED.

Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles
Jason Camp,	Plaintiff,	Case No.:	BC673403
vs.		Tentative Ruling
Los Angeles Unified School District, et al.,	Defendants.

Hearing Date: March 11, 2022

Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter

Motion for New Trial;

Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict;

Motion to Set Aside or Vacate Judgment

Moving Party: Defendants Los Angeles Unified School District

Responding Party: Plaintiff Jason Camp

T/R: DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL IS DENIED.

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT IS DENIED.

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE OR VACATE JUDGMENT IS DENIED.

DEFENDANT to notice.

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:30 am on the day of the hearing.

The Court considers the moving papers, opposition and reply.

BACKGROUND

On August 22, 2017, Plaintiff Jason Camp sued Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District and others. Plaintiff was employed as Principal of Owensmouth Continuation High School for the 2016-2017 school year. Plaintiff alleges he was dismissed for reporting misuse of Title 1 funds and national origin discrimination.

After lengthy pretrial proceedings the case proceeded to a jury trial against LAUSD on two causes of action: unlawful retaliation in violation of Labor Code 1102.5; and retaliation in violation of FEHA. On November 8, 2021, the jury found in favor of Plaintiff on his Labor Code claim and awarded $2,500,000.00 in damages.

ANALYSIS

A. Motion for New Trial

“The principal statutory authority for new trial motions is CCP 657. “The right to a new trial is purely statutory, and a motion for a new trial can be granted only on one of the grounds enumerated in the statute.” (Fomco, Inc. v. Joe Maggio, Inc. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 162, 166.) The grounds enumerated in CCP 657 include:

1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order of the court or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial.

2. Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by a resort to the determination of chance, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.

3. Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.

4. Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial.

5. Excessive or inadequate damages.

6. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or the verdict or other decision is against law.

7. Error in law, occurring at the trial and excepted to by the party making the application.

(CCP 657.)

Defendant moves for new trial under subsections (5)-(7). Defendant asserts that the jury’s damage award is excessive, Plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to support his Labor Code 1102.5 claim and the Court erred in allowing certain jury instructions.

1. Damages

Defendant contends that the jury’s award of $2,500,000.00 in non-compensatory damages is excessive and was based on prejudice, bias or passion. Defendant provides no evidence of prejudice, bias or passion. Instead, Defendant presents a list of facts it contends mitigate Plaintiff’s non-economic damages -- for example, that Plaintiff had applied to leave LAUSD before allegations were raised against him. None of the facts presented by Defendant defeats Plaintiff’s damages.

2. Labor Code 1102.5

Defendant asserts that there was insufficient evidence to establish Plaintiff believed a violation of state or federal law occurred and that Plaintiff’s report caused adverse employment actions.

At trial, Plaintiff presented evidence showing he complained of the misuse of Title I funds to the detriment of the most at-risk student population. Defendant claims that Plaintiff admitted he did not believe this misuse was a violation of state or federal law. The testimony cited by Defendant does not support this conclusion as a matter of law. Plaintiff merely testified that, regardless of the reason, the ultimate outcome was that funds were not appropriately distributed. (Exh. A. 62:12-63:6.)

Defendant also argues that any belief the activity was illegal was unreasonable. The Court is unpersuaded by this argument. A reasonable jury could find that believing the misuse of government funds is illegal is reasonable.

As for causation, Defendant asserts Plaintiff could not prove that any of his complaints were heard by “decisionmakers” in Plaintiff’s termination. This does not defeat causation. Plaintiff presented evidence that adverse employment action occurred shortly after his reports and that Defendant’s stated reason for firing Plaintiff was not true. A reasonable jury could find causation.

3. Jury Instructions

Defendant contends the Court erred in instructing the jury on the Labor Code claim. Defendant argues the Court should not have allowed the instruction to include “or state law” because the misuse of Title I funds is a federal issue. The Court does not agree that omitting the phrase “or state law” from the jury instruction likely would have impacted the verdict. Whether the Plaintiff believed something violated state law instead of federal, or vice versa, is immaterial.

Defendant also argues that the jury should have been instructed on what it means to violate Title I. This again is immaterial. The jury need only decide whether Plaintiff believed there was a violation of law, not whether there was a violation of law.

Defendant’s motion for new trial is DENIED.

B. Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict

The trial court has limited discretion to grant a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; it may grant it only when there is no substantial evidence to support the verdict. (Teitel v. First Los Angeles Bank (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1593, 1603. Campbell v. Cal-Gard Surety Services, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 563, 570.) A judgment notwithstanding the verdict can be sustained only when it can be said as a matter of law that no other reasonable conclusion is legally deducible from the evidence, and that any other holding would be so lacking in evidentiary support that the reviewing court would be compelled to reverse it, or the trial court would be compelled to set it aside as a matter of law. (Moore v. City and County of San Francisco (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 728, 733–734.) The trial court renders judgment notwithstanding the verdict when a motion for directed verdict should have been granted if made (CCP 629). (Hansen v. Sunnyside Products, Inc. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1510 [Rev. Den. 9/17/97]; Walton v. Magno (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1237, 1239–1240.) The trial judge cannot, therefore, reweigh the evidence, or judge the credibility of witnesses; if the evidence is conflicting or if several reasonable inferences may be drawn, the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be denied. (Teitel, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at 1603.)

Defendant moves for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the grounds that the there is insufficient evidence to support Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation and that Defendant would have made the termination decision regardless of the purported retaliation. As discussed above, the Court finds there was sufficient evidence to support Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. Plaintiff presented evidence that Defendant’s purported reason for terminating Plaintiff was false and the termination occurred shortly after Plaintiff’s reports. Defendant cannot show as a matter of law that it would have made the termination decision regardless of Plaintiff’s conduct.

Defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is DENIED.

C. Motion to Set Aside or Vacate Judgment

CCP 663 provides,

A judgment or decree, when based upon a decision by the court, or the special verdict of a jury, may, upon motion of the party aggrieved, be set aside and vacated by the same court, and another and different judgment entered, for either of the following causes, materially affecting the substantial rights of the party and entitling the party to a different judgment:

1. Incorrect or erroneous legal basis for the decision, not consistent with or not supported by the facts; and in such case when the judgment is set aside, the statement of decision shall be amended and corrected.

2. A judgment or decree not consistent with or not supported by the special verdict.

Defendant moves to set aside the judgment because interest against a public entity cannot exceed 7%. Defendant asserts that under Gov. Code 970.1(c), the interest rate should not exceed 2.41%.

Gov. Code 970.1(c) provides, “[u]nless another statute provides a different interest rate, interest on a tax or fee judgment against a local public entity shall accrue at a rate equal to the weekly average one-year constant maturity United States Treasury yield at the time of the judgment plus 2 percent, but shall not exceed 7 percent per annum.” This is not a tax or fee judgment. The statute does not apply.

Defendant’s motion to set aside judgment is DENIED.

b'

Case Number: BC673403 Hearing Date: July 15, 2021 Dept: 54

Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles
Jason Camp,	Plaintiff,	Case No.:	BC673403
vs.		Tentative Ruling
Los Angeles Unified School District, et al.,	Defendants.

Hearing Date: July 15, 2021

Department 54, Judge Maurice Leiter

Motion to Bifurcate Trial

Moving Party: Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District

Responding Party: Plaintiff Jason Camp

T/R: DEFENDANT’S MOTION IS GRANTED.

DEFENDANT TO GIVE NOTICE.

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:30 am on the day of the hearing.

The Court considers the moving papers, opposition and reply.

BACKGROUND

On August 22, 2017, Plaintiff Jason Camp sued Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District for (1) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; and (2) unlawful retaliation in violation of Labor Code ; 1102.5. Plaintiff was employed as Principal at Owensmouth Continuation High School for the 2016- 2017 school year. Plaintiff alleges he was dismissed for reporting misuse of Title 1 funds and national origin discrimination.

From December 14, 2017 to June 1, 2018, the parties stipulated to stay the action pending Plaintiff’s appeal of his termination before an administrative Commission. In May 2018, the Commission found Defendant had failed establish its accusations against Plaintiff.

On November 19, 2018, Plaintiff filed the operative fourth amended complaint (“FAC”), asserting causes of action for (1) unlawful retaliation in violation of Labor Code ; 1102.5; (2) defamation; (3) tortious interference with contract; (4) tortious interference with economic advantage; and (5) retaliation in violation of FEHA. The FAC also added individual Defendants Vivian Ekchian and Robert Perry. On January 16, 2019, the Court sustained Defendant’s demurrer to the FAC as to the second, third, and fourth causes of action without leave to amend.

Request for Judicial Notice

Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice Nos. 1-5 is GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice Exhs. A-E is GRANTED.

ANALYSIS

“The court may, when the convenience of witnesses, the ends of justice, or the economy and efficiency of handling the litigation would be promoted thereby [. . .] make an order [. . .] that the trial of any issue or any part thereof shall precede the trial of any other issue or any part thereof in the case [. . .] ; The court, on its own motion, may make such an order at any time. [. . .]” ; (CCP ; 598, portions omitted.)

“The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any cause of action, including a cause of action asserted in a cross-complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of causes of action or issues, preserving the right of trial by jury required by the Constitution or a statute of this state or of the United States.” ; (CCP ; 1048(b).)

Defendant asks the Court to bifurcate its statute of limitations defense to the FEHA claim and try it before empaneling a jury. The issue is whether equitable tolling applies; that is decided by the Court. Defendant argues this will promote judicial economy; a bifurcated trial on the statute of limitations defense would be simple and may shorten the jury trial.

Both sides direct the Court to statements made by Judge Mohr at the hearing on Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication. Judge Mohr said the statute of limitations may bar Plaintiff’s retaliation cause of action but the issue would need to be sorted out with evidence before a jury is empaneled. (Goldsmith Decl., ¶ 3, Exh. A pp. 7, 9.) Plaintiff contends Judge Mohr’s rulings on the motion for summary adjudication and in two prior demurrers mean the Court already has found that equitable tolling applies to its FEHA claim. According to Plaintiff, Defendant’s motion to bifurcate actually is a second motion for summary adjudication claiming that Plaintiff’s FEHA claim is time barred. Alternatively, Plaintiff urges both that the Court should resolve the issue now based on the pleadings, or conduct the jury trial first and have the jury make advisory findings on the facts relevant to equitable tolling.

The Court has not determined as a matter of law that equitable tolling applies and Plaintiff’s FEHA claim was timely filed. In denying Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication, the Court determined only that there was a triable issue of fact. Similarly, the Court’s overruling demurrers on this issue decided only that it could not be resolved on the pleadings. The statute of limitations defense still needs to be addressed.

Bifurcation of the statute of limitations defense would promote judicial economy and efficiency. Defendant argues the bench trial on this issue would take no more than two days of evidence and argument. If the Court determines the FEHA claim is time-barred, that would dispose of the FEHA cause of action, reduce the number of issues to be presented to the jury and likely simplify the jury trial.

Defendant’s motion to bifurcate is GRANTED.

Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles
Jason Camp,	Plaintiff,	Case No.:	BC673403
vs.		Tentative Ruling
Los Angeles Unified School District, et al.,	Defendants.

Hearing Date: July 15, 2021

Department 54, Judge Maurice Leiter

Motion for Supplemental Independent Medical Examination and Reopen Discovery

Moving Party: Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District

Responding Party: Plaintiff Jason Camp

T/R: DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF’S SECOND IME AND REOPEN DISCOVERY ARE DENIED.

DEFENDANT TO GIVE NOTICE.

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:30 am on the day of the hearing.

The Court considers the moving papers, opposition and reply.

BACKGROUND

On August 22, 2017, Plaintiff Jason Camp sued Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District for (1) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; and (2) unlawful retaliation in violation of Labor Code ; 1102.5. Plaintiff was employed as Principal at Owensmouth Continuation High School for the 2016- 2017 school year. Plaintiff alleges he was dismissed for reporting misuse of Title 1 funds and national origin discrimination.

From December 14, 2017 to June 1, 2018, the parties stipulated to stay the action pending Plaintiff’s appeal of his termination before an administrative Commission. In May 2018, the Commission found Defendant had failed establish its accusations against Plaintiff.

On November 19, 2018, Plaintiff filed the operative fourth amended complaint (“FAC”), asserting causes of action for (1) unlawful retaliation in violation of Labor Code ; 1102.5; (2) defamation; (3) tortious interference with contract; (4) tortious interference with economic advantage; and (5) retaliation in violation of FEHA. The FAC also added individual Defendants Vivian Ekchian and Robert Perry. On January 16, 2019, the Court sustained Defendant’s demurrer to the FAC as to the second, third, and fourth causes of action without leave to amend.

ANALYSIS

“In any case in which a plaintiff is seeking recovery for personal injuries, any defendant may demand one physical examination of the plaintiff, if both of the following conditions are satisfied: (1) The examination does not include any diagnostic test or procedure that is painful, protracted, or intrusive. (2) The examination is conducted at a location within 75 miles of the residence of the examinee.” (Code Civ. Proc., ; 2032.220, subd. (a).)

CCP ; 2024.050 states:

(a) On motion of any party, the court may grant leave to reopen discovery after a new trial date has been set. This motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.

(b) In exercising its discretion to grant or deny this motion, the court shall take into consideration any matter relevant to the leave requested, including, but not limited to, the following: (1) The necessity and the reasons for the discovery. (2) The diligence or lack of diligence of the party seeking the discovery or the hearing of a discovery motion, and the reasons that the discovery was not completed or that the discovery motion was not heard earlier. (3) Any likelihood that permitting the discovery or hearing the discovery motion will prevent the case from going to trial on the date set, or otherwise interfere with the trial calendar, or result in prejudice to any other party. (4) The length of time that has elapsed between any date previously set, and the date presently set, for the trial of the action.

Defendant contends that rare circumstances warrant a second IME of Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s initial IME was conducted on June 12, 2019. (Goldsmith Decl., ¶ 3.) Trial began on March 5, 2020 but was interrupted by closure of the Court at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. On April 16, 2020 the Court declared a mistrial. (Goldsmith Decl., ¶ 4.)

Trial now is scheduled for August 16, 2021. More than two years have passed since Plaintiff’s IME. Plaintiff’s counsel has represented she will not limit her questions at trial relating to Plaintiff’s emotional distress damages. (Goldsmith Decl., ¶ 12, Exh. 6.) Defendant also contends Plaintiff has intervening psychological conditions due to the pandemic.

Plaintiff argues the April 16, 2020 mistrial reopened discovery and the renewed discovery cutoff was based on the next trial date of April 26, 2021. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal. 4th 245.) Based on the new trial date, Defendant had until March 26, 2021 to conduct discovery; Defendant failed to serve any supplemental discovery requests or request another IME before the March 26, 2021 discovery cutoff. In addition, when the Parties stipulated to continue trial from April to August, they did not stipulate to extend the discovery period.

The mistrial reopened discovery and the new trial date of April 26, 2021, provided new deadlines for discovery. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal. 4th 245.) The discovery cutoff date was March 26, 2021. Defendant did not propound discovery until June 2, 2021, more than two months after the discovery cutoff date. (Goldsmith Decl., ¶ 8-10, Exhs. 3-5.) The demand for a second IME was not served on Plaintiff until June 11, 2021. (Goldsmith Decl., ¶ 7, Exh. 2.) As noted, there is no indication Defendant sought an IME in the many months between the April 16, 2020 mistrial and the new March 26, 2021 discovery deadline. Nor did Defendant seek to extend discovery when it stipulated to continue the trial.

Defendant has not provided any new facts to justify reopening discovery and ordering a second IME. Defendant’s claim that Plaintiff has had intervening psychological conditions resulting from COVID-19 is speculative.

Defendant’s Motion to Compel Plaintiff’s Second IME and Reopen Discovery is DENIED.

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