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This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 06/03/2021 at 06:12:47 (UTC).

EMINA MILA YOUNG VS PEGASUS ELITE AVIATION, INC.

Case Summary

On 08/25/2020 EMINA MILA YOUNG filed a Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury lawsuit against PEGASUS ELITE AVIATION, INC. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Spring Street Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judge overseeing this case is SERENA R. MURILLO. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    *******2434

  • Filing Date:

    08/25/2020

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury

  • Court:

    Los Angeles County Superior Courts

  • Courthouse:

    Spring Street Courthouse

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judge

SERENA R. MURILLO

 

Party Details

Plaintiff

MILA YOUNG EMINA

Defendant

PEGASUS ELITE AVIATION INC.

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff Attorneys

GEORGE VICTOR L.

ALFARO MEYLIN PATRICIA

GEORGE VICTOR LIGHT ESQ.

ALFARO MEYLIN PATRICIA ESQ.

COE NORMAN WAYNE ESQ.

Defendant Attorneys

WIEGMANN YAKOV PAUL

MASSEY SHALEM ASHER ESQ.

 

Court Documents

Order Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore - ORDER APPOINTING COURT APPROVED REPORTER AS OFFICIAL REPORTER PRO TEMPORE DEBORAH MORIN (CSR 11558)

5/11/2021: Order Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore - ORDER APPOINTING COURT APPROVED REPORTER AS OFFICIAL REPORTER PRO TEMPORE DEBORAH MORIN (CSR 11558)

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS FILED BY DEFE...)

5/11/2021: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS FILED BY DEFE...)

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (RULING ON SUBMITTED MATTER RE: MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PL...)

5/12/2021: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (RULING ON SUBMITTED MATTER RE: MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PL...)

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS FILED BY DEFE...)

5/4/2021: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS FILED BY DEFE...)

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

2/16/2021: Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Request for Judicial Notice

2/16/2021: Request for Judicial Notice

Declaration - DECLARATION DECLARATION OF YAKOV WIEGMANN ISO MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

2/16/2021: Declaration - DECLARATION DECLARATION OF YAKOV WIEGMANN ISO MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Declaration - DECLARATION SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF YAKOV WIEGMANN IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT PEGASUS ELITE AVIATION, INC.'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

3/4/2021: Declaration - DECLARATION SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF YAKOV WIEGMANN IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT PEGASUS ELITE AVIATION, INC.'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Opposition - OPPOSITION OPPOSITION DEFENDANT PEGASUS ELITE AVIATION, INC.S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS; DECLARATION OF MEYLIN P. ALFARO

3/8/2021: Opposition - OPPOSITION OPPOSITION DEFENDANT PEGASUS ELITE AVIATION, INC.S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS; DECLARATION OF MEYLIN P. ALFARO

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON DEFENDANT PEGASUS ELITE AVIATION, INC.'S MOTION FO...)

3/11/2021: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON DEFENDANT PEGASUS ELITE AVIATION, INC.'S MOTION FO...)

Answer

12/28/2020: Answer

Proof of Personal Service

11/23/2020: Proof of Personal Service

Notice of Posting of Jury Fees

11/24/2020: Notice of Posting of Jury Fees

Summons - SUMMONS ON COMPLAINT

9/25/2020: Summons - SUMMONS ON COMPLAINT

Civil Case Cover Sheet

8/25/2020: Civil Case Cover Sheet

Civil Case Cover Sheet

8/25/2020: Civil Case Cover Sheet

Notice of Case Assignment - Unlimited Civil Case

8/25/2020: Notice of Case Assignment - Unlimited Civil Case

Complaint

8/25/2020: Complaint

16 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 08/22/2023
  • Hearing08/22/2023 at 08:30 AM in Department 29 at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Order to Show Cause Re: Dismissal

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  • 02/22/2022
  • Hearing02/22/2022 at 08:30 AM in Department 29 at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Jury Trial

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  • 02/08/2022
  • Hearing02/08/2022 at 10:00 AM in Department 29 at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Final Status Conference

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  • 05/17/2021
  • Docketat 11:32 AM in Department 29, Serena R. Murillo, Presiding; Nunc Pro Tunc Order

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  • 05/17/2021
  • DocketMinute Order ( (Nunc Pro Tunc Order)); Filed by Clerk

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  • 05/12/2021
  • Docketat 1:00 PM in Department 29, Serena R. Murillo, Presiding; Ruling on Submitted Matter

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  • 05/12/2021
  • DocketCertificate of Mailing for ((Ruling on Submitted Matter Re: Motion for Judgment on the Pl...) of 05/12/2021); Filed by Clerk

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  • 05/12/2021
  • DocketMinute Order ( (Ruling on Submitted Matter Re: Motion for Judgment on the Pl...)); Filed by Clerk

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  • 05/11/2021
  • Docketat 1:30 PM in Department 29, Serena R. Murillo, Presiding; Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Filed by Defendant Pegasus Elite Aviation, Inc. Against Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (CCP 438)) - Held - Taken under Submission

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  • 05/11/2021
  • DocketMinute Order ( (Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Filed by Defe...)); Filed by Clerk

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17 More Docket Entries
  • 11/24/2020
  • DocketNotice of Posting of Jury Fees; Filed by Emina Mila Young (Plaintiff)

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  • 11/23/2020
  • DocketProof of Personal Service; Filed by Emina Mila Young (Plaintiff)

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  • 09/25/2020
  • Docket1st Amended Complaint; Filed by Emina Mila Young (Plaintiff)

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  • 09/25/2020
  • DocketSummons (on Complaint); Filed by Emina Mila Young (Plaintiff)

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  • 09/16/2020
  • DocketPI General Order; Filed by Clerk

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  • 09/16/2020
  • DocketCertificate of Mailing for ([PI General Order], Standing Order re PI Procedure and Hearing Dates); Filed by Clerk

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  • 08/25/2020
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by Emina Mila Young (Plaintiff)

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  • 08/25/2020
  • DocketNotice of Case Assignment - Unlimited Civil Case; Filed by Clerk

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  • 08/25/2020
  • DocketCivil Case Cover Sheet; Filed by Emina Mila Young (Plaintiff)

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 08/25/2020
  • DocketCivil Case Cover Sheet; Filed by Emina Mila Young (Plaintiff)

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Tentative Rulings

Case Number: 20STCV32434    Hearing Date: May 11, 2021    Dept: 29

… CONT FROM April 5, 2021 and from  May 4, 2021   TO ALLOW ARGUMENT TO BE PRESENTED - REQUESTED BY DEFENDANT

Young  vs.  Pegasus Elite Aviation, Inc.

TENTATIVE:     The Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED.

Legal Standard

It is well established in California that either prior to trial or at the trial the plaintiff or the defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings and that the appropriate ground for such a motion is the same as that arguable by general demurrer, namely, the failure to state a cause of action or defense. (Dobbins v. Hardister (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 787, 791; See also Sofias v. Bank of America (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 583, 586 [The non statutory motion for judgment on the pleadings can be made at any time, even during trial, since the grounds for a general demurrer are never waived.].)

A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed. (See, e.g., Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (TRG 1998) §§ 7:275, 7:322; Lance Camper Manufacturing Corp. v. Republic Indemnity Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 194, 198.) Presentation of extrinsic evidence is therefore not proper on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Id.; Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999.) Both a demurrer and a motion for judgment on the pleadings accept as true all material factual allegations of the challenged pleading, unless contrary to law or to facts of which a court may take judicial notice. (Mechanical Contractors Assn. v. Greater Bay Area Assn. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 672, 677; Edwards v. Centex Real Estate Corp, (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 15, 27.) On a motion for judgment on the pleadings a court may take judicial notice of something that cannot reasonably be controverted, even if it negates an express allegation of the pleading. (See Columbia Casualty Co. v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 457, 468-469; Evans v. California Trailer Court, Inc. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 540, 549.)

The motion may be made only after one of the following conditions has occurred: (1) If the moving party is a plaintiff, and the defendant has already filed his or her answer to the complaint and the time for the plaintiff to demur to the answer has expired; (2) If the moving party is a defendant, and the defendant has already filed his or her answer to the complaint and the time for the defendant to demur to the complaint has expired. (CCP § 438(f).) The motion provided for in CCP § 438 may be made even though either of the following conditions exist: (1) The moving party has already demurred to the complaint or answer, as the case may be, on the same grounds as is the basis for the motion provided for in this section and the demurrer has been overruled, provided that there has been a material change in applicable case law or statute since the ruling on the demurrer; (2) The moving party did not demur to the complaint or answer, as the case may be, on the same grounds as is the basis for the motion provided for in this section. (CCP § 438(g).) No motion may be made pursuant to CCP § 438 if a pretrial conference order has been entered pursuant to CCP § 575, or within 30 days of the date the action is initially set for trial, whichever is later, unless the court otherwise permits. (CCP § 438(e).)

In the case of either a demurrer or a motion for judgment on the pleadings, leave to amend should be granted if there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action. (Virginia G. v. ABC Unified School Dist. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1848, 1852.)

Discussion

Defendant’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED as to request numbers 1 and 3-6 and DENIED as to number 2. (Evid. Code § 452(b)&(h).)

Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s claims relate to and/or arise from her employment with Pegasus, and Plaintiff’s Complaint is therefore barred by California Labor Code section 3602(a). 

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that she alleges she is an independent contractor and not an employee. 

The Workers Compensation Act (“WCA”) governs compensation to employees for injuries incurred in the course and scope of their employment. (Cal. Const., art. XIV, § 4; Cal. Labor Code, § 3201; Charles J. Vacanti, M.D., Inc. v. State Compensation Insurance Fund (2001) 24 Cal.4th 800, 810.) Compensation under the WCA is an employee’s exclusive remedy against an employer for injuries sustained out of and in the course of employment. (Cal. Labor Code, §§ 3600(a), 3602(a).) Whether exclusivity bars a cause of action against an employer depends on whether the alleged injury falls within the scope of the exclusive remedy provisions. (See Charles J. Vacanti, M.D., Inc., supra, 24 Cal.4th at 811.) The exclusive remedy provisions apply only in cases of industrial personal injury or death. (Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 16.) “The purpose of this exclusivity provision is to give efficacy to the theoretical ‘compensation bargain’ between the employer and employee.” (Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689, 697 [quotation marks and citation omitted].) However, the statutory restriction does not affect an employee’s rights to damages in tort from entities that the employee has no employment relationship. (Caso v. Nimrod Productions, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 881, 888.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff filed a Workers’ Compensation claim which admits that she was an employee of Defendant. However, even if the Court were to take judicial notice of the non-conformed copy of the claim form attached to counsel’s correspondence, the claim form explicitly states that she was an independent contractor and it was being filed in an abundance of caution. 

Defendant also argues that based on the FAA regulations, Defendant had control over Plaintiff, thereby making her an employee. 

The most recent articulation of the test to determine if a worker is an employee or an independent contractor was in Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.4th 903. However, there, our Supreme Court framed its ruling as “… determining whether workers should be classified as employees or as independent contractors ¿for purposes of California wage orders, which impose obligations relating to the minimum¿wages, maximum hours, and a limited number of very basic working conditions (such as minimally required meal and rest breaks) of California employees.” (Id. at 913-914, original emphasis.) Given that the instant case does not concern the issue of wage orders, the Court is to apply the test described in S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341, 349 (Borello) to determine whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor. Under this test, “[t]he most significant factor in determining whether the status of a person performing services for another is an employee or an independent contractor is the right to control the manner and means of accomplishing the result, that is, the details of the work.” (Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. v. Superior Court (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 864, 873-874 (Toyota).) The other factors to be considered—“ ‘secondary’ indicia”—include those outlined in Section 220 of the Restatement Second of Agency. (Borello, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 349.) Section 220 states: 

(2) In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an independent contractor, the following matters of fact, among others, are considered:

(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the details of the work;

(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business;

(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision;

(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;

(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work;

(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;

(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;

(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer;

(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relations of master and servant; and

(j) whether the principal is or is not in business. 

No single factor is determinative. However, “[p]erhaps no single circumstance is more conclusive to show the relationship of an employee than the right of the employer to end the service whenever he sees fit to do so.” (May v. Farrell (1928) 94 Cal.App.703, 710.) Indeed, the unlimited right to discharge at will and without cause has been stressed by a number of cases as a strong factor demonstrating employment. (Toyota, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d 864, 875.)

Here, at this pleading stage, the FAA regulations alone are insufficient to show that Plaintiff is an employee and not an independent contractor. Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient at this time to plead that she is an independent contractor. (See FAC, ¶4.) Thus, Defendant has not shown that Plaintiff’s claims are barred. 

The motion is DENIED.

Conclusion

The Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED. 

Moving party is ordered to give notice.  

Case Number: 20STCV32434    Hearing Date: May 4, 2021    Dept: 29

… CONT FROM April 5, 2021    TO ALLOW ARGUMENT TO BE PRESENTED - REQUESTED BY DEFENDANT

Young  vs.  Pegasus Elite Aviation, Inc.

TENTATIVE

The Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED.

Legal Standard

It is well established in California that either prior to trial or at the trial the plaintiff or the defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings and that the appropriate ground for such a motion is the same as that arguable by general demurrer, namely, the failure to state a cause of action or defense. (Dobbins v. Hardister (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 787, 791; See also Sofias v. Bank of America (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 583, 586 [The non statutory motion for judgment on the pleadings can be made at any time, even during trial, since the grounds for a general demurrer are never waived.].)

A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed. (See, e.g., Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (TRG 1998) §§ 7:275, 7:322; Lance Camper Manufacturing Corp. v. Republic Indemnity Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 194, 198.) Presentation of extrinsic evidence is therefore not proper on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Id.; Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999.) Both a demurrer and a motion for judgment on the pleadings accept as true all material factual allegations of the challenged pleading, unless contrary to law or to facts of which a court may take judicial notice. (Mechanical Contractors Assn. v. Greater Bay Area Assn. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 672, 677; Edwards v. Centex Real Estate Corp, (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 15, 27.) On a motion for judgment on the pleadings a court may take judicial notice of something that cannot reasonably be controverted, even if it negates an express allegation of the pleading. (See Columbia Casualty Co. v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 457, 468-469; Evans v. California Trailer Court, Inc. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 540, 549.)

The motion may be made only after one of the following conditions has occurred: (1) If the moving party is a plaintiff, and the defendant has already filed his or her answer to the complaint and the time for the plaintiff to demur to the answer has expired; (2) If the moving party is a defendant, and the defendant has already filed his or her answer to the complaint and the time for the defendant to demur to the complaint has expired. (CCP § 438(f).) The motion provided for in CCP § 438 may be made even though either of the following conditions exist: (1) The moving party has already demurred to the complaint or answer, as the case may be, on the same grounds as is the basis for the motion provided for in this section and the demurrer has been overruled, provided that there has been a material change in applicable case law or statute since the ruling on the demurrer; (2) The moving party did not demur to the complaint or answer, as the case may be, on the same grounds as is the basis for the motion provided for in this section. (CCP § 438(g).) No motion may be made pursuant to CCP § 438 if a pretrial conference order has been entered pursuant to CCP § 575, or within 30 days of the date the action is initially set for trial, whichever is later, unless the court otherwise permits. (CCP § 438(e).)

In the case of either a demurrer or a motion for judgment on the pleadings, leave to amend should be granted if there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action. (Virginia G. v. ABC Unified School Dist. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1848, 1852.)

Discussion

Defendant’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED as to request numbers 1 and 3-6 and DENIED as to number 2. (Evid. Code § 452(b)&(h).)

Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s claims relate to and/or arise from her employment with Pegasus, and Plaintiff’s Complaint is therefore barred by California Labor Code section 3602(a). 

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that she alleges she is an independent contractor and not an employee. 

The Workers Compensation Act (“WCA”) governs compensation to employees for injuries incurred in the course and scope of their employment. (Cal. Const., art. XIV, § 4; Cal. Labor Code, § 3201; Charles J. Vacanti, M.D., Inc. v. State Compensation Insurance Fund (2001) 24 Cal.4th 800, 810.) Compensation under the WCA is an employee’s exclusive remedy against an employer for injuries sustained out of and in the course of employment. (Cal. Labor Code, §§ 3600(a), 3602(a).) Whether exclusivity bars a cause of action against an employer depends on whether the alleged injury falls within the scope of the exclusive remedy provisions. (See Charles J. Vacanti, M.D., Inc., supra, 24 Cal.4th at 811.) The exclusive remedy provisions apply only in cases of industrial personal injury or death. (Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 16.) “The purpose of this exclusivity provision is to give efficacy to the theoretical ‘compensation bargain’ between the employer and employee.” (Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689, 697 [quotation marks and citation omitted].) However, the statutory restriction does not affect an employee’s rights to damages in tort from entities that the employee has no employment relationship. (Caso v. Nimrod Productions, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 881, 888.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff filed a Workers’ Compensation claim which admits that she was an employee of Defendant. However, even if the Court were to take judicial notice of the non-conformed copy of the claim form attached to counsel’s correspondence, the claim form explicitly states that she was an independent contractor and it was being filed in an abundance of caution. 

Defendant also argues that based on the FAA regulations, Defendant had control over Plaintiff, thereby making her an employee. 

The most recent articulation of the test to determine if a worker is an employee or an independent contractor was in Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.4th 903. However, there, our Supreme Court framed its ruling as “… determining whether workers should be classified as employees or as independent contractors ¿for purposes of California wage orders, which impose obligations relating to the minimum¿wages, maximum hours, and a limited number of very basic working conditions (such as minimally required meal and rest breaks) of California employees.” (Id. at 913-914, original emphasis.) Given that the instant case does not concern the issue of wage orders, the Court is to apply the test described in S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341, 349 (Borello) to determine whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor. Under this test, “[t]he most significant factor in determining whether the status of a person performing services for another is an employee or an independent contractor is the right to control the manner and means of accomplishing the result, that is, the details of the work.” (Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. v. Superior Court (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 864, 873-874 (Toyota).) The other factors to be considered—“ ‘secondary’ indicia”—include those outlined in Section 220 of the Restatement Second of Agency. (Borello, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 349.) Section 220 states: 

(2) In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an independent contractor, the following matters of fact, among others, are considered:

(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the details of the work;

(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business;

(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision;

(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;

(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work;

(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;

(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;

(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer;

(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relations of master and servant; and

(j) whether the principal is or is not in business. 

No single factor is determinative. However, “[p]erhaps no single circumstance is more conclusive to show the relationship of an employee than the right of the employer to end the service whenever he sees fit to do so.” (May v. Farrell (1928) 94 Cal.App.703, 710.) Indeed, the unlimited right to discharge at will and without cause has been stressed by a number of cases as a strong factor demonstrating employment. (Toyota, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d 864, 875.)

Here, at this pleading stage, the FAA regulations alone are insufficient to show that Plaintiff is an employee and not an independent contractor. Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient at this time to plead that she is an independent contractor. (See FAC, ¶4.) Thus, Defendant has not shown that Plaintiff’s claims are barred. 

The motion is DENIED.

Conclusion

The Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED. 

Moving party is ordered to give notice.  

Case Number: 20STCV32434    Hearing Date: March 11, 2021    Dept: 29

Emina Mila Young vs Pegasus Elite Aviation, Inc.

,Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings by Defendant, Pegasus Elite Aviation, Inc.The Court is in receipt of Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, and also Defendant’s reply to Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion. However, the Court did not receive Plaintiff's opposition to the motion until after March 8. It is possible this was an error on the Court’s part.

The hearing on the motion is therefore continued to April 5­­, 2021 at 1:30 p.m. in D-29. 

Moving party is ordered to give notice.

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