This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 06/04/2019 at 07:13:04 (UTC).

ILAN N ROSEN JANFAZA VS ROYAL PALACE ROYAL GIRLS CABARET LLC

Case Summary

On 05/02/2017 ILAN N ROSEN JANFAZA filed a Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury lawsuit against ROYAL PALACE ROYAL GIRLS CABARET LLC. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judge overseeing this case is JON R. TAKASUGI. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.
Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****9846

  • Filing Date:

    05/02/2017

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judge

JON R. TAKASUGI

 

Party Details

Plaintiff

JANFAZA ILAN N. ROSEN

Defendants

ROYAL PALACE ROYAL GIRLS CABARET LLC

MUDARRIS ANTHONY OMAR

7180 SUNSET BLVD. INC.

LA CIENEGA CENTER LLC DOE 1

SYNN GENTLEMEN'S CLUB DBA SYNN GENTLKEMEN'S CLUB

SHABTAI DOE 2 MICHAEL

EZERZER DOE 4 MARCELLE

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff Attorney

BERNS MARK RICHARD ESQ.

Defendant Attorney

WESTON JOHN HALDANE ESQ.

 

Court Documents

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 1. ASSAULT & BATTERY ; ETC

5/2/2017: COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 1. ASSAULT & BATTERY ; ETC

SUMMONS

5/2/2017: SUMMONS

Unknown

5/21/2019: Unknown

Amendment to Complaint (Fictitious/Incorrect Name)

4/23/2019: Amendment to Complaint (Fictitious/Incorrect Name)

Amendment to Complaint (Fictitious/Incorrect Name)

4/23/2019: Amendment to Complaint (Fictitious/Incorrect Name)

Amendment to Complaint (Fictitious/Incorrect Name)

4/23/2019: Amendment to Complaint (Fictitious/Incorrect Name)

Amendment to Complaint (Fictitious/Incorrect Name)

4/23/2019: Amendment to Complaint (Fictitious/Incorrect Name)

Notice

4/16/2019: Notice

Opposition

4/5/2019: Opposition

Motion for Summary Judgment

3/25/2019: Motion for Summary Judgment

Declaration

3/25/2019: Declaration

Unknown

12/18/2018: Unknown

Minute Order

12/18/2018: Minute Order

Answer

11/30/2018: Answer

Proof of Personal Service

10/19/2018: Proof of Personal Service

Other -

10/19/2018: Other -

Minute Order

10/16/2018: Minute Order

5 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 05/21/2019
  • DocketNotice of Rejection - Pleadings; Filed by Clerk

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  • 04/23/2019
  • DocketAmendment to Complaint (Fictitious/Incorrect Name); Filed by Ilan N. Rosen Janfaza (Plaintiff)

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  • 04/23/2019
  • DocketAmendment to Complaint (Fictitious/Incorrect Name); Filed by Ilan N. Rosen Janfaza (Plaintiff)

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  • 04/23/2019
  • DocketAmendment to Complaint (Fictitious/Incorrect Name); Filed by Ilan N. Rosen Janfaza (Plaintiff)

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  • 04/23/2019
  • DocketAmendment to Complaint (Fictitious/Incorrect Name); Filed by Ilan N. Rosen Janfaza (Plaintiff)

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  • 04/18/2019
  • Docketat 1:30 PM in Department 3, Jon R. Takasugi, Presiding; Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment - Not Held - Taken Off Calendar by Party

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  • 04/16/2019
  • DocketNotice (DEFENDANTS WITHDRAWAL OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT); Filed by Synn Gentlemen's Club (Defendant)

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  • 04/05/2019
  • DocketOpposition (Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment); Filed by Ilan N. Rosen Janfaza (Plaintiff)

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  • 03/25/2019
  • DocketDeclaration (DECLARATION OF RON); Filed by Synn Gentlemen's Club (Defendant)

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  • 03/25/2019
  • DocketMotion for Summary Judgment; Filed by Synn Gentlemen's Club (Defendant)

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4 More Docket Entries
  • 11/02/2018
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department 3, Jon R. Takasugi, Presiding; Non-Jury Trial - Not Held - Advanced and Vacated

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  • 10/22/2018
  • DocketProof of Personal Service; Filed by Ilan N. Rosen Janfaza (Plaintiff)

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  • 10/19/2018
  • DocketOther - (Proof of Service of Summons); Filed by Ilan N. Rosen Janfaza (Plaintiff)

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  • 10/19/2018
  • DocketProof of Personal Service; Filed by Ilan N. Rosen Janfaza (Plaintiff)

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  • 10/16/2018
  • Docketat 10:00 AM in Department 3, Jon R. Takasugi, Presiding; Final Status Conference - Not Held - Advanced and Vacated

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  • 10/16/2018
  • DocketMinute Order ((Final Status Conference;)); Filed by Clerk

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  • 10/16/2018
  • DocketMinute order entered: 2018-10-16 00:00:00; Filed by Clerk

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  • 05/02/2017
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by Ilan N. Rosen Janfaza (Plaintiff)

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  • 05/02/2017
  • DocketSUMMONS

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  • 05/02/2017
  • DocketCOMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 1. ASSAULT & BATTERY ; ETC

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Tentative Rulings

Case Number: ****9846 Hearing Date: September 14, 2022 Dept: 47

ILAN N ROSEN JANFAZA VS ROYAL PALACE ROYAL GIRLS CABARET LLC, Case No. ****9846

September 14, 2022COURT’S STATEMENT OF THE CASE FOR VOIR DIRE

Plaintiff Ilan N. Rosen Janfaza claims that, on May 3, 2015, he was physically assaulted at an adult club by employees of the club owners, Defendants 7180 Sunset Blvd., Inc., and Marcelle Ezerzer, and by club security guards employed by Cross-Defendant Gihan Wasef dba Alliance Protective Services. Plaintiff contends he was insured as a result of the alleged assault.

Defendants and Cross-Defendants deny Plaintiff’s allegations that an assault occurred and also dispute the existence, nature and extent of Plaintiff’s claimed injuries and damages.

Dated: September 14, 2022

Theresa M. Traber

Judge of the Superior Court

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.



Case Number: ****9846 Hearing Date: July 29, 2022 Dept: 47

ILAN N ROSEN JANFAZA VS ROYAL PALACE ROYAL GIRLS CABARET LLC Case No. ****9846

TENTATIVE RULINGS ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE

Defendants’ MIL #1 – to exclude witnesses under Evidence Code 777

RULING: GRANTED as to all non-party witnesses until after they have completed their testimony in this action.

Defendants’ MIL #2 – to exclude any experts not properly designated and any expert testimony from lay witnesses

RULING: DENIED without prejudice. Defendant has identified no expert or lay testimony sought to be excluded. Nor has it been shown that expert designations were ever demanded in this case pursuant to CCP 2034.210.

Defendants’ MIL #3 – to exclude evidence or argument about any medical billing amounts that were provided on a lien basis from any health care provider.

RULING: DENIED, the medical bills provided to Plaintiff and the amounts on those bills are relevant even if the services were provided by the health care provider on a lien basis.

“Plaintiff has a two-step burden of proof in establishing damages for past medical services. The measure of recovery is well established: “[A] person injured by another's tortious conduct is entitled to recover the reasonable value of medical care and services reasonably required and attributable to the tort.” (Hanif [v. Housing Authority (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 635,] 640, 246 Cal.Rptr. 192.) First, plaintiff must prove that she actually incurred the medical expenses and the amount of her liability for the expenses caps her potential recovery. Hanif, followed by Nishihama v. City and County of San Francisco (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 298, 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 861 (Nishihama) and Howell [v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 541] . . . resolved this rather straightforward issue. Second, plaintiff must prove the reasonable value of the medical services but is entitled to no more than the expenses she actually incurred. ‘[A] plaintiff may recover as economic damages no more than the reasonable value of the medical services received and is not entitled to recover the reasonable value if his or her actual loss was less.’ (Howell, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 555, 129 Cal.Rptr.3d 325, 257 P.3d 1130.)” (Moore v. Mercer (2016) 4 Cal. App. 5th 424, 436-437.)

Even if the defendants in a particular case might be entitled to a reduction based on negotiated discounts available under MediCal or through private insurance, the actual amounts billed to plaintiffs and the bills reflecting those amounts are admissible at trial, “as they reflect[ ] on the nature and extent of plaintiffs' injuries and were therefore relevant to their assessment of an overall general damage award.” (Katiuzhinsky v. Perry (2007) 152 Cal. App. 4th 1288, 1296.) Further, even if the liens provided in exchange for medical services are sold to a third party, the amounts paid for the liens as receivables may be excluded at trial as irrelevant, so long as the plaintiffs remain fully liable for the full amount of the medical provider’s charges. (Id., at p. 1296; Moore v. Mercer, supra, at pp. 438-439.)

In any event, Defendant does not provide sufficient information for the Court to determine whether there is a specific basis for excluding Plaintiff’s medical bills, despite the general rule that they are admissible to show the reasonable value of the medical services provided. In the absence of such details, the Court cannot grant the motion in limine. The specific facts in a particular case determine what is or is not relevant because “evidence which might be admissible in one case might not be admissible in another.” (Id., at p. 442.)

Defendant’s MIL #4 – to exclude all evidence of Defendant’s financial condition until after the jury awards actual damages and makes a finding of fraud, malice or oppression under Civil Code 3294.

RULING: GRANTED, pursuant to Civil Code 3295(d).

Defendant’s MIL #5 -- to exclude any witnesses or evidence not previously disclosed.

RULING: DENIED. Defendant has not identified any specific evidence or witnesses that should be excluded or demonstrate a right to an exclusion order.

In general, a party who has responded to formal written discovery has no affirmative duty to supplement its responses when new information comes into its possession. (Biles v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1318–1319, 1328.) “[A]bsent unusual circumstances, such as repeated and egregious discovery abuses,” courts will not impose an evidentiary sanction for a failure to disclose unless there has been a “willful” failure to disclose. (Id., at p. 1327.) Here, there has been no showing that any of Plaintiff’s discovery responses were willfully false or incomplete. (Id., at p. 1323-1324.) Nor has Defendant pointed to any violation of a court order directing Plaintiff to provide further answers to Defendant’s discovery. In A & M Recs., Inc. v. Heilman (1977) 75 Cal. App. 3d 554, 565 – a case on which Defendant relies – the trial court barred use of certain documents, not because they were not disclosed in discovery, but because they were not produced in violation of a court order.

Here, Defendant has not only failed to identify specific witnesses, documents or information that it claims should be excluded, but he has also made no effort to show that any non-disclosure by Plaintiff was willful or that the failure to disclose violated a court order. On this record, there is no basis for an exclusion order.

Defendant’s MIL # – to exclude all evidence insurance coverage.

RULING: GRANTED, pursuant to Evidence Code 1155.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 29, 2022

Theresa M. Traber

Judge of the Superior Court

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.



Case Number: ****9846 Hearing Date: March 29, 2022 Dept: 47

ILAN N ROSEN JANFAZA VS ROYAL PALACE ROYAL GIRLS CABARET LLC, Case No. ****9846
RULINGS ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE
Defendants’ MIL #1 – to exclude witnesses under Evidence Code 777
RULING: GRANTED as to all non-party witnesses until after they have completed their testimony in this action.
Defendants’ MIL #2 – to exclude any experts not properly designated and any expert testimony from lay witnesses
RULING: DENIED without prejudice. Defendant has identified no expert or lay testimony sought to be excluded. Nor has it been shown that expert designations were ever demanded in this case pursuant to CCP 2034.210.
Defendants’ MIL #3 – to exclude evidence or argument about any medical billing amounts that were provided on a lien basis from any health care provider.
RULING: DENIED, the medical bills provided to Plaintiff and the amounts on those bills are relevant even if the services were provided by the health care provider on a lien basis.
“Plaintiff has a two-step burden of proof in establishing damages for past medical services. The measure of recovery is well established: “[A] person injured by another's tortious conduct is entitled to recover the reasonable value of medical care and services reasonably required and attributable to the tort.” (Hanif [v. Housing Authority (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 635,] 640, 246 Cal.Rptr. 192.) First, plaintiff must prove that she actually incurred the medical expenses and the amount of her liability for the expenses caps her potential recovery. Hanif, followed by Nishihama v. City and County of San Francisco (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 298, 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 861 (Nishihama) and Howell [v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 541] . . . resolved this rather straightforward issue. Second, plaintiff must prove the reasonable value of the medical services but is entitled to no more than the expenses she actually incurred. ‘[A] plaintiff may recover as economic damages no more than the reasonable value of the medical services received and is not entitled to recover the reasonable value if his or her actual loss was less.’ (Howell, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 555, 129 Cal.Rptr.3d 325, 257 P.3d 1130.)” (Moore v. Mercer (2016) 4 Cal. App. 5th 424, 436-437.)
Even if the defendants in a particular case might be entitled to a reduction based on negotiated discounts available under MediCal or through private insurance, the actual amounts billed to plaintiffs and the bills reflecting those amounts are admissible at trial, “as they reflect[ ] on the nature and extent of plaintiffs' injuries and were therefore relevant to their assessment of an overall general damage award.” (Katiuzhinsky v. Perry (2007) 152 Cal. App. 4th 1288, 1296.) Further, even if the liens provided in exchange for medical services are sold to a third party, the amounts paid for the liens as receivables may be excluded at trial as irrelevant, so long as the plaintiffs remain fully liable for the full amount of the medical provider’s charges. (Id., at p. 1296; Moore v. Mercer, supra, at pp. 438-439.)
In any event, Defendant does not provide sufficient information for the Court to determine whether there is a specific basis for excluding Plaintiff’s medical bills, despite the general rule that they are admissible to show the reasonable value of the medical services provided. In the absence of such details, the Court cannot grant the motion in limine. The specific facts in a particular case determine what is or is not relevant because “evidence which might be admissible in one case might not be admissible in another.” (Id., at p. 442.)
Defendant’s MIL #4 – to exclude all evidence of Defendant’s financial condition until after the jury awards actual damages and makes a finding of fraud, malice or oppression under Civil Code 3294.
RULING: GRANTED, pursuant to Civil Code 3295(d).
Defendant’s MIL #5 -- to exclude any witnesses or evidence not previously disclosed.
RULING: DENIED. Defendant has not identified any specific evidence or witnesses that should be excluded or demonstrate a right to an exclusion order.
In general, a party who has responded to formal written discovery has no affirmative duty to supplement its responses when new information comes into its possession. (Biles v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1318–1319, 1328.) “[A]bsent unusual circumstances, such as repeated and egregious discovery abuses,” courts will not impose an evidentiary sanction for a failure to disclose unless there has been a “willful” failure to disclose. (Id., at p. 1327.) Here, there has been no showing that any of Plaintiff’s discovery responses were willfully false or incomplete. (Id., at p. 1323-1324.) Nor has Defendant pointed to any violation of a court order directing Plaintiff to provide further answers to Defendant’s discovery. In A & M Recs., Inc. v. Heilman (1977) 75 Cal. App. 3d 554, 565 – a case on which Defendant relies – the trial court barred use of certain documents, not because they were not disclosed in discovery, but because they were not produced in violation of a court order.
Here, Defendant has not only failed to identify specific witnesses, documents or information that it claims should be excluded, but he has also made no effort to show that any non-disclosure by Plaintiff was willful or that the failure to disclose violated a court order. On this record, there is no basis for an exclusion order.
Defendant’s MIL # – to exclude all evidence insurance coverage.
RULING: GRANTED, pursuant to Evidence Code 1155.


b'

Case Number: ****9846 Hearing Date: August 23, 2021 Dept: 47

Tentative Ruling
Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47
HEARING DATE: August 23, 2021 TRIAL DATE: December 6, 2021
CASE: Ilan N. Rosen Janfaza v. Royal Palace Royal Girls Cabaret, LLC, et al.
CASE NO.: ****9846
MOTION TO COMPEL DEPOSITION OF PLAINTIFF AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,249.50 AGAINST PLAINTIFF AND HIS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD
MOVING PARTY: Defendant 7180 Sunset Blvd., Inc. and Marcelle Ezerzer
RESPONDING PARTY(S): No opposition on eCourt as of August 20, 2021.
CASE HISTORY:
05/02/17: Complaint filed.
04/23/19: La Cienega Center, LLC named as Doe 1.
04/23/19: Michael Shabtai named as Doe 2.
04/23/19: 7180 Sunset Blvd., Inc. named as Doe 3.
04/23/19: Marcelle Ezerzer named as Doe 4.
10/24/19: Notice of Removal to Federal Court filed.
11/06/19: Notice of Remand from Federal Court filed.
11/20/19: Transferred from PI to IC as Complicated PI.
03/16/20: First Amended Complaint filed.
08/17/20: Second Amended Complaint filed.
01/27/21: Cross-Complaint filed.
04/06/21: Dismissal entered as to 365 N. La Cienega LLC, dba Synn Gentlemen’s Club.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
Plaintiff alleges that he was assaulted by the security guards at the Defendant gentlemen’s club.
Defendant 7180 Sunset Blvd., Inc. moves to compel Plaintiff’s deposition.
TENTATIVE RULING:
On June 17, 2021, this Court conducted an informal discovery conference as to this dispute. The parties agreed that Plaintiff’s deposition was to take place on July 27, 2021, continuing on July 28, 2021 if not completed on July 27, 2021. (Minute Order, 06/17/21, at p. 1.)
Both parties have now represented to the Court that Plaintiff’s deposition has taken place. Therefore, the motion is DENIED AS MOOT. It remains on calendar only for the purpose of Defendant’s request for sanctions.
Defendant requests sanctions of $1,249.50 against Plaintiff and his attorneys of record, Mark R. Berns and Ron A. Rosen Janfaza.
Under these circumstances, sanctions are mandatory “unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (CCP ; 2025.450(g)(1).)
Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff did not act with substantial justification in failing to appear for his deposition, and no other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.
As for Defendant’s request for sanctions against both Plaintiff and his attorneys of record, Mark R. Berns and Ron A. Rosen Janfaza, there is no evidence in the record that Plaintiff’s failure to appear was due to his own conduct. Rather, the Declaration of Mazyar H. Mazarei suggests that this failure to appear is failure attributed to Plaintiff’s counsel.
Accordingly, Defendant’s request for sanction is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s attorneys of record, Mark R. Berns and Ron A. Rosen Janfaza, in the amount of $1,249.50, representing the reasonable fees and costs incurred in bringing this motion. Sanctions are payable to Defendant’s counsel within 30 days of the date of this Order.
Moving party to give notice, unless waived.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 23, 2021 ___________________________________
Theresa M. Traber
Judge of the Superior Court
Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.
'


b'

Case Number: ****9846 Hearing Date: July 19, 2021 Dept: 47

Tentative Ruling

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

HEARING DATE: July 19, 2021 TRIAL DATE: October 4, 2021

CASE: Ilan N. Rosen Janfaza v. Royal Palace Royal Girls Cabaret, LLC, et al.

CASE NO.: ****9846

MOTION TO COMPEL NON-PARTY EBI NIKJOO, DDS’S COMPLIANCE WITH DEPOSITION SUBPOENA FOR PRODUCTION OF BUSINESS RECORDS AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,386 AGAINST

EBI NIKJOO, DDS

MOVING PARTY: Defendants 7180 Sunset Blvd., Inc. and Marcelle Ezerzer

RESPONDING PARTY(S): No opposition on eCourt as of July 15, 2021.

PROOF OF SERVICE:

CASE HISTORY:

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

Plaintiff alleges that he was assaulted by the security guards at the Defendant gentlemen’s club.

Defendants move to compel a non-party’s compliance with a subpoena duces tecum and for sanctions.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendants 7180 Sunset Blvd., Inc. and Marcelle Ezerzer’s motion to compel non-party Ebi Nikjoo, DDS’s compliance with deposition subpoena for production of business records is

GRANTED. Production is to occur within 30 days of the date of this Order.

Defendants’ request for sanctions is DENIED.

DISCUSSION:

Motion to Compel Compliance

Defendants purport to bring this motion pursuant to both CCP ; 2025.480 and CCP ; 1987.1. CCP ; 2025.480 does not apply here. A motion brought under CCP ; 2025.480 is a motion to compel, not a motion to “compel compliance.” In addition, a motion under CCP ; 2025.480 applies when a deponent has failed to answer particular questions or produce particular documents, not when the deponent has failed to appear at all or produce any documents. (CCP ; 2025.480(a).) Here, Defendants indicate that the deponent has failed to appear or produce any documents. (Declaration of Mazyar H. Mazarei ¶ 7.) Thus, CCP ; 2025.480 does not apply here.

A motion to “compel compliance,” as it relates to a deposition subpoena of a third party who has failed to produce documents, is to be brought under CCP ; 1987.1, which provides, as to third parties:

If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court\'s own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.

(CCP ; 1987.1(a), bold emphasis added.) There is no meet and confer requirement set forth in CCP ; 1987.1. Nor is there any good cause requirement set forth in ; 1987.1. (But cf. Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 223-224 [reading a good-faith requirement into former section 2020, reasoning that it was part of the same statutory scheme as former section 2031, which included a good-faith requirement for parties, and “it is unlikely the Legislature intended to place greater burdens on a nonparty than on a party to the litigation”].)

Here, Defendants served a subpoena request for business records on Ebi Nikjoo, DDS on October 2, 2020, seeking “all documents . . . . pertaining to the care, treatment or examination of Ilan N. Janfaza . . . from 01/01/2013 to and including the present day.” (Mazarei Decl., Exh. A.) Defendants subpoenaed these records because Plaintiff indicated that Nikjoo had provided dental services to Plaintiff for injuries he allegedly suffered as a result of being assaulted at Defendants’ place of business. (Mazarei Decl. ¶ 3.) Nikjoo has not responded to the subpoena. (¶ 7.)

Because Nikjoo has failed to comply with the subpoena for production of business records, Defendants are entitled to an order compelling their production, unless other considerations justify the refusal to produce these documents. The burden is on the deponent to justify the refusal to produce documents. (San Diego Professional Ass’n v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 194, 199.) Given that Nikjoo has not objected to the subpoena or otherwise responded, no such showing has been made.

Accordingly, Nikjoo is ordered to produce the responsive records within 30 days of this order.

As for sanctions, the Court “may” impose a monetary sanction for misuse of the discovery process. (CCP ; 2023.030(a).) Misuse of the discovery process includes failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery. (CCP ; 2023.010(d).) In addition, the Court “may in its discretion” award reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, if a motion under CCP ; 1987.1 is opposed “in bad faith or without substantial justification.” (CCP ; 1987.2.)

Here, the Court declines to exercise its discretion to award sanctions, especially given that Defendants sought sanctions, in part, based on statutory provisions that do not apply in this context. If, however, the deponent disobeys the order to provide this discovery and this matter comes before the Court again, the Court may award sanctions at that time.

Moving party to give notice, unless waived.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 19, 2021 ___________________________________

Theresa M. Traber

Judge of the Superior Court

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.

'


Case Number: ****9846    Hearing Date: July 17, 2020    Dept: 47

Ilan N. Rosen Janfaza v. Royal Palace Royal Girls Cabaret, LLC, et al.

GIVEN THE RECENT CORONAVIRUS CRISIS, THE COURT STRONGLY ENCOURAGES APPEARENCES BY COURT CALL. PLEASE MAKE SUCH ARRANGEMENTS IF YOU WISH TO APPEAR VIA COURT CALL AT (888) 882-6878 (OR WWW.COURTCALL.COM). IF YOU APPEAR IN PERSON AT THE HEARING, YOU WILL BE SUBJECT TO ALL SOCIAL DISTANCING RULES, INCLUDING THE WEARING OF AN APPROPRIATE FACE MASK/COVERING (ABSENT ANY EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES) AS CONTAINED IN THE APPLICABLE GENERAL ORDERS ISSUED BY THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE L.A.S.C.

(1) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(2) DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT;

(3) MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

MOVING PARTY: (1) Defendant 365 N. La Cienega Beverly Hills, LLC, improperly identified as Synn Gentlemen’s Club; (2)-(3) Defendants 7180 Sunset Blvd., Inc. and Marcelle Ezerzer

RESPONDING PARTY(S): (1) No opposition on eCourt as of July 14, 2020; (2)-(3) Plaintiff Ilan N. Rosen Janfaza

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

Plaintiff alleges that he was assaulted by the security guards at the Defendant gentlemen’s club.

Defendant 365 N. La Cienega Beverly Hills, LLC, improperly identified as Synn Gentlemen’s Club, moves for summary judgment. Defendants 7180 Sunset Blvd., Inc. and Marcelle Ezerzer demur to the first amended complaint and move to strike portions of it.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant 365 N. La Cienega Beverly Hills, LLC, improperly identified as Synn Gentlemen’s Club’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED without prejudice.

Defendants 7180 Sunset Blvd., Inc. and Marcelle Ezerzer’s demurrer is OVERRULED.

Defendants’ motion to strike the prayer for punitive damages and related allegations is GRANTED. Generally speaking, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) Plaintiff must demonstrate this possibility at the hearing. Otherwise, no leave to amend will be given.

DISCUSSION:

Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendant 365 N. La Cienega Beverly Hills, LLC’s motion for summary judgment does not include the separate statement of undisputed facts that is required by CCP ; 437c(b)(1). “The failure to comply with this requirement of a separate statement may in the court’s discretion constitute a sufficient ground for denying the motion.” (CCP ; 437c(b)(1).) “Separate statements are required not to satisfy a sadistic urge to torment lawyers, but rather to afford due process to opposing parties and to permit trial courts to . . . determine quickly and efficiently whether material facts are disputed.” (United Community Church v. Garcin (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 327, 335, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in City of Pasadena v. Superior Court (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238 n.4.)

Accordingly, the motion is DENIED without prejudice. The moving party may refile the same motion, but in full compliance with the applicable summary judgment procedures.

Demurrer

Meet and Confer

The Declaration of Attorney Mazyar H. Mazarei reflects that the meet-and-confer requirement of CCP ; 430.41(a) was met.

All Causes of Action

Defendants demur to all causes of action on the ground that they are “fatally ambiguous and unintelligible” pursuant to CCP ; 430.10(f).

Demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored, because discovery can be used for clarification, and apply only where defendants cannot reasonably determine what issues or claims are stated. (Chen v. Berenjian (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 811, 822; Khoury v. Maly's of Cal., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) That is not the case here. Defendants perfectly understand that Plaintiff has made allegations that they claim cannot apply to them. Nevertheless, what Plaintiff is alleging, and against whom, is clear – or at least Defendants have not argued that they cannot reasonably determine what the claims are and whether they are alleged against them. If the 1AC is not so incomprehensible that Defendants cannot reasonably respond – and it is not – then the 1AC is not uncertain. (Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Ins. Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 848 n.3.)

Defendants also purport to ask rhetorical questions as a means of identifying ambiguities in the 1AC – such as “Who hired Defendant 7180 Sunset Blvd., Inc.?” – and then they proceed to definitively answer “the entity was not hired by anyone.” (Demurrer, at p. 5.) In other words, certain facts that they complain are ambiguous are actually already within their own knowledge. “A demurrer for uncertainty should be overruled when the facts as to which the complaint is uncertain are presumptively within the defendants’ knowledge.” (Chen, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at 822.) That is the case with Defendants’ claimed ambiguities, and any that are not within their knowledge can be clarified in discovery.

If, as Defendants argue – presumably as to Defendant 7180 Sunset Blvd., Inc. alone, although the demurrer itself is ambiguous on that point and lumps together an entity defendant and an individual defendant in connection with every argument they make – certain causes of action cannot be maintained against an entity defendant, then Defendant 7180 Sunset Blvd., Inc. had a means to attack the 1AC on that basis: it could have argued that the 1AC failed to state a cause of action against the entity pursuant to CCP ; 430.10(e) as to those particular causes of action. Defendants did not do so here, however, relying only on the disfavored ground of uncertainty.

Accordingly, the demurrer to all causes of action based on uncertainty is OVERRULED.

Motion To Strike

Meet and Confer

The Declaration of Attorney Mazyar H. Mazarei reflects that the meet-and-confer requirement of CCP ; 435.5 was met.

Analysis

Defendants move to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages and related allegations. The motion is GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to show “malice, oppression, or fraud” for purposes of punitive damages under Civil Code ; 3294(a). “Malice” is defined as conduct “intended to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct . . . carried on . . . with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code ; 3294(c)(1).) “Oppression” means “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Id. ; 3294(c)(2).) “Fraud” is “intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Id. ; 3294(c)(3).) Plaintiff has not made any specific allegations of this type of conduct on the part of the demurring Defendants.

In addition, as to Defendant 7180 Sunset Blvd.Plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient under Civil Code ; 3294(b), which requires particular allegations when punitive damages are sought against a corporation, including that the “advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.” (Civ. Code ; 3294(b).) Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations that each of the Defendants “worked as security guards, employees and owners, and in doing the things alleged here, was acting within the course or scope of that agency or employment” (1AC ¶ 24) and related allegations are insufficient.

Generally speaking, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) Plaintiff must demonstrate this possibility at the hearing. Otherwise, no leave to amend will be given.

Moving party to give notice, unless waived.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 17, 2020 ___________________________________

Randolph M. Hammock

Judge of the Superior Court

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org



Case Number: ****9846    Hearing Date: December 05, 2019    Dept: 3

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – CENTRAL DISTRICT

ILAN N. ROSEN JANFAZA,

Plaintiff,

v.

ROYAL PALACE ROYAL GIRLS CABARET, LLC , et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: ****9846

ORDER TRANSFERRING COMPLICATED PERSONAL INJURY (PI) CASE TO AN INDEPENDENT CALENDAR (IC) COURT

After review of the court file, the Court makes the following order:

Department 3 of the Personal Injury Court has determined that the above entitled action is complicated based upon the number of pretrial hearings and/or the complexity of the issues presented.

AT THE DIRECTION OF DEPARTMENT 1:

This case is hereby transferred and reassigned to the following Independent Calendar Court in THE CENTRAL DISTRICT, JUDGE RANDOLPH HAMMOCK presiding in DEPT. 47 of the STANLEY MOSK Courthouse, for all purposes except trial. Department 1 hereby delegates to the Independent Calendar Court the authority to assign the cause for trial to that Independent Calendar Court.

The Order is signed and filed this date, and incorporated herein by reference. Any pending motions or hearings, including trial and status conferences, will be reset, continued or vacated at the direction of the newly assigned Independent Calendar court.

Upon receipt of this notice, counsel for Plaintiff shall give notice to all parties of record.

DATED: December 5, 2019 ___________________________

Hon. Jon Takasugi

Judge of the Superior Court



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