This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 06/14/2019 at 07:28:53 (UTC).

ETHAN SHARIM VS PETROS MELKONYAN

Case Summary

On 12/14/2017 ETHAN SHARIM filed a Personal Injury - Motor Vehicle lawsuit against PETROS MELKONYAN. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judge overseeing this case is GEORGINA T. RIZK. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.
Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****7086

  • Filing Date:

    12/14/2017

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Personal Injury - Motor Vehicle

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judge

GEORGINA T. RIZK

 

Party Details

Guardian Ad Litem and Plaintiff

SHARIM FARIBA

Respondents and Defendants

MELKONYAN PETROS

DOES 1 TO 50

Minor

SHARIM ETHAN

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff Attorney

YADIDI PAYAM DAVID ESQ.

Defendant Attorney

HONG LYNDON HYON ESQ.

Minor Attorney

YADIDI LAW FIRM THE

 

Court Documents

COMPLAINT-PERS. INJURY, PROP DAMAGE, WRONGFUL DEATH (2 PAGES)

12/14/2017: COMPLAINT-PERS. INJURY, PROP DAMAGE, WRONGFUL DEATH (2 PAGES)

Motion to Strike (not anti-SLAPP) - without Demurrer

6/7/2019: Motion to Strike (not anti-SLAPP) - without Demurrer

Minute Order

5/30/2019: Minute Order

SUMMONS

5/8/2018: SUMMONS

APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM

5/1/2018: APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM

NOTICE OF REJECTION - APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM

4/16/2018: NOTICE OF REJECTION - APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM

APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM?CIVIL

4/16/2018: APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM?CIVIL

NOTICE OF REJECTION - APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM

3/23/2018: NOTICE OF REJECTION - APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM

APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM-CIVIL

3/23/2018: APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM-CIVIL

NOTICE OF REJECTION - APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM

2/1/2018: NOTICE OF REJECTION - APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM

APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM?CIVIL

2/1/2018: APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM?CIVIL

 

Docket Entries

  • 06/07/2019
  • DocketMotion to Strike (not anti-SLAPP) - without Demurrer; Filed by Petros Melkonyan (Defendant)

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  • 05/30/2019
  • Docketat 10:00 AM in Department 2, Georgina T. Rizk, Presiding; Final Status Conference - Held

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  • 05/30/2019
  • DocketMinute Order ( (Final Status Conference)); Filed by Clerk

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  • 05/08/2018
  • DocketSummons; Filed by Clerk

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  • 05/08/2018
  • DocketSUMMONS

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  • 05/08/2018
  • DocketSummons Issued; Filed by Clerk

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  • 05/01/2018
  • DocketAPPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM

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  • 05/01/2018
  • DocketApplication ; Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

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  • 04/16/2018
  • DocketAPPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM CIVIL

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  • 04/16/2018
  • DocketNOTICE OF REJECTION - APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM

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  • 04/16/2018
  • DocketApplication ; Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

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  • 03/23/2018
  • DocketNOTICE OF REJECTION - APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM

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  • 03/23/2018
  • DocketAPPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM-CIVIL

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  • 02/01/2018
  • DocketNOTICE OF REJECTION - APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM

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  • 02/01/2018
  • DocketApplication ; Filed by Plaintiff/Petitioner

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  • 02/01/2018
  • DocketAPPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM CIVIL

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  • 12/14/2017
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by null

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  • 12/14/2017
  • DocketCOMPLAINT-PERS. INJURY, PROP DAMAGE, WRONGFUL DEATH (2 PAGES)

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Tentative Rulings

Case Number: ****7086    Hearing Date: January 07, 2021    Dept: 29

****7086 Sharim, et al v. Melkonyani

Motion to Strike Third Cause of Action and Request for Attorney’s Fees from Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. The motion to strike the third cause of action is DENIED, but the motion to strike the prayer for attorneys fees in that claim is GRANTED without leave to amend. The prayer attorneys’ fees is stricken. Defendant is ordered to file an answer to the first amended complaint within 20 days.

In the first amended complaint, Plaintiffs Ethan Sharim and Farhad Sharim allege they were injured in a car accident as a result of the negligence of Defendant Petros Melkonyan. Plaintiffs assert claims for general negligence, motor vehicle negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress is asserted only on behalf of Ethan Sharim.

The complaint contains inconsistent allegations regarding damages. The complaint alleges that Plaintiffs suffered loss of use of property, hospital and medical expenses, general damage property damage, and loss of earning capacity, however, in the prayer in paragraph 14, Plaintiffs state that they are seeking compensatory damages “according to proof, in the amount of $20,000 property damage only.” Plaintiff includes a separate prayer for the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, in which he seeks, among other things, general damages for emotional distress and attorneys’ fees.

Defendant seeks to strike the claim for emotional distress and the prayer for attorneys’ fees. Grounds for a motion to strike are limited to matters that appear on the face of the pleading or on any matter of which the court shall or may take judicial notice. (Code Civ Proc. ; 437(a).)

With respect to the emotional distress claim, although the motion is called a motion to strike, it is actually a motion for a judgment on the pleadings since it is directed to the entire claim. The court so construes the motion. Defendant argues that Ethan Sharim’s claims have “been addressed by Plaintiff’s Uninsured Motorist policy, leaving only claims for diminution of the value of the vehicle and car rental costs.” Defendant bases the motion to strike this claim entirely on statements in Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend the complaint to add Farhad Sharim as a plaintiff. Although not framed this way, Defendant is essentially arguing that Plaintiffs are judicially estopped from pursuing the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress because of statements in the motion to amend. Defendant is also apparently implicitly asking the court to take judicial notice of those statements, though no request for judicial notice has been filed.

The elements of judicial estoppel are as follows: “(1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true); (4) the two positions are totally inconsistent; and (5) the first position was not taken as a result of ignorance, fraud, or mistake.” (The Swahn Group, Inc. v. Segal (2010) 183 Cal. App. 4th 831, 839.) The judicial estoppel doctrine applies only when the court relied on the assertion in making its ruling.

Here, the original complaint included Ethan Sharim’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, along with the other negligence claims. The motion to amend sought only to add Farhad Sharim as a plaintiff, because counsel had recently discovered that Farhad Sharim was the owner of the car and thus was the party with standing to bring the claim for property damages. Counsel stated that Farhad Sharim was “inadvertently left out as a plaintiff in the original complaint.” Counsel stated that the deposition of Farhad Sharim would not change the trial date of the action because Sharim would not have to be deposed and further discovery into the diminution of the value of the vehicle. Those are the factual representations that the court relied on in granting the motion. The court did not rely on any representations regarding the status of the claims that had been asserted in the original complaint. Thus, judicial estoppel does not apply.

To the extent that Defendant is arguing that the court, in ruling on a motion to strike, can take judicial notice of the truth of statements in Plaintiff’s filings that are not the basis for a claim of judicial estoppel, Defendant’s argument fails. The statement at issue is a statement in counsel’s declaration in support of the motion to amend in which he states: “Defendant was insured by Access Insurance” which “became insolvent during Plaintiff’s claim. Therefore, Plaintiff was forced to open a claim with his Uninsured Motorist policy. However, while Plaintiff’s Uninsured Motorist policy covered his bodily injury claim, it denied” claims for property damages. The court cannot take judicial notice of the truth of this statement. (Sosinksy v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1568.) Moreover, even if the court could do so, Defendant provides no argument for why this would require a dismissal of the claim. It may well be the case that it does, but Defendant has provided no argument in support of this position.

The court thus DENIES the motion to strike the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff is admonished to consider, however, whether Plaintiff intends to pursue the claim and if not to file a voluntary dismissal of that claim.

The court GRANTS the motion to strike as to the prayer for attorneys’ fees. “Except as attorney's fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties; but parties to actions or proceedings are entitled to their costs, as hereinafter provided.” (Code of Civil Procedure, ; 1021.) “In California, we follow the ‘American rule,’ which means everybody pays their own fees unless they agree otherwise or are entitled to claim the benefit of a statutory or judicially created exception. (Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co. (1967) 386 U.S. 714, 717-718, 87 S.Ct. 1404, 1406-1407, 18 L.Ed.2d 475; ; 1021.)” (Burnaby v. Standard Fire Ins. Co. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 787, 796.)

Plaintiffs have not opposed the motion to strike and has not alleged any statute, contract or facts that would allow them to recover attorney fees if they prevail in this action. The motion to strike the prayer for attorney fees is granted. Plaintiff has not opposed the motion and has not identified any facts that would give rise to a claim for attorney’s fees and thus the court declines to grant leave to amend.

Moving party is ordered to give notice.



Case Number: ****7086    Hearing Date: July 02, 2020    Dept: 29

Sharim v. Petros Melkonyan

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint is GRANTED.   Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint to be filed within (10) days.

Leave to amend is permitted at the court’s discretion upon any terms that may be just. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. ; 473(a)(1).

The court’s discretion will usually be exercised liberally to permit amendment of the pleadings. Nestle v. Santa Monica, (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920. If the motion is timely made, and the granting of the motion will not result in prejudice to the opposing party, it is error to refuse permission to amend. Morgan v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1959) 172 Cal. App. 2d 527, 530.

Plaintiff has adequately complied with the requirements of Rule 3.1324. Plaintiff has provided the proposed amended pleading as Exhibit A, identified the amendment to be made (inclusion of Plaintiff Farhad Shamir), and the reason why the amendment was not made earlier. Apparently, counsel was unaware that Plaintiff was not the registered owner of the vehicle. Declaration of David Yadidi, paragraph 7.

Defendant has not shown substantial prejudice arising from the amendment, nor has Defendant explained what additional discovery is required and cannot be completed prior to the September trial date, given that the additional claim concerns only the vehicle’s diminution in value and car rental costs. Motion 3:9-10.

Moving party is ordered to give notice.



Case Number: ****7086    Hearing Date: December 02, 2019    Dept: 2

On the court’s own motion, the hearing on the Motion to Consolidate set for hearing on 12/2/19 is continued to 1/3/20 at 1:30 p.m. in Department SS-2. The due date for the opposition and reply is based on the original hearing date.



Case Number: ****7086    Hearing Date: November 27, 2019    Dept: 2

SHARIM v. MELKONYAN

Defendant’s Motion to Relate and Consolidate the Cases and Continue FSC and Trial, filed on 11/1/2019, is GRANTED.

The cases Sharim v. Melkonyan, Case No. ****7086 and Melkonyan v. Sharim, Case No. 19STLC03136 arise out of the same automobile accident, and the Court previously deemed them related. The Court now GRANTS the motion to consolidate for all purposes, including trial. Case No. ****7086 is the lead case. All documents are to be filed in the lead case.

The Court also grants the motion to continue the final status conference and trial. The Court advances and vacates the trial date in ****7086 and sets the following dates for the consolidated action:

FSC: April 30, 2010

Trial: May 12, 2020

All discovery and motion cut off dates are to be calculated by reference to the new trial date.

The moving party is ordered to give notice.