Tentative Rulings

Case Number: BC680947    Hearing Date: December 16, 2019    Dept: 5

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Spring Street Courthouse, Department 5

Background

Plaintiffs James Davidson and Michael Ryan Magargal (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this action against Defendant Providence Health System-Southern California (“Defendant”) for medical negligence following the death of Leah Davidson. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant failed to treat Leah Davidson properly after she sought treatment for chest pain. Defendant moves for summary judgment. Plaintiff does not oppose the motion, which is granted.

LEGAL STANDARD

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . .  There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.”  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)  “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.”  (Ibid.)  In ruling on the motion, “the court may not weigh the plaintiff's evidence or inferences against the defendant[’s] as though it were sitting as the trier of fact.”  (Id. at 856.)  However, the court “must . . . determine what any evidence or inference could show or imply to a reasonable trier of fact.”  (Ibid., emphasis original.)  

DISCUSSION

To prevail on a claim for professional negligence against a medical professional, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) a medical professional had a duty to use the skill, prudence and diligence that members of the profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) breach of that duty; (3) an injury that resulted from the breach of that duty; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the breach of that duty. (Banerian v. O’Malley (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 604, 612.) Expert testimony is the only admissible evidence on breach of the standard of care. (Landeros v. Flood (1976) 17 Cal.3d 399, 410.)

Defendant relies on the declaration of Constance Paine, R.N. (“Paine”), a registered nurse who reviewed Ms. Davidson’s medical records. Paine states that Defendant’s non-physician and nursing staff acted within the standard of care at all times, and that no act or failure to act by a nurse contributed to any of Decedent’ injuries or death. (Declaration of Constance Paine, R.N., ¶¶ 6-9.) Defendant also proffers evidence that the doctors who treated Ms. Davidson were independent contractors, meaning that Defendant is not liable for their care. (Mejia v. Community Hospital of San Bernardino (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1448, 1454.) Specifically, Ms. Davidson executed Defendant’s “Conditions of Admission” form at the time Defendant admitted Decedent to the hospital, which states that the physicians and surgeons at Defendant’s hospital are not employees of Defendant. (Evidence in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit R.)

Defendant’s evidence is sufficient to satisfy its prima facie burden. Plaintiff proffers no evidence to rebut this showing, and there is no evidence in the record that gives rise to a triable issue. Therefore, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted. Defendant shall provide notice and file proof of such with the Court.

DATED: December 16, 2019 ___________________________

Stephen I. Goorvitch

Judge of the Superior Court