HARRIETT E. HAYWOOD VS RTED AMERICA, LLC, ET AL

Tentative Rulings

Case Number: YC072035    Hearing Date: November 18, 2020    Dept: M

Hearing Date: November 18, 2020

Moving Parties: Plaintiff Harriett E. Haywood

Responding Party: Defendants RTED America, LLC and Special Default Services, Inc.

Motion for Equitable Relief from Judgment on Grounds of Fraud

The court considered the moving and opposition papers.

RULING

The motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

On May 5, 2017, Harriett E. Haywood filed a complaint against RTED America, LLC and Special Default Services, Inc. for (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (3) promissory estoppel, (4) negligence, (5) unfair business practices, (6) negligent misrepresentation, and (7) quiet title.

On June 12, 2017, RTED America filed a cross-complaint for declaratory relief against Haywood.

On December 28, 2017, a default was entered against cross-defendant Haywood on the cross-complaint.

On January 19, 2018, the court granted RTED America’s motion to expunge lis pendens.

On November 6, 2018, the court granted SDS’s motion for summary judgment.

On October 18, 2018, the court granted RTED’s motion for summary adjudication as to the 1^st, 2^nd, and 7^th causes of action.

On December 18, 2018, the court granted plaintiff’s counsel’s motion to be relieved as counsel.

On May 17, 2019, the court entered judgment in favor of defendant Special Default Services.

On May 29, 2019, the court sustained without leave to amend RTED’s demurrer to the remaining causes of action.

On May 31, 2019, the court entered judgment in favor of RTED America, LLC and the complaint was dismissed.

On July 1, 2019, defendant dismissed its cross-complaint.

On July 30, 2019, the court granted defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees in the amount of $37,600 and $3,132.15 in costs against plaintiff.

On February 21, 2020, the court denied Haywood's motion for relief from judgment. The court found that the motion was untimely filed. The court also found she had not shown intrinsic fraud.

LEGAL AUTHORITY

Where, as here, a motion for relief from default is filed after the six-month statutory deadline set forth in CCP § 473, the only possible basis for relief is the inherent, equitable power of the court to set aside a judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud or mistake. Olivera v. Grace (1942) 19 Cal.2d 570, 578; Sporn v. Home Depot USA, Inc. (2005) 126 Cal. App. 4th 1294, 1300 (“Extrinsic fraud only arises when one party has in some way fraudulently been prevented from presenting his or her claim or defense.”). To obtain relief, the party must establish: a meritorious defense; a satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defense to the original action; and diligence in seeking to set aside the default once it was discovered. Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 982; Falahati v. Kondo (2005) 127 Cal. App. 4th 823, 833. Relief on the ground of extrinsic fraud or mistake is not available to a party who had been given notice of the action and yet fails to appear, unless the party was prevented from participating in the action. Kulchar v. Kulchar (1969) 1 Cal.3d 467, 472.

Extrinsic fraud is a broad concept that “tend(s) to encompass almost any set of extrinsic circumstances which deprive a party of a fair adversary hearing.” In re Marriage of Park (1980) 27 Cal.3d 337, 342; Estate of Sanders v. Sutton (1985) 40 Cal. 3d 607, 614.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff (self-represented) requests that the court vacate the dismissal of her complaint entered on May 29, 2019.

Plaintiff argues that her motion is timely because a motion for relief from a judgment based on fraud “may be filed at any time.” She asserts that because of the pandemic, she has been delayed in filing the motion. She contends that after the court dismissed the complaint, she “started to look into and research ways I could investigate the documents that were recorded on my property that led to the wrongful foreclosure by Defendants.” She contends that she found a “private investigator” who conducted comprehensive research and review of the documents recorded against her chain of title. She argues that they show that defendant RTED had no economic or beneficial interest in plaintiff’s mortgage debt obligation. She requests that the court allow her to amend her complaint to fix and/or cure the deficiencies and to allege different causes of action. She also argues that she was denied the opportunity to amend her complaint, to conduct discovery, and to investigate her claims against defendant because of defendant’s “misrepresentations and concealment.”

In opposition, defendants argue that the motion was untimely filed. Judgment was entered as to SDS on May 20, 2019 and a dismissal was entered as to RTED on May 31, 2019. The motion was not filed until August 2020. Defendants also argue that plaintiff has not shown extrinsic fraud.

The court finds that plaintiff presents no facts or supporting evidence showing extrinsic fraud, which deprived her of a fair adversary hearing. The complaint was dismissed after a hearing on a demurrer. The court notes that plaintiff had filed previously a motion to vacate based on intrinsic fraud, which the court denied in February 2020. In that motion she argued the same or similar—that she was denied her right to conduct discovery and due process because her complaint was dismissed at the pleading stage and that she should have been allowed to amend her complaint to assert a cause of action for wrongful foreclosure based on the claim that the assignments of the deed of trust were void. As stated in the prior ruling, “[f]raud is intrinsic and not a valid ground for setting aside a judgment when the party has been given notice of the action and has had an opportunity to present his case and to protect himself from any mistake or fraud of his adversary, but has unreasonably neglected to do so. Such a claim of fraud goes to the merits of the prior proceeding which the moving party should have guarded against at the time. Where the defrauded party failed to take advantage of liberal discovery policies to fully investigate his or her claim, any fraud is intrinsic fraud.” Heyman v. Franchise Mortgage Acceptance Corp. (2003) 107 Cal. App. 4^th 921, 1026 (citations omitted).

The motion is DENIED.

Defendants are ordered to give notice.

Case Number: YC072035    Hearing Date: February 21, 2020    Dept: SWB

Hearing Date: February 21, 2020

Moving Parties: Plaintiff Harriett E. Haywood

Responding Party: Defendants RTED America, LLC and Special Default Services, Inc.

Motion for Relief from Judgment on Ground of Intrinsic Fraud

The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers.

RULING

The motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

On May 5, 2017, Harriett E. Haywood filed a complaint against RTED America, LLC and Special Default Services, Inc. for (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (3) promissory estoppel, (4) negligence, (5) unfair business practices, (6) negligent misrepresentation, and (7) quiet title.

On June 12, 2017, RTED America filed a cross-complaint for declaratory relief against Haywood.

On January 19, 2018, the court granted RTED America’s motion to expunge lis pendens.

On October 18, 2018, the court granted RTED’s motion for summary adjudication as to the 1^st, 2^nd, and 7^th causes of action.

On December 18, 2018, the court granted plaintiff’s counsel’s motion to be relieved as counsel.

On May 17, 2019, the court entered judgment in favor of defendant Special Default Services.

On May 29, 2019, the court sustained without leave to amend RTED’s demurrer to the remaining causes of action.

On May 31, 2019, the court entered judgment in favor of RTED America, LLC and the complaint was dismissed.

On July 1, 2019, defendant dismissed its cross-complaint.

On July 30, 2019, the court granted defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees in the amount of $37,600 and $3,132.15 in costs against plaintiff.

LEGAL AUTHORITY

“The court may, upon terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted, and shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken. . . .” CCP § 473(b).

“[T]he policy of the law is to have every litigated case tried upon its merits, and it looks with disfavor upon a party, who, regardless of the merits of the case, attempts to take advantage of the mistake, surprise, inadvertence, or neglect of his adversary.” Fasuyi v. Permatex, Inc. (2008) 167 Cal. App. 4^th 681, 697 (citations and internal quotations omitted).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff (self-represented) requests that the court vacate the dismissal entered on May 29, 2019 and the order on July 30, 2019 awarding attorney’s fees to defendant.

Plaintiff argues that her motion is timely because defendants filed a notice of entry of judgment on July 1, 2019 and on August 9, 2019, and that on November 26, 2019, she made an online reservation for the motion to be heard on the earliest available date, which she contends was February 21, 2020.

Plaintiff also argues that based on intrinsic fraud, she was denied her right to conduct discovery and due process because her complaint was dismissed at the pleading stage. She asserts that defendants “deliberately concealed information and filed fraudulent documents in this matter to support a dismissal.” She claims that she should have been allowed to amend her complaint to assert a cause of action for wrongful foreclosure based on the claim that the assignments of the deed of trust were void.

In opposition, defendants argue that the motion was untimely filed. Judgment was entered as to SDS on May 20, 2019 and a dismissal was entered as to RTED on May 31, 2019. The motion was not filed until January 27, 2010. Further, defendants argue, plaintiff’s claim of intrinsic fraud cannot void the judgment and that she makes no showing of any extrinsic fraud. Moreover, defendants contend that plaintiff’s claims are baseless.

The court finds that the motion was untimely filed. As to RTED the dismissal was entered on May 31, 2019. The six-month deadline runs from the date of entry of the dismissal, not from the notice of entry of judgment. Moreover, plaintiff had notice of the court’s ruling on the demurrer at the hearing on May 29, 2019. Whether she made a reservation within the six-month deadline is of no import. Rather CCP §473(b) requires that the motion be filed within the six-month deadline. Here, she filed it on January 27, 2020, almost nine months later.

Further, intrinsic fraud is not a valid ground for setting aside a judgment. “Fraud is intrinsic and not a valid ground for setting aside a judgment when the party has been given notice of the action and has had an opportunity to present his case and to protect himself from any mistake or fraud of his adversary, but has unreasonably neglected to do so. Such a claim of fraud goes to the merits of the prior proceeding which the moving party should have guarded against at the time. Where the defrauded party failed to take advantage of liberal discovery policies to fully investigate his or her claim, any fraud is intrinsic fraud.” Heyman v. Franchise Mortgage Acceptance Corp. (2003) 107 Cal. App. 4^th 921, 1026 (citations omitted). In any event, she has not shown any intrinsic fraud.

The motion is therefore DENIED.

Defendants are ordered to give notice.