DIONNE GRAHAM VS LOS ANGELES COUNT MTA

Tentative Rulings

Case Number: ****8722 Hearing Date: May 4, 2022 Dept: 37

LOS ANGELES COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT

On April 4. 2022, Cross-Complainant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) filed a request for a statement of decision regarding the court’s decision on the MTA’s Cross-Complaint. It specifically requested the following issues be addressed:

1. Whether the statute of limitations barred the cross-complaint for breach of contract when:

a. The statute of limitations was four years. (C.C.P. 337.)

b. The statute began running on April 25, 2017, when the complaint was filed.

c. The statute was tolled from April 6, 2020 to October 1, 2020 due to the pandemic, thus extending the expiration date of the statute in this case from April 25, 2021 to October 19, 2021. (Emergency Rule 9 (a).)

d. The MTA filed its motion for leave to file a cross-complaint on April 8, 2021, and the motion was subsequently approved, and the cross-complaint was ordered filed by this Court on May 14, 2021.

2. Whether the statute of limitations barred the cross-complaint for breach of contract when the cross-complaint arose out of the same transaction or occurrence as the original action and the statute had not run when the original action was filed.

3. Whether the statute of limitations barred the cross-complaint for breach of contract when the MTA attached its cross-complaint to its motion for leave to file a cross-complaint, filed April 8, 2021, and the Court granted the motion, giving the cross-complaint an effective filing date of April 8, 2021.

On April 21, Cross-Defendant Dionne Graham filed a responsive request for a statement of decision relating to the Cross-Complaint. Graham asked the court to address the following issues:

1. Whether MTA’s Cross-Complaint for breach of contract continues to be barred by the statute of limitations, notwithstanding Emergency Rule 9(a), when:

a. The statute of limitations was four years;

b. The statute of limitations began running on April 25, 2017, when Graham filed her complaint;

c. MTA filed an Answer to the Complaint on August 21, 2017 and did not include its breach of contract claim in its Answer or as an affirmative defense;

d. The effective date that MTA filed its Cross-Complaint was May 14, 2021; and

e. MTA failed to present Emergency Rule 9(a) as a defense to the Court barring the Cross-Complaint on statute of limitations grounds prior to the case being submitted to the jury for deliberation, thereby waiving this defense.

2. Whether Graham’s motion for nonsuit or, in the alternative, directed verdict should have been granted when:

a. MTA failed to put forth substantial evidence at trial to support its breach of contract claim in its Cross-Complaint;

b. Graham testified at trial that, when signing the compromise and release, she crossed out and initialed the sentence that stated, “I agree that this agreement settles any and all claims against LACMTA, including but not limited to any FEHA/EEOC, or ADA claims;”

c. Graham testified at trial that she was settling her workers’ compensation claims only when signing the compromise and release, and MTA failed to put forth any evidence to the contrary;

d. The compromise and release at issue covered several different workers’ compensation claims over the span of a decade, and any back pay the settlement amount covered was attributed to payment for work done in the past that was withheld at the time; and

e. In Claxton v. Waters, the Supreme Court of California held that “the standard language of the preprinted form used in settling workers’ compensation claims releases only those claims that are within the scope of the workers’ compensation system, and does not apply to claims asserted in separate civil claims.” Claxton v. Waters, 34 Cal.4th 367, 376 (2004).

To some extent the issues to be addressed overlap. In addition, if the court were to change its ruling on the expiration of the statute of limitations, the court would be obligated to address the issues it did not decide in Cross-Defendant’s Motion for Nonsuit or, in the alternative, directed verdict that it did not reach because of the statute of limitations ruling.

A. Statute of Limitations

The Cross-Complaint was based on a breach of a written agreement. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, the statute of limitations was four years. (C.C.P. 337.) Under the MTA’s theory of the Cross-Complaint, the contract was breached when Plaintiff filed her complaint on April 25, 2017, for violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act and seeking damages for lost wages as a result of those violations. Four years from that date was April 25, 2021.

It is undisputed that the MTA filed a “Motion for Leave to File a Cross-Complaint” on April 8, 2021, that attached a proposed Cross-Complaint. The court granted that motion on May 14, 2021 allowing the MTA to file a Cross-Complaint within 10 days, which it did. However, that was after April 25, so the Cross-Complaint was not filed until after the 4-year statute in the CCP had run.

At no time prior to filing the request for a statement of decision did the MTA mention the Judicial Council’s emergency rule 9(a) in the many arguments about filing the Cross-Complaint or its effect on the litigation, or in the preparation for trial, in the requested jury instructions or in opposition to Cross-Defendant’s motion for a directed verdict. Cross-Defendant argues that MTA has waived application of emergency rule 9(a) by failing to raise it before the court ruled on Cross-Defendant’s motion. While a responsive pleading that fails to specify both the applicable statute and subdivision “raise[s] no issue and present[s] no defense.” (Davenport v. Stratton (1944) 24 Cal.2d 232, 246-247,—plea that action barred by CCP 339 not sufficient because that statute contains several subdivisions; Brown v. World Church (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 684, 691.) However, this is a slightly different situation. All the parties’ arguments about whether the Cross-Complaint was filed late fail to address the emergency rule. Arguably, the failure to raise the extended statute earlier could be deemed to be invited error. Nevertheless, proper application of emergency rule 9(a) would have prevented the statute of limitations from barring the cross complaint.

Accordingly, the court finds that the statute of limitations does not bar the Cross-Complaint, and the court must now address the rest of Cross-Defendant’s motion for nonsuit or a directed verdict.

B. Nonsuit

As stated several times during the trial, neither side presented any extrinsic evidence to create or explain the meaning of the terms of the Settlement Agreement entered into in the related workers’ compensation proceedings (Agreement) that were the subject of the Cross-Complaint, so the interpretation of the Agreement is a matter of law for the court to decide based on the language of the Agreement. “The interpretation of a contract is a question of law unless the interpretation turns on the credibility of extrinsic evidence. (Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 18, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 900 P.2d 19; De Guere v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 482, 501, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 438.) (Sierra Vista Regional Medical Center v. Bonta (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 237, 245.)

First, the Agreement was amended by interlineation to make it clear that Plaintiff would be allowed to file her FEHA claims. Therefore, filing a FEHA claim clearly was not a breach of the Agreement.

Second, the language of the Agreement did not purport to bar damage claims arising after the date of the Agreement, such as future lost wages that are commonly sought in FEHA cases. While Plaintiff agreed not to apply for positions with the MTA, the provision relating to back pay did not contain a covenant not to sue. Therefore, suing for the back pay settled in the Agreement would not breach any terms of the Agreement, even if the Agreement was a defense to collecting them. For that reason, Cross-Defendant’s motion for nonsuit or directed verdict as to the Cross Complaint for breach of the Agreement is granted.

Having ruled on those grounds, the court declines to address any other issues raised as they do not affect that conclusion.

C. Judgment

The MTA was previously ordered to prepare a judgment based on the jury verdict. It is now ordered to include in the judgment the following language:

“On Cross-Complainant’s Cross-Complaint, judgment shall be entered for Cross-Defendant Graham and against Cross-Complainant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, which shall recover nothing on its Cross-Complaint.”

Dated: May 2, 2022

Richard J. Burdge, Jr.

Superior Court Judge

Case Number: ****8722 Hearing Date: May 2, 2022 Dept: 37

LOS ANGELES COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT

On April 4. 2022, Cross-Complainant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) filed a request for a statement of decision regarding the court’s decision on the MTA’s Cross-Complaint. It specifically requested the following issues be addressed:

1. Whether the statute of limitations barred the cross-complaint for breach of contract when:

a. The statute of limitations was four years. (C.C.P. 337.)

b. The statute began running on April 25, 2017, when the complaint was filed.

c. The statute was tolled from April 6, 2020 to October 1, 2020 due to the pandemic, thus extending the expiration date of the statute in this case from April 25, 2021 to October 19, 2021. (Emergency Rule 9 (a).)

d. The MTA filed its motion for leave to file a cross-complaint on April 8, 2021, and the motion was subsequently approved, and the cross-complaint was ordered filed by this Court on May 14, 2021.

2. Whether the statute of limitations barred the cross-complaint for breach of contract when the cross-complaint arose out of the same transaction or occurrence as the original action and the statute had not run when the original action was filed.

3. Whether the statute of limitations barred the cross-complaint for breach of contract when the MTA attached its cross-complaint to its motion for leave to file a cross-complaint, filed April 8, 2021, and the Court granted the motion, giving the cross-complaint an effective filing date of April 8, 2021.

On April 21, Cross-Defendant Dionne Graham filed a responsive request for a statement of decision relating to the Cross-Complaint. Graham asked the court to address the following issues:

1. Whether MTA’s Cross-Complaint for breach of contract continues to be barred by the statute of limitations, notwithstanding Emergency Rule 9(a), when:

a. The statute of limitations was four years;

b. The statute of limitations began running on April 25, 2017, when Graham filed her complaint;

c. MTA filed an Answer to the Complaint on August 21, 2017 and did not include its breach of contract claim in its Answer or as an affirmative defense;

d. The effective date that MTA filed its Cross-Complaint was May 14, 2021; and

e. MTA failed to present Emergency Rule 9(a) as a defense to the Court barring the Cross-Complaint on statute of limitations grounds prior to the case being submitted to the jury for deliberation, thereby waiving this defense.

2. Whether Graham’s motion for nonsuit or, in the alternative, directed verdict should have been granted when:

a. MTA failed to put forth substantial evidence at trial to support its breach of contract claim in its Cross-Complaint;

b. Graham testified at trial that, when signing the compromise and release, she crossed out and initialed the sentence that stated, “I agree that this agreement settles any and all claims against LACMTA, including but not limited to any FEHA/EEOC, or ADA claims;”

c. Graham testified at trial that she was settling her workers’ compensation claims only when signing the compromise and release, and MTA failed to put forth any evidence to the contrary;

d. The compromise and release at issue covered several different workers’ compensation claims over the span of a decade, and any back pay the settlement amount covered was attributed to payment for work done in the past that was withheld at the time; and

e. In Claxton v. Waters, the Supreme Court of California held that “the standard language of the preprinted form used in settling workers’ compensation claims releases only those claims that are within the scope of the workers’ compensation system, and does not apply to claims asserted in separate civil claims.” Claxton v. Waters, 34 Cal.4th 367, 376 (2004).

To some extent the issues to be addressed overlap. In addition, if the court were to change its ruling on the expiration of the statute of limitations, the court would be obligated to address the issues it did not decide in Cross-Defendant’s Motion for Nonsuit or, in the alternative, directed verdict that it did not reach because of the statute of limitations ruling.

A. Statute of Limitations

The Cross-Complaint was based on a breach of a written agreement. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, the statute of limitations was four years. (C.C.P. 337.) Under the MTA’s theory of the Cross-Complaint, the contract was breached when Plaintiff filed her complaint on April 25, 2017, for violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act and seeking damages for lost wages as a result of those violations. Four years from that date was April 25, 2021.

It is undisputed that the MTA filed a “Motion for Leave to File a Cross-Complaint” on April 8, 2021, that attached a proposed Cross-Complaint. The court granted that motion on May 14, 2021 allowing the MTA to file a Cross-Complaint within 10 days, which it did. However, that was after April 25, so the Cross-Complaint was not filed until after the 4-year statute in the CCP had run.

At no time prior to filing the request for a statement of decision did the MTA mention the Judicial Council’s emergency rule 9(a) in the many arguments about filing the Cross-Complaint or its effect on the litigation, or in the preparation for trial, in the requested jury instructions or in opposition to Cross-Defendant’s motion for a directed verdict. Cross-Defendant argues that MTA has waived application of emergency rule 9(a) by failing to raise it before the court ruled on Cross-Defendant’s motion. While a responsive pleading that fails to specify both the applicable statute and subdivision “raise[s] no issue and present[s] no defense.” (Davenport v. Stratton (1944) 24 Cal.2d 232, 246-247,—plea that action barred by CCP 339 not sufficient because that statute contains several subdivisions; Brown v. World Church (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 684, 691.) However, this is a slightly different situation. All the parties’ arguments about whether the Cross-Complaint was filed late fail to address the emergency rule. Arguably, the failure to raise the extended statute earlier could be deemed to be invited error. Nevertheless, proper application of emergency rule 9(a) would have prevented the statute of limitations from barring the cross complaint.

Accordingly, the court finds that the statute of limitations does not bar the Cross-Complaint, and the court must now address the rest of Cross-Defendant’s motion for nonsuit or a directed verdict.

B. Nonsuit

As stated several times during the trial, neither side presented any extrinsic evidence to create or explain the meaning of the terms of the Settlement Agreement entered into in the related workers’ compensation proceedings (Agreement) that were the subject of the Cross-Complaint, so the interpretation of the Agreement is a matter of law for the court to decide based on the language of the Agreement. “The interpretation of a contract is a question of law unless the interpretation turns on the credibility of extrinsic evidence. (Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 18, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 900 P.2d 19; De Guere v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 482, 501, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 438.) (Sierra Vista Regional Medical Center v. Bonta (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 237, 245.)

First, the Agreement was amended by interlineation to make it clear that Plaintiff would be allowed to file her FEHA claims. Therefore, filing a FEHA claim clearly was not a breach of the Agreement.

Second, the language of the Agreement did not purport to bar damage claims arising after the date of the Agreement, such as future lost wages that are commonly sought in FEHA cases. While Plaintiff agreed not to apply for positions with the MTA, the provision relating to back pay did not contain a covenant not to sue. Therefore, suing for the back pay settled in the Agreement would not breach any terms of the Agreement, even if the Agreement was a defense to collecting them. For that reason, Cross-Defendant’s motion for nonsuit or directed verdict as to the Cross Complaint for breach of the Agreement is granted.

Having ruled on those grounds, the court declines to address any other issues raised as they do not affect that conclusion.

C. Judgment

The MTA was previously ordered to prepare a judgment based on the jury verdict. It is now ordered to include in the judgment the following language:

“On Cross-Complainant’s Cross-Complaint, judgment shall be entered for Cross-Defendant Graham and against Cross-Complainant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, which shall recover nothing on its Cross-Complaint.”

Dated: May 2, 2022

Richard J. Burdge, Jr.

Superior Court Judge

Case Number: ****8722    Hearing Date: May 14, 2021    Dept: 37

HEARING DATE: May 14, 2021

CASE NUMBER: ****8722

CASE NAME: Dionne Graham v. Los Angeles County MTA

MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Los Angeles County MTA

OPPOSING PARTY: Plaintiff, Dionne Graham

TRIAL DATE: October 26, 2021

PROOF OF SERVICE: OK

MOTION: Motion for Leave to File Cross Complaint

OPPOSITION: May 3, 2021

REPLY: May 7, 2021

TENTATIVE: LACMTA’s motion is granted. LACMTA is to file the proposed cross-complaint within 10 days. LACMTA is to give notice.

Background

This action arises in connection with Plaintiff, Dionne Graham’s (“Plaintiff”) employment with Defendant, Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (“LACMTA”) as a bus operator. Plaintiff alleges that she was hired on February 2, 2002 and worked for over thirteen (13) years. Plaintiff was allegedly injured while performing her duties when another vehicle rear-ended her while she was stopped to pick up passengers. According to the Complaint, Plaintiff suffered physical disabilities as a result of these injuries and required accommodations for work restrictions. Plaintiff alleged informed LACMTA that she required these accommodations and instead of providing them, LACMTA placed her on a medical leave of absence and terminated her while she was on leave.

Plaintiff’s Complaint, filed April 25, 2017, alleges the following causes of action: (1) unlawful discrimination pursuant to the Fair Employment Housing Act (“FEHA”), (2) failure to engage in a timely, good faith interactive process to determine effective reasonable accommodation in violation of the FEHA, (3) failure to provide reasonable accommodation under the FEHA, (4) employment discrimination (retaliation) in violation of the FEHA, (5) failure to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination from occurring in violation of the FEHA.

On February 22, 2019, LACMTA’s motion for summary judgment or in the alternative, summary adjudication was granted as to Plaintiff’s first, fourth, and fifth causes of action. On April 29, 2020, the court continued trial for this matter from June 9, 2020 to February 16, 2021 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

On February 9, 2021, the court held a Final Status Conference in this case. Pursuant to the request of LACMTA, trial was continued to October 26, 2021.

On April 8, 2021, LACMTA filed the instant motion for leave to file a cross-complaint. Plaintiff filed its opposition on May 3, 2021 and LACMTA filed its reply on May 7, 2021.

Discussion

1. Legal Authority

    

   Generally, parties must file a cross-complaint against the party who filed the complaint before or at the same time as the answer to the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., ; 428.50, subd. (a).)  Any other cross-complaint may be filed at any time before the court has set a date for trial.  (Id. ; 428.50, subd. (b).)  Parties may seek leave of the court to file an untimely cross-complaint, and leave may be granted in the interest of justice at any time during the course of the action.  (Id. ; 428.50, subd. (c).)   

2. Analysis

LACMTA seeks leave to file a cross-complaint against Plaintiff alleging that Plaintiff has breached a 2015 worker’s compensation settlement agreement with LACMTA. (Motion, 1-2.) LACMTA contends that leave to file a cross-complaint should be granted because the cross-complaint is compulsory, as it arises out of the same set of facts as Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Motion, 3-4.) LACMTA also submits a declaration from Nohemi Gutierrez Ferguson (“Gutierrez Ferguson”) in support of its motion.

Gutierrez Ferguson attests that on November 23, 2015, Plaintiff settled her worker’s compensation claims with LACMTA, agreeing to never again work for LACMTA. (Gutierrez Ferguson Decl. ¶ 6.) Further, Plaintiff allegedly confirmed through this settlement that she had not suffered any other injuries while employed by Defendant. (Id.) According, Plaintiff executed a settlement agreement on December 3, 2015 to settle all worker’s compensation claims against LACMTA. (Gutierrez Ferguson Decl. ¶ 7.) Gutierrez Ferguson attests that the proposed Cross-Complaint will bring the 2015 settlement agreement to the court’s attention. (Gutierrez Ferguson Decl. ¶ 11.)

In opposition, Plaintiff first contends that the Cross-Complaint is not compulsory because the 2015 settlement agreement pertains to worker’s compensation claims, which are separate from those alleged in this action. (Opposition, 2.) Additionally, Plaintiff contends that the interests of justice weigh in favor of denying the motion, as LACMTA seeks to file the Cross-Complaint five months before trial and a trial continuance may be required to “fully litigate” the cross-complaint. (Opposition, 3.) Finally, Plaintiff contends that the motion should be denied because LACMTA did not demonstrate how failure its failure to file the cross-complaint at the time of answer was the result of inadvertence, mistake or neglect. (Opposition, 3-4.)

In reply, LACMTA contends that there is no requirement to demonstrate failure to file a cross-complaint due to oversight, mistake, or neglect prior to the court granting a motion for leave to file a cross-complaint. (Reply, 2-3.) In addition, LACMTA contends that the interest of justice weigh in favor of permitting the cross-complaint to be filed because there exists ample time to conduct discovery and Plaintiff is aware of the issues LACMTA seeks to present in the cross-complaint. (Reply, 3-4.)

The court agrees with LACMTA that the proposed cross-complaint arises out of the same facts as Plaintiff’s Complaint. The proposed cross-complaint alleges that Plaintiff impermissibly seeks recovery of medical expenses and emotional distress damages in connection with her employment at LACMTA, and that recovery of such damages is barred by the 2015 settlement agreement. Additionally, trial is approximately five and a half months away, which is sufficient time to conduct discovery on the issues in the proposed cross-complaint. Thus, permitting LACMTA to assert these claims in a cross-complaint in the same action would be in the interest of justice.

Conclusion

LACMTA’s motion is granted. LACMTA is to file the proposed cross-complaint within 10 days. LACMTA is to give notice.