This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 06/11/2019 at 11:38:27 (UTC).

FRED KAYNE VS. HENRY BUSHKIN

Case Summary

On 12/28/2017 FRED KAYNE filed a Contract - Other Contract lawsuit against HENRY BUSHKIN. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judge overseeing this case is ELIZABETH ALLEN WHITE. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.
Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****6486

  • Filing Date:

    12/28/2017

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Contract - Other Contract

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judge

ELIZABETH ALLEN WHITE

 

Party Details

Plaintiffs and Petitioners

KAYNE FRED INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEE

KAYNE FRED

Defendants and Respondents

DOES 1-50 INCLUSIVE

BUSHKIN HENRY

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff and Petitioner Attorneys

BOOTH LLP

BOOTH JASON M.

 

Court Documents

Unknown

5/23/2018: Unknown

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF BENJAMIN L. CAPLAN

5/31/2018: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF BENJAMIN L. CAPLAN

Minute Order

6/6/2018: Minute Order

NOTICE OF CONTINUED CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

6/8/2018: NOTICE OF CONTINUED CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

Minute Order

7/19/2018: Minute Order

Minute Order

7/19/2018: Minute Order

NOTICE OF RULING

7/19/2018: NOTICE OF RULING

PLAINTIFF FRED KAYNE'S NOTICE OF DEFENDANT HENRY BUSHKIN'S FAILURE TO OPPOSE KAYNE'S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT

8/16/2018: PLAINTIFF FRED KAYNE'S NOTICE OF DEFENDANT HENRY BUSHKIN'S FAILURE TO OPPOSE KAYNE'S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT

Minute Order

8/22/2018: Minute Order

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF ORAL CONTRACT AND BREACH OF WRITTEN CONTRACT

8/22/2018: SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF ORAL CONTRACT AND BREACH OF WRITTEN CONTRACT

NOTICE OF RULING AND CONTINUED CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

8/22/2018: NOTICE OF RULING AND CONTINUED CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

Answer

10/9/2018: Answer

Case Management Order

11/5/2018: Case Management Order

Minute Order

11/5/2018: Minute Order

Notice

11/6/2018: Notice

NOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

1/12/2018: NOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

Unknown

12/28/2017: Unknown

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT AND TO RECLASSIFY MATTER TO UNLIMITED JURISDICTION

12/28/2017: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT AND TO RECLASSIFY MATTER TO UNLIMITED JURISDICTION

23 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 11/06/2018
  • DocketNotice (of Ruling); Filed by Fred Kayne (Plaintiff)

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  • 11/05/2018
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department 48, Elizabeth Allen White, Presiding; Case Management Conference - Held

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  • 11/05/2018
  • DocketCase Management Order; Filed by Clerk

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  • 11/05/2018
  • DocketMinute Order ((Case Management Conference)); Filed by Clerk

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  • 10/09/2018
  • DocketAnswer (to Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint); Filed by Henry Bushkin (Defendant)

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  • 08/22/2018
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department 48; Unknown Event Type - Held - Motion Granted

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  • 08/22/2018
  • DocketNOTICE OF RULING AND CONTINUED CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

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  • 08/22/2018
  • DocketMinute order entered: 2018-08-22 00:00:00; Filed by Clerk

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  • 08/22/2018
  • DocketNotice of Ruling; Filed by Fred Kayne (Plaintiff)

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  • 08/22/2018
  • DocketSecond Amended Complaint; Filed by Fred Kayne (Plaintiff)

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48 More Docket Entries
  • 12/28/2017
  • DocketRECEIPT FOR TRANSMITTED RECORD

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  • 12/28/2017
  • DocketANSWER TO COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF ORAL CONTRACT

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  • 12/28/2017
  • DocketNOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT AND TO RECLASSIFY MATTER TO UNLIMITED JURISDICTION

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  • 12/28/2017
  • DocketNOTICE OF CASE REASSIGNMENT AND ORDER FOR PLAINTIFF TO GIVE NOTICE (VACATE DATES)

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  • 12/28/2017
  • DocketCLERK'S NOTICE OF RECLASSIFICATION

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  • 12/28/2017
  • DocketAMENDED PROOF OF SERVICE RE NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR(1) AN ORDER COMPELLING RESPONSES, WITHOUT OBJECTIONS, TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE; ETC

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  • 12/28/2017
  • DocketSUMMONS

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  • 12/28/2017
  • DocketCOMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF ORAL CONTRACT

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  • 12/28/2017
  • DocketFirst Amended Complaint for Breach of Oral Contract; Filed by Fred Kayne (Plaintiff)

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  • 12/28/2017
  • DocketMinute Order

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Tentative Rulings

Case Number: ****6486    Hearing Date: March 15, 2021    Dept: 48

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE MOTIONS IN LIMINE

Plaintiff’s MIL No. 1 – Documents Not Produced in Discovery

Plaintiff Fred Kayne seeks to exclude Defendant Henry Bushkin from using documents at trial that he did not produce in discovery. The motion did not identify any particular document Plaintiff expects Defendant to use. If Defendant attempts to introduce a document that was requested in discovery and not produced, Plaintiff should object to that exhibit on the exhibit list or object at the time Defendant attempts to use the document. At this point, the motion is DENIED as vague.

Plaintiff’s MIL No. 2 – Reference to Kayne’s Wealth

Plaintiff seeks to exclude references to and evidence about his wealth as irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. Defendant did not oppose this motion. Plaintiff alleges he loaned money to Defendant, which Defendant did not repay. Plaintiff’s wealth is irrelevant to the issues in dispute about the loan, and reference to his wealth would only serve to unfairly prejudice him by, for example, implying that regardless of the terms of the promissory note, Plaintiff does not need the money repaid. Therefore this motion is GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s MIL No. 3 – Plaintiff’s Litigation History

Plaintiff seeks to exclude references to and evidence about his litigation history as irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. Plaintiff argues Defendant asked him questions in discovery about other lawsuits Plaintiff has filed. Defendant did not oppose this motion and did not show that the existence of any other lawsuit is relevant to this case. Therefore, the motion is GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s MIL No. 4 – Value of IP Rights

Plaintiff seeks to exclude references to and evidence about the intellectual property rights and work product contributed by Defendant to Hard Act, LLC. Plaintiff explains that the promissory note and loan at issue was part of a deal between the parties that resulted in the creation of Hard Act, LLC, a company that was to produce an adaption of a book Defendant had written about Johnny Carson. Hard Act, LLC owns the adaption rights to the book. Defendant has claimed in this case that the value of the work product Plaintiff obtained is greater than the loan amounts Plaintiff claims need to be repaid. Plaintiff argues the value of the work product is irrelevant because the promissory note requires repayment in money.

The Court cannot rule on the proper interpret of the promissory note, or determine the terms of the parties’ deal that created Hard Act, LLC, on a motion in limine. Therefore, this motion is DENIED.

Moving party to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit. Parties intending to appear are STRONGLY encouraged to appear remotely.



Case Number: ****6486    Hearing Date: February 18, 2021    Dept: 48

[TENATIVE] ORDER RE MOTION TO WITHDRAW ADMISSIONS

On February 25, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff Fred Kayne’s motion to deem requests for admission admitted by Defendant Henry Bushkin because he had not responded to the RFAs. On March 17, 2020, even though the Court had already deemed them admitted, Bushkin served late responses admitting the RFAs. Eleven months later, on January 26, 2021, Defendant filed this motion to be relived from both the Court’s order and from his responses.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.300, subdivision (b), “The court may permit withdrawal or amendment of an admission only if it determines that the admission was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, and that the party who obtained the admission will not be substantially prejudiced in maintaining that party’s action or defense on the merits.” This statute also applies to deemed admissions. (Wilcox v. Birthwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 983.) The party moving for relief has the burden to show that the mistake, inadvertence, or neglect was excusable. (New Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1420.) The trial court’s discretion to deny a motion under section 2033.300 “is limited to circumstances where it is clear that the mistake, inadvertence, or neglect was inexcusable, or where it is clear that the withdrawal . . . would substantially prejudice the party who obtained the admission in maintaining the party’s action or defense on the merits.” (Id. at pp. 1420-1421.) Inexcusable delay in making the motion for relief alone, without a showing of substantial prejudice, cannot justify the denial of a motion under section 2033.300. (Id. at p. 1421.)

The statutory language “mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect” is identical to the language used in section 473, subdivision (b) and has the same meaning as that language in section 473, subdivision (b). (New Albertsons, Inc., supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1418-1419.) “In determining whether the attorney’s mistake or inadvertence was excusable, ‘the court inquires whether “a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances might have made the same error.” ’ [Citation.]” (Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 249, 258.) “A party who chooses to act as his or her own attorney ‘ “is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys. Citation.]” ’ [Citation.]” (Stover v. Bruntz (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 19, 31.) A self-represented party is “not entitled to disregard the rules for timely responding to discovery” and is “not immune from the consequences of a failure to do so.” (Ibid.)

Plaintiff argues his life was frantic from 2013 into 2020 because he was dealing with six different lawsuits, which caused him to be excusably negligent in not responding to the RFAs. (Motion at p. 3; Bushkin Decl. ¶ 5.) When he prepared his February 18, 2020 declaration in opposition to the motion to deem the RFAs admitted, he did not recall the promissory note. (Bushkin Decl. ¶ 25.) The February 18, 2020 declaration explains that Defendant did not provide the RFA responses because settlement discussions were ongoing, he was involved in other litigations, the litigation was an attempt by Plaintiff to put him into insolvency and harass him, he has few assets, he has been in poor health, he does not live in California and therefore it is difficult for him to litigate, and the motion should be continued so the parties could settle. (Bushkin Decl., Ex. C.)

The current declaration and the February 18, 2020 declaration do not describe excusable neglect in failing to respond to the RFAs before the February 25, 2020 order. Kayne served the RFAs in September 2018. Kayne granted extensions of time to respond. On December 2019 and January 2020, Kayne continued to request the responses. On January 15, 2020, Kayne’s counsel sent another email notifying Bushkin that they had reserved dates for motions to compel beginning on February 25, 2020. Kayne asked for the discovery responses by January 22, 2020 to avoid Kayne filing the motions to compel. The numerous emails attached to Kayne’s opposition show Kayne’s great effort to obtain responses and avoid the motion. Despite being given sixteen months to provide responses and numerous warnings, Buskin did not serve the responses. A reasonably prudent person would have heeded these warnings. Bushkin knew the responses were due and knew Kayne was about to file a motion to compel. Therefore Bushkin cannot show excusable neglect in failing to provide responses, which resulted in the Court deeming the RFAs admitted.

In addition, trial is scheduled for March 29, 2021, in a bit more than five weeks. The fact discovery cutoff is in eight days. If the order deeming the RFAs admitted is withdrawn, Plaintiff will not have time to take discovery on the matters covered by the RFAs. Bushkin had a year after the February 25, 2020 order to seek to have the admissions withdrawn. He waited eleven months to file this motion. If the motion were granted, Plaintiff would be prejudiced.

Finally, the argument that Bushkin forgot about the promissory note when he drafted the February 18, 2020 declaration and served the March 17, 2020 responses (Bushkin Decl. ¶¶ 21, 25) is not supported by the evidence. On August 22, 2018, Kayne filed a second amended complaint alleging breach of the promissory note. On October 9, 2019, Buskin filed an answer to the second amended complaint. Kayne’s motion to deem the RFAs admitted stated, “This case constitutes a relatively straightforward attempt by Kayne to collect loans and enforce a promissory note signed by Bushkin.” (January 28, 2020 Motion at p. 1.) The motion discussed the promissory note in detail. (See, e.g., January 28, 2020 Motion at p. 2.) Therefore, if Bushkin had read Kayne’s motion to deem the RRFs admitted when he was preparing his opposing declaration, he would have seen the numerous references to the promissory note.

The motion is DENIED.

Moving party to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit. Parties intending to appear are STRONGLY encouraged to appear remotely.



Case Number: ****6486    Hearing Date: December 15, 2020    Dept: 48

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

On August 22, 2018, Plaintiff Fred Kayne, individually and as trustee for the Fred and Lenore Kayne Family Trust (“Plaintiff”), filed a second amended complaint (“SAC”) against Defendant Henry Bushkin (“Defendant”). The SAC alleges Plaintiff loaned defendant money over the years, which Defendant failed to repay. On June 22, 2020, Plaintiff filed this motion for summary adjudication of the second cause of action and part of the first cause of action.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of a July 29, 2014 Notice of Motion and Motion to Intervene in Adversary Proceeding, Memorandum of Points and Authorities, and Declaration of Fred Kayne, filed in In re Henry Isaac Bushkin, Case No. 2-11-bk-43502-DS, United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California, Los Angeles Division. The Court grants the request.

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

Plaintiff’s objections to the Declaration of Henry Bushkin are overruled.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

As of September 15, 2013, Plaintiff had, at various times, loaned funds to Defendant totaling $1 million. (Undisputed Material Facts “UMF” 1.) On or about September 15, 2013, Defendant signed a promissory note for $1 million in principal, with Plaintiff as lender. (UMF 4, 7.) Interest was to accrue on the unpaid principal at a rate of 6% per annum. (UMF 8.) The promissory note states that Hard Act and Defendant, jointly and severally, promise to pay the $1 million principal, and all unpaid principal shall be due and payable on December 31, 2017. (See UMF 9.) No payments were made under the promissory note. (UMF 10.) Defendant admitted that he had not made any payments and was liable to Plaintiff for all unpaid principal and interest. (UMF 11.)

In 2014 and 2015, Plaintiff made two additional personal loans to Defendant: one $10,000 check on December 18, 2014, and one $10,000 check on March 11, 2015. (UMF 12.) Both checks contained the word “loan” on the memo lines. (UMF 14.) During discovery, Defendant admitted that the checks are genuine and that he received the funds. (UMF 15.) On July 28, 2016, Plaintiff’s counsel sent a letter to Defendant demanding that he repay several outstanding loans, including the personal loans. (UMF 16.) Defendant stated that he had no ability to pay, and he did not ever repay the loans. (UMF 18.)

DISCUSSION

A plaintiff moving for summary adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by proving each element of a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., ; 437c, subd. (p)(1).) Then the burden shifts to the defendant to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., ; 437c, subd. (p)(2).) To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce “substantial responsive evidence.” (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 162-163.)

Second Cause of Action – Breach of Written Contract

Plaintiff moves for summary adjudication of the second cause of action for breach of the September 15, 2013 promissory note. The second cause of action alleges that Kayne loaned $1,000,000 as memorialized in the promissory note, Bushkin did not pay back the principal amount or any interest on the principal amount, and Kayne has “suffered damages in an amount no less than $1,000,000 (one million dollars), plus interest.” (SAC, 31.)

A cause of action for breach of contract requires (1) the existence of a contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) damage to plaintiff. (Wall Street Network, Ltd. v. New York Times Co. ;(2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1178.) When a plaintiff moves for summary adjudication of a breach of contract cause of action, the plaintiff must prove each of element of the cause of action. (Paramount Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Court (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 226, 241.) That includes damages. “[A] plaintiff cannot obtain judgment on a breach of contract cause of action in an amount of damages to be determined later.” (Ibid.)

Plaintiff did not produce any evidence of the total amount of damages he suffered. Plaintiff argues that he “has made his prima facie case that Bushkin is in breach of contract, and is liable for one million dollars, plus 6% interest per annum for the period between September 15, 2013 and December 31, 2017.” (Motion at p. 7.) But nowhere in the motion, separate statement, or declaration and exhibits does Plaintiff provide evidence of the total amount owed – principal plus accrued interest. Therefore Plaintiff did not satisfy his burden.

First Cause of Action – Breach of Oral Contract (2014-2015 Loans)

Plaintiff moves for summary adjudication of his first cause of action with respect to the 2014-2015 loans. The first cause of action alleges that in 2014 and 2015, Kayne loaned Bushkin $20,000 “pursuant to an oral agreement wherein Bushkin agreed to repay Kayne at an unspecified later date.” (SAC, 11.) Kayne demanded repayment, but Bushkin never paid the loans back. Kayne was damages in an amount of the loans “plus interest.” (SAC, 23.) “The elements of a breach of oral contract claim are the same as those for a breach of written contract: a contract; its performance or excuse for nonperformance; breach; and damages.” (Stockton Mortgage, Inc. v. Tope (2014) 233 Cal.App.4th 437, 453.)

Plaintiff submits evidence that he made two $10,000 loans to Defendant “pursuant to an oral agreement,” to be repaid at an unspecified later date. (Kayne Decl. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff provides copies of the December 18, 2014 and March 11, 2015 checks from the trust to Defendant. (Id., Ex. C.) Each check contains the word “loan” in the “for” line. Defendant admitted in discovery that the checks are genuine and that he received the money. (UMF 15; Caplan Decl., Exs. D-E.) It is also undisputed that Defendant did not repay these funds. (UMF 18.) Plaintiff contends he has been damaged in the amount of $20,000, apparently foregoing the interest alleged in the SAC. (Motion at p. 7.) Accordingly, Plaintiff has met his initial burden, and the burden shifts to Defendant to show a triable issue of fact.

Defendant denies that there was an oral loan agreement. (Opposition at p. 5; Bushkin Decl. 20.) Defendant’s mere denial of the existence of an agreement, without setting forth specific facts, is not substantial responsive evidence sufficient to show a disputed material fact. (See Code Civ. Proc., ; 437c, subd. (p)(1).)

Defendant also contends that he has “substantial defenses” including unclean hands, waiver, equitable estoppel, and unjust enrichment. (Opposition at p. 5; Bushkin Decl. ¶ 20.) However, Defendant makes no further argument and provides no evidence in support of his defenses. Accordingly, Defendant has not raised a triable issue of fact, and Plaintiff is entitled to summary adjudication of the first cause of action as to the 2014-2015 loans in the amount of $20,000.

CONCLUSION

The motion for summary adjudication is GRANTED for Plaintiff on the $20,000 breach of contract alleged in the first cause of action, and DENIED on the second cause of action.

Moving party to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit. Parties intending to appear are STRONGLY encouraged to appear remotely.



Case Number: ****6486    Hearing Date: February 28, 2020    Dept: 48

Plaintiff's Motion to Deem Requests for Admissions Admitted is GRANTED.

Failure to timely respond to requests for admissions does not result in automatic admissions. Rather, the propounder of the requests for admissions must “move for an order that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the requests be deemed admitted, as well as for a monetary sanction” under ; 2023.010 et seq. (Code Civ. Proc., ; 2033.280, subd. (b).) For a motion to compel initial responses, no meet and confer is required. All that needs to be shown is that a set of requests was properly served on the opposing party, that the time to respond has expired, and that no response of any kind has been served.  

Here, as of the date of the filing of the motion, Plaintiff had not received any responses to the requests for admission from Defendant. See Declaration of Benjamin Caplan, ¶ 21. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to an order that the truth of any matters and the genuineness of all documents specified in the requests for admission are deemed admitted. The motion to deem admitted the truth of any matters and the genuineness of all documents specified in the requests for admission is

Plaintiff’s request for monetary sanctions against Defendant GRANTED in the total reduced amount of $747.50 (2.5 hours at $275/hour plus four $60 filing fee). Sanctions are to be paid to Plaintiff’s counsel within 10 days of notice of this ruling.

Moving party is ordered to give notice.



Case Number: ****6486    Hearing Date: February 26, 2020    Dept: 48

Plaintiff's Motions to Compel Defendant's Responses to Request for Production of Documents and Form Interrogatories are GRANTED.

When a party to whom requests for production of documents are directed fails to respond, under CCP ; 2031.300(b) a party propounding the interrogatories may move for an order compelling a response. A party who fails to provide a timely response waives any objection, including one based on privilege or work product. CCP ; 2031.300(a). For a motion to compel initial responses, no meet and confer is required. All that needs to be shown is that a set of requests was properly served on the opposing party, that the time to respond has expired, and that no response of any kind has been served.

When a party to whom interrogatories are directed fails to respond, under CCP ; 2030.290(b) a party propounding the interrogatories may move for an order compelling a response. A party who fails to provide a timely response waives any objection, including one based on privilege or work product. CCP ; 2030.290(a). For a motion to compel initial responses, no meet and confer is required. All that needs to be shown is that a set of interrogatories was properly served on the opposing party, that the time to respond has expired, and that no response of any kind has been served. 

Here, as of the date of the filing of the motion, Plaintiff had not received any responses to the request for production of documents or interrogatories from Defendant. See Declaration of Benjamin Caplan, ¶ 21. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to an order compelling responses. The motions to compel responses to request for production of documents and form interrogatories are GRANTED. Defendant is ordered to provide code-compliant, verified responses without objection within 10 days of notice of this ruling.

Plaintiff’s request for monetary sanctions against Defendant is  GRANTED in the total reduced amount of $945.00 (3 hours at $275/hour plus $120 filing fee). Sanctions are to be paid to Plaintiff’s counsel within 10 days of notice of this ruling.

Moving party is ordered to give notice.



Case Number: ****6486    Hearing Date: February 25, 2020    Dept: 48

   

Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Defendant's Responses to Special Interrogatories is GRANTED.

When a party to whom interrogatories are directed fails to respond, under CCP ; 2030.290(b) a party propounding the interrogatories may move for an order compelling a response. A party who fails to provide a timely response waives any objection, including one based on privilege or work product. CCP ; 2030.290(a). For a motion to compel initial responses, no meet and confer is required. All that needs to be shown is that a set of interrogatories was properly served on the opposing party, that the time to respond has expired, and that no response of any kind has been served.    

Here, as of the date of the filing of the motion, Plaintiff had not received any responses to the special interrogatories from Defendant. See Declaration of Benjamin Caplan, ¶ 21. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to an order compelling responses. The motions to compel responses to special interrogatories are GRANTED.

Defendant is ordered to provide code-compliant, verified responses without objection within 10 days of notice of this ruling.

Plaintiff’s request for monetary sanctions against Defendant is  GRANTED in the total reduced amount of $747.50 (2.5 hours at $275/hour plus $60 filing fee). Sanctions are to be paid to Plaintiff’s counsel within 10 days of notice of this ruling.

Moving party is ordered to give notice.