On 11/08/2019 HENRIK SHAHINYAN filed a Personal Injury - Medical Malpractice lawsuit against VALLEY PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL . This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Spring Street Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.
Pending - Other Pending
VALLEY PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL AN ENTITY
BEJJANI M.D. BASSAM
MCMURRAY RANDY HUE
HENRIKS YANA GAYANE
11/8/2019: Summons - SUMMONS ON COMPLAINT
11/8/2019: Civil Case Cover Sheet
11/8/2019: Notice of Case Assignment - Unlimited Civil Case
Hearing11/04/2022 at 08:30 AM in Department 2 at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Order to Show Cause Re: DismissalRead MoreRead Less
Hearing05/07/2021 at 08:30 AM in Department 2 at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Non-Jury TrialRead MoreRead Less
Hearing04/23/2021 at 10:00 AM in Department 2 at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Final Status ConferenceRead MoreRead Less
DocketComplaint; Filed by Henrik Shahinyan (Plaintiff); Alina Nersisyan (Plaintiff)Read MoreRead Less
DocketNotice of Case Assignment - Unlimited Civil Case; Filed by ClerkRead MoreRead Less
DocketSummons (on Complaint); Filed by Henrik Shahinyan (Plaintiff); Alina Nersisyan (Plaintiff)Read MoreRead Less
DocketCivil Case Cover Sheet; Filed by Henrik Shahinyan (Plaintiff); Alina Nersisyan (Plaintiff)Read MoreRead Less
Case Number: 19STCV40556 Hearing Date: July 27, 2021 Dept: U
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF\r\nCALIFORNIA\r\n\r\n
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES -\r\nNORTHWEST DISTRICT\r\n\r\n
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HENRIK\r\n SHAHINYAN, an individual, and ALINA NERSISYAN, an individual,\r\n
BASSAM BEJJANI, M.D., an individual;\r\n VALLEY PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL, an entity; and DOES 1-100, inclusive,\r\n
|\r\n \r\n |
|\r\n \r\n |
CASE NO: 19STCV40556\r\n
[TENTATIVE]\r\n ORDER RE:\r\n
PLAINTIFF HENRIK SHAHINYAN’S MOTION FOR\r\n A PROTECTIVE ORDER\r\n
July 27, 2021\r\n
This\r\nis a medical malpractice action arising out of alleged failure to timely and\r\nproperly diagnose and treat the perforation on Plaintiff Henrik Shahinyan’s (“Plaintiff”)\r\nurinal bladder.\r\n\r\n
On\r\nJanuary 28, 2021, Plaintiff\r\nfiled his operative first amended complaint (“FAC”) against Defendants Bassam\r\nBejjani, M.D., (“Bejjani”) Valley Presbyterian Hospital (“VPH”), and Does 1\r\nthrough 100 asserting a sole cause of action for professional negligence —medical\r\nmalpractice.\r\n\r\n
Plaintiff\r\nalleges Bejjani was negligent in failing to timely discover, diagnose, and\r\ntreat the perforation on Plaintiff’s urinal bladder and that VPH’s nursing\r\nstaff failed to inform Bejjani of Plaintiff’s symptoms and condition during\r\nPlaintiff’s entire admission and treatment at the hospital.\r\n\r\n
Plaintiff\r\nnow moves for a protective order limiting the scope of his deposition\r\ntestimony.\r\n\r\n
Bejjani\r\nopposes and Plaintiff filed a reply.\r\n\r\n
No\r\nparty seeks monetary sanctions.\r\n\r\n
II. \r\nLEGAL STANDARD\r\n\r\n
“Before,\r\nduring, or after a deposition, any party, any deponent, or any other affected\r\nnatural person or organization may promptly move for a protective order. . . .\r\n.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.420, subd. (a).)\r\n\r\n
“The\r\ncourt, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to\r\nprotect any party, deponent, or other natural person or organization from\r\nunwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and\r\nexpense.” (Id., subd. (b).)\r\n\r\n
The\r\nprotective order may provide that the deposition to be taken at a different\r\ntime or only on certain specified terms and conditions. (Id., subd. (c)(1), (5).)\r\n\r\n
Courts\r\nhave considerable discretion in granting and crafting protective orders. (Raymond\r\nHandling Concepts Corp. v. Superior Court (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 584, 588.)\r\n\r\n
“A\r\nparty seeking the protective order must show by a preponderance of the evidence\r\nthat the issuance of a protective order is proper.” (Stadish v. Superior Court (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1130, 1145.)\r\n\r\n
Code\r\nof Civil Procedure section 2031.060 states that “the court shall impose a\r\nmonetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against\r\nany party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion for\r\na protective order, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with\r\nsubstantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of\r\nthe sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.060, subd. (h).)\r\n\r\n
It is undisputed\r\nthat Plaintiff must appear for his deposition. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2025.010,\r\n2025.210.) Plaintiff has offered to appear for a further deposition. The only\r\nissue is what Bejjani can ask Plaintiff to answer at this deposition. More\r\nspecifically, Plaintiff requests that the Court restrict Bejjani from inquiring\r\ninto the following matters:\r\n\r\n
a. No repetitive,\r\nharassing, and invasive questions regarding Plaintiff’s penis being examined,\r\ntouched, or have items “stuck up.”\r\n\r\n
b. No race-baiting\r\nquestions or questions intended to incite racial tension.\r\n\r\n
c. No questions\r\ncalling for expert testimony.\r\n\r\n
(Proposed order 2:11-14.)\r\n\r\n
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff filed an expert\r\ndeclaration with his reply papers. This evidence filed in reply is improper. (Jay\r\nv. Mahaffey (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1537-1538.) Therefore, the Court\r\ndoes not consider it.\r\n\r\n
The Court acknowledges the broad and liberal nature\r\nof discovery. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010; Williams\r\nv. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 540-541.) However, the scope of\r\ndiscovery is not unlimited. Here, the Court finds Bejjani’s arguments in\r\nopposition well-taken and denies Plaintiff’s motion in its entirety.\r\n\r\n
Depending on the case, the penis is irrelevant for a\r\npatient receiving treatment for an internal bladder rupture. Plaintiff’s SAC\r\ndoes not mention penis and there is no documentation of anything involving the\r\npenis in Plaintiff’s medical records pursuant to Plaintiff’s counsel’s\r\nattestation as an officer of the court. (Henricks Decl. ¶ 5.) The issue of\r\nPlaintiff’s penis facially appears irrelevant in this case, which involves the\r\nidentification and treatment of an internal bladder tear due to the negligent\r\nuse of a chemotherapy agent, Mitomycin. However, based on the review of the\r\ntranscript, Bejjani is not asking these questions for the purpose of\r\nharassment. Instead, Bejjani is asking the questions so he can identify the\r\ntreatment Plaintiff has received by other urologists. Because of difficulties\r\nin getting direct responses from Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s limited\r\nunderstanding of what a urologist is,\r\nit was necessary to ask further, clarifying questions directed at other\r\ninteractions with other urologists, who commonly perform procedures on the\r\npenis. In other words, asking these questions was a way to “jog” Plaintiff’s\r\ntestimony in order to identify other specialists in the same field as Bejjani\r\nwho may have operated on the same area of Plaintiff’s body. The use of the term\r\n“penis” is not otherwise inherently offensive. It is an anatomical term.\r\nAccordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion seeking to restrict\r\nPlaintiff’s testimony about his penis.\r\n\r\n
Next, the Court addresses the “race-baiting” issue.\r\nPlaintiff contends that the question about his circumcision is race-baiting and\r\noffensive considering Plaintiff’s Armenian heritage and the history of forced\r\ncircumcision by Muslims. Plaintiff’s counsel does not show that he has the\r\nproper foundation to make this factual claim. (Henricks Decl. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff\r\ncannot otherwise rely on secondary authority, i.e., books, to prove the truth\r\nof the matter asserted because of an evidentiary issue, i.e., hearsay. Additionally,\r\nthe question of the circumcision is a proper clarifying question for the reason\r\nas stated before. Nevertheless, the issue of Plaintiff’s circumcision is a moot\r\nissue because Plaintiff testified that he is uncircumcised\r\nand Bejjani has agreed not to ask further questions on this issue. But the\r\nmotion seeks a restriction on “race-baiting” questions. Plaintiff fails to\r\nidentify any other possible “race-baiting” questions. Accordingly, the Court\r\ndenies Plaintiff’s motion seeking to restrict Bejjani from asking unspecified\r\nquestions that Plaintiff claims are race-baiting.\r\n\r\n
Finally, regarding the issue of “expert testimony,”\r\nPlaintiff’s motion is silent on this issue. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to meet\r\nhis burden to restrict any specific questions, notwithstanding Bejjani should\r\nbe well aware that questions of this nature are inadmissible. Accordingly, the\r\nCourt denies Plaintiff’s motion seeking to restrict Bejjani from asking\r\nunspecified questions that Plaintiff claims calls for expert testimony.\r\n\r\n
The Court denies Plaintiff’s motion in its entirety.\r\n\r\n
The Court denies Bejjani’s request to order a\r\nreferee to oversee the deposition with the parties to share in the costs. The\r\nCourt does not find that the parties’ conduct at this time is so extreme and/or\r\nunsalvageable that a referee is necessary. To the extent that a further\r\ndeposition demonstrates otherwise, the Court will then entertain an application\r\nfor this request.\r\n\r\n
The Court denies Plaintiff’s motion in its entirety.\r\n\r\n
Defendant is ordered to give notice of this ruling.\r\n\r\n
DATED: July 27,\r\n2021\r\n\r\n
Bernie C. LaForteza\r\n\r\n
Judge of the Superior Court\r\n\r\n
 The caption\r\nincludes a second named plaintiff, Alina Nersisyan. However, there are no\r\nallegations involving her.\r\n\r\n
 “Q. Mr.\r\nShahinyan, what is your understanding of what a urologist is? MR. BRAL: Same\r\nobjections. THE WITNESS: Well, in my opinion, urologist is someone that has to\r\ndo with the urinary tract, or if there's any problems with the urinary tract is\r\nthe one who is resolving the issues.” (Henricks Decl. Ex. B 16:1-7.)\r\n\r\n
 “THE WITNESS: No,\r\nno, no. I am not a Muslim, so how would I be circumcised.” (Henricks Decl. Ex.\r\nB 39:1-2.)\r\n\r\n
Case Number: 19STCV40556 Hearing Date: April 19, 2021 Dept: U
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHWEST DISTRICT
HENRIK SHAHINYAN, et al.,
BASSAM BEJJANI, M.D., et al.,
CASE NO: 19STCV40556
[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE:
DEFENDANT BASSAM K. BEJJANI, M.D.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
April 19, 2021
On November 8, 2019, Plaintiffs Henrik Shahinyan (“Shahinyan”) and Alina Nersisyan (“Nersisyan”) filed a complaint against Defendants Bassam Bejjani, M.D. (“Dr. Bejjani”) and Valley Presbyterian Hospital for (1) professional negligence – medical malpractice and (2) loss of consortium. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Dr. Bejjani was negligent in failing to timely discover, diagnose, and treat the perforation on Plaintiff Shahinyan’s urinal bladder and that Defendant Valley Presbyterian Hospital’s nursing staff failed to inform Dr. Bejjani of Shahinyan’s symptoms and condition during Shahinyan’s entire admission and treatment at Valley Presbyterian Hospital. Plaintiff Nersisyan alleges she is Shahinyan’s wife and was deprived of her husband’s companionship, affection, love, sexual relations, conjugal fellowship, and physical assistance in maintaining the family home and comfort as a result of Defendants’ negligence.
On February 4, 2020, dismissal of the second cause of action was entered as to Defendant Valley Presbyterian Hospital.
On May 5, 2020, dismissal of the second cause of action was entered as to Defendant Dr. Bejjani.
On November 20, 2020, Defendant Dr. Bejjani filed a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed opposition papers on April 4, 2021. Dr. Beijjani filed reply papers on April 14, 2021.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The purpose of a motion for summary judgment “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)
“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf Genisman “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Id.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi Urgente
“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 467; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,(c).)
Defendant Dr. Bejjani moves for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s Complaint.
An amended complaint supersedes all prior complaints. (State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Superior Court (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1130-31.) The amended complaint furnishes the sole basis for the cause of action, and the original complaint ceases to have any effect either as a pleading or as a basis for judgment. (Id.) Since there is but one complaint in a civil action, the filing of an amended complaint moots a motion directed to a prior complaint. (Id.) Accordingly, once an amended complaint is filed, it is error to grant summary judgment or adjudication on a cause of action contained in a previous complaint. (Id.)
Subsequent to Defendant’s filing of the motion for summary judgment on November 20, 2020, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on January 28, 2021 pursuant to the parties’ stipulation. The First Amended Complaint is thus the operative complaint in this action, superseding the Complaint. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is thus moot.
Defendant argues in reply that the filing of the First Amended Complaint does not moot his motion for summary judgment. Defendant cites to State Compensation Insurance Fund seemingly for the proposition that the Court may proceed to rule on a motion for summary judgment where the sufficiency of the cause of action is undisputed even after the filing of an amended complaint. Defendant cites to the portion of State Compensation Insurance Fund stating that “‘[a]fter a cause of action is amended, the court may rule in favor of the defendant if, upon subsequent motion, or perhaps renewal of the earlier motion if appropriately framed, it is shown . . . there are no triable material issues of fact which would permit recovery on that theory.’” (Id. at 1131 (quoting Hejmadi v. AMFAC, Inc. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 525, 536) (emphasis in original).) This discussion merely provides that a subsequent motion for summary judgment or a renewed motion for summary judgment may be brought after a complaint is amended and granted upon a showing that no triable issues of material fact exist. It does not stand for the proposition that the Court may proceed to rule on a motion for summary judgment brought prior to the filing of the amended complaint if the sufficiency of allegations are undisputed. In fact, State Compensation Insurance Fund stands for the contrary—i.e., the filing of an amended complaint renders a motion for summary judgment or adjudication directed at the prior complaint moot—and that it would be error for the Court to grant a motion for summary judgment directed at a complaint that is no longer operative. (State Compensation Insurance Fund, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at 1130-31.)
Based on the foregoing, Defendant Dr. Bejjani’s motion for summary judgment is TAKEN OFF CALENDAR AS MOOT.
Moving party to give notice.
DATED: April 19, 2021
Hon. Bernie C. LaForteza
Judge of the Superior Court
Case Number: 19STCV40556 Hearing Date: October 21, 2020 Dept: 29
19STCV40556 Shahinyan et al v. Valley Presbyterian, et al.
Court Order Re: Transfer and Reassignment of Complicated Personal Injury (“PI”) Case to An Independent Calendar ("IC") Courtroom from Department 29, a PI Hub Court.
The Court's order Re: Transfer of Complicated Personal Injury Case to an Independent Calendar Court, is posted on the Court's website.
AFTER REVIEW OF THE FILE, THE COURT MAKES THE FOLLOWING ORDER:
Department 29 of the Personal Injury Court has determined that the above-entitled action is complicated based upon the number of pretrial hearings and/or the complexity of the issues presented.
At the direction of Department 1, this case is hereby ordered reassigned and transferred to the Northwest District, Van Nuys, the Honorable VIRGINIA KEENY Judge presiding in Department W for further reassignment to an IC Court. Department 1 hereby delegates to the Independent Calendar Court the authority to assign the cause for trial to that Independent Calendar Court.
Hearing on the above motion and any pending motions or hearings, including trial or status conferences, will be reset, continued or vacated at the direction of the newly assigned Independent Calendar Court. (NOTE: All hearings currently set in Department 29 of the Spring Street Courthouse are taken off calendar subject to being reset and notified by the receiving court Re: New hearing dates.)
Judicial Assistant is directed to give notice to Plaintiff, who upon receipt of this notice, is ordered to give notice to all parties of record.
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