This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 10/01/2020 at 11:30:13 (UTC).

DESTILLERIA EL PANDILLO S A DE C V VS CORAZON AZUL SPIRITS I

Case Summary

On 05/22/2018 DESTILLERIA EL PANDILLO S A DE C filed a Contract - Other Contract lawsuit against VS CORAZON AZUL SPIRITS I. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judges overseeing this case are HOLLY E. KENDIG and ELAINE LU. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****6466

  • Filing Date:

    05/22/2018

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Contract - Other Contract

  • Court:

    Los Angeles County Superior Courts

  • Courthouse:

    Stanley Mosk Courthouse

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judges

HOLLY E. KENDIG

ELAINE LU

 

Party Details

Plaintiffs and Petitioners

DESTILERIA EL PANDILLO S.A. DE C.V.

C.V. DESTILERIA EL PANDILLO S.A. DE

Defendants, Respondents and Cross Plaintiffs

GONZALEZ RODOLFO

CORAZON AZUL SPIRITS INC.

DOES 1-100

COLONY HOUSE LIQUOR INC. (DOE13)

VENDOME WINE & SPIRITS (DOE14)

GEORGIA'S LIQUOR (DOE3)

CLAMS BOTTLE HOUSE (DOE8)

RAMIREZ LIQUOR & KEGS DELIVERY (DOE16)

PAT HOLDEN'S LIQUOR AND GIFT SHOP (DOE9)

TOP SHELF WINE & SPIRITS INC. (DOE7)

SANTA MONICA LIQUOR (DOE12)

COUNTRY WINE & SPIRITS INC. (DOE6)

HOLIDAY WINE CELLAR (DOE5)

VENDOME WINE & SPIRITS-BEVERLY HILLS

OLD TOWN LIQUOR (DOE 1)

WADE'S WINES INC. (DOE4)

TEXAS WINE & SPIRITS (DOE2)

BEVERLY HILLS LIQUOR & WINES (DOE11)

Plaintiff and Cross Defendant

C.V. DESTILERIA EL PANDILLO S.A. DE

1 More Parties Available

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff and Petitioner Attorneys

MERRILL LISBETH BOSSHARD

LAZO MARC Y. ESQ.

MERRILL LISBETH BOSSHART ESQ.

LAZO MARC YOUSSEF

LAZO MARC

Defendant Attorneys

SCHINDLER ERIC J

FRALEY LINDLEY PAIGE

Plaintiff and Cross Defendant Attorneys

LAZO MARC YOUSSEF

LAZO MARC

 

Court Documents

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (TRIAL SETTING CONFERENCE)

7/21/2020: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (TRIAL SETTING CONFERENCE)

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (COURT ORDER)

3/23/2020: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (COURT ORDER)

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON DEMURRER - WITH MOTION TO STRIKE (CCP 430.10))

2/14/2020: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON DEMURRER - WITH MOTION TO STRIKE (CCP 430.10))

Notice - NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER TO CROSS-COMPLAINT

2/6/2020: Notice - NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER TO CROSS-COMPLAINT

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON EX PARTE APPLICATION TO EXTEND MEDIATION COMPLETIO...)

11/20/2019: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON EX PARTE APPLICATION TO EXTEND MEDIATION COMPLETIO...)

Summons - SUMMONS ON CROSS COMPLAINT

8/16/2019: Summons - SUMMONS ON CROSS COMPLAINT

Declaration - DECLARATION RE STATUS OF DOE DEFENDANTS

5/28/2019: Declaration - DECLARATION RE STATUS OF DOE DEFENDANTS

Certificate of Mailing for - CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR MINUTE ORDER (CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE) OF 05/31/2019

5/31/2019: Certificate of Mailing for - CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FOR MINUTE ORDER (CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE) OF 05/31/2019

Motion to Deem RFA's Admitted

4/18/2019: Motion to Deem RFA's Admitted

Request for Dismissal

2/5/2019: Request for Dismissal

Case Management Statement

10/29/2018: Case Management Statement

AMENDMENT TO COMPLAINT -

8/27/2018: AMENDMENT TO COMPLAINT -

AMENDMENT TO COMPLAINT -

8/27/2018: AMENDMENT TO COMPLAINT -

NOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

6/20/2018: NOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

NOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE & OSC RE PROOF OF SERVICE

6/1/2018: NOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE & OSC RE PROOF OF SERVICE

COMPLAINT FOR: 1. BREACH OF WRITTEN CONTRACT ;ETC

5/22/2018: COMPLAINT FOR: 1. BREACH OF WRITTEN CONTRACT ;ETC

89 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 11/30/2020
  • Hearing11/30/2020 at 09:30 AM in Department 26 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Non-Jury Trial

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  • 11/17/2020
  • Hearing11/17/2020 at 09:00 AM in Department 26 at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Final Status Conference

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  • 07/27/2020
  • DocketNotice of Ruling; Filed by Destileria El Pandillo S.A. De C.V. (Plaintiff)

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  • 07/21/2020
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department 26, Elaine Lu, Presiding; Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses

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  • 07/21/2020
  • Docketat 08:30 AM in Department 26, Elaine Lu, Presiding; Trial Setting Conference - Held - Continued

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  • 07/21/2020
  • Docketat 1:28 PM in Department 26, Elaine Lu, Presiding; Nunc Pro Tunc Order

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  • 07/21/2020
  • DocketMinute Order ( (Nunc Pro Tunc Order)); Filed by Clerk

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  • 07/21/2020
  • DocketMinute Order ( (Trial Setting Conference)); Filed by Clerk

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  • 07/21/2020
  • DocketCertificate of Mailing for ((Trial Setting Conference) of 07/21/2020, FSC order); Filed by Clerk

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  • 07/21/2020
  • DocketCertificate of Mailing for ((Nunc Pro Tunc Order) of 07/21/2020); Filed by Clerk

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122 More Docket Entries
  • 06/20/2018
  • DocketNOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

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  • 06/19/2018
  • DocketProof-Service/Summons; Filed by Destileria El Pandillo S.A. De C.V. (Plaintiff)

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  • 06/19/2018
  • DocketPROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

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  • 06/19/2018
  • DocketPROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

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  • 06/19/2018
  • DocketProof-Service/Summons; Filed by Destileria El Pandillo S.A. De C.V. (Plaintiff)

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  • 06/01/2018
  • DocketNOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE & OSC RE PROOF OF SERVICE

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  • 06/01/2018
  • DocketNotice of Case Management Conference; Filed by Clerk

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  • 05/22/2018
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by Destileria El Pandillo S.A. De C.V. (Plaintiff)

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  • 05/22/2018
  • DocketSUMMONS

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  • 05/22/2018
  • DocketCOMPLAINT FOR: 1. BREACH OF WRITTEN CONTRACT ;ETC

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Tentative Rulings

Case Number: BC706466    Hearing Date: February 14, 2020    Dept: 26

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 26

destileria el pandillo s.a. de c.v.,

Plaintiff,

v.

corazon azul spirits, inc., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: BC706466

Hearing Date: February 14, 2020

[TENTATIVE] order RE:

Cross-Defendant’S Demurrer and motion to strike the cross-complaint

Background

On May 22, 2018, Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Destileria el Pandillo S.A. de C.V. (“Cross-Defendant”) filed the complaint in this action against Corazon Azul Spirits, Inc. (“Corazon”), Rodolfo Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”), and Does 1 through 100 for the alleged failure to pay pursuant to a purchase agreement between the parties for tequila that Plaintiff imported for Defendants’ company in 2016.

On August 20, 2018, Gonzalez filed an answer to the underlying complaint in his personal capacity.

At a case-management conference on October 29, 2018, Gonzalez stated that the corporation Corazon Azul Spirits is no longer an existing corporation. (Minute Order 10/29/18.)

A default was entered against Corazon Azul Spirits, Inc. on February 5, 2019.

At a case-management conference on May 31, 2019, Gonzalez raised the possibility that he may wish to file a cross-complaint. The Court advised that if that was his intention, Gonzalez was to file a noticed motion for leave to file a Cross-Complaint as soon as possible. (Minute Order 5/31/19.)

Gonzalez did not file a motion seeking leave to file a Cross-Complaint as advised. Instead, on July 1, 2019, “Gonzalez, individually and dba CORAZON AZUL SPIRITS” filed a Cross-Complaint against Destileria el Pandillo S.A. de C.V. without leave of Court. On September 30, 2019, Cross-Defendant filed the instant demurrer and motion to strike. Cross-Complainant has not filed any opposition.

Request for Judicial Notice

Cross-Defendant’s request that the Court take judicial notice of the entry of Default of Corazon Azul Spirits, Inc. on February 5, 2019, is GRANTED. (See CCP § 452(d).)

Corazon Azul Spirits, Inc.

There is a discrepancy in the record as to the status of Corazon Azul Spirits. At a case-management conference on October 29, 2018, Gonzalez stated that the corporation Corazon Azul Spirits was at that time no longer an existing corporation. (Minute Order 10/29/18.) Gonzalez’s statement to the court implies that at one time Corazon Azul Spirits was an existing corporation, not merely a fictitious business name of Gonzalez. However, the Cross-Complaint alleges that Corazon Azul Spirits is simply Gonzalez’s fictitious business name. (Cross-Complaint ¶ 1.)

To the extent that the Cross-Complaint purports to be brought by Corazon Azul Spirits, Inc. as a corporation, the Court strikes Corazon Azul Spirits, Inc. from the Cross-Complaint.[1] Corazon Azul Spirits, Inc. was in default at the time of filing of the Cross-Complaint. Thus, it had no standing to file the Cross-Complaint. (See Harbour Vista, LLC v. HSBC Mortgage Services Inc. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1496, 1513 (“The entry of a default terminates a defendant’s rights to take any further affirmative steps in the litigation until either its default is set aside or a default judgment is entered. [citations] A defendant against whom a default has been entered is out of court and is not entitled to take any further steps in the cause affecting plaintiff’s right of action; he cannot thereafter, until such default is set aside in a proper proceeding, file pleadings or move for a new trial or demand notice of subsequent proceedings.”).) Thus, the Court grants Cross-Defendant’s motion to strike Corazon Azul Spirits, Inc. from the Cross-Complaint on this basis.

Moreover, though a corporation has the capacity to bring a lawsuit because it has all the powers of a natural person in carrying out its business, under a long-standing common law rule of procedure, a corporation, unlike a natural person, cannot represent itself before courts of record in propria persona, nor can it represent itself through a corporate officer, director or other employee who is not an attorney. (CLD Const., Inc. v. City of San Ramon (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1145.) “[A Corporation] must be represented by licensed counsel in proceedings before courts of record. (Id.; Gutierrez v. G & M Oil Co., Inc. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 551, 564; Thomas G. Ferruzzo, Inc. v. Superior Court (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 501, 503.)

Here, The Cross-Complaint does not include a caption setting forth the name, address, telephone number, fax number and email address, and State Bar membership number of any attorney for Corazon Azul Spirits, Inc. (Cross-Complaint, p. 1.) This information is required by CRC Rule 2.111(1). Instead, the Cross-Complaint is signed by Cross-Complainant Rodolfo Gonzalez in pro per. (Id. at p. 7.) Gonzalez is not an attorney and therefore cannot represent Corazon Azul Spirits, Inc. Accordingly, on this independent ground, the Court strikes Corazon Azul Spirits, Inc. from the cross-complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 436(b).

Legal Standard

Meet and Confer Requirement

CCP Section 430.41(a) requires that “[b]efore filing a demurrer pursuant to this chapter, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Emphasis added.) The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (C.C.P. § 430.41, subd. (a)(2).) The demurring party must also file and serve a declaration detailing the meet and confer efforts. (Id. at subd. (a)(3).)  If an amended pleading is filed, the parties must meet and confer again before a demurrer may be filed to the amended pleading. (Id. at subd. (a).)

Demurrer Standard

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal 3d 311, 318.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no “speaking demurrers”).

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal. App. 4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Ct. (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.) “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

A special demurrer for uncertainty, Code of Civil Procedure §430.10(f), is disfavored and will only be sustained where the pleading is so bad that defendant cannot reasonably respond—i.e., cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against him/her. (Khoury v. Maly’s of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Moreover, even if the pleading is somewhat vague, “ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Ibid.)

Motion to Strike Standard

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (C.C.P. § 435(b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1322(b).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (C.C.P. §§ 436(a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].)

Discussion

Failure to Request Leave to File Cross Complaint

As a preliminary matter the Court notes that it is within its discretion to strike the entirety of the Cross-Complaint for failure to obtain leave to file a cross-complaint. (See CCP § 436(b); see also Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 528.) Here, the Court expressly advised Gonzalez of the requirement that he seek leave of court to file a cross-complaint because he did not file the cross-complaint concurrently with his answer. (Minute Order 5/31/19.) Therefore, Cross-Defendant’s motion to strike the Cross-Complaint is granted on this basis.

However, for the sake of judicial efficiency the Court will also proceed to address the merits of Cross-Defendant’s demurrer as it may provide guidance for Gonzalez in the event that he successfully seeks leave to file an amended cross-complaint.

Meet and Confer Requirement

The Court finds that Defendant has complied with the meet and confer requirement. (See Lazo Decl. ¶ 2.)

First Cause of Action: Unfair Business Practice in violation of Business & Professions Code § 17200

California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) prohibits unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business acts or practices.  (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.)  “The Legislature intended this ‘sweeping language’ to include ‘anything that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.’” (Bank of the West v. Sup. Ct. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1266.) “A plaintiff alleging unfair business practices under these statutes must state with reasonable particularity the facts supporting the statutory elements of the violation.” (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 619.)

Because the statute is framed in the disjunctive, a business practice need only meet one of the three criteria to be considered unfair competition.” (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1359.) Section 17200’s “unlawful” prong “borrows violations of other laws ... and makes those unlawful practices actionable under the UCL.” (Klein v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1383.) “[V]irtually any law or regulation—federal or state, statutory or common law—can serve as [a] predicate for a ... [section] 17200 ‘unlawful’ violation.’ ” (Ibid.) “A business practice is “fraudulent” within the meaning of section 17200 if it is “likely to deceive the public.” (Id. at p. 1380.) A business practice is “unfair” within the meaning of the UCL if it violates established public policy or if it is immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous and causes injury to consumers which outweighs its benefits. (Nolte v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1407–1408 (Nolte).) The determination whether a business practice is unfair involves an examination of that practice’s impact on its alleged victim, balanced against the reasons, justifications and motives of the alleged wrongdoer. (Ibid.) In brief, the court must weigh the utility of the defendant's conduct against the gravity of the harm to the alleged victim. (Nolte, Supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1407–1408; Cf. Durell v. Sharp Healthcare, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at 1365 [“[u]nfair” business practices are those which offend an “established public policy” that is tethered to “specific constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provisions”]; Morgan v. AT & T Wireless Services, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1235, 1254–1255.)

The California Supreme Court has stated that “to guide courts and the business community adequately and to promote consumer protection, we must require that any finding of unfairness to competitors under section 17200 be tethered to some legislatively declared policy or proof of some actual or threatened impact on competition. We thus adopt the following test: When a plaintiff who claims to have suffered injury from a direct competitor's ‘unfair’ act or practice invokes section 17200, the word ‘unfair’ in that section means conduct that threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition.” (Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 186–187.)

Cross-Defendant demurrers to the first cause of action for failure to identify any unfair, fraudulent, or unlawful business practices. The Court agrees. Here, the Cross-Complaint alleges only one specific act by Cross-Defendant -- that Cross-Defendant “spitefully sued each of the doe defendants solely in an effort to ruin GONZALEZ’s business relationships with the 14 Doe defendants.” (Cross-Complaint ¶ 21.) However, this allegation is merely a legal conclusion devoid of any factual allegations to support it. Indeed, the Cross-Complaint does not even allege that Cross-Defendant’s claims against the 14 Does were unmeritorious. Moreover, the allegation that Cross-Defendant pursued legal action against 14 Does does not describe fraudulent or unlawful conduct. Nor does this allegation demonstrate any unfair business practice that threatens or harms competition. (See Khoury, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 619; Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co., 20 Cal.4th at 163, 186–187.)

Accordingly, Cross-Defendant’s demurrer to the first cause of action for unfair business practices is SUSTAINED.

Second Cause of Action: Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage

“To establish a prima facie case of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) an economic relationship between the plaintiff and a third party, with a probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant's knowledge of this relationship; (3) intentional and wrongful conduct on the part of the defendant, designed to interfere with or disrupt the relationship; (4) actual disruption or interference; and (5) economic harm to the plaintiff as a proximate result of the defendant's wrongful conduct.” (Overstock.com, Inc. v. Gradient Analytics, Inc. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 688, 713.) “The first element (hereafter the economic relationship element) has two parts: (1) an existing economic relationship that (2) contains the probability of an economic benefit to the plaintiff.” (Roy Allan Slurry Seal, Inc. v. American Asphalt South, Inc. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 505, 512.) “The tort's requirements ‘presuppose the relationship existed at the time of the defendant's allegedly tortious acts lest liability be imposed for actually and intentionally disrupting a relationship which has yet to arise.’” (Id. at 518, [emphasis in original].)

Cross-Defendant contends that the Cross-Complaint does not allege an existing contractual relationship. The Court agrees. The Cross-Complaint alleges that “GONZALEZ had either business relationships or prospective agreements in place with each of the Doe Defendants.” (Id. ¶ 19.) In a similarly ambiguous and self-contradictory manner, the Cross-Complaint further alleges that Cross-Defendant’s conduct was “designed to disrupt the economic relationships between GONZALEZ and his clients,” implying an existing economic relationship and also that “prospective customers and merchants have declined to do business with GONZALEZ,” implying that there was not yet an existing economic relationship. (Cross Complaint ¶ 28.) In sum, the Cross-Complaint fails to plead sufficient facts to allege an existing economic relationship that contained the probability of an economic benefit to Cross-Complainant, including the nature and extent of these relationships and when in relation to the formation of the relationship the alleged conduct occurred. Rather, the Cross-Complaint merely parrots legal conclusions with little allegations of fact. Accordingly, Cross-Defendant’s demurrer to the second cause of action for tortious interference with prospective advantage is SUSTAINED.

Third Cause of Action: Civil Conspiracy

Civil conspiracy is not an independent tort and cannot be the basis for a cause of action without an “independent civil wrong.” (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1062.)

Accordingly, as no independent civil wrong has been alleged, this cause of action also fails. Therefore, Cross-Defendants demurrer to the third cause of action is SUSTAINED.

Leave to Amend

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Goodman v. Kennedysupra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 348; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) 

Cross-Complainant has failed to file any opposition to the instant demurrer. Nonetheless, the Court will allow Cross-Complainant an opportunity at the hearing on this demurrer to make an offer of proof as to how the Cross-Complaint can reasonably be amended to state a cause of action against Cross-Defendant. If Cross-Complainant fails to do so, leave to amend will be denied.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Cross-Defendant’s motion to strike the cross-complaint is GRANTED. Cross-Defendant’s demurrer to the cross-complaint is SUSTAINED in full.

The burden is on Gonzalez to make an offer of proof at the hearing as to how the Cross-Complaint can reasonably be amended.

Plaintiff is ordered to provide notice of this order and file proof of service of such.

DATED: February 14, 2020 ___________________________

Elaine Lu

Judge of the Superior Court


[1] This discussion does not affect Corazon Azul Spirits, Inc.’s status as a fictitious business name of Gonzalez.