This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 06/12/2019 at 14:59:22 (UTC).

ELIZABETH CARPENTER VS ROBERT JOHN LISKEY ESQ ET AL

Case Summary

On 11/08/2017 ELIZABETH CARPENTER filed a Contract - Professional Negligence lawsuit against ROBERT JOHN LISKEY ESQ. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judge overseeing this case is SAMANTHA JESSNER. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****2790

  • Filing Date:

    11/08/2017

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Contract - Professional Negligence

  • Court:

    Los Angeles County Superior Courts

  • Courthouse:

    Stanley Mosk Courthouse

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judge

SAMANTHA JESSNER

 

Party Details

Plaintiff and Petitioner

CARPENTER ELIZABETH

Defendants and Respondents

DOES 1 TO 50

LISKEY ROBERT JOHN

BROWN MARIE RENEE

BJ THOMPSON PROFESSIONAL LEGAL DOCUMENT

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff and Petitioner Attorneys

LEWIS BRET D. ESQ.

LEWIS BRET D.

Defendant Attorneys

SAUNDERS JENNIFER K.

MANN JEFF

 

Court Documents

NOTICE OF CONTINUANCE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

2/21/2018: NOTICE OF CONTINUANCE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

DEFENDANT ROBERT JOHN LISKEY'S REQUEST TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STAY ACTION PENDING RESOLUTION OF UNDERLYING PROCEEDINGS

3/2/2018: DEFENDANT ROBERT JOHN LISKEY'S REQUEST TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STAY ACTION PENDING RESOLUTION OF UNDERLYING PROCEEDINGS

DEFENDANT ROBERT JOHN LISKEY'S MOTION TO STAY ACTION PENDING RESOLUTION OF UNDERLYING PROCEEDINGS; ETC.

3/2/2018: DEFENDANT ROBERT JOHN LISKEY'S MOTION TO STAY ACTION PENDING RESOLUTION OF UNDERLYING PROCEEDINGS; ETC.

NOTICE OF EXECUTION OF NOTICE OF ACKNOWLEDGEMENT BY ATTORNEY FOR ROBERT JOHN LISKEY

3/9/2018: NOTICE OF EXECUTION OF NOTICE OF ACKNOWLEDGEMENT BY ATTORNEY FOR ROBERT JOHN LISKEY

Unknown

4/9/2018: Unknown

NOTICE OF DEPOSIT OF JURY FEES

4/10/2018: NOTICE OF DEPOSIT OF JURY FEES

NOTICE OF RULINGS IN CONNECTION WITH MOTION TO STAY AND CMC CONDUCTED ON APRIL 10, 2018

4/12/2018: NOTICE OF RULINGS IN CONNECTION WITH MOTION TO STAY AND CMC CONDUCTED ON APRIL 10, 2018

SUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEY

9/5/2018: SUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEY

NOTICE OF: ERRATA RE MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT AND DECLARATION

9/26/2018: NOTICE OF: ERRATA RE MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT AND DECLARATION

Substitution of Attorney

11/6/2018: Substitution of Attorney

Minute Order

12/7/2018: Minute Order

Unknown

12/20/2018: Unknown

Request for Entry of Default / Judgment

12/21/2018: Request for Entry of Default / Judgment

Unknown

1/11/2019: Unknown

Minute Order

2/21/2019: Minute Order

Opposition

5/22/2019: Opposition

Statement of the Case

5/29/2019: Statement of the Case

Exhibit List

5/30/2019: Exhibit List

127 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 06/05/2019
  • at 09:00 AM in Department 34; Final Status Conference - Held

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  • 06/05/2019
  • Substitution of Attorney; Filed by Marie Renee Brown (Defendant)

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  • 06/05/2019
  • Minute Order ( (Final Status Conference)); Filed by Clerk

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  • 06/03/2019
  • Opposing Motion to Plaintiff's Motion to Bifurcate Issues of Liability and Damages; Filed by Marie Renee Brown (Defendant)

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  • 06/03/2019
  • [Proposed] Statement of the Case; Filed by Marie Renee Brown (Defendant)

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  • 05/30/2019
  • Witness List; Filed by Marie Renee Brown (Defendant)

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  • 05/30/2019
  • Exhibit List; Filed by Marie Renee Brown (Defendant)

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  • 05/29/2019
  • Opposing Motion in Limine #2; Filed by BJ Thompson Professional Legal Document Assistant (Defendant); Marie Renee Brown (Defendant)

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  • 05/29/2019
  • Exhibit List; Filed by Elizabeth Carpenter (Plaintiff)

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  • 05/29/2019
  • Witness List; Filed by Elizabeth Carpenter (Plaintiff)

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194 More Docket Entries
  • 12/20/2017
  • Notice of Case Management Conference; Filed by Clerk

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  • 12/12/2017
  • Summons; Filed by ELIZABETH CARPENTER (Plaintiff)

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  • 12/12/2017
  • SUMMONS

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  • 11/30/2017
  • at 1:30 PM in Department 44; Unknown Event Type - Held - Continued

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  • 11/30/2017
  • Order on Court Fee Waiver After Hearing (Superior Court); Filed by Court

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  • 11/30/2017
  • ORDER ON COURT FEE WAIVER AFTER HEARING (SUPERIOR COURT)

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  • 11/09/2017
  • ORDER ON COURT FEE WAIVER

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  • 11/09/2017
  • Order on Court Fee Waiver (Superior Court); Filed by Clerk

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  • 11/08/2017
  • COMPLAINT FOR: 1) ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE-NEGLIGENCE ;ETC

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  • 11/08/2017
  • Complaint; Filed by ELIZABETH CARPENTER (Plaintiff)

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Tentative Rulings

Case Number: BC682790    Hearing Date: November 21, 2019    Dept: 34

SUBJECT: Motion for Attorney’s Fees

Moving Party: Plaintiff Elizabeth Carpenter

Resp. Party: Defendant Marie Brown

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees in the amount of $52,020.00.

PRELIMINARY COMMENTS:

Plaintiff Elizabeth Carpenter has submitted a Declaration attesting to the harm caused by Defendant Marie Brown. The damages wrought by the defendant is an issue that can be considered at trial – and may affect either the award of compensatory or punitive damages. In a motion for attorney's fees, however, the Court must consider what is a reasonable lodestar for the time spent by the prevailing party’s attorney; the Court does not take into consideration the severity of the harm caused by Defendant.

BACKGROUND:

Plaintiff Elizabeth Carpenter commenced this action on November 8, 2017 against Defendants Robert John Liskey, Esq., Marie Renee Brown, and BJ Thompson Professional Legal Document Assistants, Inc. for: (1) attorney malpractice – negligence; (2) attorney malpractice – constructive fraud; (3) money had and received; (4) violations of Bus. & Prof. Code sections 6400-6415; and (5) violations of Bus. & Prof. Code sections 6450-6456.

On April 10, 2018, the Court denied Defendant Liskey’s motion to stay the proceeding pending the appeal of a probate action.

On October 22, 2018, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a first amended complaint.

On December 4, 2018, the Court granted Defendant Liskey’s motion to approve good faith settlement.

On December 7, 2018, the Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff’s motion to compel deposition and production of documents at the deposition as to Defendant Marie Brown.

On September 30, 2019, the Court ordered “that judgment entered is entered against Defendant Marie Renee Brown in the amount of $44,640 and Plaintiff may recover costs and attorneys’ fees as set forth below.” Further, the Court ordered:

Based on the evidence presented, the Court finds in favor of Elizabeth Carpenter and against Marie Brown on the causes of action in the complaint for: Money Had and Received (Cause of Action No. 4); Violations of Business & Professions Code Section 6400-6415 et seq; (Cause of Action No. 5); Violations of Business & Professions Code Section 6450-6456 et seq. (Cause of Action No.8); and Violation of Penal Code Section 496 (Cause of Action No. 9): Since Defendant’s conduct was plainly willful and not negligent, there is no recovery under the negligence cause of action.

As to recoverable damages, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff in the amount of $14,880 which damages are trebled by this Court under Penal Code Section 496(c) for a total amount of $44,640 as Plaintiff demonstrated a conversion and theft of the sum of $14,880 by false pretenses by Defendant.

Plaintiff Elizabeth Carpenter is therefore the party who prevailed in this action.

Plaintiff is further entitled to costs of suit Plaintiff incurred in this matter and attorneys’ fees pursuant to Bus. & Prof. Code Section 6412.1(b), Bus. & Prof. Code Section 6455, and Penal Code Section 496(c) to be shown by separate post-judgment filing/motion.” (09/30/19 Amended Judgment.)

On October 4, 2019, Plaintiff filed the memorandum of costs.

On October 23, 2019, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for attorney fees of $159,885 pursuant to judgment after trial, Business & Professions Code section 6312.1(b), Business & Professions Code section 6455, and Penal Code section 496(c).

ANALYSIS:

A. Legal Standard

Attorneys’ fees are allowed for prevailing parties as costs when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (Code Civ. Proc, § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10)(B).) “‘Prevailing party’ includes the party with a net monetary recovery . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4).) “A prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (b).)

The attorney bears the burden of proof as to “reasonableness” of any fee claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5(c)(5).) This burden requires competent evidence as to the nature and value of the services rendered. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.) “Testimony of an attorney as to the number of hours worked on a particular case is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records.” (Id.)

A plaintiff’s verified billing invoices are prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services listed were necessarily incurred. (See Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.) “In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated to not suffice.” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488, quoting Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Ass’n (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)

B. Discussion

Plaintiff seeks the recovery of attorneys’ fees of $159,885.00. (Motion, p. 2:1-2.)

1. Statutory Authority & Prevailing Party

The Court’s Judgment entered on September 30, 2019 states:

“Plaintiff Elizabeth Carpenter is therefore the party who prevailed in this action.

Plaintiff is further entitled to costs of suit Plaintiff incurred in this matter and attorneys’ fees pursuant to Bus. & Prof. Code Section 6412.1(b), Bus. & Prof. Code Section 6455, and Penal Code Section 496(c) to be shown by separate post-judgment filing/motion.” (09/30/19 Amended Judgment.)

Business and Professions Code section 6412.1, subdivision (b) states: “(b) Any person injured by a violation of this chapter by a legal document assistant or unlawful detainer assistant may file a complaint and seek redress in any superior court for injunctive relief, restitution, and damages. Attorney’s fees shall be awarded to the prevailing plaintiff. . . .”

Business and Professions Code section 6455, subdivision (a) states: “Any consumer injured by a violation of this chapter may file a complaint and seek redress in superior court for injunctive relief, restitution, and damages. Attorney's fees shall be awarded in this action to the prevailing plaintiff.”

Penal Code Section 496, applies to larceny and subdivision (c) states: “(c) Any person who has been injured by a violation of subdivision (a) or (b) may bring an action for three times the amount of actual damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff, costs of suit, and reasonable attorney’s fees.”

Plaintiff seeks attorneys’ fees pursuant to the Court’s Judgment entered on September 30, 2019 and pursuant to Business and Professions Code sections 6312.1, subdivision (b), 6455, subdivision (a), and Penal Code section 496(c). (Id. at p. 2:2-8.)

In opposition, Defendant Marie Renee Brown (“Defendant”) argues that “Plaintiff was seeking millions of dollars” and “from a practical standpoint, the reduction to the judgment amount is a basis for concluding that Plaintiff is not the prevailing party and should be denied fees altogether.” (Opp., p. 7:14-16.)

In reply, Plaintiff argues that she “is the prevailing party under the Judgment because that [is] what the court held,” thus, “there can be no dispute.” (Reply, p. 3:3-5.)

Defendant’s argument is borderline frivolous. The Court previously found that Plaintiff was the prevailing party.

Plaintiff is the prevailing party and is entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to Business and Professions Code sections 6312.1(b), 6455, and Penal Code section 496(c).

2. Hourly Rate

“The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court.” (Id.)

Plaintiff seeks to recover attorney’s fees for her counsel, Bret D. Lewis, at an hourly rate of $425.00. (Motion, p. 5:22-24.) Plaintiff asserts that her counsel’s hourly rate has been deemed to be reasonable in prior litigation. (Id.; Lewis Decl., ¶¶1-2; RFJN Ex. 1.)

Defendant does not argue that Plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rate is unreasonable.

The Court finds that the hourly rate of $425 requested by Plaintiff is reasonable and commensurate with rates charged by attorneys with comparable skill and expertise.

3. Reasonable Hours Incurred

“A trial court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney ... involved in the presentation of the case.” (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.) “The reasonableness of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court, to be determined from a consideration of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved. The court may also consider whether the amount requested is based upon unnecessary or duplicative work.” (Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)

While not per se objectionable, block billing can exacerbate the vagueness of an attorney fee request and support a court’s finding that time entries were inflated and non-compensable. (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1325-1326.)

“When a cause of action for which attorney fees are provided by statute is joined with other causes of action for which attorney fees are not permitted, the prevailing party may recover only on the statutory cause of action.” (Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1133.) However, “[w]the liability issues are so interrelated that it would have been impossible to separate them into claims for which attorney fees are properly awarded and claims for which they are not, then allocation is not required.” (Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1133.)

Plaintiff argues that “due to the recalcitrant and uncooperative conduct of Brown as reflected in the Declaration of Lewis, counsel was forced to spend hours on this matter which were reasonably incurred.” (Motion, p. 5:24-26.) Plaintiff’s counsel declares that he “incurred a total of 367.20 hours for a total of $156,060 of attorneys’ fees in connection through trial” and attaches a time record for this matter as Exhibit A to his declaration. (Lewis Decl., ¶ 1.) Plaintiff’s counsel asserts that he “spent an additional 4.5 hours on the herein motion and [he] expect[s] to spend an additional 4.5 hours on preparing a Reply and appearing at the hearing for a total of an additional $3,825 at a rate of $425 per hour.” (Ibid.) Therefore, Plaintiff’s counsel declares, “the total amount of fees sought is $159,885.” (Ibid.)

Plaintiff’s counsel declares that reasonable hours were incurred due to the trial which was “proceeded by substantial in court proceedings, including, without limitation, a case management conference on February 21, 2019, a case management on March 23, 2018, a Motion to Amend the Complaint on October 22, 2018, ex parte proceedings on November 2, 2018, a Motion to Compel Brown’s Deposition and the Production of Documents on December 7, 2018, numerous status conferences or other hearings (at least six) which were continued at the request of Brown for one reason or another, the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration, and the constant appearance and disappearance of apparent or defacto attorneys for Brown.” (Id. at ¶ 4 [misspellings and grammar in original].) Plaintiff’s counsel asserts that “outside of Court, the posture of Brown and her attorneys was recalcitrant and uncooperative as illustrated by Brown’s failure and delaying tactics at her deposition where she failed to deliver her text messages on her phone that ultimately required the filing of a motion to compel and an order for her to produce the phone and messages.” (Ibid.)

In opposition, Defendant first argues that “the amount of fees requested is grossly excessive and no attempt has been made to apportion fees as to work performed unrelated to the claims against this opposing defendant.” (Opp., p. 7:18-23.) Defendant maintains that “Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint against multiple defendants, including for legal malpractice of an attorney, money had and received, etc.” and “the First, Third, and Seventh Causes of Action do not name Defendant, Marie Renee Brown at al[l].” (Id. at p. 8:7-12.) Defendant asserts that “the moving papers do not distinguish between work pertaining to the statutory cause of action and that which is not, and makes no attempt to distinguish between work related to the other defendants.” (Id. at p. 8:14-18.)

Next, Defendant argues that “wholly aside from the issue of apportionment and degree of success in the context of who is a prevailing party, the fees requested are grossly in excess of that which is reasonable.” (Id. at p. 8:19-23.) Defendant argues that the following amounts claimed are unreasonable and excessive:

· Research and preparation of the complaint stated to take 15 hours could not have reasonably taken more than 6 hours

· Preparation of form interrogatories and requests for admission stated to be 6 hours for 4/10/18 could have reasonably taken 1.5 hours

· 8 hours on 5/30/18 and 8 hours on 5/31/18 for preparation of discovery responses to Liskey discovery was unrelated to Defendant Brown and could not have reasonably taken more than 3 hours

· 7/6/18 meet and confer letter could not have reasonably taken more than 1.5 hours and does not appear to be related to Defendant Brown

· 7/27/18 meet and confer letter could not have taken more than 1.5 hours instead of 5, also unrelated to Defendant Brown

· 8/10/18 deposition notice preparation could not have reasonably taken more than .5 hours, rather than 2.5 hours claimed

· 9/15/18 deposition notice of Liskey was unrelated to Defendant Brown and could not have reasonably taken more than .5 hours, rather than 3

· 9/14/18 preparation of form interrogatories and requests for admissions were unrelated to Defendant Brown, and could not have taken more than 1 hour, instead of 3

· 9/20/18 preparation of motion to amend the complaint could not have reasonably taken more than 3 hours, instead of the 10 being claimed

· 9/25/18 preparation for deposition could not have reasonably required more than 1.5 hours instead of 8

· 9/26/18 attendance at the deposition and meeting with client did not actually or reasonably take 8 hours, but rather only 4 hours

· 9/26/18 attendance at the deposition did not actually or reasonably take 7 hours, but rather only 4 hours

· 9/28/18 preparation of requests for admission, form interrogatories, special interrogatories could not have taken more than 2.5 hours, and also were unrelated to Defendant Brown

· 10/5/18 preparation of questions for a deposition could not have reasonably taken more than 1 hour, instead of 4

· 10/7/18 additional preparation for a deposition could not have required more than ½ additional hour, instead of 6

· 10/14/18 preparation for the Liskey deposition claimed to take 7 hours, could not have reasonably required more than 1.5 hours and was unread to Defendant Brown

· 10/15/18 preparation of notice of fraud and review of substitution of attorney could not have taken more than .5 hours instead of 2.5 hours claimed

· 10/15/18 additional 6.2 hours of preparation for the Liskey deposition was duplicative of other claims, could not have reasonably required more than .5 additional hours, and was unrelated to Defendant Brown

· 10/16/18 7 hours attendance at a deposition, did not require more than approximately 4 hours

· 10/19/18 4 hours discussion of settlement and review of settlement agreement, could not have reasonably require more than .5 hours

· 10/20/18 time was unnecessary and uncertain as to what is meant by “TCF”

· 10/25/18 2.5 hours amended motion preparation was unnecessary and overstated as to time

· 10/30/18 email and discovery preparation could not have taken more than 1.5 hours in total

· 10/31/18 2.5 hour meet and confer preparation could not have reasonably taken more than 1 hour

· 11/5-11/9/18 preparation of motion to compel and separate statement could not have reasonably taken more than 6 hours

· 12/6/18 1.5 hours to review objections could not have required more than .5 hours

· 12/16/18 12 hour trial document preparation could not have taken more than 6 hours

· 12/17/18 15 hour preparation of jury instructions and amendment to exhibit list could not have taken more than 5 hours

· 12/23 - 12/26/18 15 hour preparation of trial document preparation is duplicative, could not have reasonably required any further time, or certainly no more than 2 additional hours

· 12/24/18 preparation of a subpoena and email could not have taken more than .5 hours

· 03/15/19 final status conference and documents preparation is duplicative and could not have reasonably required more than 1 additional hour

· 5/8/19 time for preparation of motions in limine and to bifurcate reasonably required no more than 1 hour each, instead of 2.5 hours each

· 6/7/19 - 6/11/19 25 hours is grossly overstated and should be no more than 5 hours (Id. at pp. 10:25-13:4.)

Defendant argues “that to the extent a fee award were to be made at all, the total reasonable hours expended in relation to the claims against this opposing party are a small fraction of the hours claimed in the itemization in the moving papers.” (Id. at p. 13:6-8.) Defendant maintains that “Plaintiff is claiming 367 hours at a rate of $425.00 per hour, but the hours reasonably extended in relation to the claims against Ms. Brown, did not exceed approximately 30 hours (after apportionment).” (Id. at p. 13:8-10.)

In reply, Plaintiff argues that her attorney fee recovery should not be apportioned among the defendants because “all the claims shared a common nexus and were inextricably linked to the common set of facts.” (Reply, p. 3:1-2.) Plaintiff also argues that the hours incurred are reasonable and necessary because “Defendant postponed and avoided trial dates causing Plaintiff to prepare and reprepare for trial on numerous instances, Defendant did not respond properly to discovery, even after compelled, she failed to deliver crucial text messages, and Plaintiff substituted and resubstituted in and out new counsel and existing counsel which further exacerbated Plaintiff’s efforts.” (Id. at p. 3:10-15.)

First, the Court finds that allocation is not required because Plaintiff’s claims of (1) attorney malpractice – negligence; (2) attorney malpractice – constructive fraud; (3) money had and received; (4) violations of Bus. & Prof. Code sections 6400-6415; and (5) violations of Bus. & Prof. Code sections 6450-6456, which involved liability issues between all of the defendants, are so interrelated, that it would have been impossible to separate them into claims for which attorney fees are properly awarded and claims for which they are not. (See Akins, 79 Cal.App.4th at 1133.)

Second, having reviewed the entries submitted by Dwelling’s counsel, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s counsel spent an unreasonable amount of time on certain matters and it appears that counsel is seeking reimbursement for duplicative billings. The Court also notes “block billing” of various entries, which, while not prohibited, makes a determination a reasonableness more difficult. (See, e.g., Heritage Pacific Financial v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1010, fn. 6. [“consistent precedent in California cases . . . provide[s] trial courts with the discretion about whether [or not] to penalize block billing.”])

A few examples are:

· May 30 and 31, 2018, Plaintiff’s counsel claims to have spent 16 hours re Liskey Discovery responses.

· September 20-25, 2018, Plaintiff’s counsel claims to have spent 10 hours to prepare a notice of motion to amend the complaint.

· December 16, 2018 and between December 23 and December 26, 2018, Plaintiff’s counsel claims to have spent 27 hours on preparation of trial documents.

· June 6 and June 11, 2019, Plaintiff’s counsel claims to have spent 20 hours for trial preparation

· June 13 and 14, 2019, Plaintiff’s counsel claims to have spent 20 hours for trial preparation.

Third, the Court notes that these time-billing entries appear to have been created after-the-fact. For instance, between an entry for 4/25/2018 and the entry for 5/8/2018, is an entry for 4/26/2019. (Exh. A, p. 12.) It is clear that counsel meant the entry to be for April 26, 2018; the fact that it states “2019” tells this Court that the entries did not come from computer time-billing software that recorded the entries on a day-by-day basis.

Having analyzed the motions and pleadings filed, and having reviewed the billing statements provided, the Court determines that a reasonable lodestar in this case, to limit any duplicative and excessive fees, is $52,020.00.