This case was last updated from Los Angeles County Superior Courts on 11/23/2020 at 06:30:24 (UTC).

DEBRA MCLAURIN VS MOTEV LLC ET AL

Case Summary

On 12/08/2017 DEBRA MCLAURIN filed a Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury lawsuit against MOTEV LLC. This case was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Courts, Stanley Mosk Courthouse located in Los Angeles, California. The Judges overseeing this case are JON R. TAKASUGI, HOLLY E. KENDIG and THOMAS D. LONG. The case status is Pending - Other Pending.

Case Details Parties Documents Dockets

 

Case Details

  • Case Number:

    ****6336

  • Filing Date:

    12/08/2017

  • Case Status:

    Pending - Other Pending

  • Case Type:

    Personal Injury - Other Personal Injury

  • Court:

    Los Angeles County Superior Courts

  • Courthouse:

    Stanley Mosk Courthouse

  • County, State:

    Los Angeles, California

Judge Details

Presiding Judges

JON R. TAKASUGI

HOLLY E. KENDIG

THOMAS D. LONG

 

Party Details

Plaintiff and Petitioner

MCLAURIN DEBRA

Defendants, Respondents, Cross Plaintiffs and Cross Defendants

MOTEV LLC

RAHIMZADEH PHILIP D.

FORCE-611 GRAMERCY INDUSTRIAL LLC

POLLISTER LAWRENCE A.

FREEMAN MORGAN

DOES 1 - 100

Attorney/Law Firm Details

Plaintiff and Petitioner Attorney

MARCUS GERALD L. ESQ.

Defendant, Respondent and Cross Plaintiff Attorneys

O'MEARA FRANCES ESQ.

PEARCE CHARLES W. ESQ.

GARBER MARC H.

O'MEARA FRANCES MARY ESQ.

O'MEARA FRANCES M. M.

 

Court Documents

Opposition - OPPOSITION OPPOSITION TO CROSS DEFENDANT MOTEV, LLCS DEMURRER TO CROSS COMPLAINANTS CROSS-COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; [PROPOSED] ORDER

7/29/2020: Opposition - OPPOSITION OPPOSITION TO CROSS DEFENDANT MOTEV, LLCS DEMURRER TO CROSS COMPLAINANTS CROSS-COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; [PROPOSED] ORDER

Proof of Personal Service

6/15/2020: Proof of Personal Service

Notice - NOTICE OF COURT ORDER RE: SETTING HEARING DATE FOR DEMURRER

6/26/2020: Notice - NOTICE OF COURT ORDER RE: SETTING HEARING DATE FOR DEMURRER

Notice - NOTICE OF DISMISSAL OF REQUEST TO TAKE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION OFF CALENDAR

6/26/2020: Notice - NOTICE OF DISMISSAL OF REQUEST TO TAKE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION OFF CALENDAR

Notice - NOTICE NOTICE OF COURT ORDER RE SETTING HEARING DATE FOR CROSS-DEFENDANT'S DEMURRER, PURUANT TO EMERGENCY ORDER RE: COVID-19

6/30/2020: Notice - NOTICE NOTICE OF COURT ORDER RE SETTING HEARING DATE FOR CROSS-DEFENDANT'S DEMURRER, PURUANT TO EMERGENCY ORDER RE: COVID-19

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (COURT ORDER RE SETTING OF MOTION PURSUANT TO EMERGENCY ORDER ...)

6/12/2020: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (COURT ORDER RE SETTING OF MOTION PURSUANT TO EMERGENCY ORDER ...)

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER TO CONTINUE THE ...)

1/13/2020: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (HEARING ON EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER TO CONTINUE THE ...)

Motion for Summary Judgment

12/19/2019: Motion for Summary Judgment

Request for Judicial Notice

12/19/2019: Request for Judicial Notice

Motion for Order - MOTION FOR ORDER ADVANCING THE RESERVED HEARING DATE ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FROM 3/11/20 TO 3/6/20

12/23/2019: Motion for Order - MOTION FOR ORDER ADVANCING THE RESERVED HEARING DATE ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FROM 3/11/20 TO 3/6/20

Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER RE EX PARTE APPLICATION OF 8/23/19 TO CON...)

11/14/2019: Minute Order - MINUTE ORDER (NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER RE EX PARTE APPLICATION OF 8/23/19 TO CON...)

Order - ORDER RE: EXPARTE APPLICATION TO CONTINUE TRIAL AND RELATED DATES

8/23/2019: Order - ORDER RE: EXPARTE APPLICATION TO CONTINUE TRIAL AND RELATED DATES

Association of Attorney

7/24/2019: Association of Attorney

CROSS COMPLAINT - PERS. INJURY PROPERTY DAMAGE, WRONG DEATH (2 PAGES) -

3/28/2018: CROSS COMPLAINT - PERS. INJURY PROPERTY DAMAGE, WRONG DEATH (2 PAGES) -

DECLARATION OF DUE DILIGENCE -

4/11/2018: DECLARATION OF DUE DILIGENCE -

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT MOTEV, LLC

5/4/2018: DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT MOTEV, LLC

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL ON BEHALF OF DEFFNDANT LAWRENCE A. POLLISTER

5/24/2018: DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL ON BEHALF OF DEFFNDANT LAWRENCE A. POLLISTER

SUMMONS -

12/8/2017: SUMMONS -

44 More Documents Available

 

Docket Entries

  • 02/22/2021
  • Hearing02/22/2021 at 10:30 AM in Department 31 at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Trial Setting Conference

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  • 12/08/2020
  • Hearing12/08/2020 at 08:30 AM in Department 31 at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012; Order to Show Cause Re: Dismissal

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  • 11/20/2020
  • Docketat 1:30 PM in Department 31, Thomas D. Long, Presiding; Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment - Not Held - Rescheduled by Party

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  • 10/26/2020
  • DocketProof of Personal Service; Filed by Force-611 Gramercy Industrial, LLC (Cross-Complainant)

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  • 09/17/2020
  • DocketAnswer; Filed by Motev, LLC (Cross-Defendant)

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  • 08/18/2020
  • Docketat 3:30 PM in Department 31, Thomas D. Long, Presiding; Hearing on Demurrer - without Motion to Strike - Held

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  • 08/18/2020
  • Docketat 3:30 PM in Department 31, Thomas D. Long, Presiding; Trial Setting Conference - Held - Continued

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  • 08/18/2020
  • DocketMinute Order ( (Trial Setting Conference; Hearing on Demurrer - without Motio...)); Filed by Clerk

    Read MoreRead Less
  • 08/14/2020
  • Docketat 3:30 PM in Department 31, Thomas D. Long, Presiding; Hearing on Demurrer - without Motion to Strike - Not Held - Continued - Court's Motion

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  • 08/14/2020
  • Docketat 2:30 PM in Department 31, Thomas D. Long, Presiding; Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment ((Defendant Motev,LLC dismissed by Pltf. Need SJ off calendar)) - Not Held - Taken Off Calendar by Party

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80 More Docket Entries
  • 04/11/2018
  • DocketPROOF OF SERVICE SUMMONS

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  • 03/28/2018
  • DocketANSWER TO COMPLAINT

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  • 03/28/2018
  • DocketCross-Complaint; Filed by Force-611 Gramercy Industrial, LLC (Defendant)

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  • 03/28/2018
  • DocketSummons on Cross Complaint

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  • 03/28/2018
  • DocketCROSS COMPLAINT - PERS. INJURY PROPERTY DAMAGE, WRONG DEATH (2 PAGES)

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  • 03/28/2018
  • DocketAnswer; Filed by Force-611 Gramercy Industrial, LLC (Defendant); Philip D. Rahimzadeh (Defendant)

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  • 03/28/2018
  • DocketSummons Issued; Filed by Force-611 Gramercy Industrial, LLC (Defendant); Philip D. Rahimzadeh (Defendant)

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  • 12/08/2017
  • DocketCOMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

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  • 12/08/2017
  • DocketSUMMONS

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  • 12/08/2017
  • DocketComplaint; Filed by Debra McLaurin (Plaintiff)

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Tentative Rulings

Case Number: BC686336    Hearing Date: August 18, 2020    Dept: 31

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

DEBRA MCLAURIN,

Plaintiff(s),

vs.

MOTEV LLC, ET AL.,

Defendant(s).

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CASE NO: BC686336

[TENTATIVE] ORDER SUSTAINING DEMURRER TO CROSS-COMPLAINT IN PART

Dept. 31

3:30 p.m.

August 18, 2020

 

  1. Background

Plaintiff, Debra McLaurin filed this action against Defendants Motev, LLC, Lawrence A. Pollister, Morgan Freeman, Force-6111 Gramercy Industrial, LLC, and Philip D. Rahimzadeh (collectively, Cross-Complainants”) alleging a negligence/premises liability against Defendants.

On 3/28/18, Force-6111 Gramercy Industrial, LLC and Philip D. Rahimzadeh filed a cross-complaint against Motev, LLC, Lawrence A. Pollister, and Morgan Freeman alleging causes of action for (1) indemnification, (2) apportionment of fault, (3) declaratory relief, and (4) express indemnity.

At this time, Cross-Defendant Motev, LLC (“Motev”) demurs to the first cause of action for indemnity and the fourth cause of action for express indemnity in the cross-complaint.

  1. Demurrer

A demurrer is a pleading used to test the legal sufficiency of other pleadings. It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party's pleading (complaint, answer or cross-complaint). (CCP §§ 422.10, 589; see Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) It is not the function of the demurrer to challenge the truthfulness of the complaint; and for purposes of the ruling on the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true. (Donabedian, 116 Cal.App.4th at 994.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered. (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881 [error for court to consider facts asserted in memorandum supporting demurrer]; see also Afuso v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 859, 862 [disapproved on other grounds in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287] [error to consider contents of release not part of court record].)

A demurrer can be utilized where the “face of the complaint” itself is incomplete or discloses some defense that would bar recovery. (Guardian North Bay, Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 963, 971-72.) The “face of the complaint” includes material contained in attached exhibits that are incorporated by reference into the complaint; or in a superseded complaint in the same action. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94; see also Barnett v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 500, 505 [“[W]e rely on and accept as true the contents of the exhibits and treat as surplusage the pleader’s allegations as to the legal effect of the exhibits.”]).

A demurrer can only be sustained when it disposes of an entire cause of action. (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97,119; Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redev. Agency (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1046.)

  1. Meet and Confer

Before filing a demurrer, the demurring party is required to meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading demurred to for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (CCP § 430.41(a).) The Court notes that Motev has fulfilled the meet and confer requirement prior to filing this demurrer. (See Dem. Hammers Decl. ¿¿ 3-4.)

  1. Request for Judicial Notice

Motev requests the court take judicial notice of Plaintiff McLaurin’s Complaint for Damages filed 12/8/17 (Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”) Exh. A), and of the lease agreement between Lessor Force 6111 Grammercy Industrial, LLC and Lessee Motev, dated 4/27/16 (RJN Exh. B).

The request as to Exhibit A is granted pursuant to Evidence Code § 452(d). The request as tot Exhibit B is granted pursuant to Evidence Code § 452(h). (Scott v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 743, 754 [“Where … judicial notice is requested of a legally operative document—like a contract—the court may take notice not only of the fact of the document and its recording or publication, but also facts that clearly derive from its legal effect.”]; but see Richtek USA, Inc. v. uPI Semiconductor Corp. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 651, 660 [“The hearing on demurrer may not be turned into a contested evidentiary hearing through the guise of having the court take judicial notice of documents whose truthfulness or proper interpretation are disputable.”].)

  1. 1st Cause of Action, Indemnification; 4th Cause of Action, Express Indemnification

Motev demurs to the first and fourth causes of action in the cross-complaint, contending that the basis for the cross-complaint is a lease agreement between Cross-Complainants and Motev. Motev asserts that paragraph 57 of the Rider attached to the lease specifically modifies the agreement and states that nothing shall exculpate Cross-Complainants, as Lessors, from liability from their own negligence. Motev contends that Plaintiff McLaurin’s only claim is based on Cross-Complainants’ own negligence, and thus, Cross-Complainants are not entitled to indemnification. As to fourth cause of action, Motev argues that Cross-Complainants merely refer to paragraphs 8.2 and 8.7 in the cross-complaint, but when looking at the entire lease agreement, specifically paragraph 57 of the Rider, the lease agreement never intended to exculpate Cross-Complainants from their own negligence. As to the first cause of action for indemnity, Motev avers that because Motev and Cross-Complainants have contracted a duty to indemnify in the lease, the express indemnity clauses are given preemptive effect to any claim for equitable indemnity.

In opposition, Cross-Complainants contend that the cross-complaint sufficiently alleges ultimate facts to establish a cause of action for contractual indemnity against Motev. Concerning paragraph 57 of the Rider, Cross-Complainants argue that paragraph 57 only modifies the lease’s provisions as they relate to property damage claims. Alternatively, even if paragraph 57 does not apply only to property damage claims, it is unenforceable at this stage of the litigation as Cross-Complainants deny they were negligent or violated the terms of the lease at this time. Cross-Complainants contend that these are disputed facts which must be determined by a trier of fact.

Motev, in reply, again asserts that paragraph 57 of the Rider is fatal to the cross-complaint, as it makes it unambiguous that Cross-Complainants are liable for their own negligence. Further, Motev asserts that paragraph 57’s language is clear and not subject to dispute, and that Cross-Complainants have failed to incorporate relevant portions of the lease into the cross-complaint.

Pertaining to the fourth cause of action, the operative cross-complaint alleges that pursuant to the 4/27/16 lease between Cross-Complainants and Motev, Motev is obligated to defend and indemnify Cross-Complainants and provide additional insured coverage for all bodily injury claims arising out of the use or occupancy of the subject premises by Motev. The cross-complaint specifically references paragraphs 8.2 and 8.7 of the lease, which state:

8.2 Liability Insurance (a) Carried by Lessee. Lessee shall obtain and keep in force a Commercial General Liability policy of Insurance protecting Lessee and Lessor as an additional insured against claims for bodily injury, personal injury and property damage based upon or arising out of the ownership, use, occupancy or maintenance of the Premises and all areas appurtenant thereto. Such insurance shall be an occurrence basis providing single limit coverage in an amount not less than $1,000,000 per occurrence with an annual aggregate of not less than 2,000,000. Lessee shall add Lessor as an additional insured by means of an endorsement at least as broad as the Insurance Service Organization's "Additional Insured -Managers or Lessors of Premises" Endorsement. The policy shall not contain any intra-insured exclusions as between insured persons or organizations, but shall include coverage for liability assumed under this lease as an "insured contract" for the performance of Lessee's indemnity obligations under this Lease. The limits of said insurance shall not, however, limit the liability of Lessee nor relieve Lessee of any obligation hereunder. Lessee shall provide an endorsement on its liability policy(ies) which provides that it's insurance shall be primary to and not contributory with any similar insurance carried by Lessor, whose insurance shall be considered excess insurance only.

(b) Carried by Lessor. Lessor shall maintain liability insurance as described in Paragraph 8.2(a), in addition to, and not in lieu of, the insurance required to be maintained by Lessee. Lessee shall not be named as an additional insured therein.

8.7 Indemnity. Except for Lessor's gross negligence or willful misconduct, Lessee shall indemnify, protect, defend and hold harmless the Premises, Lessor and its agents, Lessor's master or ground lessor, partners and Lenders, from and against any and all claims, loss of rents and/or damages, liens, judgments, penalties, attorneys' and consultants' fees, expenses and/or liabilities arising out of, involving, or in connection with, the use and/or occupancy of the Premises by Lessee. If any action or proceeding is brought against Lessor by reason of any of the foregoing matters, Lessee shall upon notice defend the same at Lessee's expense by counsel reasonably satisfactory to Lessor and Lessor shall cooperate with Lessee in such defense, Lessor need not have first paid any such claim in order to be defended or indemnified.

The opening of paragraph 57 to the Rider states, “[i]n the event of any conflict between the terms and conditions of this Rider and those set forth in the print form of Lease to which this Rider is attached, the terms and conditions of this Rider shall govern.” (RJN Exh. B.) Paragraph 57 of the Rider provides:

Indemnity: Nothing contained herein shall be deemed to exculpate lessor from liability for (and lessor hereby agrees to indemnify, defend and hold lessee harmless from and against any costs, losses, damages or expenses arising out of) lessor’s negligence or willful misconduct or breach of this lease. The indemnification obligations of lessor and lessee under paragraph 8.7 and this paragraph 8.8 are expressly subject to the waiver provisions of paragraph 8.6.

(RJN Exh. B.)

Paragraph 8.6 of the lease states:

Waiver of Subrogation: Without affecting any other rights or remedies, lessee and lessor each hereby release and relieve the other, and waive their entire right to recover damages against the other, for loss of or damage to its property arising out of or incident to the perils required to be insured against herein. The effect of such releases and waivers is not limited by the amount of insurance carried or required, or by any deductibles applicable hereto. The parties agree to have their respective property damage insurance carriers waive any right to subrogation that such companies may have against lessor or lessee, as the case may be, so long as the insurance is not invalidated thereby.

(Ibid.)

Although Cross-Complainants agree that paragraph 57 modifies the lease agreement, they contend that the second sentence of paragraph 57 limits the scope of the first sentence by specifically referencing paragraphs 8.7 and 8.8 and subjecting them to 8.6, which limits paragraph 57’s applicability to property damage claims. The parties here thus dispute the proper interpretation and their intent regarding paragraph 57. Motev’s interpretation of the lease is not conclusively established by the judicially noticeable evidence at this stage. (See Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113-15 [a court ruling on a demurrer may not take judicial notice of the proper interpretation of an ambiguous contract submitted in support of the demurrer].)

The cross-complaint on its face pleads that Motev is legally obligated indemnify and provide additional insured coverage for all bodily injury claims pursuant to paragraphs 8.2 and 8.7, and Motev has not established that paragraph 57 of the Rider is fatal to the cross-complaint as a matter of law. The provisions seem to be in conflict and factual determinations may be needed to clarify the apparent ambiguity. (See Richtek USA, Inc., 242 Cal.App.4th at 660 [“[J]udicial notice of matters upon demurrer will be dispositive only in those instances where there is not or cannot be a factual dispute concerning that which is sought to be judicially noticed.”]; see also Marina Tenants Assn. v. Deauville Marina Development Co. (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 122, 127 [on demurrer a court's function is limited to testing the legal sufficiency of the complaint].) Additionally, regarding Motev’s claim that the cross-complaint is defective because Cross-Complainants did not incorporate every provision referenced in the opposition, although a written contract is usually pleaded by alleging its making and attaching a copy which is incorporated by reference, a written contract can also be pleaded by alleging the making and the substance of the relevant terms. (See Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 198-199; see also Perry v. Robertson (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 333, 341.)

Based on the foregoing, the demurrer as to the fourth cause of action for express indemnity is overruled.

Pertaining to the first cause of action for indemnity, Cross-Complainants do not dispute that the contractual indemnity provisions preempt claims for equitable indemnity.

The existence of the express indemnity provision preempts claims for equitable indemnity between the same parties. Where the parties have expressly contract for indemnity, there is no right to equitable indemnity. (Regional Steel Corp. v. Superior Court (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 525, 528 see also Davidson v. Welch (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 220, 232 [extent of duty to indemnify must be determined by agreement when expressly contracted to, not usual rules of implied indemnity].)

Given the cross-complaint explicitly alleges the parties have contracted regarding the parties’ duties to indemnify, the first cause of action for equitable indemnity is improper. The demurrer to the first cause of action for equitable indemnity is sustained.

Leave to amend should be granted if there is any reasonable possibility that plaintiff can state good cause of action. (Eckler v. Neutrogena Corporation (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 433.) Similar to where a demurrer is sustained, the plaintiff “has the burden of proving the possibility of cure by amendment.” (Czajkowski v. Haskell & White, LLP (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 166, 173 (quoting Grinzi v. San Diego Hospice Corp. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 72, 78-79 (internal quotations omitted)).)

Cross-Complainants, in this case, do not state the manner in which this deficiency can be cured. The demurrer is sustained as to the first cause of action without leave to amend.

Cross-Defendant Motev LLC is ordered to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at sscdept31@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If the parties do not submit on the tentative, they should arrange to appear remotely.

 

Dated this 18th day of August, 2020

Hon. Thomas D. Long

Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: BC686336    Hearing Date: August 14, 2020    Dept: 31

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

DEBRA MCLAURIN,

Plaintiff(s),

vs.

MOTEV LLC, ET AL.,

Defendant(s).

)

)

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)

)

)

)

)

)

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CASE NO: BC686336

[TENTATIVE] ORDER CONTINUING DEMURRER

Dept. 31

3:30 p.m.

August 14, 2020

 

Cross-Defendant Motev, LLC filed a demurrer to Cross-Complainants Force 6111 Gramercy Industrial, LLC and Phillip Rahimizadeh’s Cross-Complaint on 6/11/20. On 6/12/20, the court set Motev’s demurrer for 8/14/20. However, due to a calendaring error, Motev’s demurrer was not properly scheduled for hearing on 8/14/20. The court wishes to have sufficient time to review the moving papers, opposition, and reply. The hearing on the demurrer is therefore continued from 8/14/20 to 8/18/20.

Court Clerk to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at sscdept31@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If the parties do not submit on the tentative, they should arrange to appear remotely.

 

Dated this 14th day of August, 2020

Hon. Thomas D. Long

Judge of the Superior Court