DR CLAUDIA SHIELDS VS AURORA CHARTER OAK - LOS ANGELES LLC E

Tentative Rulings

Case Number: ****2431 Hearing Date: August 11, 2021 Dept: 15

# 15 TENTATIVE RULING 9:15 a.m., Wednesday, August 11, 2021

DR. CLAUDIA SHIELDS v. AURORA CHARTER OAK, etc., et al. [****2431]

RULING ON MOTION OF DEFENDANT CESAR CRUZ, M.D., FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

MEET & CONFER: DEFECTIVE – MP’s counsel’s decl. states only that he

spoke to one of Plaintiff’s attys [POSTER], that she said she’d speak to co-counsel and get back to him, and that she failed to do so.

BACKGROUND: action for false imprisonment, etc., as described previoulsy

CONT’D TIMELINE:

June 4, 2018: Plaintiff filed her SAC asserting 10 causes of action [v. various

Defendants, including DOE 13]:

(1) False Imprisonment

(2) Medical Malpractice

(3) Fraud

(4) Concealment

(5) Negligent Misrepresentation

(6) Conversion

(7) Trespass to Chattels

(8) Invasion of Privacy (9) Violation of Welfare & Institutions Code ;15600

(10) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

10/15/20: Plaintiff identified Dr. Cruz as DOE 13. According to moving defendant’s counsel, Plaintiff’s counsel subsequently “confirmed via email that Plaintiff would dismiss claims 3-8 against Dr. Cruz.”

Def CRUZ then demurred to the 9th cause of action for Elder Abuse,

and that demurrer was sustained without leave to amend.

6/18/21: def Cruz’s Motion for Summary Judgment was denied. In its ruling, the Court held that Dr. Cruz did not address causes of action nos. 3-8 to the SAC, which were asserted against DOE 13. The Court noted that despite Plaintiff’s counsel email which indicated their agreement to dismiss these claims, a formal request for dismissal was never filed and therefore these claims against DOE 13 were still outstanding.

7/14/21: Moving defendant filed this motion, seeking JOP as to causes of

action 3-8 of Plaintiff’s 2AC

RE EACH CAUSE OF ACTION ADDRESSED BY THE MOTION OF DEFENDANT CESAR CRUZ, M.D., FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, THE COURT RULES AS FOLLOWS:

(3) Fraud: GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. Re the other defendant doctors, the Court previously stated: “[The doctors] are not responsible for the facility; they’re not responsible for locking her up. They’re responsible for the medical judgment. [Plaintiff has] a cause of action against them alleging their medical judgment is below the standard of care. That’s all that [Plaintiff is] allowed.” See Wong Decl. ¶11; Exhibit F p. 54:14- 21. Here, Plaintiff fails to allege fraud with specificity as against defendant CRUZ.

She argues that she can allege defendant CRUZ misrepresented to her that she could not be released from her involuntary hold without Dr. AL-ASADI’s approval, and that had she known of defendant’s CRUZ’ true role at the time, she could have spoken to him about getting released (or she could have gotten her friend involved) a day earlier. The argument is speculative, and doesn’t support her claim. Instead, the Court agrees with moving Defendant’s argument to the effect that his alleged conduct occurred in connection with the provision of medical services, and to the extent Plaintiff has a claim against him, that claim is for professional negligence only.

(4) Concealment: GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. See above re fraud. This claim fails for the same reasons. Plaintiff fails to allege facts demonstrating that defendant CRUZ misrepresented a material fact to her, that he had a duty to disclose such information, or that he intended to defraud her. Further, the Court agrees with moving Defendant’s argument to the effect that his alleged conduct occurred in connection with the provision of medical services, and to the extent Plaintiff has a claim against him, that claim is for professional negligence only.

(5) Negligent Misrepresentation: GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. See above re fraud. This claim fails for the same reasons. Plaintiff fails to allege facts demonstrating that defendant CRUZ made a misrepresentation of material fact to her without reasonable grounds for believing it to be true; or that she justifiably relied on the representation to her detriment.

Further, the Court agrees with moving Defendant’s argument to the effect that his alleged conduct occurred in connection with the provision of medical services, and to the extent Plaintiff has a claim against him, that claim is for professional negligence only.

(6) Conversion: GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiff fails to allege facts demonstrating that moving defendant had “an intention or purpose to convert the goods and to exercise ownership over them, or to prevent [plaintiff] from taking possession of [her] property.” See Collin v. American Empire Ins. Co. (1994) 21 CA4th 787, 812. Here, Plaintiff claims that her personal effects were confiscated by the staff at defendant AURORA. There is no allegation that defendant CRUZ took anything from her, or that he intended to do so. Nor could there be, under the facts alleged. Further, the Court agrees with moving Defendant’s argument to the effect that his alleged conduct occurred in connection with the provision of medical services, and to the extent Plaintiff has a claim against him, that claim is for professional negligence only.

(7) Trespass to Chattels: GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. See above re conversion; the same reasoning applies here.

(8) Invasion of Privacy: GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. The only factual allegation re an invasion of privacy is found in para. 99 of Plaintiff’s 2AC, where she asserts:

99. By conducting the above -described strip search of Dr. Shields, Aurora, Signature, and DOES 1 through 25 interfered with Dr. Shields' reasonable expectation of privacy by means of threats, intimidation, and/or coercion.

In the moving papers, defendant CRUZ points out that Plaintiff doesn’t allege that he was involved in the purported strip-search “or any other acts that would constitute an invasion of her privacy.” In opposition, Plaintiff makes no argument to the contrary. Instead, Plaintiff apparently attempts to argue that defendant CRUZ engaged in false light publicity by certifying Plaintiff as “gravely disabled,” thereby creating a “false impression about her.” Not only does this nonsensical assertion not appear in the 2AC, but even if that were otherwise, it wouldn’t support an invasion of privacy claim.

Re Plaintiff’s argument to the effect that the Court “must” allow leave to amend: The Court disagrees. See, e.g., CCP 430.41(e)(1), which states: “In response to a demurrer and prior to the case being at issue, a complaint… shall not be amended more than three times, absent an offer to the trial court as to such additional facts to be pleaded that there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured to state a cause of action….” While the matter before the Court is a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the result is the same. There is a 3-complaint limit, and Plaintiff has reached it.

Her assertion re certifying her as “gravely disabled” doesn’t show a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured. Even if her right of privacy were somehow implicated by such conduct, or if the Court were willing to allow her to assert a false light claim, the characterization of her condition on a medical chart would be immunized as a communication made to “interested persons” under Civil Code 47.

MP is to serve notice of ruling. This TR shall be the order of the Court, unless changed at the hearing, and shall by this reference be incorporated into the Minute Order. TR E-MAILED TO COUNSEL AT 8:30 a.m. on 8/11/21.