This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 08/15/2019 at 10:15:35 (UTC).

JASON CAMP VS LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

Case Summary

On 08/22/2017 JASON CAMP filed a Labor - Wrongful Termination lawsuit against LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judges overseeing this case are BARBARA A. MEIERS, ERNEST HIROSHIGE, ANTHONY MOHR, ERNEST M. HIROSHIGE and RUTH ANN KWAN. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****3403

  • Filing Date:

    08/22/2017

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Labor - Wrongful Termination

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judges

BARBARA A. MEIERS

ERNEST HIROSHIGE

ANTHONY MOHR

ERNEST M. HIROSHIGE

RUTH ANN KWAN

 

Party Details

Petitioner and Plaintiff

CAMP JASON

Defendants and Respondents

LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

DOES 1 TO 25

PERRY ROBERT C.

EKCHIAN VIVIAN

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Petitioner and Plaintiff Attorneys

BERNSTEIN DAVID CRAIG ESQ.

JAIN RENUKA VINCHURKAR

Defendant and Respondent Attorneys

DAVID GRECO ASSISTANT GENERAL COUNSEL

BURKWITZ AVI A

KWON MARY GRACE

 

Court Documents

Stipulation and Order

5/29/2019: Stipulation and Order

Declaration

7/26/2019: Declaration

Exhibit List

7/26/2019: Exhibit List

Declaration

7/26/2019: Declaration

Exhibit List

7/26/2019: Exhibit List

Declaration

7/26/2019: Declaration

Motion for Summary Judgment

7/26/2019: Motion for Summary Judgment

Exhibit List

7/26/2019: Exhibit List

Separate Statement

7/26/2019: Separate Statement

Proof of Personal Service

7/26/2019: Proof of Personal Service

Order

7/26/2019: Order

Declaration

7/29/2019: Declaration

Opposition

7/29/2019: Opposition

Opposition

7/29/2019: Opposition

Declaration

7/29/2019: Declaration

Minute Order

7/30/2019: Minute Order

Ex Parte Application

7/30/2019: Ex Parte Application

Memorandum

8/1/2019: Memorandum

89 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 02/03/2020
  • Hearingat 10:30 AM in Department 96 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Jury Trial

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  • 01/31/2020
  • Hearingat 09:30 AM in Department 96 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Final Status Conference

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  • 10/22/2019
  • Hearingat 09:15 AM in Department 96 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses

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  • 10/11/2019
  • Hearingat 09:00 AM in Department 96 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment

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  • 08/01/2019
  • DocketSeparate Statement; Filed by Jason Camp (Plaintiff)

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  • 08/01/2019
  • DocketDeclaration (OF RENUKA V. JAIN IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ORDER TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FORM INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, SET ONE, AND FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST DEFENDANT LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT AND); Filed by Jason Camp (Plaintiff)

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  • 08/01/2019
  • DocketNotice of Motion (AND MOTION FOR ORDER TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF?S FORM INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, SET ONE, AND FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST); Filed by Jason Camp (Plaintiff)

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  • 08/01/2019
  • DocketMemorandum (OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF ORDER TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FORM INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, SET ONE, AND FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST DEFENDANT LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT AND ITS); Filed by Jason Camp (Plaintiff)

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  • 07/30/2019
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department 96, Anthony Mohr, Presiding; Hearing on Ex Parte Application ( TO HEAR PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES AND FOR SANCTIONS ATTACHED AS EXHIBIT A OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, ORDER SHORTENING TIME TO HEAR PLAINTIFF'S MOTION) - Held - Motion Granted

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  • 07/30/2019
  • DocketEx Parte Application (PLAINTIFF JASON CAMP'S EX PARTE APPLICATION TO HEAR PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES AND FOR SANCTIONS ATTACHED AS EXHIBIT A OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, ORDER SHORTENING TIME TO HEAR PLAINTIFF'S MOTION); Filed by Jason Camp (Plaintiff)

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148 More Docket Entries
  • 09/07/2017
  • DocketNOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

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  • 09/07/2017
  • DocketNotice of Case Management Conference; Filed by Clerk

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  • 09/05/2017
  • Docketat 00:00 AM in Department 12; (Affidavit of Prejudice; Transferred to different departmnt) -

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  • 09/05/2017
  • DocketMinute order entered: 2017-09-05 00:00:00; Filed by Clerk

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  • 09/05/2017
  • DocketMinute Order

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  • 08/24/2017
  • DocketPEREMPTORY CHALLENGE PURSUANT TO C.C.P. 170.6

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  • 08/24/2017
  • DocketChallenge To Judicial Officer - Peremptory (170.6); Filed by Jason Camp (Plaintiff)

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  • 08/22/2017
  • DocketCOMPLAINT WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY; ETC

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  • 08/22/2017
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by Jason Camp (Plaintiff)

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  • 08/22/2017
  • DocketSUMMONS

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Tentative Rulings

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Case Number: BC673403 Hearing Date: July 15, 2021 Dept: 54

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Superior\r\n Court of California

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County\r\n of Los Angeles

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Jason Camp,

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Plaintiff,

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Case\r\n No.:

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BC673403

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vs.

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Tentative Ruling

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Los Angeles Unified School District, et al.,

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Defendants.

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Hearing Date: July\r\n15, 2021

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Department 54, Judge Maurice Leiter

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Motion to Bifurcate Trial

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Moving Party: Defendant Los Angeles Unified School\r\nDistrict

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Responding Party: Plaintiff Jason Camp

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T/R: DEFENDANT’S\r\nMOTION IS GRANTED.

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DEFENDANT TO GIVE NOTICE.

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If the parties wish to submit on the\r\ntentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to\r\nopposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:30 am on the day of the\r\nhearing.

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The Court\r\nconsiders the moving papers, opposition and reply.

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BACKGROUND

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On August\r\n22, 2017, Plaintiff Jason Camp sued Defendant Los Angeles Unified School\r\nDistrict for (1) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; and (2)\r\nunlawful retaliation in violation of Labor Code § 1102.5. Plaintiff was employed as Principal at\r\nOwensmouth Continuation High School for the 2016- 2017 school year. Plaintiff alleges he was dismissed for\r\nreporting misuse of Title 1 funds and national origin discrimination.

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From December 14, 2017 to June 1, 2018, the\r\nparties stipulated to stay the action pending Plaintiff’s appeal of his\r\ntermination before an administrative Commission. In May 2018, the Commission found Defendant\r\nhad failed establish its accusations against Plaintiff.

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On\r\nNovember 19, 2018, Plaintiff filed the operative fourth amended complaint\r\n(“FAC”), asserting causes of action for (1) unlawful retaliation in violation\r\nof Labor Code § 1102.5; (2) defamation; (3) tortious interference with\r\ncontract; (4) tortious interference with economic advantage; and (5)\r\nretaliation in violation of FEHA. The\r\nFAC also added individual Defendants Vivian Ekchian and Robert Perry. On January 16, 2019, the Court sustained\r\nDefendant’s demurrer to the FAC as to the second, third, and fourth causes of\r\naction without leave to amend.

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Request\r\nfor Judicial Notice

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Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice Nos. 1-5\r\nis GRANTED.

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Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice Exhs.\r\nA-E is GRANTED.

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ANALYSIS

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“The court may, when the convenience of\r\nwitnesses, the ends of justice, or the economy and efficiency of handling the\r\nlitigation would be promoted thereby [. . .] make an order [. . .] that\r\nthe trial of any issue or any part thereof shall precede the trial of any\r\nother issue or any part thereof in the case [. . .]¿ The court, on its own\r\nmotion, may make such an order at any time. [. . .]”¿ (CCP § 598, portions\r\nomitted.)

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“The court, in furtherance of convenience or to\r\navoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and\r\neconomy, may order a separate trial of any cause of action, including\r\na cause of action asserted in a cross-complaint, or of any separate\r\nissue or of any number of causes of action or issues, preserving the right\r\nof trial by jury required by the Constitution or a statute of this state or of\r\nthe United States.”¿ (CCP § 1048(b).)

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Defendant\r\nasks the Court to bifurcate its statute of limitations defense to the FEHA\r\nclaim and try it before empaneling a jury. The issue is whether equitable\r\ntolling applies; that is decided by the Court. Defendant argues this will promote judicial\r\neconomy; a bifurcated trial on the statute of limitations defense would be\r\nsimple and may shorten the jury trial.

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Both\r\nsides direct the Court to statements made by Judge Mohr at the hearing on\r\nDefendant’s motion for summary adjudication. Judge Mohr said the statute of\r\nlimitations may bar Plaintiff’s retaliation cause of action but the issue would\r\nneed to be sorted out with evidence before a jury is empaneled. (Goldsmith Decl., ¶ 3, Exh. A pp. 7, 9.) Plaintiff contends Judge Mohr’s rulings on the\r\nmotion for summary adjudication and in two prior demurrers mean the Court\r\nalready has found that equitable tolling applies to its FEHA claim. According to Plaintiff, Defendant’s motion to\r\nbifurcate actually is a second motion for summary adjudication claiming that\r\nPlaintiff’s FEHA claim is time barred. Alternatively, Plaintiff urges both that\r\nthe Court should resolve the issue now based on the pleadings, or conduct the jury\r\ntrial first and have the jury make advisory findings on the facts relevant to equitable\r\ntolling.

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The\r\nCourt has not determined as a matter of law that equitable tolling applies and Plaintiff’s\r\nFEHA claim was timely filed. In denying Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication,\r\nthe Court determined only that there was a triable issue of fact. Similarly, the\r\nCourt’s overruling demurrers on this issue decided only that it could not be resolved\r\non the pleadings. The statute of limitations defense still needs to be addressed.\r\n

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Bifurcation\r\nof the statute of limitations defense would promote judicial economy and\r\nefficiency. Defendant argues the bench trial on this issue would take no more\r\nthan two days of evidence and argument. If the Court determines the FEHA claim\r\nis time-barred, that would dispose of the FEHA cause of action, reduce the number\r\nof issues to be presented to the jury and likely simplify the jury trial.

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Defendant’s motion to bifurcate is\r\nGRANTED.

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Superior\r\n Court of California

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County of\r\n Los Angeles

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Jason Camp,

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Plaintiff,

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Case No.:

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BC673403

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vs.

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Tentative Ruling

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Los Angeles Unified School District,\r\n et al.,

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Defendants.

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Hearing\r\nDate: July 15, 2021

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Department 54, Judge Maurice Leiter

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Motion for Supplemental Independent\r\nMedical Examination and Reopen Discovery

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Moving Party: Defendant Los Angeles Unified School\r\nDistrict

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Responding Party: Plaintiff Jason Camp

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T/R: DEFENDANT’S MOTION\r\nTO COMPEL PLAINTIFF’S SECOND IME AND REOPEN DISCOVERY ARE DENIED.

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DEFENDANT TO GIVE NOTICE.

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If the parties wish to submit on the\r\ntentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to\r\nopposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:30 am on the day of the\r\nhearing.

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The\r\nCourt considers the moving papers, opposition and reply.

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BACKGROUND

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On August 22, 2017, Plaintiff Jason Camp sued\r\nDefendant Los Angeles Unified School District for (1) wrongful termination in\r\nviolation of public policy; and (2) unlawful retaliation in violation of Labor\r\nCode § 1102.5. Plaintiff was employed as\r\nPrincipal at Owensmouth Continuation High School for the 2016- 2017 school\r\nyear. Plaintiff alleges he was dismissed\r\nfor reporting misuse of Title 1 funds and national origin discrimination.

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From December 14, 2017 to June 1, 2018, the\r\nparties stipulated to stay the action pending Plaintiff’s appeal of his\r\ntermination before an administrative Commission. In May 2018, the Commission found Defendant\r\nhad failed establish its accusations against Plaintiff.

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On\r\nNovember 19, 2018, Plaintiff filed the operative fourth amended complaint\r\n(“FAC”), asserting causes of action for (1) unlawful retaliation in violation\r\nof Labor Code § 1102.5; (2) defamation; (3) tortious interference with\r\ncontract; (4) tortious interference with economic advantage; and (5)\r\nretaliation in violation of FEHA. The\r\nFAC also added individual Defendants Vivian Ekchian and Robert Perry. On January 16, 2019, the Court sustained\r\nDefendant’s demurrer to the FAC as to the second, third, and fourth causes of\r\naction without leave to amend.

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ANALYSIS

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“In any\r\ncase in which a plaintiff is seeking recovery for personal injuries, any\r\ndefendant may demand one physical examination of the plaintiff, if both of the\r\nfollowing conditions are satisfied: (1) The examination does not include any\r\ndiagnostic test or procedure that is painful, protracted, or intrusive. \r\n(2) The examination is conducted at a location within 75 miles of the residence\r\nof the examinee.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2032.220, subd. (a).)

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CCP §\r\n2024.050 states:

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(a) On\r\nmotion of any party, the court may grant leave to reopen discovery\r\nafter a new trial date has been set. This motion shall be accompanied by a meet\r\nand confer declaration under Section 2016.040.

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(b) In\r\nexercising its discretion to grant or deny this motion, the court shall take\r\ninto consideration any matter relevant to the leave requested, including,\r\nbut not limited to, the following: (1) The necessity and the reasons for\r\nthe discovery. (2) The diligence or lack of diligence of the party seeking\r\nthe discovery or the hearing of a discovery motion, and the\r\nreasons that the discovery was not completed or that the discovery motion\r\nwas not heard earlier. (3) Any likelihood that permitting the discovery or\r\nhearing the discovery motion will prevent the case from going to\r\ntrial on the date set, or otherwise interfere with the trial\r\ncalendar, or result in prejudice to any other party. (4) The length of\r\ntime that has elapsed between any date previously set, and the date\r\npresently set, for the trial of the action.

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Defendant\r\ncontends that rare circumstances warrant a second IME of Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s initial IME was conducted on June\r\n12, 2019. (Goldsmith Decl., ¶ 3.) Trial began on March 5, 2020 but was\r\ninterrupted by closure of the Court at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. On\r\nApril 16, 2020 the Court declared a mistrial. (Goldsmith Decl., ¶ 4.)

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Trial now is\r\nscheduled for August 16, 2021. More than two years have passed since\r\nPlaintiff’s IME. Plaintiff’s counsel has\r\nrepresented she will not limit her questions at trial relating to Plaintiff’s\r\nemotional distress damages. (Goldsmith\r\nDecl., ¶ 12, Exh. 6.) Defendant also contends Plaintiff has intervening\r\npsychological conditions due to the pandemic.

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Plaintiff argues\r\nthe April 16, 2020 mistrial reopened discovery and the renewed discovery cutoff\r\nwas based on the next trial date of April 26, 2021. (Fairmont Ins. Co.\r\nv. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal. 4th 245.) Based on the new trial date, Defendant had\r\nuntil March 26, 2021 to conduct discovery; Defendant failed to serve any\r\nsupplemental discovery requests or request another IME before the March 26,\r\n2021 discovery cutoff. In addition, when\r\nthe Parties stipulated to continue trial from April to August, they did not\r\nstipulate to extend the discovery period.

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The\r\nmistrial reopened discovery and the new trial date of April 26, 2021, provided\r\nnew deadlines for discovery. (Fairmont\r\nIns. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal. 4th 245.) The discovery cutoff date was March 26,\r\n2021. Defendant did not propound\r\ndiscovery until June 2, 2021, more than two months after the discovery cutoff\r\ndate. (Goldsmith Decl., ¶ 8-10, Exhs.\r\n3-5.) The demand for a second IME was\r\nnot served on Plaintiff until June 11, 2021. \r\n(Goldsmith Decl., ¶ 7, Exh. 2.) As\r\nnoted, there is no indication Defendant sought an IME in the many months\r\nbetween the April 16, 2020 mistrial and the new March 26, 2021 discovery\r\ndeadline. Nor did Defendant seek to extend discovery when it stipulated to\r\ncontinue the trial.

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Defendant has\r\nnot provided any new facts to justify reopening discovery and ordering a second\r\nIME. Defendant’s claim that Plaintiff has\r\nhad intervening psychological conditions resulting from COVID-19 is\r\nspeculative.

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Defendant’s Motion to Compel Plaintiff’s Second IME and Reopen Discovery\r\nis DENIED.

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