This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 05/19/2021 at 17:47:23 (UTC).

DOUGLAS ECONN VS CASA BELA LLC ET AL

Case Summary

On 08/23/2018 DOUGLAS ECONN filed a Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury lawsuit against CASA BELA LLC. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judges overseeing this case are HOLLY E. KENDIG, JON R. TAKASUGI and THOMAS D. LONG. The case status is Disposed - Dismissed.
Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****9030

  • Filing Date:

    08/23/2018

  • Case Status:

    Disposed - Dismissed

  • Case Type:

    Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judges

HOLLY E. KENDIG

JON R. TAKASUGI

THOMAS D. LONG

 

Party Details

Petitioner and Plaintiff

ECONN DOUGLAS

Respondents, Defendants and Cross Plaintiffs

MATYAS MICHAEL

LOS ANGELES CITY OF

CASA BELA LLC

DOES 1-100

Defendant, Respondent and Cross Plaintiff

LOS ANGELES CITY OF

Respondent, Defendant and Cross Defendant

CASA BELA LLC

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Petitioner and Plaintiff Attorneys

MCNICHOLAS & MCNICHOLAS LLP

MCNICHOLAS JOHN PATRICK IV

Defendant and Cross Plaintiff Attorneys

PRESS MICHELLE R

FEUER MICHAEL N. CITY ATTORNEY

YOUNG MICHELLE L.

GELINI THOMAS S

 

Court Documents

Notice - NOTICE NOTICE OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE

5/17/2021: Notice - NOTICE NOTICE OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE

Order - Dismissal

5/17/2021: Order - Dismissal

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT)

5/17/2021: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT)

Declaration - DECLARATION DECLARATION OF SUE H. KIM

3/3/2021: Declaration - DECLARATION DECLARATION OF SUE H. KIM

Declaration - DECLARATION DECLARATION OF MICHAEL MATYAS

3/3/2021: Declaration - DECLARATION DECLARATION OF MICHAEL MATYAS

Motion for Summary Judgment

3/3/2021: Motion for Summary Judgment

Notice - NOTICE TABLE OF EVIDENCE AND EXHIBITS

3/3/2021: Notice - NOTICE TABLE OF EVIDENCE AND EXHIBITS

Separate Statement

3/3/2021: Separate Statement

Certificate of Mailing for - CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR (COURT ORDER RE DOCUMENT TABLE OF EVIDENCE AND EXHIBITS IN SUP...) OF 03/05/2021

3/5/2021: Certificate of Mailing for - CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR (COURT ORDER RE DOCUMENT TABLE OF EVIDENCE AND EXHIBITS IN SUP...) OF 03/05/2021

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (COURT ORDER RE DOCUMENT TABLE OF EVIDENCE AND EXHIBITS IN SUP...)

3/5/2021: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (COURT ORDER RE DOCUMENT TABLE OF EVIDENCE AND EXHIBITS IN SUP...)

Brief - BRIEF AMENDED TABLE OF EVIDENCE AND EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

3/8/2021: Brief - BRIEF AMENDED TABLE OF EVIDENCE AND EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Joinder to Motion for Summary Judgment / Adjudication

3/8/2021: Joinder to Motion for Summary Judgment / Adjudication

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (TRIAL SETTING CONFERENCE)

8/10/2020: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (TRIAL SETTING CONFERENCE)

Notice - NOTICE NOTICE OF COURT ORDER RE RESCHEDULING HEARINGS PURSUANT TO EMERGENCY ORDER RE COVID-19

7/30/2020: Notice - NOTICE NOTICE OF COURT ORDER RE RESCHEDULING HEARINGS PURSUANT TO EMERGENCY ORDER RE COVID-19

Certificate of Mailing for - CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR (COURT ORDER RE RESCHEDULING HEARINGS PURSUANT TO EMERGENCY O...) OF 07/23/2020

7/23/2020: Certificate of Mailing for - CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR (COURT ORDER RE RESCHEDULING HEARINGS PURSUANT TO EMERGENCY O...) OF 07/23/2020

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (COURT ORDER RE RESCHEDULING HEARINGS PURSUANT TO EMERGENCY O...)

7/23/2020: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (COURT ORDER RE RESCHEDULING HEARINGS PURSUANT TO EMERGENCY O...)

Notice of Posting of Jury Fees

7/14/2020: Notice of Posting of Jury Fees

Notice of Posting of Jury Fees

7/16/2020: Notice of Posting of Jury Fees

26 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 05/18/2021
  • Docketat 2:30 PM in Department 31, Thomas D. Long, Presiding; Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment - Not Held - Taken Off Calendar by Party

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  • 05/17/2021
  • Docketat 1:30 PM in Department 31, Thomas D. Long, Presiding; Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment - Not Held - Taken Off Calendar by Court

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  • 05/17/2021
  • DocketOrder - Dismissal; Filed by Court

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  • 05/17/2021
  • DocketNotice (Notice of Dismissal With Prejudice); Filed by Los Angeles, City Of (Defendant)

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  • 05/17/2021
  • DocketMinute Order ( (Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment)); Filed by Clerk

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  • 05/12/2021
  • Docketat 2:30 PM in Department 31, Thomas D. Long, Presiding; Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment - Not Held - Rescheduled by Party

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 05/12/2021
  • Docketat 1:30 PM in Department 31, Thomas D. Long, Presiding; Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment - Not Held - Rescheduled by Party

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 04/16/2021
  • Docketat 2:30 PM in Department 31, Thomas D. Long, Presiding; Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment - Not Held - Rescheduled by Party

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 04/16/2021
  • Docketat 1:30 PM in Department 31, Thomas D. Long, Presiding; Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment - Not Held - Rescheduled by Party

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 03/08/2021
  • DocketJoinder to Motion for Summary Judgment / Adjudication; Filed by Los Angeles, City Of (Defendant)

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48 More Docket Entries
  • 09/05/2018
  • DocketProof-Service/Summons; Filed by Douglas Econn (Plaintiff)

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  • 09/05/2018
  • DocketPROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

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  • 09/05/2018
  • DocketPROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

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  • 08/28/2018
  • DocketAMENDED SUMMONS

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  • 08/28/2018
  • DocketSummons; Filed by Douglas Econn (Plaintiff)

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  • 08/23/2018
  • DocketCIVIL DEPOSIT

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  • 08/23/2018
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by Douglas Econn (Plaintiff)

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  • 08/23/2018
  • DocketCOMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 08/23/2018
  • DocketNOTICE OF CASE ASSIGNMENT

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  • 08/23/2018
  • DocketSUMMONS

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Tentative Rulings

Case Number: ****9030    Hearing Date: May 17, 2021    Dept: 31

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

DOUGLAS ECONN,

Plaintiff(s),

vs.

CASA BELA, LLC, ET AL.,

Defendant(s).

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Case No.: ****9030

[TENATATIVE] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Dept. 31

1:30 p.m.

May 17, 2021

1. Background

Plaintiff, Douglass Econn filed this action against Defendants, Casa Bela, LLC, Michael Matyas, and the City of Los Angeles for damages arising out of a trip and fall on a sidewalk.

At this time, Defendants Casa Bela, LLC (“Casa Bela”) and Michael Matyas (“Matyas”) (collectively, “Defendants”) move for summary judgment. On 3/8/21, the City of Los Angeles (the “City”) filed a Joinder to Casa Bela’s and Matyas’s motion for summary judgment. As of 5/12/21, no opposition has been filed.

2. Motion for Summary Judgment

a. Moving Argument

Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because the condition that allegedly caused Plaintiff’s fall is a trivial defect as a matter of law, and because the condition was open and obvious such that Defendants owed no duty to warn of a dangerous condition.

b. Burdens on Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper “if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc. ;437c(c).) Where a defendant seeks summary judgment or adjudication, he must show that either “one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action.” (Id. at ;437c(o)(2).) A defendant may satisfy this burden by showing that the claim “cannot be established” because of the lack of evidence on some essential element of the claim. (Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 574, 590.) Once the defendant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a “triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or defense thereto.” (Ibid.)

The moving party bears the initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) A defendant moving for summary judgment must show either (1) that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established or (2) that there is a complete defense to that cause of action. (Id. at ;437c(p).) A defendant may discharge this burden by furnishing either (1) affirmative evidence of the required facts or (2) discovery responses conceding that the plaintiff lacks evidence to establish an essential element of the plaintiff's case. If a defendant chooses the latter option he or she must present evidence “and not simply point out that plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence….” Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 865-66,

[A] defendant may simply show the plaintiff cannot establish an essential element of the cause of action “by showing that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” (Id. at p. 854.) Thus, rather than affirmatively disproving or negating an element (e.g., causation), a defendant moving for summary judgment has the option of presenting evidence reflecting the plaintiff does not possess evidence to prove that element. “The defendant may, but need not, present evidence that conclusively negates an element of the plaintiff's cause of action. The defendant may also present evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence—as through admissions by the plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing” to support an essential element of his case. (Aguilar, supra, at p. 855.) Under the latter approach, a defendant's initial evidentiary showing may “consist of the deposition testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses, the plaintiff's factually devoid discovery responses, or admissions by the plaintiff in deposition or in response to requests for admission that he or she has not discovered anything that supports an essential element of the cause of action.” (Lona v. Citibank, N.A., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 110.) In other words, a defendant may show the plaintiff does not possess evidence to support an element of the cause of action by means of presenting the plaintiff's factually devoid discovery responses from which an absence of evidence may be reasonably inferred. (Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Construction Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 83.)

Thus, a moving defendant has two means by which to shift the burden of proof under the summary judgment statute: “The defendant may rely upon factually insufficient discovery responses by the plaintiff to show that the plaintiff cannot establish an essential element of the cause of action sued upon. [Citation.] [Or a]lternatively, the defendant may utilize the tried and true technique of negating (‘disproving’) an essential element of the plaintiff's cause of action.” (Brantly v. Pisaro (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1591, 1598.)

Leyva v. Garcia (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1095, 1103.

Until the moving defendant has discharged its burden of proof, the opposing plaintiff has no burden to come forward with any evidence. Once the moving defendant has discharged its burden as to a particular cause of action, however, the plaintiff may defeat the motion by producing evidence showing that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action. (Id. at ;437c(p)(2).) On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party's supporting documents are strictly construed and those of his opponent liberally construed, and doubts as to the propriety of summary judgment should be resolved against granting the motion. (D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 21.)

c. Law Governing Trivial Defect Doctrine

Defendants’ contention is that the defects in the sidewalk, if any, were trivial as a matter of law. A “dangerous condition” is a condition of property that creates a substantial risk of injury when such property is used with due care in a manner which is reasonably foreseeable. Ordinarily, the existence of a dangerous condition is a question of fact. However, it can be resolved as a question of law if reasonable minds can come but to one conclusion. It is for the Court to determine whether, as a matter of law, a given defect is not dangerous because property owners should not become insurers against injuries arising from trivial defects. Davis v. City of Pasadena (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 701, 704.

Persons who maintain walkways, whether public or private, are not required to maintain them in an absolutely perfect condition. The duty of care imposed on a property owner, even one with actual notice, does not require the repair of minor defects. The rule which permits a court to determine “triviality” as a matter of law rather than always submitting the issue to a jury provides a check valve for the elimination from the court system of unwarranted litigation which attempts to impose upon a property owner what amounts to absolute liability for injury to persons who come upon the property. “[W]hen a court determines whether a given defect is trivial, as a matter of law, the court should not rely merely upon the size of the depression. While size may be one of the most relevant factors to the decision, it is not always the sole criterion. Instead, the court should determine whether there existed any circumstances surrounding the accident which might have rendered the defect more dangerous than its mere abstract depth would indicate.” Fielder v. City of Glendale (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 719, 734; see also Ursino v. Big Boy Restaurants (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 394, 398-399; Kasparian v. AvalonBay Communities (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 11, 27.

The Fielder court, after reviewing various appellate decisions involving defective walkways, concluded that the variance in these decisions as to what size of a depression, break, or nonalignment in a sidewalk constituted a mere trivial defect could be reconciled on the basis of whether there existed aggravating factors, such as lighting, debris, or a history of other similar injuries and thus rejected a rigid application of a “tape measure” test.

In Fielder, a pedestrian, who allegedly tripped on raised edge of segment of sidewalk and suffered a fractured femur as result of her fall, sued the City of Glendale. The appellate court held that: (1) it is for court to determine whether as matter of law a given defect in a sidewalk is not dangerous and (2) where the only facts alleged concerning whether the ‘defect’ was dangerous was evidence as to the depth of the depression and no evidence was presented as to any other surrounding circumstances or to other injuries to other persons on same spot, the approximate three-quarter-inch depression in the sidewalk at issue was not dangerous as matter of law. The Fielder court also disregarded the testimony of the plaintiff's expert that the defect was dangerous, reasoning that “there is no need for expert opinion. It is well within the common knowledge of lay judges and jurors just what type of a defect in a sidewalk is dangerous.” Fielder, supra, at p. 732.

In Ursino, the plaintiff was walking on a sidewalk on the defendant’s property and tripped over the raised edge of one of the concrete sections of the sidewalk. The raised edge was no more than three-fourths of an inch, the accident occurred in the morning, the weather was fair and dry, nothing concealed the defect, the plaintiff had frequented the restaurant on an average of once per week over 15 years, the raised edge had been there for between one to five years, neither party knew of any prior similar incidents, the plaintiff’s walking pattern was affected by her age, and 32 photographs of the sidewalk area at issue confirmed, to the trial and appellate courts, that reasonable minds could not differ and that the defect was in fact trivial. Ursino, supra, at pp. 396-397.

In Kasparian, the plaintiff, an elderly tenant, had sustained serious injuries when she tripped over a recessed drain in the ground in an apartment complex. In overruling the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant based on the trivial defect doctrine, the appellate court held that the trial court only focused on the depth of the recession and ignored the recessed nature of the drain when viewed in the context of the surrounding circumstances. Kasparian’s expert stated that the hole created for the drain grate was uneven, with heights ranging from 1/32 inch to 5/16 inch. He opined that the size and profile of the depression created for the grate varied from one end to the other which posed a safety hazard to pedestrians who did not have any expectation that any drain was not flush with the surrounding brick pavers. The survey of the other drains in the immediate vicinity of the drain in question confirmed that those drain covers were flush with the brick/paver surface, and the slope to the drain was nearly level unlike the drain in question. The slope to the drain in question was dramatically more severe than that found in customary drains. Moreover, there were no warnings or color distinctions to warn pedestrians that the drain was recessed. The expert opined that the surrounding circumstances of the location of the accident made the area very hazardous given the drains from a distance appeared similar in color to the bricks/pavers, the drains were not distinguishable by color and texture from the surrounding pavers, and in the totality of the circumstances they could not be easily detected even in daylight. Kasparian, supra, at pp. 28-29.

In Caloroso, a pedestrian, who tripped over a crack in a walkway, and her husband sued the defendant property owner for personal injury and consortium damages. It was undisputed that the difference in elevation created by the crack in the walkway was less than half an inch at the highest point. Elevations ranging from three-fourths inch to one and one-half inches were found minor and trivial as a matter of law. Caloroso v. Hathaway (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 922, 927, citing Barrett v. City of Claremont (1953) 41 Cal.2d 70, 74. Following this line of cases, the Caloroso court held that the defect at issue should also have been deemed trivial as a matter of law, unless there was disputed evidence that other conditions made the walkway dangerous. In an attempt to raise a triable issue of material fact, the plaintiff submitted an expert declaration on the issue of triviality. Citing Evidence Code ;801(a), the appellate court held that no expert was needed to decide whether the size or irregular shape of the crack rendered it dangerous. The photographs of the crack submitted by both sides demonstrated that the crack was minor and any irregularity in shape was minimal. Regardless of whether a witness can be found to opine on the subject of a dangerous condition, the court must independently evaluate the circumstances. Caloroso, supra, at p. 928, citing Davis v. City of Pasadena (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 701, 705. The appellate court also found no foundation for the plaintiff’s expert’s opinion that noncompliance with certain building codes and standards made the crack dangerous. The expert failed to indicate that the codes and standards cited had been accepted as the proper standard in California for safe sidewalks. Moreover, there was no indication regarding whether such codes applied to existing walkways as opposed to new construction. Thus, the trial court properly concluded that the defect was trivial as a matter of law, and summary judgment was appropriate. Caloroso, supra, at p. 929.

d. Analysis re: Trivial Defect

Defendants asserts that Plainitff claims he was walking on a sidewalk when he tripped over damaged, dislodged, or missing brick tiles on a sidewalk. (UMF 4, 8.)

Defendants provide evidence showing that the alleged condition measured approximately ½ inch. (UMF 23.) Defendants aver Plaintiff’s photos taken at or near the time of the fall show that the view of the condition was not obstructed from either direction, there were no branches or leaves covering the area, there was no business placard, debris, or other obstruction. (UMF 15.) Further, Defendants assert the color difference between the red tiles and missing tiiles was plainly visible in both shade and sunlight, but that it was daylight when the incident occurred and there was pleasnt weather. (UMF 10, 12, 17-18.) In addition, there were no other accidents involving the condition before or after Plaintiff’s fall. (UMF 24.)

The foregoing is sufficient, under the standards discussed above, to meet the moving burden to show Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff, however, does not oppose the motion and thus necessarily fails to meet the shifted burden.

Based on the foregoing, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the ground the alleged condition was trivial as a matter of law.

e. Open and Obvious

The elements of a negligence and premises liability cause of action are the same: duty, breach, causation, and damages. (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.) Those who own, possess, or control property generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in managing the property in order to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm. (Annocki v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 37.) To determine the existence and scope of duty, courts consider the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, and the extent of the burden to the defendant of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach. (Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 113.)

“Generally, if a danger is so obvious that a person could reasonably be expected to see it, the condition itself serves as a warning, and the landowner is under no further duty to remedy or warn of the condition.” (Krongos v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 387, 393.) The Court may, in appropriate circumstances, determine a condition is open and obvious where “photographs prima facie established the obviousness” of the condition. (Martinez, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1184.) In examining photographs, the court should consider: (1) the photograph’s subject (i.e., its focal point); (2) the view of the subject (e.g., close-up, distant isolated, in context); (3) the photograph’s perspective (e.g., eye-level, overhead, ground-level); (4) the use of any plain-view altering devices (e.g., camera color filter, fish-eye lens, computer-manipulation); (5) the characteristics of the photograph (e.g., sharp and clear, blurry, grainy, color or black and white); (6) whether the photograph was taken under identical or substantially similar conditions (e.g., timing, lighting, weather); and (7) any other relevant circumstances (e.g., addition of extrinsic aids, such as a ruler or pointer). (Kasparian v. AvalonBay Communities, Inc. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 11, 24-25.)

Nonetheless, the obviousness of a danger “may obviate the duty to warn of its existence,” but if “if it is foreseeable that the danger may cause injury despite the fact that it is obvious (e.g, when necessity requires persons to encounter it), there may be a duty to remedy the danger, and the breach of that duty may in turn form the basis for liability . . .” (Osborn v. Mission Ready Mix (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 104, 122.)

Foreseeability is an elastic factor, and the degree of foreseeability necessary to warrant a finding of a duty will vary from case to case. (Lopez v. McDonald’s Corp. (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 495, 509.) In determining whether a given harm was foreseeable, “it is necessary to review the ‘totality of the circumstances’ including the nature, condition and location of the defendant's premises [Citation], in light of the firmly established rule that ‘what is required to be foreseeable is the general character of the event or harm ... not its precise nature or manner of occurrence. [Citations.]’ ” (Id.)

In this case, Defendants submit evidence showing that at the time of the incident, the weather was clear and it was not raining. (UMF 10, 12.) Further, Plaintiff’s photos reveal the condition was not obstructed, and that the color difference between the red and missing tiles was obvious in the shade and sunlight. (UMF 15, 17-18.) The photographs submitted by Defendants show the condition was plainly visible and there were was nothing obstructing the view of the condition. (Mot. Table of Evidence, Exhs. B-E.)

This evidence is sufficient to show the condition was open and obvious as a matter of law, and that Defendants thus, owed no duty to warn Plainitff about the condition. Plaintiff does not oppose the motion and so fails to raise a triable issue of material fact.

Therefore, Defendants are also entitled to summary judgment on the ground they owed no duty to warn Plaintiff.

f. Conclusion

Defendants met their moving burden to show the defect at issue was trivial as a matter of law. Plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of material fact. Defendants motion for summary judgment is granted. The City’s joinder is also granted.

Moving Defendants are ordered to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at sscdept31@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If the parties do not submit on the tentative, they should arrange to appear remotely.

Dated this 17th day of May, 2021

Hon. Thomas D. Long

Judge of the Superior Court


Case Number: ****9030    Hearing Date: May 18, 2021    Dept: 31

ECourt shows a motion for summary judgment in Econn v. Casa Bela, ****9030, set for 5-18.  However, the only msj filed in this matter is noticed for 5-17, for which a hearing is already scheduled.  It appears the 5-18 hearing may have been scheduled by mistake. 


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