ELERI IRONS, A MINOR INDIVIDUAL BY AND THROUGH HER GUARDIAN AD LITEM, CHRISTOPHER IRON VS EL SEGUNDO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

Tentative Rulings

Case Number: 19STCV14649 Hearing Date: September 15, 2021 Dept: 29

TENTATIVE

Defendant El Segundo Unified School District’s motion for summary judgment, and in the alternative, summary adjudication, is DENIED.

Legal Standard

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., ; 437c(p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at 467; Code Civ. Proc., ;437c(c).)

Discussion

A. Evidentiary Objections

Defendant’s evidentiary objections are OVERRULED.

B. Immunity

“Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or public employee or any other person.” ; (Gov. Code ; 815.2, subd. (b).) ; “Simply stated, a public entity employer ‘is vicariously liable for the torts of its employees committed within the scope of the employment.” (M.P. v. City of Sacramento (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 121, 128-129.)

Government Code section 820.2 states, “[e]xcept as provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.”

Under Government Code section 820.2, the government defendant “. . . must prove that the employee, in deciding to perform (or not to perform) the act which led to plaintiff’s injury, consciously exercised discretion in the sense of assuming certain risks in order to gain other policy objectives.” (Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780, 794 (emphasis in original).)

Defendant has not shown, argued, or even mentioned in its separate statement that the actions of its employees amounted to consciously exercised discretion. Instead, Defendant merely concludes that the decisions were “discretionary acts.” Further, “there is no basis for immunizing lower-level, or ‘ministerial,’ decisions that merely implement a basic policy already formulated.” (Conway v. County of Tuolumne (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1005, 1014–15, quotations and citations omitted.) Defendant has not shown that these acts are not ministerial or operational. The cases Defendant cites to involve expulsion and re-admission of students. Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendants should have expelled the alleged bullies. The other case Defendant cites to are non-binding federal cases.

Accordingly, Defendant has not met its initial burden and summary judgment is DENIED.

C. Causation

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs cannot establish causation because the alleged bullying caused Plaintiff no appreciable harm, and any possible harm was either (1) obviated by the repeated counseling sessions with Plaintiff and the other two middle school girls and/or (2) admittedly nonexistent when plaintiff was repeatedly asked by the principal and the counselor and confirmed in an email from Mrs. Irons, wherein she acknowledged things were “okay” in March of 2018. The Court does not find this sufficient to meet Defendant’s initial burden to show there was no causation.

Even if it had met its initial burden, Plaintiff provides the expert declaration of Laura Chism who opines that the District failed to adequately investigate any claims of bullying and take appropriate action after the initial restorative justice meeting, neglected its responsibility to act and its responsibility to provide a safe environment for its student, and as such the district is ultimately liable for her injures. (Chism Decl., ¶23.) Further, Plaintiff provides evidence of her injuries such as self-harming by cutting her stomach, emotional distress, anxiety, and seeking therapy. (Ramey Decl., Exhs. 2-4, 12.)

Accordingly, summary adjudication is denied.

Conclusion

The motion for summary judgment and in the alternative, summary adjudication, is DENIED.

Moving party is ordered to give notice.