This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 01/05/2023 at 00:49:43 (UTC).

HEIDI WAHL VS HYUN BAE, ET AL.

Case Summary

On 10/22/2019 HEIDI WAHL filed a Personal Injury - Medical Malpractice lawsuit against HYUN BAE,. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Spring Street Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judges overseeing this case are SERENA R. MURILLO and MICHAEL E. WHITAKER. The case status is Disposed - Dismissed.
Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    *******8158

  • Filing Date:

    10/22/2019

  • Case Status:

    Disposed - Dismissed

  • Case Type:

    Personal Injury - Medical Malpractice

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judges

SERENA R. MURILLO

MICHAEL E. WHITAKER

 

Party Details

Plaintiff

WAHL HEIDI

Defendants

CANO LISA

BAE HYUN

THE SPINE INSTITUTE CENTER FOR SPINAL RESTORATION AN UNKNOWN ENTITY

PROVIDENCE ST. JOHN'S HEALTH CENTER

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff Attorney

SOKOL RONALD JAY ESQ.

Defendant Attorneys

MCANDREWS THOMAS FRANCIS ESQ.

KISESKEY KELLY LYNN ESQ.

MISSHORE BRYAN C. ESQ.

 

Court Documents

Stipulation and Order - STIPULATION AND ORDER STIPULATION TO DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE; PROPOSED ORDER THEREON

9/21/2022: Stipulation and Order - STIPULATION AND ORDER STIPULATION TO DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE; PROPOSED ORDER THEREON

Notice of Change of Address or Other Contact Information

6/3/2022: Notice of Change of Address or Other Contact Information

Notice - NOTICE OF UNAVAILABILITY OF COUNSEL

6/7/2022: Notice - NOTICE OF UNAVAILABILITY OF COUNSEL

Request for Dismissal

10/4/2021: Request for Dismissal

Notice of Ruling

10/12/2021: Notice of Ruling

Notice of Entry of Dismissal and Proof of Service

10/25/2021: Notice of Entry of Dismissal and Proof of Service

Informal Discovery Conference Form for Personal Injury Courts

10/25/2021: Informal Discovery Conference Form for Personal Injury Courts

Informal Discovery Conference Form for Personal Injury Courts

11/8/2021: Informal Discovery Conference Form for Personal Injury Courts

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (INFORMAL DISCOVERY CONFERENCE (IDC))

11/17/2021: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (INFORMAL DISCOVERY CONFERENCE (IDC))

Certificate of Mailing for - CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR (INFORMAL DISCOVERY CONFERENCE (IDC)) OF 11/17/2021

11/17/2021: Certificate of Mailing for - CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR (INFORMAL DISCOVERY CONFERENCE (IDC)) OF 11/17/2021

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (INFORMAL DISCOVERY CONFERENCE (IDC))

11/18/2021: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (INFORMAL DISCOVERY CONFERENCE (IDC))

Motion to Continue Trial Date

3/15/2022: Motion to Continue Trial Date

Stipulation and Order - STIPULATION AND ORDER STIPULATION TO CONTINUE TRIAL AND PROPOSED ORDER THEREON

4/1/2022: Stipulation and Order - STIPULATION AND ORDER STIPULATION TO CONTINUE TRIAL AND PROPOSED ORDER THEREON

Notice of Continuance

4/4/2022: Notice of Continuance

Notice - NOTICE OF TAKING MOTION TO COMPEL OFF CALENDAR

9/21/2021: Notice - NOTICE OF TAKING MOTION TO COMPEL OFF CALENDAR

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (RULING ON SUBMITTED MATTER)

8/10/2021: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (RULING ON SUBMITTED MATTER)

Stipulation and Order - STIPULATION AND ORDER STIPULATION AND (PROPOSED) ORDER TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT

8/27/2021: Stipulation and Order - STIPULATION AND ORDER STIPULATION AND (PROPOSED) ORDER TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (COURT ORDER RE: STIPULATION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT OF DEFENDANT...)

8/27/2021: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (COURT ORDER RE: STIPULATION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT OF DEFENDANT...)

93 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 09/21/2022
  • DocketCase reassigned to Spring Street Courthouse in Department 26 - Hon. Mark E. Windham; Reason: Other

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 09/21/2022
  • DocketCase reassigned to Spring Street Courthouse in Department 29 - Hon. Serena R. Murillo; Reason: Other

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 09/21/2022
  • DocketOn the Complaint filed by Heidi Wahl on 10/22/2019, entered Order for Dismissal without prejudice as to the entire action

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 09/21/2022
  • DocketStipulation and Order STIPULATION TO DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE; PROPOSED ORDER THEREON; Signed and Filed by: Heidi Wahl (Plaintiff); As to: Hyun Bae (Defendant); Lisa Cano, P.A. Erroneously Sued As Lisa Cano (Defendant); The Spine Institute Center for Spinal Restoration, an unknown entity (Defendant) et al.

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 09/21/2022
  • DocketUpdated -- Stipulation and Order STIPULATION TO DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE; PROPOSED ORDER THEREON: Filed By: Heidi Wahl (Plaintiff); Result: Granted; Result Date: 09/21/2022

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 09/21/2022
  • DocketFinal Status Conference scheduled for 11/07/2022 at 10:00 AM in Spring Street Courthouse at Department 29 Not Held - Vacated by Court on 09/21/2022

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 09/21/2022
  • DocketJury Trial scheduled for 11/21/2022 at 08:30 AM in Spring Street Courthouse at Department 29 Not Held - Vacated by Court on 09/21/2022

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 09/21/2022
  • DocketHearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings scheduled for 11/17/2022 at 01:30 PM in Spring Street Courthouse at Department 29 Not Held - Vacated by Court on 09/21/2022

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 09/15/2022
  • DocketPursuant to the request of moving party, Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings scheduled for 10/18/2022 at 01:30 PM in Spring Street Courthouse at Department 29 Not Held - Rescheduled by Party was rescheduled to 11/17/2022 01:30 PM

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 07/29/2022
  • DocketPursuant to the request of moving party, Hearing on Joinder to Motion for Summary Judgment / Adjudication scheduled for 10/18/2022 at 01:30 PM in Spring Street Courthouse at Department 29 Not Held - Taken Off Calendar by Party on 07/29/2022

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
162 More Docket Entries
  • 10/29/2019
  • DocketProof of Service by Substituted Service; Filed by: Heidi Wahl (Plaintiff); As to: The Spine Institute Center for Spinal Restoration, an unknown entity (Defendant); Proof of Mailing Date: 10/28/2019; Service Cost: 75.00; Service Cost Waived: No

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 10/29/2019
  • DocketProof of Service by Substituted Service; Filed by: Heidi Wahl (Plaintiff); As to: The Spine Institute Center for Spinal Restoration, an unknown entity (Defendant); Proof of Mailing Date: 10/28/2019; Service Cost: 75.00; Service Cost Waived: No

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 10/24/2019
  • DocketFinal Status Conference scheduled for 04/06/2021 at 10:00 AM in Spring Street Courthouse at Department 2

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 10/24/2019
  • DocketNon-Jury Trial scheduled for 04/20/2021 at 08:30 AM in Spring Street Courthouse at Department 2

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 10/24/2019
  • DocketOrder to Show Cause Re: Dismissal scheduled for 10/18/2022 at 08:30 AM in Spring Street Courthouse at Department 2

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 10/24/2019
  • DocketCase assigned to Hon. Kristin S. Escalante in Department 2 Spring Street Courthouse

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 10/22/2019
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by: Heidi Wahl (Plaintiff); As to: Hyun Bae (Defendant); Lisa Cano (Defendant); The Spine Institute Center for Spinal Restoration, an unknown entity (Defendant)

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 10/22/2019
  • DocketCivil Case Cover Sheet; Filed by: Heidi Wahl (Plaintiff); As to: Hyun Bae (Defendant); Lisa Cano (Defendant); The Spine Institute Center for Spinal Restoration, an unknown entity (Defendant)

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 10/22/2019
  • DocketSummons on Complaint; Issued and Filed by: Heidi Wahl (Plaintiff); As to: Hyun Bae (Defendant); Lisa Cano (Defendant); The Spine Institute Center for Spinal Restoration, an unknown entity (Defendant)

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less
  • 10/22/2019
  • DocketNotice of Case Assignment - Unlimited Civil Case; Filed by: Clerk

    [+] Read More [-] Read Less

Tentative Rulings

b'

Case Number: *******8158 Hearing Date: July 12, 2021 Dept: 29

CAN ALL PARTIES APPEAR AT 1:30 P.M. INSTEAD OF 2:30 P.M.? IF SO, PLEASE SEND AN E-MAIL TO THE COURT CONFIRMING READING OF THE TENTATIVE AND APPEARING ...THANKS

WAHL vs. BAE, et. al.

TENTATIVE

Defendant Lisa Cano, P.A.’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

Legal Standard

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., ; 437c(p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Id.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi, 159 Cal.App.4th at 467; Code Civ. Proc., ;437c(c).)

Discussion

Evidentiary Objections

Plaintiff has submitted evidentiary objections to the declarations of Shawn Bond, Robert F. Watkins III, and Bryan C. Misshore. The Court rules on the evidentiary objections as follows:

A. Declaration of Shawn Bond

1. Overruled

2. Overruled

3. Overruled

4. Overruled

5. Overruled

6. Overruled

7. Overruled

8. Overruled

9. Overruled

10. Overruled

11. Overruled

12. Overruled

13. Overruled

14. Overruled

15. Overruled

16. Sustained

17. Overruled

18. Overruled

19. Overruled

With respect to Plaintiff’s objections based on Bond not considering all relevant records, the Court finds that this goes towards the credibility of Bond’s expert opinion rather than admissibility. Credibility is not an issue for the purposes of this motion.

B. Declaration of Robert F. Watkins III

1. Overruled

2. Overruled

3. Overruled

4. Overruled

5. Overruled

6. Overruled

7. Overruled

8. Overruled

9. Overruled

10. Overruled

11. Overruled

12. Overruled

13. Overruled

14. Overruled

15. Overruled

16. Overruled

17. Overruled

18. Overruled

19. Overruled

20. Overruled

21. Overruled

With respect to Plaintiff’s objections based on Watkins not considering all relevant records, as discussed, this goes towards credibility, not admissibility.

C. Declaration of Bryan C. Misshore

Plaintiff objects to the declaration of Byran C. Misshore on grounds that he allegedly cherry-picked what he submitted to his experts to rely on in forming their opinions and counsel has cited and attached the Cano deposition without any references to specific pages or lines. These are not proper grounds to object to evidence. As such, these objections are overruled.

Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendant Cano moves for summary judgment in her favor and against Plaintiff on the sole cause of action for medical malpractice. Defendant argues she met the standard of care in her care and treatment of Plaintiff and no act or omission on her part was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s injuries.

The elements of medical malpractice are: “(1) the duty of the professional to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of his profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the professional’s negligence.” (Simmons v. West Covina Medical Clinic (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 696, 701-02 [citations omitted].)

“Both the standard of care and defendants’ breach must normally be established by expert testimony in a medical malpractice case.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal. App. 4th 463, 467.) Thus, in a medical malpractice case, “[w]hen a defendant moves for summary judgment and supports his motion with expert declarations that his conduct fell within the community standard of care, he is entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff comes forward with conflicting expert evidence.” (Munro v. Regents of University of California (1989) 215 Cal. App. 3d 977, 984-985 (citations omitted).) An expert declaration, if uncontradicted, is conclusive proof as to the prevailing standard of care and the propriety of the particular conduct of the health care provider. (Starr v. Mooslin (1971) 14 Cal. App. 3d 988, 999.)

“The law is well settled that in a personal injury action causation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability based upon competent expert testimony.” (Jones v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 396, 402.) “Mere possibility alone is insufficient to establish a prima facie case.” (Id.) “There can be many possible ‘causes,’ indeed, an infinite number of circumstances which can produce an injury or disease.” (Id. at 403.) “A possible cause only becomes ‘probable’ when, in the absence of other reasonable causal explanations, it becomes more likely than not that the injury was a result of its action.” (Id.)

Defendant Cano has submitted a declaration from Shawn Bond, P.A.-C, M.P.A.S., a certified Physician Assistant with experience in assisting with spinal surgery, pre- and post-operative care planning, and medication management. (Bond Decl., ¶ 1.) Bond opines that, based on a review of Plaintiff’s medical records from St. John’s Hospital and Dr. Bae’s office, pharmacy records from St. John’s Medical Plaza Pharmacy and Ralph’s Grocery Company, and the transcript of Defendant Cano’s deposition, as well as his education, training, and experience, the care and treatment provided by Defendant Cano to Plaintiff complied with the standard of care at all times. (Id., ¶¶ 2-3, 24.) According to Bond, physician assistants are medical professionals who work alongside and with the supervision of a doctor and that a P.A.’s duties include such tasks as taking patient history, conducting physical exams, ordering tests, prescribing medication, assisting in surgery, and developing treatment plans. (Id., ¶ 5.) Bond states that while P.A.s can assist in surgery, the P.A.’s role is limited to that of assisting the surgeon with resuscitation in the event of cardiac arrest; adjusting and maintaining operating room temperature, light and humidity according to the surgeon’s specifications; applying sutures, staples, clips, and drainage systems; and applying dressings, casts, splints, braces, or other devices. (Id., ¶¶ 5-6.) Bond states that P.A.s do not perform primary surgery or make medical decisions regarding the patient’s primary surgery, such as the selection or implantation of corrective hardware. (Id.) Bond states that Defendant Cano served as first assistant during Plaintiff’s surgery on May 23, 2017 and there were no reported complications during the surgery. (Id., ¶ 8.) Bond states that the operative report describes a normal course for the type of surgery performed and there was nothing to indicate Defendant Cano did anything inappropriately during surgery. (Id.) Defendant Cano thus met the standard of care in her role as a P.A. first assistant during the May 23, 2017 surgery. (Id., ¶¶ 8-10.) Bond states that, following surgery, Cano was one of a number of providers involved in Plaintiff’s post-operative evaluation and treatment and there was nothing in Plaintiff’s medical records indicating Cano’s examinations, recommendations, or participation in Plaintiff’s in-hospital post-operative recovery course following the May 23, 2017 surgery deviated from the standard of care. (Id., ¶ 11.)

Bond provides that Plaintiff received a prescription for Norco pain medication from Dr. Bae starting the day of the surgery due to her complaints of severe pain, that Plaintiff’s Norco prescription was renewed because her of continued complaints of severe pain following surgery, and that the prescriptions were given and renewed by Dr. Bae or Defendant Cano, with each renewal given approximately one month apart. (Id., ¶¶ 12, 16.) Bond states that Defendant Cano primarily assessed Plaintiff for renewal of pain medication over the phone. (Id., ¶ 16.) Bond explains that Norco is a common pain medication to prescribe to patients with chronic pain and those experiencing severe pain following surgery or who are awaiting repeat surgery; that it is within the standard of care for a P.A. to prescribe narcotic pain medication such as Norco; that the standard of care does not require the patient to be seen in the office every time a prescription for pain medication is given; and that it is not uncommon for pain medication to be prescribed following consultation and assessment over the phone, especially when the consultation is for renewal of a pain medication the patient was already taken. (Id., ¶ 18.) Bond states that Plaintiff’s Norco prescriptions amounted to approximately two to three pills per day, which is well within reason for a patient such as Plaintiff with complaints of chronic pain, pseudoarthrosis, continued pain following surgery, and who later required additional surgery. (Id., ¶ 19.) Bond states that are no indications Cano was overprescribing narcotic pain medication or in any way deviated from the standard of care in her prescribing of Norco for Plaintiff. (Id., ¶ 20.)

Bond states that Plaintiff underwent a second surgery with Dr. Bae on August 28, 2018 and that Cano again served as first assistant during that surgery. (Id., ¶ 22.) Bond declares that there were no reported complications during the surgery, that the operative report described a normal course for that type of surgery, that there was nothing in the operative report to indicate Cano did anything inappropriately during surgery, and that, as such, every indication was that Cano met the standard of care as a P.A. first assistant during Plaintiff’s August 28, 2018 surgery. (Id.) According to Bond, Cano was one of a number of providers involved in Plaintiff’s post-operative evaluation and treatment and there was nothing in Plaintiff’s medical records indicating Cano’s examinations, recommendations, or participation in Plaintiff’s in-hospital post-operative recovery course flowing the surgery deviated from the standard of care at any point. (Id., p. 7, ¶ 21.) Bond states that there are no indications Cano treated Plaintiff following her discharge from the hospital after the second surgery and Cano did not prescribe or renew any prescriptions for Plaintiff. (Id., ¶ 23.) Bond thus concludes that the care and treatment provided by Cano to plaintiff complied with the standard of care at all times. (Id., ¶ 24.)

Defendant has also submitted a declaration from Robert G. Watkins, III, M.D., a board-certified orthopedic surgeon. (Watkins Decl., ¶ 1.) Dr. Watkins opines that, based on his review of the complaint, Plaintiff’s medical records from St. John’s Hospital and Dr. Bae, pharmacy records from St. John’s Medical Plaza Pharmacy and Ralph’s Grocery Company, and Cano’s deposition transcript, as well as his education, training, and experience, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, the care and treatment provided by Defendant Cano was not a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s harm. (Id., ¶¶ 3-4, 30.) Dr. Watkins confirms that a P.A.’s role regarding the performance of surgery is limited to that of assisting the surgeon and that a P.A. does not perform primary surgery or make medical decisions regarding the patient’s primary surgery. (Id., ¶¶ 6-7.) Dr. Watkins explains that Plaintiff had a failed fusion in the first surgery and there is nothing in Plaintiff’s medical records indicating anything done by Cano during the surgery had any effect or impact on Plaintiff’s surgery or surgical recovery in terms of causing injury or leading to the need for a subsequent surgery. (Id., ¶ 12.) Dr. Watkins declares that there was nothing in Plaintiff’s medical records indicating Cano’s examinations, recommendations, or participation in Plaintiff’s in-hospital post-operative recovery course following the first surgery had any effect or impact on Plaintiff’s surgery or surgical recovery in terms of causing injury or leading to the need for subsequent surgery. (Id., ¶ 13.) Dr. Watkins states that Cano’s prescribing of Norco pain medication to Plaintiff had no effect or impact on Plaintiff’s surgery or surgical recovery in terms of causing injury or leading to the need for subsequent surgery. (Id., ¶¶ 12, 20.) Dr. Watkins further provides that there is nothing in Plaintiff’s medical records indicating that anything Cano did while assisting on Plaintiff’s second surgery on August 28, 2018 had any effect or impact on Plaintiff’s surgery or surgical recovery in terms of causing injury. (Id., ¶ 24.) Dr. Watkins explains that it was later determined that Plaintiff had loosening hardware following the second surgery and that this type of surgical outcome is not medically related to the prescription of pain medication or the intra-operative or post-operative involvement of a P.A. (Id.) Dr. Watkins states that there was nothing in Plaintiff’s medical records indicating Cano’s examinations, recommendations, or participation in Plaintiff’s in-hospital post-operative recovery course following the second surgery had any effect or impact on Plaintiff’s surgery or surgical recovery in terms of causing injury and that there are no indications Cano treated Plaintiff after Plaintiff’s discharge. (Id., ¶¶ 25, 27.) Dr. Watkins thus concludes that the care and treatment provided by Cano was not a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s harm. (Id., ¶ 30.)

The Court finds Defendant Cano has met her burden of demonstrating that she met the applicable standard of care in her care and treatment of Plaintiff and nothing she did caused or was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s injuries. The burden thus shifts to Plaintiff to show triable issues of material fact exist. (Code Civ. Proc., ; 437c(p)(2).)

Plaintiff has submitted a declaration from David Davis, a certified Physician Assistant with experience in orthopedics and spine surgery and pain management. (Davis Decl., ¶ 1.) Davis opines that, based on a review of Plaintiff’s medical records from Dr. Virginia Johnson, Providence St. John’s Medical Center, the delegation of services agreement between Dr. Bae and Cano, Cano’s motion for summary judgment, and the depositions of Plaintiff, Cano, Dr. Hooman Melamed, and Dr. Bae, as well as his education and experience, Defendant Cano’s conduct was below the standard of care and a material factor in Plaintiff’s poor outcome. (Id., ¶ 1, 3-4, 5e.) Davis states that it’s clear Dr. Bae deferred to Cano, that Plaintiff dealt primarily with Cano, and that Cano played a key, integral role in Plaintiff’s care and treatment over the course of 18 months. (Id., ¶ 5a.) Davis states that Plaintiff was diagnosed with Ehlers Danlos before she met or saw Dr. Bae or Defendant Cano and that both Dr. Bae and Cano were informed of this condition. (Id., ¶ 5b.) According to Davis, because of Plaintiff’s condition, there should have been a fundamental and careful examination prior to any decision-making with respect to ongoing treatment and care. (Id.) Davis states that there are no indications from any of the records that Dr. Bae or Cano addressed the Ehlers Danlos at all. (Id.) According to Davis, Dr. Melamed testified in deposition that the failure to take the Ehlers Danlos condition into consideration is one of the indications that medical malpractice occurred here. (Id.) Davis states that it is rudimentary that the P.A. is to know her patient and to work in support of what is in the best interests of the patient. (Id.) Davis declares this was not done here and that Cano’s lax treatment and care deviated from the standard of care as a P.A. and is a causative factor in Plaintiff’s harm, including the two failed surgeries. (Id.)

Davis explains that opioids such as Norco can be very dangerous if the patient has one or more other medications she is taking, such as a sedative and that it is imperative the P.A. be aware of what other medications the patient is taking when dispensing an opioid. (Id., ¶ 5c.) Davis states that the medications a patient is taking can be readily garnered from a CURES report, but Cano has acknowledged that she had no idea of any other significant medications Plaintiff was taking until more than a year after she continually dispensed Norco to her. (Id.) Davis states that Cano’s repeated refilling of Norco by text deviates from the P.A.’s standard of care, particularly because Plaintiff was reporting increasing pain after the first surgery. (Id.) Davis states that it is unclear how Cano was able to refill the Norco repeatedly by simply calling it in as opposed to having the paperwork physically delivered to the pharmacy. (Id.) Davis provides that the ongoing dispensing of Norco, which masks pain, means the patient is getting increasingly worse, not healing or improving, and that this complicates the problems the patient is having and makes a second revision surgery that much more challenging. (Id.) Davis states that Cano’s failure to sufficiently monitor, care for and take typical precautionary steps with regard to Plaintiff is a further causative factor in the harm to Plaintiff. (Id.)

Davis further states that there was also the specter of “surgery room hopping” with Dr. Bae and Cano engaging in multiple “concurrent surgeries,” which suggests questions about the care or lack thereof that was afforded to Plaintiff. (id., ¶ 5d.) Davis states that while Dr. Bae is in charge, Cano was an integral part in Plaintiff’s treatment and care. (Id., ¶¶ 5d, 5e.) Davis concludes that Cano was complicit in her care and treatment of Plaintiff and thus Cano’s conduct fell below the standard of care. (Id.)

Plaintiff has also provided a declaration from Hooman Melamed, M.D., a board-certified orthopedic spine surgeon and Plaintiff’s primary orthopedic caretaker and surgeon since

December 2018. (Melamed Decl., ¶¶ 1-2.) Dr. Melamed opines that, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, medical malpractice occurred with respect to Plaintiff’s care and treatment that caused harm to Plaintiff and that Cano was responsible for such malpractice. (Id., ¶¶ 4c.) Dr. Melamed explains that he testified at his deposition that Dr. Bae’s conduct fell below the standard of care and caused injury to Plaintiff because Dr. Bae failed to take Plaintiff’s Ehlers Danlos into consideration and failed to get flexion extension x-rays prior to surgery. (Id., ¶ 4a.) Dr. Melamed explains there was also concern as to the multiple overlapping surgeries Dr. Bae conducted each time he operated on Plaintiff and that such conduct by Dr. Bae and Cano indicate they were more focused on making more money than with taking the necessary precautions for a patient such as Plaintiff to do what needs to be done, which in Plaintiff’s case was far more substantial stabilization. (Id.) Dr. Melamed states that Cano was clearly the key person with whom Plaintiff dealt and thus an integral part of the failed surgeries. (Id., ¶ 4b.) Dr. Melamed states that while Cano is not the absolute decision-maker, she is hardly expected to be passive and silent and has serious and substantial duties to the patient, including making sure she knows the patient’s status, carefully evaluating the patient on an ongoing basis, not overmedicating the patient, and not denigrating the patient as “fn whacky.” (Id.) Dr. Melamed further states that Cano’s duties also include keeping Dr. Bae apprised of Plaintiff’s condition and that, despite the many communications Cano had with Plaintiff after the first surgery, there are no indications from the records that Cano kept Dr. Bae apprised of Plaintiff’s condition. (Id.) Dr. Melamed thus concludes that, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, medical malpractice occurred that caused harm to Plaintiff and that Cano was responsible for such malpractice and harm. (Id., ¶ 4c.)

The Court finds Plaintiff has met her burden of demonstrating triable issues of material fact exist as to whether Cano’s care and treatment of Plaintiff met the applicable standard of care and whether Cano’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s harm. Defendant Cano is thus not entitled to summary judgment.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Defendant Lisa Cano, P.A.’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

Moving party is ordered to give notice.

'


related-case-search

Dig Deeper

Get Deeper Insights on Court Cases


Latest cases where PROVIDENCE ST JOHNS HEALTH CENTER is a litigant

Latest cases represented by Lawyer KISESKEY KELLY L.

Latest cases represented by Lawyer MISSHORE BRYAN C

Latest cases represented by Lawyer MCANDREWS THOMAS FRANCIS